The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large annual funding outlays. The current estimated investment is $323 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft. As required by law, this report discusses (1) program cost, schedule, and performance; (2) manufacturing results; and (3) test plans and progress. GAO's work includes interviews, cost data, test plans, production measures, and analyses by defense and contractor officials.
Matter for Congressional Consideration
|Congress may wish to consider requiring DOD to provide a JSF "system maturity matrix" as a tool that could help Congress better measure the program's progress in maturing the weapon system. The matrix should provide criteria and conditions for comparing documented results to expected progressive levels of demonstrated weapon system maturity in relationship to planned increases in future procurement quantities. This matrix should explain how increasing levels of demonstrated, quantifiable knowledge about the weapon system maturity at annual procurement decision points justify a ramp up of procurement quantities, and corresponding increasing funding needs, leading up to full-rate procurement. Key areas of the matrix and potential criteria could include: (1) manufacturing maturity (including on-time deliveries, manufacturing process control, quality rates, and labor efficiency rates); (2) engineering maturity (design traffic and design changes); (3) performance and testing progress (test points, hours and flights accomplished, capabilities demonstrated, key performance parameters, and attributes demonstrated); (4) mission effectiveness and system reliability (operational effectiveness and reliability growth); (5) cost estimate fidelity; and (6) training, fielding, and deployment status.||Our report (GAO-10-382) suggested that Congress consider requiring DOD to provide a JSF "system maturity matrix" as a tool that could help Congress better measure the program's progress in maturing the weapon system. We also suggested a framework for the matrix, including key areas and potential criteria including manufacturing maturity; engineering maturity; performance and testing progress; and mission effectiveness and system reliability among other items. Subsequently, Congress in Section 122 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 2011, directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a system management plan and matrix for the JSF program. The matrix and criteria largely reflected what we identified in our "Matter for Congressional Consideration". In response to this legislation, DOD provided a report on the program system management plan and matrix dated October 28, 2011.|
Recommendations for Executive Action
|Department of Defense||Given the continuing changes in JSF program plans and future risks going forward and to provide DOD leaders and Congress with accurate and timely data for making decisions and appropriating funds, the Secretary of Defense should direct appropriate offices within DOD to expeditiously complete a full, independent, comprehensive cost and schedule estimate for the JSF acquisition program through completion and that this new estimate be established as the official program of record for planning, budgeting, and congressional reporting purposes. This effort should build upon the work already accomplished by the Joint Estimating Team, the Independent Manufacturing Review Team, the Joint Assessment Team, and NAVAIR. In addition to development and procurement costs, this effort should also include (1) a robust estimate of military construction costs, (2) identification of JSF-related costs not funded in the JSF program but which are needed to properly base and operate service fleets on the ground and at sea, and (3) a comprehensive evaluation of projected operating and support costs and the implications of higher JSF operating costs compared to legacy aircraft on future defense budgets and force structure.|
|Department of Defense||The Secretary of Defense should direct that the military services, with Joint Staff and combatant command participation, conduct a detailed review of each service's initial operational capabilities requirement to determine the minimum warfighter needs (both capabilities and capacity) and reasonable, realistic time frames for achieving the requirement. In conducting this review, the military services should consider trading off desired capabilities in order to more rapidly field JSF aircraft with an initial set of usable capabilities to reduce risks of a future tactical aircraft "gap" created by delays in fielding the JSF. Capabilities that are not needed to meet more immediate warfighter needs should be deferred to a future development increment. If options are not available for deferring capabilities to future increments, DOD needs to extend its IOC dates to better align operating plans with more realistic, higher confidence development and production schedules. In addition, because of remaining JSF development risks and uncertainties--including potential for future delays and possible reductions in JSF quantities--contingency plans for legacy aircraft need to be developed so that a properly resourced strategy is in place to fill the capability and capacity gaps until the JSF can replace the legacy aircraft. Completing this review before finalizing its ongoing program restructure would ensure that the program's acquisition strategy is in sync with and supports revisions to services' IOC requirements. The Secretary of Defense should report the results of this review to the congressional defense committees.|