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DOD Reserve Components: Issues Pertaining to Readiness

T-NSIAD-96-130 Published: Mar 21, 1996. Publicly Released: Mar 21, 1996.
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Highlights

GAO discussed the readiness of armed forces reserve components. GAO noted that: (1) reserve components provided crucial support and combat functions in the Persian Gulf War and in various peacekeeping operations; (2) the Army National Guard's combat forces far exceed projected force requirements for two major regional conflicts, while the Army has critical shortages in support functions; (3) none of the enhanced brigades that it reviewed achieved the training proficiency that the Army required for deployment within 90 days of mobilization; (4) active-duty advisers assigned to National Guard brigades were limited by an ambiguous definition of their role, poor management communication, and difficult working relationships; (5) it is uncertain that the Guard's mechanized infantry and armor brigades could deploy within 90 days after mobilization; (6) while it has found that a dedicated continental air defense force is no longer necessary to defend North America against a long-range air threat, the Air Force has only reduced its dedicated Air National Guard force for this mission from 180 aircraft to 150 aircraft; and (7) eliminating continental air defense units and assigning their missions to existing units could save $1.8 billion from fiscal years 1997 through 2000.

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Armed forces reserve trainingArmed forces reservesCombat readinessDefense contingency planningMilitary aircraftMilitary cost controlMilitary downsizingMilitary operationsMobilizationCivic action