Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to Be Reassessed
NSIAD-99-32
Published: Dec 09, 1998. Publicly Released: Dec 09, 1998.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Department of Defense's (DOD) major guided weapon programs, focusing on whether: (1) the services' plans for developing or procuring guided weapons can be carried out as proposed within relatively fixed defense budgets; (2) the number of guided weapons the services plan to buy is consistent with projected threats and modernization needs; (3) the current and planned guided weapon programs duplicate or overlap each other; and (4) DOD is providing effective oversight in the development and procurement of deep attack weapons.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | DOD's planned spending for guided weapons will escalate rapidly over the next few years, and key decisions will be made to start procurement to some very costly and unneeded guided weapons. Instead of continuing to start procurement programs that may not be executable as proposed, DOD should determine how much procurement funding can realistically be expected to be available for guided weapons over the long term and cost-effectively execute those programs within that level of funding. In doing so, DOD should also consider the already large inventory of guided weapons and the advances in technologies that are expected to increase the effectiveness of future weapons as well as the current and projected decline in threat. |
Closed – Not Implemented
In its follow-up letter dated January 26, 1999, DOD commented that Pentagon oversight is adequate and that DOD would continue its efforts to improve. However, the response did not cite specific steps DOD would take to demonstrate its improvements.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, should establish an aggregate requirement for deep attack capabilities. |
Closed – Implemented
DOD commented that it had made significant progress in determining Deep Attack needs by involving the Commanders'-in-Chief and by looking at weapons mix problem from a joint perspective as in the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and the Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements Process. However, there is no provision for continuing the work started by the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study and DOD officials stated that a planned deep attack follow-on study was cancelled.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, should reevaluate the assumptions used in guided weapon requirements determination processes to better reflect the new international situation, realistic target sets, enhanced weapon effectiveness, proper weapons selection, and the use of advanced tactics. |
Closed – Not Implemented
DOD commented that Pentagon oversight is adequate and cited the work of the Joint Requirement Oversight Council, the Milestone 0 Review, OSD oversight role, the Capabilities Based Munitions Process and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System to demonstrate the Pentagon's oversight.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, should reevaluate the planned guided weapons acquisition programs in light of existing capabilities and the current budgetary and security environment to determine whether the procurement of all planned guided weapon types and quantities: (1) is necessary and cost-effective in the aggregate; and (2) can clearly be carried out as proposed within realistic long-term projections of procurement funding. |
Closed – Not Implemented
DOD commented that the proposed acquisitions were the culmination of the development of new weapons and that a lull in procurement is ending which will raise the level of procurement. DOD maintains that affordability is a key tenet in the coming procurements and cites the Cost as an Independent Variable initiatives for the Joint Standoff Weapon unitary variant and inclusion of cost as a key performance parameter for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff weapon as examples of their attention to affordability.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense, with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should develop an assessment process that yields more comprehensive information on procurement requirements and aggregate capabilities in key mission areas such as deep attack. This can be done by broadening the current joint warfare capabilities assessment process or developing an alternative mechanism. One such alternative could be the establishment of a DOD-wide coordinating office to consider the services combines requirements, capabilities, and acquisition plans for deep attack weapons. This office could be modeled after the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile Office. |
Closed – Not Implemented
Although DOD indicated in its response that it planned to expand somewhat the role of the Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Office to include Air-to-Ground weapons, it indicated that the larger issues encompassed by the recommendation were not appropriate for consideration by an interservice office.
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