Nuclear Nonproliferation: Controls Over the Commercial Sale and Export of Tritium Can Be Improved
RCED-91-90
Published: Mar 25, 1991. Publicly Released: Apr 25, 1991.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the adequacy of the Department of Energy's (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) existing controls on the commercial sales and exports of tritium.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Energy | To help ensure that problems similar to those that occurred in the ORNL tritium program do not occur in future DOE commercial tritium operations, other isotope programs, and other similar DOE programs, the Secretary of Energy should emphasize to DOE program managers the need to adhere to existing DOE orders for the control of tritium, including DOE policy for immediately identifying, investigating, and reconciling shipper-receiver tritium discrepancies. |
Closed – Implemented
The agency accepted and implemented the recommendation. The recommendation should be closed.
|
| Department of Energy | To help ensure that problems similar to those that occurred in the ORNL tritium program do not occur in future DOE commercial tritium operations, other isotope programs, and other similar DOE programs, the Secretary of Energy should direct the DOE Isotope Production and Distribution Program Director and DOE operations office managers to ensure that management and oversight lessons learned from the Oak Ridge tritium program are transferred to other Oak Ridge programs and other DOE isotope programs at other locations, including the new commercial tritium operation at Mount Plant, Ohio. |
Closed – Implemented
DOE completed action on this recommendation. The agency accepted and implemented the recommendation.
|
| Nuclear Regulatory Commission | The Chairman, NRC, should analyze the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a limit on the size of individual shipments that are allowed under tritium licenses, particularly as they relate to ensuring that the amount sent in a single shipment cannot be used as a booster in a nuclear weapons device if stolen or otherwise diverted. |
Closed – Not Implemented
NRC had previously told Congress in hearings that controls over tritium were adequate and continues to state that this type of analysis is not necessary because tritium by itself cannot produce a bomb; it is only a booster for a fission bomb. NRC considers this adequate protection.
|
| Nuclear Regulatory Commission | The Chairman, NRC, should pursue, with the aid of the Department of State, obtaining written agreements from recipient countries for notification and approval of retransfer of exported U.S. tritium. |
Closed – Not Implemented
State is now recommending a status quo approach. It does not want to be aggressive with the other countries.
|
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