Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans
GAO-06-745
Published: Sep 06, 2006. Publicly Released: Sep 06, 2006.
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Highlights
The Army considers its modular force transformation its most extensive restructuring since World War II. Restructuring units from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force will require an investment of over $52 billion, including $41 billion for equipment, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2011, according to the Army. Because of broad congressional interest in this initiative, GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority and assessed (1) the Army's progress and plans for equipping modular combat brigades, (2) progress made and challenges to managing personnel requirements of the modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army has developed an approach for assessing the results of its modular conversions and the need for further changes to designs or implementation plans.
Recommendations
Matter for Congressional Consideration
| Matter | Status | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| Given the significant cost and far-reaching magnitude of the Army's plans for creating modular forces, Congress may wish to consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to provide the information outlined in our recommendations including details about the Army's equipping strategy and an assessment of the operational risk associated with this equipping strategy. | No change in status | |
| Given the significant cost and far-reaching magnitude of the Army's plans for creating modular forces, Congress may wish to consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to provide the information outlined in our recommendations including the status of the Army's personnel initiatives and an assessment of how the Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force and manage the risk to its noncombat force structure. | Since the Secretary of Defense announced in early 2007 that the active Army would be expanding by 65,000 soldiers from FY 2007 through FY 2013 the condition behind our recommendation has significantly changed. This additional manpower was requested by the Army in part to build another six Brigade Combat Teams as well as an unspecified number of support brigades. The additional manpower was also requested to address some MOS shortages within the operational force as well as the TDA and TTHS accounts that have now been deemed too low under the Army's proposed 482.4K force structure. These decisions are now being vetted within the Army's Force Management Review process. It is too early to know whether the additional manpower will completely address all of the Army's force structure issues we identified, but since the original conditions behind our recommendation have changed the recommendation no longer applies as originally written. | |
| Given the significant cost and far-reaching magnitude of the Army's plans for creating modular forces, Congress may wish to consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to provide the information outlined in our recommendations including the Army's plan for assessing its progress toward achieving the benefits of modularity, plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular unit designs, and a testing plan for conducting comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is being implemented. | No change in status |
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of the Army | In order for decision makers to better assess the Army's strategy for equipping modular combat brigades, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with details about the Army's equipping strategy, to include the types and quantities of equipment active component and National Guard modular units would receive in each phase of the force rotation model, including how these amounts compare to design requirements for modular units, and an assessment of the operational risk associated with this equipping strategy. |
The Army concurred with this recommendation in their response to our draft report. The Army contends that it considers this information as part of its biannual equipping conference. However, the Army has not yet provided information to the Secretary of Defense and Congress which includes the level of detail in GAO's recommendation.
|
| Department of the Army | In order for decision makers to have the visibility needed to assess the Army's ability to meet the personnel requirements for its new modular operational forces while simultaneously managing the risk to its noncombat forces, the Army should develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a report on the status of its personnel initiatives, including executable milestones for realigning and reducing its noncombat forces, and an assessment of how the Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force while managing the risk to its noncombat supporting force structure. |
The recently announced decision to expand the size of the Army by 74,400 soldiers from FY 2007 through FY 2013 will change the condition GAO originally reported. At the time of GAO's report, the Army was attempting to reduce its end strength back to a 482.4K level from approximately 512.4K and GAO expected the Army would face significant challenges in executing its plans. Since the Army's increased end strength level changes the condition GAO originally reported, this recommendation will no longer apply.
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| Department of the Army | To improve information available for decision makers on progress of the Army's modular force implementation plans, the Army should develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a comprehensive plan for assessing the Army's progress toward achieving the benefits of modularity to include specific, quantifiable performance metrics to measure progress toward meeting the goals and objectives established in the Army Campaign Plan, and plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular unit designs that discuss the extent to which unit designs provide sufficient capabilities needed to execute National Defense Strategy and 2006 QDR objectives for addressing a wider range of both traditional and irregular security challenges. |
The Army partially concurred with our recommendation to establish performance metrics to measure progress toward meeting the goals for modular units. To date the Army has not established these performance metrics.
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| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should provide a testing plan as part of its Army Campaign Plan that includes milestones for conducting comprehensive assessments of the modular force as it is being implemented so that decision makers--both inside and outside the Army--can assess the implications of changes to the Army force structure in terms of the goals of modular restructuring. The results of these assessments should be provided to Congress as part of the Army's justification for its annual budget through fiscal year 2011. |
The Army nonconcurred with this recommendation and has not provided a testing plan as part of the Army's Campaign Plan.
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Army modularityArmy personnelCombat readinessDefense capabilitiesDefense conversionMilitary forcesProgram evaluationStrategic planningTransparencyU.S. Army