Access to Space: Issues Associated With DOD's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program
NSIAD-97-130
Published: Jun 24, 1997. Publicly Released: Jun 24, 1997.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) progress in acquiring the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), focusing on: (1) factors associated with program cost, schedule, and performance; and (2) selected aspects of EELV's relationship to the commercial launch vehicle market.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | Considering the cost and schedule issues associated with the EELV program, the Secretary of Defense should either: (1) revise the program strategy, by decoupling the planned concurrent engineering and manufacturing development decision and initial production authorization, to take advantage of the most current program risk assessment information available prior to obligating procurement funds planned for fiscal year 2000; or (2) review the initial production authorization prior to obligating any procurement funds, if that authorization is made concurrently with the engineering and manufacturing development decision. |
Closed – Implemented
In November 1997, DOD revised its acquisition approach to: (1) solicit two contractors to share in development costs, instead of one being fully funded by the government; (2) use an acquisition instrument called an "other transaction" for development, instead of a contract; and (3) acquire launch services, instead of production vehicles.
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| Department of Defense | Considering the cost and schedule issues associated with the EELV program, the Secretary of Defense should develop contingency plans to: (1) meet national security and civil satellite launch schedules when the existing launch vehicle production contracts expire; and (2) address the potential for delay in the availability of launch facilities. |
Closed – Not Implemented
In November 1997, DOD revised its acquisition approach to: (1) solicit two contractors to share in development costs, instead of one being fully funded by the government; (2) use an acquisition instrument called an "other transaction" for development, instead of a contract; and (3) acquire launch services, instead of production vehicles.
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| Department of Defense | In view of the expected compensating benefits to the winning EELV contractor to enhance its competitive position in the international commercial launch vehicle market, the Secretary of Defense should devise a mechanism, such as a cost-sharing contract and/or a recoupment arrangement for commercial launch vehicle sales, to help reduce the government's investment in EELV and see that the mechanism is included in the Air Force's request-for-proposal for the EMD acquisition phase of the EELV program. |
Closed – Implemented
In November 1997, instead of planning to pay one contractor $1.5 billion to develop the EELV system, DOD approved a revised acquisition approach whereby two contractors would share in the cost of EELV development. As a result, in October 1998, the Air Force entered into an "other transactions" agreement with the two contractors, fixing DOD's share to an amount not to exceed $1 billion--$500 million for each contractor. The contractors were to pay the remaining development costs. GAO subsequently determined that the $205 million that was needed to acquire two additional launch vehicles with procurement funds would reduce the planned $500 million cost avoidance to DOD. Thus, the net cost avoidance was expected to be $295 million.
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Topics
Aerospace industryConcurrencyContingency plansCost overrunsDefense conversionDefense cost controlMilitary procurementMilitary satellitesCommunication satellitesOperational testingSatellites