What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) is not assessing risks at federal facilities in a manner consistent with standards such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plans (NIPP) risk management framework, as FPS originally planned. Instead of conducting risk assessments, since September 2011, FPSs inspectors have collected information, such as the location, purpose, agency contacts, and current countermeasures (e.g., perimeter security, access controls, and closed-circuit television systems). This information notwithstanding, FPS has a backlog of federal facilities that have not been assessed for several years. According to FPSs data, more than 5,000 facilities were to be assessed in fiscal years 2010 through 2012. However, GAO was unable to determine the extent of FPSs facility security assessment (FSA) backlog because the data were unreliable. Multiple agencies have expended resources to conduct risk assessments, even though the agencies also already pay FPS for this service. FPS received $236 million in basic security fees from agencies to conduct FSAs and other security services in fiscal year 2011. Beyond not having a reliable tool for conducting assessments, FPS continues to lack reliable data, which has hampered the agencys ability to manage its FSA program.
FPS has an interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST), which it plans to use to assess federal facilities until it develops a longer-term solution. According to FPS, once implemented, MIST will allow it to resume assessing federal facilities vulnerabilities and recommend countermeasuressomething FPS has not done consistently for several years. Furthermore, in developing MIST, FPS generally followed GAOs project management best practices, such as conducting user acceptance testing. However, MIST has some limitations. Most notably, MIST does not estimate the consequences of an undesirable event occurring at a facility. Three of the four risk assessment experts GAO spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. FPS officials stated that they did not include consequence information in MIST because it was not part of the original design and thus requires more time to validate. MIST also was not designed to compare risks across federal facilities. Thus, FPS has limited assurance that critical risks at federal facilities are being prioritized and mitigated.
FPS continues to face challenges in overseeing its approximately 12,500 contract guards. FPS developed the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) to help it oversee its contract guard workforce by (1) verifying that guards are trained and certified, and (2) conducting guard post inspections. However, FPS faced challenges using RAMP, such as verifying guard training and certification information, for either purpose and has recently determined that it would no longer use RAMP. Without a comprehensive system, it is more difficult for FPS to oversee its contract guard workforce. FPS is verifying guard certification and training information by conducting monthly audits of guard contractor training and certification information. However, FPS does not independently verify the contractors information. Additionally, according to FPS officials, FPS recently decided to deploy a new interim method to record post inspections to replace RAMP.
Why GAO Did This Study
FPS provides security and law enforcement services to over 9,000 federal facilities under the custody and control of the General Services Administration (GSA). GAO has reported that FPS faces challenges providing security services, particularly completing FSAs and managing its these challenges, FPS spent about $35 million and 4 years developing RAMPessentially a risk assessment and contract guard oversight tool. However, RAMP ultimately could not be used because of system problems.
GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which FPS is completing risk assessments; (2) the status of FPSs efforts to develop an FSA tool; and (3)FPSs efforts to manage its contract guard workforce. GAO reviewed FPS documents, conducted site visits at 3 of FPSs 11 regions, and interviewed FPS officials and inspectors, guard companies, and 4 risk management experts.
GAO recommends that FPS incorporate NIPPs risk management framework in any future risk assessment tool; coordinate with federal agencies to reduce any unnecessary duplication in FPSs assessments; address limitations with its interim tool to better assess federal facilities; develop and implement a comprehensive and reliable contract guard oversight system; and independently verify that its contract guards are current on all training and certification requirements. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
|Department of Homeland Security||1. Given the challenges that FPS faces in assessing risks to federal facilities and managing its contract guard workforce, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to incorporate NIPP's risk management framework--specifically in calculating risk to include threat, vulnerability, and consequence information--in any permanent risk assessment tool.|
|Department of Homeland Security||2. Given the challenges that FPS faces in assessing risks to federal facilities and managing its contract guard workforce, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to coordinate with GSA and other federal tenant agencies to reduce any unnecessary duplication in security assessments of facilities under the custody and control of GSA.|
|Department of Homeland Security||3. Given the challenges that FPS faces in assessing risks to federal facilities and managing its contract guard workforce, the Secretary of Homeland Security should address MIST's limitations (assessing consequence, comparing risk across federal facilities, and measuring performance) to better assess and mitigate risk at federal facilities until a permanent system is developed and implemented.|
|Department of Homeland Security||4. Given the challenges that FPS faces in assessing risks to federal facilities and managing its contract guard workforce, the Secretary of Homeland Security should develop and implement a new comprehensive and reliable system for contract guard oversight.|
|Department of Homeland Security||5. Given the challenges that FPS faces in assessing risks to federal facilities and managing its contract guard workforce, the Secretary of Homeland Security should verify independently that FPS's contract guards are current on all training and certification requirements.|