Inventory Management: Vulnerability of Sensitive Defense Material to Theft
NSIAD-97-175
Published: Sep 19, 1997. Publicly Released: Oct 22, 1997.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the actions taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to correct weaknesses cited in GAO's September 1994 report on the military services' most sensitive category I missiles and to determine if problems still remained. GAO also reviewed DOD's oversight of category I rockets and the vulnerability of category I missiles and rockets and category II grenades, mines, and explosives to theft from U.S. military arsenals by terrorists or extremists.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop a cost-effective procedure for periodically revalidating the category I inventory baseline by, for example, matching item managers' records with site records annually at a representative sample of storage sites. |
The services have developed, or are developing, procedures for revalidating the category I baseline. For example, the Navy ammunition management system validates all transactions, and a physical inventory is conducted semiannually of all category I items. The Army has redesigned its industrial operations command quarterly audit system into a monthly reconciliation system. In addition, the Standard Army Ammunition System-Modernization (SAAS-MOD) has completed fielding worldwide, which reports all daily transactions and serial number data to the Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System (WARS). This system increases visibility of the category I missiles. It also reconciles and revalidates category I missile information from customer data. It also allows for the elimination of manual reporting of category I missiles.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop a cost-effective procedure for opening containers of missiles and rockets, for example, by selecting a representative sample of pallets, rather than individual missiles and rockets, to inspect. |
Army regulations require that all missile/rocket containers eventually be opened during maintenance checks. The Army has issued Ammunition Information Notice 36-97, addressing AT-4 and LAW rockets, and Missile Information Notice 97-05, addressing Category I missiles. SB 742-1, Ammunition Surveillance Procedures, establishes the Army policy on random selection of samples for inspections, and is applicable for Category I munitions. The Navy policy for cost-effective safeguards is in OPNAVINST 5530.13B, Physical Security Instructions for Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives. Implementing procedures within NAVSEA two-10-AC-ORD require the opening and inspection of the container for which original seals have been removed, if it appears to have been tampered with, or if the lot or serial number ID is no longer legible.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to manage category I rockets by serial number so that the item managers will have total visibility over the numbers and locations of rockets. |
Serial numbers for Category I rockets will be available within the Army Standard Depot System (SDS) across the custodial records during the first quarter of fiscal year 1998, and also in the Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System. Guidance will be issued to all Navy reporting activities to manage Category I rockets by serial number. Guidance was provided to Navy reporting activities via message 09199Z in July 1997.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to establish procedures for ensuring that serial numbers are not changed during upgrades and modifications of category I missiles and rockets. |
DOD Directive 4140.1-R, Material Management Policy, will include the following: "Upgrades/renovation or modification of a Category I missile or rocket will require a suffix be added to the original serial number assigned to the item. In no circumstances will the original serial number of the Category I missile or rocket be replaced in its entirety with another serial number." The information was inadvertently left out of the regulation during its last update a few years ago.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to continue to emphasize compliance with physical security requirements. |
The Department has specific policy guidance in DOD 5100.76-M, Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E). More general DOD guidance to installation commanders on access and circulation controls is provided in DOD regulation 5200.8-R, DOD Physical Security Program.
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Topics
Facility securityTerroristsInventory control systemsLarcenyLogisticsMilitary inventoriesMissilesTerrorismWeaponsU.S. Army