Radioactive Sources:

Opportunities Exist for Federal Agencies to Strengthen Transportation Security

GAO-17-58: Published: Feb 7, 2017. Publicly Released: Mar 9, 2017.

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The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security work to secure high risk radioactive sources during ground transport. After the 9/11 attacks, these agencies have collaborated to strengthen the security of these sources.

However, we found that NRC does not inspect motor carriers (such as large trucks) for compliance with its security requirements, and it doesn't collect data on all shipments. Additionally, NRC and DOT have different security and safety thresholds—which may allow some shipments to be transported without certain safety protections. We made recommendations to address these issues.

 

Division of Regulatory Authority among Federal Agencies Responsible for the Security of Risk-Significant Radioactive Sources during Ground Transport

Graph of federal agencies responsible for radioactive source security during ground transport.

Graph of federal agencies responsible for radioactive source security during ground transport.

Multimedia:

Additional Materials:

Contact:

Shelby S. Oakley
(202) 512-3841
oakleys@gao.gov

 

Office of Public Affairs
(202) 512-4800
youngc1@gao.gov

What GAO Found

Since September 11, 2001, the three federal agencies responsible for securing risk-significant radioactive sources (those considered most dangerous) during ground transport have taken steps to strengthen the security of these sources. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires source licensees to ensure that motor carriers transporting these sources have security measures, such as 24-hour monitoring of shipments of potentially fatal sources. The Department of Transportation (DOT) updated its regulations to require security plans for these sources, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established security standards for commercial drivers' licenses. The agencies' participation in three collaborative mechanisms—a task force, memorandums of understanding (MOU), and coordinating councils—has also facilitated security improvements. The figure below illustrates how the agencies divide their responsibilities.

Division of Regulatory Authority among Federal Agencies Responsible for the Security of Risk-significant Radioactive Sources during Ground Transport

Division of Regulatory Authority among Federal Agencies Responsible for the Security of Risk-significant Radioactive Sources during Ground Transport

NRC and DOT face challenges related to collecting data and ensuring compliance with NRC security requirements for ground transport of risk-significant radioactive sources, but opportunities exist to address them. For example, NRC does not directly inspect whether motor carriers contracted by licensees to transport risk-significant sources have implemented its security requirements because its regulatory authority extends only to its licensees. Instead, NRC requires licensees to ensure that carriers meet the requirements, and its inspectors are to verify that licensees do so. DOT and state officials have regulatory authority over carriers, but their inspectors do not enforce compliance with NRC security requirements because DOT does not have that authority. Thus, no federal or state agency directly inspects carriers for compliance with NRC's security requirements. Under a 2015 MOU, the three agencies committed to coordinating on inspection activities to optimize available resources. By consulting with DOT and DHS to identify an approach to verify that carriers are meeting NRC's security requirements, NRC has an opportunity to further strengthen the security of shipments of risk-significant sources, for example, by having DOT inspectors verify compliance during on-site investigations.

Why GAO Did This Study

Concerns have been raised that risk-significant sources could be stolen by terrorists and used to create a “dirty bomb.” NRC is responsible for licensing the possession and use of these sources. DOT regulates the transport of such sources, and DHS is responsible for securing all modes of transportation.

GAO was asked to review the security of these sources during ground transport. This report examines (1) the steps that NRC, DOT, and DHS have taken since September 11, 2001, to strengthen the security of these sources; and (2) the challenges that exist to further strengthening the security of these sources during ground transport and opportunities to address them.

GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations, analyzed information on source shipments, and interviewed federal agency officials, officials from four motor carriers identified through interviews and research, and officials from two of the largest source manufacturers.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making three recommendations, including that NRC, in consultation with DOT and DHS, identify an approach to verify that carriers meet NRC requirements. NRC agreed with the recommendation. DOT agreed to consult with NRC and DHS, but did not fully concur, citing a lack of authority. GAO clarified the recommendation in response to DOT's concern.

For more information, contact Shelby S. Oakley at (202) 512-3841 or oakleys@gao.gov.

Recommendations for Executive Action

  1. Status: Open

    Comments: In its February 26, 2018 report to Congress on actions NRC has taken in response to GAO recommendations, NRC continued to disagree with the recommendation to expand its existing data collection requirements or to transition such information from its existing NRC databases to the NSTS. NRC stated that, as required by 10 CFR Part 37, "Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material," the NRC currently collects the number of shipments and mode of transport for domestic transfers, and the import and export of Category 1 quantities of radioactive material. Additionally, under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 110, "Export and Import of Nuclear Material," the NRC stated that it collects the number of shipments and mode of transport for the import and export of shipments containing Category 2 or higher quantities of radioactive material. The NRC stated that it is the agency's position that the current information collected provides the NRC with an understanding of the potential modes of transport for Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material and existing regulatory requirements provide robust protection for all such modes. The NRC stated that it does not consider the proposed additional information collection activity to be of sufficient safety or security benefit to justify the associated regulatory actions it would require. Despite its disagreement with this recommendation, we will continue to monitor whether NRC takes any actions that would result in addressing the concern GAO raised.

    Recommendation: To improve the awareness of how risk-significant radioactive sources are transported within the United States and to better determine whether Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is meeting its goal of providing reasonable assurance for preventing the theft or diversion of these dangerous materials, the Chairman of NRC should take actions to collect information from licensees on the number of shipments and mode of transport for such sources--for example, by identifying the extent to which an existing NRC database (e.g., the National Source Tracking System) may be used to capture this information.

    Agency Affected: Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  2. Status: Closed - Implemented

    Comments: In July 2018, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) officials reported that they had implemented this recommendation by meeting internally and with federal partners to explore approaches to verify that motor carriers are meeting 10 CFR Part 37 transportation security requirements. Specifically, NRC officials reported that they had established a working group in April 2017 composed of officials from NRC's Nuclear Security and Incident Response and Office of Enforcement, with the participation of officials from NRC's Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of General Counsel, NRC's inspectors from Regions I and III, and the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. This working group conducted numerous meetings from April 2017 through January 2018 to explore GAO's recommendation. In addition, NRC officials reported that they had conducted several meetings with Department of Transportation (DOT) officials from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and also met informally with officials from the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to explore GAO's recommendation. NRC officials reported that they sent three requests to the Department of Homeland Security to discuss the recommendation, but did not receive a response. NRC officials reported that in the internal NRC meetings and in the meetings NRC held with DOT, staff determined that the existing methods being employed to verify that motor carriers are implementing 10 CFR Part 37 security requirements provide reasonable assurance that the requirements of 10 CFR Part 37 are being met.

    Recommendation: To further enhance the security of radioactive sources during ground transport, the Chairman of NRC, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Homeland Security, should identify an approach to verify that motor carriers are meeting NRC's Part 37 security requirements applicable to transportation, for example by having DOT inspectors verify compliance with NRC Part 37 security requirements during their on-site investigations.

    Agency Affected: Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  3. Status: Open

    Comments: In April 2018, DOT officials stated that the agency had consulted with the NRC regarding the existing NRC 10 CFR Part 37 security regulations on Category 1 sources and the data available on their shipments. In addition, DOT officials stated that the agency had also reviewed information on various state laws and policies regarding HRCQ shipments, and obtained input from shippers of Category 1 sources. DOT officials stated that revising the regulations to lower the HRCQ will not result in any significant improvements in security, but would increase compliance burdens on shippers and carriers, including increased costs. DOT officials stated that NRC's 10 CFR Part 37 security requirements provide adequate protection for all Category 1 source shipments. DOT officials stated that DOT does not intend to lower the HRCQ threshold so that more, or all, category 1 shipments are classified as HRCQ shipments. We will continue to monitor DOT's efforts to coordinate with the NRC and Homeland Security on this recommendation.

    Recommendation: To further enhance the security of radioactive sources during ground transport, the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Chairman of NRC and the Secretary of Homeland Security, should consider examining the potential costs and security benefits associated with lowering the Highway Route Controlled Quantity (HRCQ) threshold so that more, or all, category 1 shipments are classified as HRCQ shipments.

    Agency Affected: Department of Transportation

 

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