Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Address Significant Operational Challenges and Implement Planned Sustainment Approach
Fast Facts
The Navy is planning for a total of 35 Littoral Combat Ships, which are designed to operate in shallow waters close to shore.
But the Navy hasn't demonstrated that this type of ship can perform its intended missions. For example, operational testing found challenges in the ship's defenses. Also, some key equipment has failed, and the Navy is behind schedule in developing capabilities such as mine countermeasures.
The Navy is taking steps to address these and other issues, but doesn't have a comprehensive plan to resolve them. We recommended making such a plan and tying the decision to use the ships to the progress made in addressing the issues.
Littoral Combat Ship Freedom Variant (U.S.S. Freedom) at Sea
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) fleet has not demonstrated the operational capabilities it needs to perform its mission. Operational testing has found several significant challenges, including the ship's ability to defend itself if attacked and failure rates of mission-essential equipment. The Navy is also behind schedule in developing the various mission modules—different configurations of key systems for different missions, such as mine countermeasures—for the LCS. In addition, GAO found that the LCS has frequently encountered challenges during deployments. The Navy has begun to take steps to address some of these issues, but it does not have a comprehensive plan to address the various deficiencies identified during testing and deployments. Without a comprehensive plan to address deficiencies, perform adequate testing of the mission modules, and implement lessons learned from completed deployments, the LCS will remain at risk of being unable to operate in its intended environment. Further, gaps between desired and demonstrated capabilities have substantial implications for the Navy's ability to deploy the LCS as intended. Until the Navy makes future operational deployments contingent on progress in addressing gaps between desired and demonstrated capabilities, the LCS will continue to be dependent in combat and require protection by multi-mission combatants.
The Navy has implemented eight of the 10 recommendations from its 2016 Review of the LCS program. Among other things, it has implemented new approaches for assigning and training sailors for the LCS crew. However, the Navy is facing challenges in implementing a revised maintenance approach, under which Navy personnel will perform some maintenance currently being conducted by contractors. Until the Navy determines the specific tasks Navy personnel will perform, it risks not being able to meet the maintenance needs of the LCS, thus hindering the ships' ability to carry out their intended missions.
The Navy's operating and support (O&S) cost estimates for the LCS do not account for the cost implications of its revised maintenance approach. Specifically, the Navy has not assessed the cost implications of its revised maintenance approach, and thus lacks a clear picture of its impact on O&S costs. Some of the Navy's O&S actual cost data are also incomplete and inaccurate. For example, the Navy reported on each O&S cost element for the seaframes in its Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs database, but it reported only on the maintenance cost element for the mission modules. Further, the Navy does not report maintenance costs separately for each mission module, but instead totals those costs for all mission modules and divides by the number of seaframes in the fleet. Without complete and accurate cost data, the Navy is at risk of failing to anticipate O&S cost increases that could create challenges in funding LCS as intended or delivering capabilities when expected.
Finally, the Navy has not updated its O&S cost estimates to reflect its revised operational and sustainment concepts and has not incorporated actual cost data into some of its estimates. Without complete information on the cost of implementing the revised operational and sustainment concepts, and the use of actual cost data, the Navy will not be able to analyze the differences between estimates and actual costs—important elements for identifying and mitigating critical risks to the LCS.
Why GAO Did This Study
The LCS is designed to operate in shallow waters close to shore—known as the littorals. The Navy estimates it will cost over $60 billion to operate and support the 35 LCS it plans to build, including the 17 it has already delivered.
A House report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 included a provision for GAO to review the LCS's affordability and sustainability. This report examines the extent to which the Navy has (1) demonstrated that the LCS has the operational and warfighting capabilities to perform its missions; (2) implemented the recommendations in the Navy's 2016 Review; and (3) updated its cost estimates to account for revised operational and sustainment concepts.
GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, Navy guidance; analyzed LCS cost data for fiscal years 2009 to 2019; and interviewed relevant officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in August 2021. Information that the Navy deemed sensitive has been omitted.
Recommendations
GAO recommends, and the Navy concurs with, developing a comprehensive plan to address deficiencies, performing adequate testing of the mission modules, and implement lessons learned; making deployments contingent on progress in addressing gaps in capabilities, and determining tasks Navy personnel and contractors will perform, among others.
GAO also recommends, and the Navy partially concurs with, updating and improving LCS cost data, as discussed in the report.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval Operations conducts a study to determine the appropriate number of maintenance teams and personnel, a feasible set of tasks to be performed by these teams, how to obtain technical data needed to perform maintenance, and how to use these teams to fill vacancies on the LCS. (Recommendation 1) |
DOD concurred with our recommendation. In January 2022, the Navy stated it had begun establishing maintenance teams (MT) to support preventative maintenance within and beyond the continental United States and currently plans to build up enough MTs to achieve a goal of supporting approximately 95 percent of preventative maintenance for all littoral combat ships (LCS). Navy officials said the Navy had allocated funding in Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 to pay for MT personnel and planned to provide funding for additional MT personnel through FY 2024. Navy officials also stated that they planned to use MT sailors to fill LCS vacancies only under exceptional circumstances. Officials said that keeping maintenance teams intact will be vital to fulfilling maintenance obligations to the LCS Fleet. Navy officials expect to complete these efforts by the 4th quarter of FY 2024. In February 2023, the Navy had stated that it was in the process of collecting documentation and updating its corrective action plan. In September 2023, DOD informed us that it had requested a status update from the Navy and would provide an update upon receiving the response. In May 2024, however, the Navy reported that, in accordance with provisions in the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2023, they have shifted from dual-crewing model for the LCS platforms to a single crewing structure. Due to the new single crew requirement for LCS ships, the Navy stated that the crew size will be increased, resulting in a crew that is large enough to maintain the ship. Therefore, according to the Navy, implementation of the maintenance teams is no longer necessary, and a study is no longer applicable. The Navy's plan going forward is to maintain LCS class ships by the same crew, similar to how the Navy maintains other ship classes in its fleet. Since the Navy will no longer rely on maintenance teams to perform regular maintenance on the LCS fleet, this recommendation is no longer valid.
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| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval Operations assesses the implications of the Navy's revised maintenance approach for the LCS seaframes on future O&S costs. (Recommendation 2) |
DOD concurred with our recommendation. In January 2022, Navy officials stated that efforts to address this recommendation are being undertaken by Task Force LCS. Navy officials expect to complete these efforts by the third quarter of fiscal year 2023. In February 2023, the Navy had stated that it was in the process of collecting documentation and updating its corrective action plan. In September 2023, DOD informed us that it had requested a status update from the Navy and would provide an update upon receiving the response. In May 2024, however, the Navy reported that, in accordance with provisions in the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2023, they have shifted from dual-crewing model for the LCS platforms to a single crewing structure. Due to the new single crew requirement for LCS ships, the Navy stated that the crew size will be increased, resulting in a crew that is large enough to maintain the ship. Therefore, according to the Navy, implementation of the maintenance teams is no longer necessary. Since the Navy is no longer reliant on established maintenance teams to support the LCS, our recommendation to assess the implications of the Navy's revised maintenance approach for the LCS seaframes on future Operating and Support costs is no longer valid.
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| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Naval Sea Systems Command updates the cost estimates for the LCS to include operating and support costs, incorporate data from completed LCS deployments, and reflect current and planned revised operational and sustainment concepts. (Recommendation 3) |
DOD concurred with our recommendation. In April 2026, the Navy provided operating and supporting cost estimates based on 2024 data. According to the information provided, the estimates include a planned lifecycle of 25 years except for ships that have been or planned to be decommissioned. The Navy's cost estimates include changes to the crewing and maintenance approaches, among other things. Based on averages from deployments, such as light ship weight, steaming hours, price of fuel, barrels of fuel used, and other information collected, in 2024, the Navy estimated an average operational cost per ship of $66.9 million (2010 dollars). According to the Navy, this estimate is a decrease of $2.5 million per ship (2010 dollars) compared to the 2021 cost estimate. Using this per ship estimate as the basis, the lifecycle cost estimates for the fleet of 27 ships is approximately $1.8 billion per year in 2010 dollars. As a result of the information provided, we are closing this as implemented.
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| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Program Executive Office Unmanned and Small Combatants reports complete and accurate operating and support cost data in VAMOSC for LCS mission modules on a per ship and per mission module basis. (Recommendation 4) |
DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. The Navy's Surface Warfare and Mine Countermeasures mission modules are fully operational. The Navy chose to discontinue the Anti-Submarine Warfare mission module. Navy officials told us that lifecycle cost data is reported in the Navy's Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) system by individual hull. However, mission modules or packages are not assigned by hull. Therefore, according to officials, a data mismatch exists between hull lifecycle costs and mission modules. While officials said that an effort to fix this mismatch is underway, until such reporting changes occurs, the intent of this recommendation remains unmet.
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| Department of the Navy |
Priority Rec.
The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the LCS program office, in coordination with the Chief of Naval Operations, develops a comprehensive plan, including estimated costs and time frames, for addressing deficiencies in the seaframes, performing adequate testing of mission modules, and implementing lessons learned from completed deployments. (Recommendation 5) |
DOD concurred with this recommendation. In December 2024, the Navy issued an LCS Campaign Plan. This plan includes two main lines-of-effort to improve platform lethality and optimize readiness. These efforts include capability upgrades and installation of new systems that will be incorporated across the fleet over the next ten years. While the campaign plan does include general timeframes for which capability upgrades and system installations intend to be completed, the campaign plan does not include estimated initial and lifecycle sustainment costs for these improvements. In April 2026, Navy officials told us that they are updating the LCS lifecycle sustainment plan. However, they have not yet provided the sustainment plan which may include the estimated costs of these upgraded capabilities and systems to be incorporated through fiscal year 2037. In addition, in 2023, the Navy announced that the Mine-Countermeasures (MCM) and Surface Warfare (SUW) mission module had achieved initial operational capability. Officials also told us that issues with the fleet are discussed by the LCS Lessons Learned Working Group but the extent to which these lessons learned were coming from deployments is unclear. Based on the information provided, such as the development of 2024 LCS Campaign Plan with identified lines-of effort and general timeframes to improve platform lethality and optimize readiness, the Navy has partially met the intent of this recommendation. To reach full implementation of this recommendation, the Navy should provide the estimated sustainment costs of the upgraded capabilities and systems supporting the LCS and should show how identified lessons learned have informed deployment decisions.
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| Department of the Navy |
Priority Rec.
The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval Operations, to the extent practicable, makes future operational deployments contingent on demonstrated progress in addressing gaps between desired and demonstrated capabilities. (Recommendation 6) |
DOD concurred with our recommendation. According to Navy officials, design challenges identified in our 2021 report have been addressed. Specifically, officials said that they have strengthened the aluminum hull of the Independence variant ships and repairs to remaining Freedom variant ships have been completed. Officials also said that new navigation systems have been installed across the active fleet with the exception of one ship. However, officials said that other deficiencies have been identified after new ships have been delivered that remain to be addressed. In addition, the officials we spoke with were not able to comment on the extent to which decisions to deploy specific ships were made on demonstrated progress towards addressing gaps between desired and demonstrated capabilities. Navy officials referred us to the U.S. Fleet Forces Command to determine whether decisions regarding deployments were made based on whether deficiencies continued to exist. To close out this recommendation as implemented, the Navy should demonstrate that ship deployment-related decisions are based, in part, on how operational deficiencies or capability gaps have been addressed.
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