Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Enhance the Security of High-Risk Ammunition at Storage Locations
Fast Facts
The Department of Defense stores all of its ammunition in secure locations. However, "Category I" ammunition—such as ready-to-fire nonnuclear missiles—is especially lethal and needs additional security.
We reviewed DOD's Category I ammunition storage in select domestic locations and found that the military services:
did not conduct some storage location security inspections on time
did not consistently document whether all identified security deficiencies were resolved
We recommended the services take action to ensure these inspections follow existing policy and that DOD revise guidance on documenting security deficiencies.
Javelin Missile—An example of a Category I Ammunition item
Photograph of two soldiers firing a portable, shoulder-launched missile system known as a Javelin missile.
Highlights
What GAO Found
Military service guidance for safeguarding Security Risk Category (SRC) I ammunition—which consists of nonnuclear, portable missiles and rockets in a ready-to-fire configuration—is not consistent with all of the Department of Defense's (DOD) minimum requirements. For example, DOD's guidance requires at least 8 hours of backup power for intrusion detection systems, but the Army, Navy, and Air Force guidance requires only 4 hours. The Army and Navy have drafted updates to their guidance to be consistent with DOD requirements and planned to issue revised guidance by or before the end fiscal year 2018. Marine Corps and Air Force officials told GAO they also plan to revise their guidance to be consistent with DOD requirements.
Examples of Physical Security Requirements for Ammunition Storage
The military services have conducted inspections of the physical security at locations with SRC I ammunition that GAO reviewed, and have identified security deficiencies. However, GAO is not identifying examples of deficiencies in this report because DOD deemed such information sensitive. GAO determined that some inspections were not conducted on time in accordance with military service guidance. For example, GAO reviewed 125 Army, Navy, and Marine Corps inspection reports from select locations and found that 54 inspections (or 43 percent) were late by 1 day to 14 months. These services have not taken actions to help ensure that physical security inspections are being conducted on time. Without taking actions to help achieve the services' requirements for timely inspections—such as assigning roles and responsibilities for monitoring—the services are at greater risk of compromising the security of SRC I ammunition.
In addition, it is unknown whether the military services have resolved all security deficiencies because the services do not consistently document resolutions. For example, only 3 of 14 Army locations provided documentation about how identified physical security deficiencies were resolved. DOD guidance does not require such documentation, and therefore GAO could not determine whether 29 of the 35 selected locations reviewed across the services had consistently resolved all identified deficiencies and, if so, what steps were taken to do so. Revising DOD guidance to ensure that the military services establish a process for documenting the resolution of all identified security deficiencies would help the services further reduce the risk of loss or theft of SRC I ammunition.
Why GAO Did This Study
DOD maintains stockpiles of ammunition for use during operations, including SRC I ammunition. SRC I ammunition requires a high level of protection and security due to its ability to cause extreme damage or lethality.
Senate Report 114-255 (2016), included a provision that GAO evaluate how DOD and the military services have established and maintained physical security measures at DOD locations with SRC I ammunition. GAO's report evaluates the extent to which (1) military service guidance is consistent with DOD's requirements for safeguarding SRC I ammunition and (2) the military services have identified and resolved physical security deficiencies at selected locations that store SRC I ammunition. GAO reviewed DOD guidance, visited selected military locations that were chosen based on size and variety of SRC I inventory, and interviewed officials. GAO also analyzed security inspection reports from 2014 to 2017.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2018. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted.
Recommendations
GAO is making five recommendations, including that the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps take actions to ensure their physical security inspections of locations that store SRC I ammunition are completed in accordance with policy, and that DOD revise its guidance to require that the services establish a process to consistently document the resolution of all identified physical security deficiencies. DOD concurred with all five recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of the Army | The Secretary of the Army should direct the Army's Provost Marshal General to take actions to help ensure that physical security inspections at locations with Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) are conducted on time, as required by Army guidance. (Recommendation 1) |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. In January 2019, the Army issued updated guidance that reiterated the requirements to conduct (1) physical security inspections of all AA&E storage facilities at intervals not to exceed 18 months and (2) a reinspection 6 months later if the initial inspection resulted in an unsatisfactory rating. Further, the updated guidance discusses using a new information system to conduct the inspections. According to Army officials, this system went live in August 2019 and Army personnel had completed over 2,900 inspections using the system as of Spring 2021. Based on timelines outlined in Army guidance, the system automatically assigns a new inspection date off of the date of the most recently completed inspection. Additionally, officials stated that the Army's Office of the Provost Marshal General Physical Security Division accesses the system periodically during the year and downloads an annual report of the system to check various data points including inspection timeline compliance. In June 2021, the Army provided a copy of an annual report of the system which shows timeline compliance data points. These actions meet the intent of this recommendation.
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| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Chief of Naval Operations' Supply, Ordnance, and Logistics Operations Division to take actions to help ensure that physical security inspections at locations with AA&E are conducted on time, as required by Navy guidance. (Recommendation 2) |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. In June 2019, the Commander, Navy Installations Command sent a message to naval commands reiterating policies for physically securing Arms, Ammunition and Explosives including the requirement to conduct physical security inspections every 12 months. Further, the October 2020 version of the Explosives Safety Inspection Program checklist includes two questions about whether (1) physical security inspections occur annually and (2) associated records are maintained for three years for review. According to a Navy official, explosives safety officers and physical security officers use this checklist annually at the installation level and provide it to the installation's commanding officer for review and concurrence. Finally, according to this same Navy official, no installation with Security Risk Category I ammunition was found to be out of compliance with the annual physical security inspection requirement between 2019 to mid-2021. These actions meet the intent of this recommendation.
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| Department of the Navy | The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations to take actions to help ensure that physical security inspections at locations with AA&E are conducted on time, as required by Marine Corps guidance. (Recommendation 3) |
Open
DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2022, when we reached out through DOD about the status of this recommendation, no update was provided. We reached out to DOD in June 2023 and again in August 2023 to request an update on the status of this recommendation, but as of November 2023 we have not heard back from DOD. We will keep this recommendation open and continue to monitor whether the Marine Corps takes relevant implementation actions.
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| Department of the Air Force | The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Air Force's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, Directorate of Security Forces, to take actions to help ensure that inspectors at locations with AA&E are consistently documenting in inspection reports that all minimum requirements for physical security were checked. (Recommendation 4) |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. In March 2020, the Air Force issued updated guidance that reiterated the requirements about what information that inspection reports must include. Additionally, as of January 2022, the Air Force inspector general program is to review whether applicable units are complying with the timing requirement for AA&E inspections. Further, the Air Force Management Internal Control Toolset has been updated to include checking whether inspections are being conducted when required and if the corresponding inspections reports include the minimum physical security requirements. The Air Force Management Internal Control Toolset is an Air Force program of record to communicate a unit's program health and it also provides supervisors and the command chain visibility into compliance reports and program status as well as indications of program health across functional and command channels. In combination, these actions meet the intent of this recommendation.
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| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to revise DOD guidance to require that the military services establish a process to consistently document the resolution of all identified physical security deficiencies. (Recommendation 5) |
Closed – Implemented
DOD concurred with this recommendation. In May 2022, DOD provided GAO guidance in the form of a memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security about the Protection and Reporting Requirements for Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives. This memorandum was dated September 2021. Among other items, the memorandum requires the military services to do the following for ongoing and future inspections: (1) develop a corrective action plan to correct identified physical security deficiencies or to implement alternative security measures to provide equivalent levels of protection and (2) maintain inspection records for three years or until any deficiencies identified by the inspection are corrected, whichever is longer. These requirements meet the intent of the recommendation.
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