Navy Shipbuilding and Readiness

The Navy must have combat-ready ships to keep the U.S. safe and ensure the seas are open to trade. But despite nearly doubling its shipbuilding budget over the last 2 decades, the U.S. Navy hasn’t increased its number of ships. The Navy works with private companies to build ships but the shipbuilding industry has not been able to meet the Navy’s goals. Additionally, the Navy struggles to meet its ship repair and maintenance goals.  

There are a number of ways that the Navy could address such challenges.  

For example:  

• The industrial base. The Navy relies on contracts with private companies—the "industrial base"—to build and, in many cases, repair ships. These companies are critical to the Navy's plans to increase its fleet size and improve the fleet's readiness for missions. But ships are often ready much later than expected and at a much higher cost. DOD has invested billions to support the shipbuilding industrial base—with plans for investments in ship repair. A strategy and coordinated leadership around its industrial base efforts could ensure the Navy is getting what it needs from these investments. 

• Shipbuilding. Recent investments—in the billions—in the Navy’s shipyard infrastructure and workforces have yet to yield desired improvements. And the Navy’s ship acquisition practices consistently result in growing costs and delivery delays. The Navy should comprehensively rethink its approach to shipbuilding as maritime threats from adversaries grow. As a starting point for holistic reform, the Navy could implement leading ship design practices. For example, the Navy's frigate program began construction before completing ship design. This, and other challenges, led the Navy to cancel the program after spending billions. As adversary threats grow, the Navy needs to take a new approach to increase its fleet size and better manage its investments.  

• Submarine construction. The Navy plans to spend $130 billion to acquire 12 Columbia class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Timely delivery of these submarines is critical for the nation's nuclear deterrence. But the first submarine is estimated to be delivered over a year late and cost hundreds of millions of dollars more than planned. Design and construction challenges persist despite longstanding efforts to address them. With difficult construction work ahead, delays and cost growth will likely continue and get worse. The Navy needs to take steps to better understand the risks to its cost and schedule estimates. 

• Ship maintenance. Navy sailors maintain the ships that are needed to keep the U.S. safe and the seas open for world commerce. But the Navy faces a range of challenges that hinder sailors' ability to complete maintenance work. For example, there aren't always enough sailors available—and the Navy doesn't track and report data that could help it better oversee personnel assignments. Additionally, newer sailors might not be fully prepared for maintenance work. Sailors also want more hands-on training. The Navy also uses old software to manage maintenance logistics, and efforts to replace it are running behind. Moreover, the Navy faces significant challenges holding maintenance contractors accountable for fire safety and performance during maintenance periods.  

• Attack submarine maintenance. The U.S. Navy's attack submarines gather intelligence undetected and attack enemy targets.10 years of maintenance delays for these submarines have resulted in over 15,000 lost operational days and an estimated $3.4 billion in costs. Additional delays are on the rise as submarines wait to be decommissioned—taken out of service—because shipyards don't have the capacity to start that process. With more submarines needing to be decommissioned in the next 5 years, decommissioning delays could cost the Navy more than $3.1 billion. Finding alternative ways to reduce maintenance backlogs could save the Navy billions of dollars. 

• Public shipyards. The Navy is taking on its largest-ever construction and restoration effort to improve poor conditions and outdated infrastructure at its 4 public shipyards. These shipyards are essential to ensuring the Navy’s aircraft carriers and submarines are fit to fight in operations. This effort could take over 50 years and ultimately cost more than $200 billion. However, Navy and congressional oversight requirements don't include regular evaluation of costs, risks, and performance for this effort. Having such information for decision-making would ensure that current plans evolve with the Navy’s future needs. 

• Navy cruisers. The Navy spent billions to modernize its cruisers to extend their service lives rather than retire them. But the effort has been plagued with problems like schedule delays, wasted costs, and poor-quality work. Only 3 of 11 cruisers will complete the modernization process and won't spend as much time at sea as intended. Weak oversight is also contributing to this issue. Navy leadership discouraged the use of key quality control tools. For example, leadership discouraged the use of monetary penalties, so contractors weren't held accountable for their late and sometimes poor-quality work. 

• Testing new ships. The Navy uses operational testing to assess the capabilities of new ships. But "fleet organizations" that work in ship operations aren't consistently represented in test planning. This misses opportunities to get direct user feedback to make tests more relevant. Using more digital tools could improve testing, too. For example, digital twins can allow the Navy to find and address some issues before live testing—saving money and time. But without a cohesive plan for developing and sustaining such tools, it will be difficult for the Navy to make testing more timely and useful.  

Image