Nuclear Weapons: Improvements Needed to DOE's Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Surveillance Program

In its January 29, 1997, response, DOE provided a written plan designed to demonstrate the actions necessary to fully recover the stockpile surveillance testing schedule with programmatic requirements. Included in the plans are laboratory tests of key components such as pits, secondaries, detonators, and gas transfer systems. DOE states that with pits back on schedule, it projects that the backlog of secondaries will be eliminated in fiscal year 1999. Further, DOE is confident the detonator backlog will be eliminated in fiscal year 1997. DOE estimates the gas transfer system backlog will be eliminated during a transition of operations from an interim to a permanent facility in fiscal year 2000. DOE's plan also addresses getting flight testing back on schedule for three weapons systems i.e., W88 by February 1998, W78 by fiscal year 1998, and a decision to be made on the W62 in fiscal year 1997.

DOE states that, historically, its weapons production and surveillance testing has had minimal redundancy. Given today's regulatory, economic, fiscal, and political realities, DOE states that it does not intend to invest the resources necessary to fully document, plan, or implement a wide variety of low probability scenarios. Instead, DOE chose to develop what it calls specific cost-effective solutions to specific problems. Should production or testing disruptions occur at certain major facilities, DOE outlines six recovery operations critical to its weapons program. DOE presents six hypothetical surveillance capability problems that could impact its nuclear weapons program with varying degrees of operational recovery that range from as little as 1 year to as long as 10 years.