The end of the Cold War left the United States with a surplus of weapons-grade plutonium, which poses proliferation and safety risks. Much of this material is found in a key nuclear weapon component known as a pit. The Department of Energy (DOE) plans to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of plutonium by fabricating it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for domestic nuclear reactors. To do so, DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is constructing two facilities--a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) and a Waste Solidification Building (WSB)--at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. GAO was asked to assess the (1) cost and schedule status of the MFFF and WSB construction projects, (2) status of NNSA's plans for pit disassembly and conversion, (3) status of NNSA's plans to obtain customers for MOX fuel from the MFFF, and (4) actions that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and DOE have taken to provide independent nuclear safety oversight. GAO reviewed NNSA documents and project data, toured DOE facilities, and interviewed officials from DOE, NRC, and nuclear utilities.
Recommendations for Executive Action
|National Nuclear Security Administration||1. To address uncertainties associated with NNSA's plans to establish a pit disassembly and conversion capability, the Administrator of the NNSA should develop a plan to mitigate the likely shortfall in plutonium oxide feedstock for the MFFF prior to the start of pit disassembly operations. This plan should include, at a minimum, the following five items: (1) the actions needed to ensure that the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) project will meet its existing production goals, and the cost and schedule associated with any needed expansion of the project; (2) an assessment of how much additional plutonium material, including fuel-grade plutonium, is available within the DOE complex for use as feedstock for the MFFF; (3) an assessment of the effect on the design and safety of the MFFF from the use of fuel-grade plutonium as feedstock; (4) an assessment of potential changes to the MOX fuel production schedule and the effect of these changes on the cost and schedule for operating the MFFF; and (5) an assessment of the cost and schedule associated with obtaining a limited but sufficient pit disassembly process to produce feedstock for the MFFF.|
|National Nuclear Security Administration||2. To address uncertainties associated with NNSA's plans to establish a pit disassembly and conversion capability, the Administrator of the NNSA should develop a technology maturation plan for the pit disassembly and conversion mission that (1) includes all critical technologies to be used in pit disassembly and conversion operations and (2) provides details (including preliminary cost and schedule estimates) on planned testing and development activities to bring each critical technology up to a sufficient level of maturity.|
|National Nuclear Security Administration||3. To address uncertainties associated with NNSA's plans to establish a pit disassembly and conversion capability, the Administrator of the NNSA should conduct additional outreach activities to better inform utilities about the MOX fuel program and related incentives.|
|Department of Energy||4. To ensure that the WSB and similar projects receive consistent nuclear safety oversight that is independent from the DOE program offices, the Secretary of Energy should revise DOE Order 413.3A to provide that the Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) participate in key project reviews for the WSB and similar high-hazard facilities prior to the beginning of construction activities regardless of their status as nonmajor projects.|
|National Nuclear Security Administration||5. To ensure that the WSB and similar projects receive consistent nuclear safety oversight that is independent from the DOE program offices, the Administrator of NNSA should ensure that the Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety (CDNS) conducts oversight activities to the extent called for by DOE Order 413.3A and establishes a formal, standardized approach to reviewing safety documentation.|