Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification
GAO-07-316: Published: Feb 22, 2007. Publicly Released: Mar 14, 2007.
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The United States imports natural gas by pipeline from Canada and by tanker as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from overseas. LNG--a supercooled form of natural gas--currently accounts for about 3 percent of total U.S. natural gas supply, with an expected increase to about 17 percent by 2030, according to the Department of Energy (DOE). With this projected increase, many more LNG import terminals have been proposed. However, concerns have been raised about whether LNG tankers could become terrorist targets, causing the LNG cargo to spill and catch on fire, and potentially explode. DOE has recently funded a study to consider these effects; completion is expected in 2008. GAO was asked to (1) describe the results of recent studies on the consequences of an LNG spill and (2) identify the areas of agreement and disagreement among experts concerning the consequences of a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker. To address these objectives, GAO, among other things, convened an expert panel to discuss the consequences of an attack on an LNG tanker.
The six unclassified completed studies GAO reviewed examined the effect of a fire resulting from an LNG spill but produced varying results; some studies also examined other potential hazards of a large LNG spill. The studies' conclusions about the distance at which 30 seconds of exposure to the heat (heat hazard) could burn people ranged from less than 1/3 of a mile to about 1-1/4 miles. Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) conducted one of the studies and concluded, based on its analysis of multiple attack scenarios, that a good estimate of the heat hazard distance would be about 1 mile. Federal agencies use this conclusion to assess proposals for new LNG import terminals. The variations among the studies occurred because researchers had to make modeling assumptions since there are no data for large LNG spills, either from accidental spills or spill experiments. These assumptions involved the size of the hole in the tanker; the volume of the LNG spilled; and environmental conditions, such as wind and waves. The three studies that considered LNG explosions concluded explosions were unlikely unless the LNG vapors were in a confined space. Only the Sandia study examined the potential for sequential failure of LNG cargo tanks (cascading failure) and concluded that up to three of the ship's five tanks could be involved in such an event and that this number of tanks would increase the duration of the LNG fire. GAO's expert panel generally agreed on the public safety impact of an LNG spill, but believed further study was needed to clarify the extent of these effects, and suggested priorities for this additional research. Experts agreed that the most likely public safety impact of an LNG spill is the heat hazard of a fire and that explosions are not likely to occur in the wake of an LNG spill. However, experts disagreed on the specific heat hazard and cascading failure conclusions reached by the Sandia study. DOE's recently funded study involving large-scale LNG fire experiments addresses some, but not all, of the research priorities identified by the expert panel. The leading unaddressed priority the panel cited was the potential for cascading failure of LNG tanks.
Recommendation for Executive Action
Status: Closed - Implemented
Comments: Based on GAO's recommendation, DOE directed Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) to develop and execute a research plan examining the potential consequences of large-scale LNG fires and the potential for cascading failure of an LNG tanker. In response, Sandia developed and executed a research plan that includes a detailed examination of the physics of LNG fires ignited after LNG is spilled on water and the potential for cascading failure of an LNG tanker when exposed to extreme temperatures.
Recommendation: To provide the most comprehensive and accurate information for assessing the public safety risks posed by tankers transiting to proposed LNG facilities, the Secretary of Energy should ensure that DOE incorporates the key issues identified by the expert panel into its current LNG study. In particular, DOE should examine the potential for cascading failure of LNG tanks in order to understand the damage to the hull that could be caused by exposure to extreme cold or heat.
Agency Affected: Department of Energy