Research Security: Agencies Should Assess Safeguards Against Discrimination
Fast Facts
Foreign countries, primarily China, attempt to improperly influence scientists conducting federally funded research, creating risks of fraud and to research integrity. Agencies address this risk through research security processes, but there are concerns that these efforts unfairly target scientists of Chinese or Asian descent.
We identified five safeguards to help agencies avoid discrimination, but agencies varied in their use. Further, no agency had assessed the potential for discrimination in their research security processes. Our recommendations would make research security more transparent and have agencies assess their safeguards.
A person in a lab coat swiping a badge on a reader in a secure facility.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The federal government gives grants to individual scientists and groups of scientists through their respective research institutions, supporting both basic and applied research. Federal funding agencies must have research security policies in place to ensure that such research is free of improper foreign influence. Such influence includes, for example, malign talent recruitment activities by foreign governments or misappropriation of research findings. Agencies are required to carry out research security policies in a manner that does not discriminate against scientists based on their race, ethnicity, or national origin. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and National Science Foundation (NSF) have applied safeguards to varying degrees in their research security programs to help prevent discrimination.
Extent to Which Selected Agencies Have Adopted Safeguards to Prevent Discrimination While Addressing Improper Foreign Influence
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Transparent improper foreign influence review processes |
Collection and use of demographic data to assess agency processes |
Multiple levels of review in improper foreign influence reviews |
Training agency staff in non-discrimination in improper foreign influence reviews |
Leadership commitment to non-discrimination in improper foreign influence reviews |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Department of Defense |
◒ | ◯ | ● | ◒ | ◯ |
|
Department of Energy |
◒ | ◯ | ● | ◒ | ● |
|
National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
◒ | ◯ | ● | ◯ | ◯ |
|
National Institutes of Health |
● | ◒ | ● | ◯ |
● |
|
National Science Foundation |
◒ | ◯ | ● | ● | ● |
● = Fully adopted ◒ = Partially adopted or plan in development; ◯ = Not adopted
Source: GAO analysis of selected agencies’ documents and interviews. | GAO-26-107544
While NASA and NSF documented their processes for identifying and addressing improper foreign influence, they have not documented their risk mitigation processes. By clearly documenting risk mitigation processes, agencies can create shared expectations with research institutions and researchers about how these processes are implemented fairly and without discrimination. Additionally, DOD, DOE, NASA, NIH, and NSF have not assessed their research security processes to determine whether the safeguards the agencies have in place provide reasonable assurance that discrimination will not occur. By assessing their current safeguards, agencies can provide greater assurance that discrimination will not occur and may identify additional safeguards appropriate to the agency.
Why GAO Did This Study
As a global leader in scientific research, the U.S. has benefited from recruiting international talent and international collaborations. However, concerns have grown about improper foreign influence in federally funded research.
While agency identification of improper foreign influence is critical to preventing fraud in taxpayer funded research, some stakeholders raised concerns that agencies were discriminating against certain demographic groups when reviewing grants.
GAO was asked to examine whether federal agencies ensure that research security reviews are free from discrimination. This report assesses the extent to which selected agencies have implemented safeguards to prevent discrimination in research security processes.
GAO selected the five agencies that funded the highest amounts of extramural research and reviewed agency documents and published literature. GAO also performed statistical analysis on data obtained from one agency to assess differences among improper foreign influence cases and interviewed agency officials and representatives of universities and civil society organizations.
Recommendations
GAO is making seven recommendations. NASA and NSF should document their risk mitigation processes. All five agencies should assess their research security processes to determine if their safeguards reasonably ensure nondiscrimination. NASA and NIH agreed, and NSF said it would consider the recommendation. DOE disagreed, noting it designed its process to ensure nondiscrimination. GAO believes that an assessment could yield benefits. DOD did not comment.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| National Science Foundation | The Director of the NSF should ensure that the Office of the Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy, or the appropriate office within NSF, document an interim risk mitigation process for its TRUST pilot while continuing to develop a final process. (Recommendation 1) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| National Aeronautics and Space Administration | The Administrator of NASA should ensure that the appropriate office document how its interim process addresses risk assessment criteria, remediation steps, and due process rights for research institutions or individuals as it continues to develop its final research security process. (Recommendation 2) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| Department of Defense | The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, or the appropriate office within DOD, assess the agency's research security processes to determine whether current safeguards provide reasonable assurance that discrimination will not occur and whether any additional safeguards would be practical and beneficial. (Recommendation 3) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy should ensure that the Research, Technology, and Economic Security Office, or the appropriate office within DOE, assess the agency's research security processes to determine whether current safeguards provide reasonable assurance that discrimination will not occur and whether any additional safeguards would be practical and beneficial. (Recommendation 4) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| National Aeronautics and Space Administration | The Administrator of NASA should ensure that the appropriate office assess the agency's research security processes to determine whether current safeguards provide reasonable assurance that discrimination will not occur and whether any additional safeguards would be practical and beneficial. (Recommendation 5) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| National Institutes of Health | The Director of NIH should ensure that the Office of Extramural Research, or the appropriate office within NIH, assess the agency's research security processes to determine whether current safeguards provide reasonable assurance that discrimination will not occur and whether any additional safeguards would be practical and beneficial. (Recommendation 6) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| National Science Foundation | The Director of NSF should ensure that the Office of the Chief of Research Security Strategy and Policy, or the appropriate office within NSF, assess the agency's research security processes to determine whether current safeguards provide reasonable assurance that discrimination will not occur and whether any additional safeguards would be practical and beneficial. (Recommendation 7) |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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