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Open Recommendations

Coast Guard: A More Systematic Process to Resolve Recommended Actions Could Enhance Future Surge Operations

GAO-21-584
Sep 21, 2021
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1 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
United States Coast Guard The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish a more systematic process for ensuring that assigned recommended actions are tracked, updated, and resolved in line with the Coast Guard's resolution rate and timeliness goals. (Recommendation 1)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Capitol Attack: Special Event Designations Could Have Been Requested for January 6, 2021, but Not All DHS Guidance is Clear [Reissued with revisions on Aug. 09, 2021.]

GAO-21-105255
Aug 09, 2021
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2 Open Recommendations
2 Priority
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Homeland Security
Priority Rec.
Priority recommendations are those that GAO believes warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies.
The Secretary of Homeland Security should consider whether additional factors, such as the context of the events and surrounding circumstances in light of the current environment of emerging threats, are needed for designating NSSE events. (Recommendation 1)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Homeland Security
Priority Rec.
Priority recommendations are those that GAO believes warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies.
The Secretary of Homeland Security should update the Department of Homeland Security's policy to clarify and communicate the process for requesting an NSSE designation for an event held on federal property in Washington, D.C. to all relevant stakeholders, including relevant federal, state, and local entities (Recommendation 2).
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen Preparedness

GAO-21-513
Aug 04, 2021
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16 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Homeland Security The Secretary of Homeland Security, should, with input from key nonfederal partners, work through the Biodefense Steering Committee to ensure that the Biodefense Coordination Team defines the set of capabilities needed to prepare for and respond to nationally significant biological incidents. (Recommendation 1)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense, should, with input from key nonfederal partners, work through the Biodefense Steering Committee to ensure that the Biodefense Coordination Team defines the set of capabilities needed to prepare for and respond to nationally significant biological incidents. (Recommendation 2)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Health and Human Services The Secretary of Health and Human Services, should, with input from key nonfederal partners, work through the Biodefense Steering Committee to ensure that the Biodefense Coordination Team defines the set of capabilities needed to prepare for and respond to nationally significant biological incidents. (Recommendation 3)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Agriculture The Secretary of Agriculture, should, with input from key nonfederal partners, work through the Biodefense Steering Committee to ensure that the Biodefense Coordination Team defines the set of capabilities needed to prepare for and respond to nationally significant biological incidents. (Recommendation 4)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Homeland Security The Secretary of Homeland Security should work through the Biodefense Steering Committee to ensure that the Biodefense Coordination Team establishes a process to periodically assess and communicate exercise priorities among the capabilities they identify to support nationally significant biological incidents. (Recommendation 5)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should work through the Biodefense Steering Committee to ensure that the Biodefense Coordination Team establishes a process to periodically assess and communicate exercise priorities among the capabilities they identify to support nationally significant biological incidents. (Recommendation 6)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Air Cargo Security: TSA Field Testing Should Ensure Screening Systems Meet Detection Standards

GAO-21-105192
Jul 29, 2021
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4 Open Recommendations
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Homeland Security The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Administrator of TSA and the Commissioner of CBP establish a documented process to ensure that relevant officials from both agencies are aware of and have access to applicable data to inform their inbound air cargo risk assessment efforts. (Recommendation 1)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Homeland Security The Administrator of TSA, prior to designating the explosives detection system for air cargo screening currently under evaluation as "qualified" on the air cargo screening technology list, should, to the extent practicable, verify through additional data collection or analysis that the system's probability of detection in the field matches the performance measured in laboratory testing. (Recommendation 2)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Homeland Security The Administrator of TSA should ensure that necessary data are collected during field assessments to independently verify that the probability of detection of explosives detection systems for air cargo screening in the field matches the performance measured in laboratory testing, prior to designating systems as "qualified" on the air cargo screening technology list. TSA could provide this verification either through live explosives testing or, when operational considerations limit TSA's ability to use live threat materials, TSA should use an independently validated, fully documented alternative testing strategy. (Recommendation 3)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Homeland Security The Administrator of TSA should ensure statistical techniques are used to analyze data from TSA field assessments, including data from the current field assessment, of explosives detection systems for air cargo screening, prior to designating systems as "qualified" on the air cargo screening technology list. This statistical analysis should include the following elements: (1) calculating error values for each quantitative measurement, (2) identifying all necessary performance thresholds, and (3) comparing the measured values and errors against each threshold to determine the statistical confidence of the results. (Recommendation 4)
Open
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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