Security of Radioactive Materials

Radioactive materials are used throughout the United States for medical, industrial, and research purposes. For instance, these materials help treat cancer, sterilize food and medical instruments, and detect flaws in metal welds. However, these materials could also be very dangerous in the hands of terrorists. 

Several federal agencies play key roles in assuring that radioactive materials stay out of the hands of terrorists. For instance, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have all taken steps to improve the security of some radioactive materials sources at medical, industrial, and research facilities. Additionally, NNSA has partnered with 59 countries to provide radiation detection equipment and support to help prevent nuclear and radiological smuggling.

However, NRC could improve its efforts to secure radioactive materials by addressing some priority recommendations. 

For example:

• “Dirty bombs.” In the hands of terrorists, some radioactive materials could be used to construct a radiological dispersal device (i.e., a “dirty bomb”), which uses conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. This type of bomb could expose nearby individuals to radiation and increase their long-term risks of cancer. The NRC considers the health risks from short-term radiation exposure when determining how to safeguard radioactive material. However, it should also consider factors such as deaths during an evacuation and the cost of environmental cleanup. Additionally, key NRC security requirements only apply to large quantities of radioactive material, even though both large and small amounts of material could produce many billions of dollars of socioeconomic damage, if misused.

A Radiological Dispersal Device
(This is a fictional urban landscape and is not intended to represent any specific city or urban area.)

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• Licenses for radioactive materials. NRC has worked to ensure that licenses for radioactive materials are granted only to legitimate organizations, and that licensees can only obtain such materials in quantities allowed by their licenses. However, investigators set up fake businesses and were able to obtain genuine licenses to purchase dangerous quantities of radioactive material in 2007 and 2016. They also used fake licenses to purchase radioactive material in 2022. 
• Importantly, since NRC has been unwilling or unable to address identified vulnerabilities by implementing key radioactive material security recommendations, Congress may need to direct NRC to do so. 

Radioactive Material Delivered to GAO's Shell Companies

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• Alternative technologies. There are opportunities to permanently reduce the risks of radioactive material by making greater use of alternative technologies. However, no agency in the federal government has the lead on developing these technologies or encouraging their use. In fact, some agencies operate at cross purposes with each other. To address this, Congress could consider establishing a national strategy for replacing technologies that use high-risk radioactive materials where there are viable alternatives.
• Smuggling. DHS’s Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) plays a key role in preventing radioactive material from getting in the hands of terrorists. However, this office needs to complete a gap analysis for its global nuclear detection architecture—a comprehensive system to deter and detect smuggled nuclear material. Such an analysis will help CWMD better understand where future investments are needed to address known vulnerabilities and emerging threats. 

A CBP Radiation Detection Portal Monitor

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• Radiation detection technologies. Through its Securing the Cities program, CWMD provides the largest US cities with technology and training to help deter and detect radioactive materials. CWMD has made meaningful improvements to this program since 2019. However, CWMD can better assess how these cities are implementing the program, including whether the cities are meeting milestones for deploying radiation detection technologies.
• Proper disposal. Licensees of high-risk radioactive sources may delay disposing of sources that are in their possession but no longer in use (i.e., disused) for a variety of reasons, including disposal costs. This can lead to sources becoming “orphaned,” which increases the risk that they could fall into the wrong hands or be misused. Further, some high-risk sources have limited disposal pathways that may require government assistance or may not have a viable disposal pathway at all. NRC and the Department of Energy should evaluate options and take action to facilitate long-term storage of these sources until a permanent disposal or viable recycling option is available.

Disused High-Risk Radioactive Sources at a Source Processing Facility

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