Southwest Border: CBP Could Take Additional Steps to Strengthen Its Response to Incidents Involving Its Personnel
Fast Facts
While performing their duties, Customs and Border Protection personnel may be involved in incidents. Those resulting in a serious injury or death are known as "critical incidents."
In 2022, CBP disbanded Border Patrol teams that responded to and investigated critical incidents and assigned the responsibility to its Office of Professional Responsibility. The office is doubling its investigator workforce, and more than half of its new hires are from Border Patrol. This may present risks to the independence of these critical incident investigations.
We recommended implementing guidance and training for investigator independence, and more.
Highlights
What GAO Found
Within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), seven of nine U.S. Border Patrol sectors on the southwest border independently operated critical incident teams (CIT) that responded to and investigated critical incidents. CBP defines a critical incident as an incident involving CBP personnel that results in a serious injury, a death, a use of deadly or excessive force, or widespread media attention. The teams also responded to noncritical incidents, such as a vehicle crash with no injuries. From fiscal years 2010 through 2022, CITs responded to an estimated 2,351 incidents (see figure).
Estimated Border Patrol Critical Incident Team Responses, Fiscal Years 2010–2022
Before 2022, CBP did not have a unified approach to critical incident response. Border Patrol headquarters did not create the CITs or oversee their operations. In 2022, CBP directed Border Patrol to disband the CITs and assigned critical incident response to CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). Border Patrol sectors disbanded their CITs and continue to respond to noncritical incidents, which they approach inconsistently. Some sectors collect limited information about these incidents, which, according to Border Patrol officials, the agency needs to assess liability for associated property damage. One sector created a specialized team to respond to these incidents, but OPR officials raised concern that its activities may infringe on OPR's critical incident responses. Implementing standardized guidance for noncritical incident response and monitoring adherence to it would help Border Patrol ensure sectors' activities align with their responsibilities for noncritical incidents.
While OPR became solely responsible for CBP critical incident response in October 2022, it did not have sufficient resources to carry out these activities. OPR has since increased its capacity to respond to critical incidents by, for example, initiating a hiring surge to nearly double its investigator workforce.
OPR has made significant progress implementing investigative standards—which it adopted in 2020—but it could strengthen its efforts regarding investigator independence. OPR has limited guidance or formal training regarding independence. Further, its significant number of new hires, of which more than half are from Border Patrol, present increased risks for impairments to independence to arise. Developing guidance and training to help investigators identify such potential impairments could provide OPR and CBP leadership with further assurance that critical incident investigations are objective and unbiased.
Why GAO Did This Study
With more than 60,000 employees, CBP is the nation's largest federal law enforcement agency and is responsible for securing U.S. borders while facilitating legitimate travel and trade. When conducting their duties, CBP law enforcement personnel may be involved in critical incidents. For example, in 2023, critical incidents occurred when a vehicle struck and injured Border Patrol agents and when a child died in CBP custody. CBP personnel may also be involved in noncritical incidents.
GAO was asked to review CBP's approach in responding to incidents. This report assesses how Border Patrol CITs operated before they were disbanded in 2022, Border Patrol's response to noncritical incidents since that time, and how OPR has developed capacity and implemented investigative standards for critical incident response. GAO analyzed Border Patrol documents on CIT operations from fiscal years 2010 through 2022. GAO interviewed Border Patrol officials from headquarters and the nine southwest border sectors. GAO also analyzed OPR documents and data and interviewed OPR officials. GAO conducted site visits to three southwest border locations.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that Border Patrol implement guidance that standardizes sector approaches to noncritical incident response and monitor adherence to the guidance, and that OPR develop guidance for investigators on identifying potential impairments to their independence and train investigators on how to apply the guidance. CBP concurred.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. Border Patrol | The Chief of Border Patrol should develop and implement guidance that standardizes sector approaches to responding to noncritical incidents and documenting these response activities. (Recommendation 1) |
DHS concurred with this recommendation. In July 2025, Border Patrol developed and distributed guidance that describes roles and responsibilities for a headquarters-based program to oversee the activities of sector management inquiry teams. According to the guidance, management inquiry teams conduct internal administrative inquiries regarding allegations of noncriminal Border Patrol employee misconduct and policy violations. These can include noncritical incidents, such as a vehicle crash with no injuries. Such inquiries are to be initiated by the Chief of Border Patrol or their designee, such as a Sector Chief Patrol Agent. The guidance states that sectors may supplement the headquarters guidance with their own standard operating procedures. According to Border Patrol, a national program manager for management inquiry teams plans to schedule monthly meetings with the field to ensure compliance with the guidance. The first such meeting took place in October 2025. In November 2025, Border Patrol officials told us they are also developing guidance for two other headquarters-based programs. The first will oversee the activities of evidence collection teams, which assist in criminal investigations of defendants external to Border Patrol. The second will oversee activities related to targeting and plainclothes operations. We will continue to monitor steps Border Patrol is taking to implement this recommendation.
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| U.S. Border Patrol | The Chief of Border Patrol should regularly monitor sector noncritical incident response activities to ensure they adhere to the guidance. (Recommendation 2) |
DHS concurred with this recommendation. In July 2025, Border Patrol developed and distributed guidance that describes roles and responsibilities for a headquarters-based program to oversee the activities of sector management inquiry teams, which conduct internal administrative inquiries regarding allegations of noncriminal Border Patrol employee misconduct and policy violations. These management inquiries can include noncritical incidents, such as a vehicle crash with no injuries. In October 2025, Border Patrol began collecting data about the activities of these teams across all Border Patrol sectors using a standardized monthly case reporting template. In addition, a headquarters-based national program manager plans to schedule monthly meetings with the field to ensure compliance with the guidance and answer questions. At the first meeting in October 2025, the national program manager answered questions from the field to ensure the field was implementing standard operating procedures regarding management inquiries in a uniform manner.As of November 2025, Border Patrol officials told us that they are developing guidance for two other headquarters-based programs. The first will oversee the activities of evidence collection teams, which assist in criminal investigations of defendants external to Border Patrol. The second will oversee activities related to targeting and plainclothes operations. Once that guidance is complete, Border Patrol plans to collect monthly data about these activities, hold monthly meetings with the field to ensure compliance with the guidance, and provide briefings to Border Patrol leadership, including compliance assurances. We will continue to monitor steps Border Patrol is taking to implement this recommendation.
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| United States Customs and Border Protection | The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that OPR develops guidance for investigators on identifying potential impairments to their investigative independence and when and how to take action regarding any such impairments. (Recommendation 3) |
DHS concurred with this recommendation. In July 2024, OPR updated its investigator operating procedures manual. The updated manual includes a description of the investigative independence standard as it applies to OPR and defines types of potential impairments to investigator independence, including personal, external, and organizational impairments. The guidance includes direction to investigators about the steps they are to take if they identify a potential impairment to their independence, including stopping investigative activity, notifying their supervisor, seeking guidance to resolve the situation, and documenting any decisions made. Developing and implementing this guidance provides additional assurance to OPR that its investigators can identify potential impairments to their independence and take action to mitigate them. As such, we consider this recommendation implemented.
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| United States Customs and Border Protection | The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that OPR trains investigators on how to apply the guidance on the independence standard, once developed, to their investigative work. (Recommendation 4) |
DHS concurred with this recommendation. Beginning in April 2024, OPR piloted training on identifying and responding to potential impairments to investigative independence to newly hired criminal investigators. OPR subsequently implemented the training, entitled Objectivity and Independence. The training includes descriptions of potential impairments to investigator independence and exercises to help investigators consider mitigation actions to such potential impairments. Developing and implementing this training provides additional assurance to OPR that its investigators can identify potential impairments to their independence and take action to mitigate them. As such, we consider this recommendation implemented.
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