Nuclear Nonproliferation: Uncertainties With Implementing IAEA's Strengthened Safeguards System
NSIAD/RCED-98-184
Published: Jul 09, 1998. Publicly Released: Jul 09, 1998.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) changes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is undertaking to strengthen its safeguards program; (2) the reasonableness of IAEA's assumptions regarding the impact of these changes on program costs and efficiency; and (3) comments on the extent of IAEA's reliance on the United States to finance the Agency's safeguards activities.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of State | The Secretary of State, working with other IAEA member states, should request the Director General to develop and circulate a plan for implementing parts 1 and 2 of the Strengthened Safeguards System. Such a plan should include: (1) an estimate of the total cost of program implementation; (2) a schedule, with milestones, for implementing the strengthened safeguards measures; and (3) criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the new measures. This plan should be used by IAEA and its member states to determine when the new measures can replace existing safeguards measures. Furthermore, IAEA should periodically revise and update the plan as it implements the strengthened safeguards measures and use the plan to develop its budgetary requirements for the program. |
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member States are implementing Part I of the Strengthened Safeguards System on a routine basis, including enhanced access to safeguarded facilities, regular use of environmental sampling at enrichment plants and large hot cells, and evaluation of open-source information. Part 2 is being implemented as Member States bring their Additional Protocols into Force, and as of August 2001, 21 states had done so. The IAEA has made progress in developing "Integrated Safeguards", the combination of traditional safeguards measures and the Additional Protocol measures, including replacement of, or reductions in traditional measures. The Agency is developing Integrated Safeguards approaches for each facility type, starting with the most common type--light water reactors, and it has developed a schedule and milestones for the near-term phases of this work. While these approaches are intended to reduce costs while preserving effectiveness, IAEA Member States continue to allow for no real growth in the Agency's budget. As such, the total funds available for safeguards program implementation remain fixed. IAEA estimates that a regular budget increase of $28 million would be needed to fully implement its safeguards responsibilities. The United States, however, continues to support crucial unfunded safeguards expenses, especially procurement of equipment, through extrabudgetary contributions. While the IAEA is implementing Parts I and 2 of the Strengthened Safeguards System, the Agency's member states continue to allow no real growth in the IAEA budget. Full implementation hinges upon an increased IAEA budget and the results of safeguards underway. At this time it is difficult to assess when IAEA safeguards funding levels will increase and how successful the Integrated Safeguards approaches will be.
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| Department of State | To reduce reliance on U.S. extrabudgetary contributions, the Secretary of State should reevaluate the United States' policy of supporting zero real growth for IAEA's regular budget and the need to maintain a one-for-one funding balance between the safeguards and technical cooperation programs. |
State concurred with this recommendation and the Secretary of State completed the evaluation called for in GAO's report. The Executive branch has decided not to exempt IAEA from the current budget practice of zero nominal growth because of the impact such a change would have on overall funding issues for international organizations.
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