Export Controls: Issues In Removing Militarily Sensitive Items From the Munitions List
NSIAD-93-67
Published: Mar 31, 1993. Publicly Released: May 04, 1993.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the export control jurisdiction decisions the Departments of State and Defense (DOD) made regarding certain military sensitive items.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | Because of the militarily sensitive nature of the items involved, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Defense Technology Security Agency to, in view of the key differences between the two export regimes and other concerns GAO identified, jointly examine the national security implications of transferring to Commerce's jurisdiction the following items: nonmilitary inertial navigation system (INS) technical data, nonmilitary focal plane arrays and second-generation and above image intensification tubes, commercial systems containing such components, and related technical data. |
DOD reexamined its decision but determined that the added conditions imposed through a recent amendment made to the interagency MOU would permit the transfer of the sensitive items to Commerce's jurisdiction without adversely affecting national security interests.
|
| Department of State | Because of the militarily sensitive nature of the items involved, the Secretary of State should direct the Center for Defense Trade to, in view of the key differences between the two export control regimes and other concerns GAO identified, jointly examine the national security implications of transferring to Commerce's jurisdiction the following items: nonmilitary INS technical data, nonmilitary focal plane arrays and second-generation and above image intensification tubes, commercial systems containing such components, and related technical data. |
State reexamined its decision but determined that conditions in the original interagency MOU together with recently added conditions imposed through an amendment made to the MOU would adequately protect national security interests in the transfer of the sensitive items to Commerce's jurisdiction.
|
| Department of Defense | Because of the militarily sensitive nature of the items involved, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Defense Technology Security Agency to, if the risks to national security interests are determined to be significant, retain the item or items on USML. |
DOD reexamined its decision but determined that the added conditions imposed through a recent amendment made to the interagency MOU would permit the transfer of the sensitive items to Commerce's jurisdiction without adversely affecting national security interests.
|
| Department of State | Because of the militarily sensitive nature of the items involved, the Secretary of State should direct the Center for Defense Trade to, if the risks to national security interests are determined to be significant, retain the item or items on USML. |
State reexamined its decision but determined that the conditions in the original interagency MOU together with recently added conditions imposed through an amendment made to the MOU would adequately protect national security interests in the transfer of the sensitive items to Commerce's jurisdiction.
|
| Department of State | To ensure appropriate and adequate control over only those hot section technologies that Defense considers sensitive and critical to U.S. national security, the Secretary of State should direct the Center for Defense Trade to identify, with the assistance of Defense and other agencies as appropriate, specific hot section technologies in which the United States leads the world and are militarily critical and assert jurisdiction over those technologies. |
In March 1996, the administration announced that export control jurisdiction over hot-section technology used in commercial jet engines would be transferred to the Department of Commerce.
|
| Department of State | To ensure appropriate and adequate control over only those hot section technologies that Defense considers sensitive and critical to U.S. national security, the Secretary of State should direct the Center for Defense Trade to transfer jurisdiction over all other hot section technologies for commercial engines to Commerce. |
In March 1996, the administration announced that export control jurisdiction over all hot-section technology used in commercial jet engines would be transferred to the Department of Commerce.
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Dual-use technologiesExport regulationForeign trade policiesInteragency relationsInternational relationsInternational trade regulationInternational trade restrictionMunitionsNational defense operationsTechnology transfer