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Highlights

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has coordinated the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to other locations in the Asia-Pacific region through developing a synchronization plan and organizing working groups. However, DOD has not resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marine units; training needs in the region; the reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility in Okinawa; and challenges for operating in Australia. DOD guidance indicates that mission requirements—which would include the capabilities needed to fulfill the mission—largely determine land and facility support requirements. If DOD does not resolve the selected identified capability deficiencies in its infrastructure plans, DOD may be unable to maintain its capabilities or face much higher costs to do so.

DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans and schedules for its relocation efforts, but it did not develop a reliable schedule for the Marine relocation to Guam and has not completed its risk planning for infrastructure in Guam. DOD developed plans that will support construction efforts in Guam and Japan, and developed some initial infrastructure plans for Hawaii and Australia. However, GAO found the Marines Corps' integrated master schedule for Guam did not fully meet the comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. For example, the schedule does not include resources needed for nonconstruction activities, such as information technology and design activities. Additionally, the Marine Corps has not completed its risk-management plan for infrastructure construction in Guam. Specifically, the Marine Corps has not identified its strategy to address construction risks including labor shortages and endangered-species protection. If DOD does not have a reliable schedule or has not completed risk planning for Guam, it may not have complete information to identify and address risks that may result in cost overruns and schedule delays.

DOD has made progress in developing cost estimates for Guam, but its estimates partially met GAO best practices for reliable cost estimates for the relocations to Guam and Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. For cost estimates related to Guam military construction activities, DOD included ground rules and assumptions, but did not include some elements of a reliable cost estimate, such as a risk analysis. Additionally, DOD developed cost estimates for nonmilitary construction activities that provide a high-level planning overview of the requirements, but they did not incorporate several other best practices, including a unifying Work Breakdown Structure that defines in detail the work necessary to accomplish a program's objectives. For Hawaii and Australia, the cost estimates are not considered reliable because they did not include all life-cycle costs or a Work Breakdown Structure. If DOD does not revise the cost estimates for these locations, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost information to inform funding decisions and to help them determine the viability of relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia.

Why GAO Did This Study

For two decades, DOD has planned to realign its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Marine Corps has plans to consolidate bases in Okinawa, relocating 4,100 Marines to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii, 800 to the continental United States, and a rotational presence of 1,300 to Australia.

The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, included a provision that GAO study the realignment initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) coordinated its efforts and resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marines, (2) developed infrastructure plans and schedules and completed risk planning for its infrastructure that will support the relocation, and (3) developed reliable cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation of Marines to Guam and Hawaii and the rotational presence in Australia. GAO reviewed relevant policies and plans; analyzed cost documents; interviewed DOD officials; and visited U.S. military installations in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Recommendations

GAO recommends that DOD resolve capability deficiencies in the four selected identified areas, update its schedule for Guam infrastructure, complete a risk-management plan for Guam infrastructure, and revise its three cost estimates. DOD concurred with two recommendations, partially concurred with six, and did not concur with one. GAO continues to believe its recommendations are valid, as discussed in this report.

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense 1. To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in the movement of Marine Corps units by, for example, reconsidering when units should move to Guam to minimize leaving facilities vacant.
Open
DOD partially concurred with this recommendation and stated that the Marine Corps' plans for the movement of units from Okinawa to Guam has considered many factors, including, among others, the capabilities required to support Pacific Command and the logistical requirements associated with the movement of forces. In March 2020, DOD stated that the Marine Corps and Pacific Command have done extensive planning and analysis to determine how best to posture, move, and support distributed III Marine Expeditionary Force Marines. However, as of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of this analysis. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense 2. To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI by, for example, identifying other suitable training areas.
Open
DOD partially concurred with this recommendation and stated that it has already conducted an extensive analysis of training needs. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.
Department of Defense 3. To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility by, for example, selecting other runways that would support mission requirements.
Open
DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD had not identified any additional runways and stated that this is a Government of Japan responsibility. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.
Department of Defense 4. To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in challenges in Australia regarding seasonal changes and biosecurity requirements that affect equipment downtime by, for example, deciding on a location for the wet season and identifying a solution for biosecurity requirements.
Open
DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD stated that no new decisions have been made regarding the Australia rotation. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.
Department of Defense 5. To provide DOD with reliable information on potential sources of delays for the design and construction of infrastructure in Guam, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to update the Marine Corps' integrated master schedule for Guam so that it meets the comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. For example, the update to the schedule should include resources for nonconstruction activities.
Open
DOD concurred with this recommendation. In March 2020, DOD stated that the updated integrated master schedule for Guam conforms to the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide and accounts for the best practices of a reliable schedule. However, as of May 2020, we have not received an updated integrated master schedule that meets the criteria for a reliable schedule.
Department of Defense 6. To provide DOD and Congress with sufficient information to mitigate risks for infrastructure construction and sustainment, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to complete a Risk Management Plan for Guam, and include, at a minimum, plans to address: (1) construction labor shortages, (2) explosive--ordnance detection, (3) cultural-artifact discovery and preservation, and (4) protection of endangered species.
Closed - Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of May 2020, DOD took actions on addressing risk in Guam for infrastructure construction and sustainment. For example: 1) To address risks related to construction labor shortages, DOD supported legislation (which was ultimately enacted) in the fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act to address foreign worker visas during the peak of the Guam Relocation construction period. Further, DOD has continued to track its labor status in Guam. 2) To address risks related to explosive-ordnance detection, in January 2020 the DOD Explosives Safety Board approved the Guam Munitions Response Explosives Safety Submission. The Submission identifies the risk management process for distributing soil known or suspected to contain munitions and explosives of concern on Guam. It also provides definitions of risks and how to address and mitigate those risks. According to DOD officials, the Submission is currently being actively implemented and is included in each of the contracts the Department enters into regarding construction on Guam. 3) To address risks related to cultural-artifact discovery and preservation, DOD officials stated that, in 2018, DOD provided $12 million for the construction of the Guam Cultural Repository. Officials added that the Marine Corps meets annually with stakeholders to review cultural resources issues. Additionally, the officials stated that the Marine Corps provides a professional archaeologist to help manage the workload at the Guam State Historic Preservation Office, and DOD created a position to serve as a key interlocutor between DOD and the Government of the Marianas Islands on cultural and environmental issues. 4) To address risks related to protection of endangered species, DOD officials stated they had consultations with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 2017 and 2018. Further, in May 2020, DOD concluded a separate Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of the Interior to maintain purpose and mission of the Guam National Wildlife Refuge Ritidian Unit. By taking actions to address risk in Guam for infrastructure construction and sustainment, DOD should be better positioned to address risks to the design and construction of its infrastructure and, in turn, reduce the potential for cost overruns and schedule delays.
Department of Defense 7. To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Guam, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to revise the cost estimates for Guam to address all best practices established by GAO's cost estimating guide. Specifically, the revisions to the cost estimates should include: a unifying Work Breakdown Structure, risk and sensitivity analyses, and an independent cost estimate.
Open
DOD nonconcurred with this recommendation. In March 2020, DOD stated that the department does not accept the assertion that GAO's best practices for cost estimates are universally applicable to a wide range of activities that includes military construction, acquisition, or basing. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.
Department of Defense 8. To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to revise the DOD cost estimates for Hawaii to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure.
Open
DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD stated that it continues to update its cost estimates for the Hawaii program in line with GAO's cost estimating guide but did not agree that detailed cost estimates are required at this early planning stage to make decisions in the 2026 timeframe and beyond. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.
Department of Defense 9. To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia, the Secretary of Defense should revise the DOD cost estimates for Australia to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure.
Open
DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD stated that it continues to update its cost estimates for the Australia program in line with GAO's cost estimating guide. However, DOD stated that since Australia will build or provide much of the infrastructure enhancements in support of the Marine Corps, cost estimates will not incorporate the construction costs. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

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