The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) procures most of its goods and services through contracts, and it terminates very few of them. In fiscal year 2010, for example, NASA's procurements, ranging from small contracts for human resources consulting services to multimillion dollar contracts to build and operate spacecraft, totaled approximately $17.4 billion, representing about 83.4 percent of the agency's obligations that year. That same year, it terminated 28 of 16,343 active contracts and orders--a termination rate of about .17 percent. This rate is about the same--less than 0.2 percent--for each of the past 5 fiscal years. NASA contract terminations--the complete or partial cancellation of work under a contract before the contract's period of performance ends--are rare but could become more common in the future. The federal government is facing real fiscal limitations and will have to make difficult choices about upcoming priorities. This reality makes it more important than ever that NASA manage its projects as efficiently and effectively as possible and within its budget. This is a struggle for NASA. Our work has shown that NASA's large-scale projects tend to cost more and take longer to develop than planned. In this time of calls for greater fiscal austerity, NASA recognizes that it has to operate within its budget and that its projects must be affordable and sustainable over the long term. If NASA cannot address some of the issues that have led to cost and schedule growth for its projects in the past, tough decisions may need to be made about whether or not to start new projects or which projects to terminate, as additional funding could be scarce. As demonstrated by the proposed cancellation of NASA's Constellation program, a program that we have reported to be at risk of not meeting cost and schedule goals, the cancellation of a project can have potentially significant financial impacts. After the President proposed canceling the Constellation program in his fiscal year 2011 budget request, NASA reported that the agency's costs associated with terminating the various Constellation program contracts could reach close to $1 billion. As we reported previously, responsibility for these potential costs became an issue between NASA and its Constellation contractors. The questions about responsibility for potential termination liability costs, coupled with the Constellation program's constrained budget profile, led to disruption in work activities at some contractors. Because of these questions regarding responsibility for potential termination liability costs and the impact they could have on NASA's ability to execute its projects effectively, Congress asked us to assess NASA's policies and practices pertaining to the management and funding of contract termination liability, as well as interactions between the agency and its contractors related to termination liability.
Recommendations for Executive Action
|National Aeronautics and Space Administration||1. The NASA Administrator should review how the agency's acquisition professionals monitor potential termination costs and establish guidance as appropriate to ensure consistency across the agency. The agency should ensure that the guidance it develops provides instructions to acquisition professionals on adequately addressing potential termination risks on their contracts, and on how potential termination costs would be funded in the event of a termination.|