What GAO Found
Why GAO Did This Study
Iran's illicit nuclear activities, support for terrorism, and human rights abuses have led the United States and other nations to impose multiple sanctions. For example, U.S. law provides for sanctions against foreign firms that engage in certain activities in Iran's energy sector. It also prohibits U.S. agencies from entering into or renewing procurement contracts with individuals or entities that export sensitive technologies to Iran for monitoring, filtering, or disrupting the flow of information and communication in Iran or of the people of Iran. The United States imposed these sanctions through legislation and executive orders that include the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (ISA); the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010; and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA). Senate Reports 111-201 and 112-267 require GAO to annually update a 2010 GAO report that used open source data to identify foreign firms with commercial activity in Iran's energy sector and determine if they had contracts with the U.S. government. They also require GAO to expand the 2010 report's scope to include firms that export technologies to Iran that are specifically to be used to disrupt information and communication flows. GAO has previously issued two reports related to the Senate mandates. In addition, GAO issued a report in December 2012 that identified seven firms reported in open sources to have engaged in commercial activities in Iran's energy sector at some point between June 1, 2011, and September 30, 2012. To further update GAO's response to the Senate mandates, this report identifies: (1) whether any of the seven foreign firms reported in open sources to have been engaged in commercial activity in Iran's energy sector between June 1, 2011, and September 30, 2012, had U.S. contracts, awards, or purchasing agreements; and To further update GAO's response to the Senate mandates, this report identifies: (2) which foreign firms were reported in open sources to have exported technologies to the Iranian government for monitoring, filtering, and disrupting information and communications flows, from June 24, 2011, through December 15, 2012, and whether they had U.S. contracts, awards, or purchasing agreements.
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