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Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces Overseas

NSIAD-00-181 Published: Jul 19, 2000. Publicly Released: Jul 19, 2000.
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Highlights

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to protect U.S. forces stationed overseas from terrorist attacks, focusing on: (1) the extent to which DOD has made improvements to its antiterrorism/force protection program overseas; (2) changes in DOD's process for assessing and reporting vulnerability at overseas installations; and (3) the adequacy of antiterrorism/force protection funding and staff.

Recommendations

Matter for Congressional Consideration

Matter Status Comments
To improve congressional oversight of the risks that U.S. forces overseas are facing from terrorism, Congress may wish to consider requiring DOD to provide, as part of its Combating Terrorism Budget Justification documentation, information on the number and type of antiterrorism/force protection projects that have not been addressed by the budget request and the estimated cost to complete these projects. Information on the backlog of projects should be presented by geographic combatant command.
Closed – Not Implemented
As of September 2001, Congress has not required DOD to provide information on unfunded requirements in its budget submissions for Combating Terrorism. As of September 2004, Congress has not required DOD to provide information on its unfunded requirements in its Combating Terrorism budget submissions.

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense To improve the effectiveness and increase the impact of the vulnerability assessments and the vulnerability assessment reports, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to improve the vulnerability assessment reports provided to installations. Although the Joint Staff is planning to take some action to improve the value of these reports, GAO believes the vulnerability assessment reports should recommend specific actions to overcome identified vulnerabilities.
Closed – Not Implemented
DOD believes that the changes in process at the time of GAO's report address the recommendations. DOD has not completed these actions as of September 2001. September 2004 at this time DOD has not changed the format of its vulnerability reports to include specific solutions for indentified vulnerabilities as GAO recommended.
Joint Chiefs of Staff The Joint Chiefs of Staff should develop an antiterrorism/force protection best practices or lessons learned program that would share recommendations for both physical and process-oriented improvements. The program would assist installations to find answers to common problems--particularly those installations that do not receive Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment reports or others who have found vulnerabilities through their own vulnerability assessments.
Closed – Implemented
JCS has undertaken a number of lessons learned programs, but not all of the programs which would address this recommendation are operational. September 2004 The Joint Staff has established a lessons learned program and shares lessons by a number of methods. First, lessons learned continue to be shared in the in the AT/FP newsletter. Second, the Joint Staff has established the Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal which allows registered webusers to access AT/FP lessons learned, access Army, Navy and Joint lessons learned programs and post item on a AT/FP best practices discussion board. In addition, the portal allows users to access vulnerability assessment trends as well as vulnerability assessment reports which document actions taken to fix vulnerabilities.
Department of Defense To provide Congress with the most complete information on the risks that U.S. forces overseas are facing from terrorism, the Secretary of Defense should direct the services to include in their next consolidated combating terrorism budget submission information on the number and types of antiterrorism/force protection projects that have not been addressed by the budget request and the estimated cost to complete these projects. Information on the backlog of projects should be presented by geographic combatant command.
Closed – Not Implemented
The Department of Defense did not concur with this recommendation. They believe there is no need to provide the additional information to Congress.
Department of Defense To assure that antiterrorism/force protection managers have the knowledge and skills needed to develop and implement effective antiterrorism/force protection programs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict to expeditiously implement the Joint Staff's draft antiterrorism/force protection manager training standard and formulate a timetable for the services to develop and implement a new course that meets the revised standards. Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict should review the course content to ensure that the course has consistency of emphasis across the services.
Closed – Implemented
The services developed and implemented the training programs required by DODI 2000.16. Known as Level II training, the training prepares individuals to perform their duties at AT program managers and advisors to the commander.

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Topics

AntiterrorismArmed forces abroadBudget reapportionmentDefense budgetsDefense contingency planningDefense operationsEmergency preparednessHomeland securityReporting requirementsCombating terrorism