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Operation Desert Storm: Army Guard Combat Brigade War Lessons Reflect Long-Standing Problems

T-NSIAD-92-36 Published: May 05, 1992. Publicly Released: May 05, 1992.
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Highlights

GAO discussed the mobilization of Army National Guard combat forces for the Persian Gulf war. GAO noted that: (1) the Army experienced many long-standing problems in readying brigades for the war, which affected proficiency at the individual and small-unit levels; (2) the problems were a reflection of the complexity of the skills required of large, ground combat maneuver units and a peacetime training system that has not worked; (3) there may have been unreasonable expectations about the level of proficiency that combat reserves could achieve on a part-time basis, due to weaknesses in the Army's collective training evaluation reports; (4) the Army replaced National Guard roundout brigades with active forces in its early deployments; (5) if needed, roundout brigades will be deployed as fourth brigades to divisions already deployed, and reserve combat brigades can still be expected to have a significant role in the Army's Base Force; and (6) as late-deploying forces, these brigades may have missions that require commitment to a war effort after only a few months of post-mobilization training.

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Topics

Armed forces reserve trainingArmy reservistsCombat readinessDefense capabilitiesDefense contingency planningGround warfareLogisticsMilitary interventionMobilizationMilitary forces