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State Department's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) is responsible for the protection of people, information, and property at over 400 foreign missions and domestic locations. Diplomatic Security must be prepared to counter threats such as crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to assess (1) how Diplomatic Security's mission has evolved since 1998, (2) how its resources have changed over the last 10 years, and (3) the challenges it faces in conducting its missions. GAO analyzed Diplomatic Security data; reviewed relevant documents; and interviewed officials at several domestic facilities and 18 international missions.

Diplomatic Security's mission, toensure a safe environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, involves activities such as the protection of people, information, and property overseas, and dignitary protection and passport and visa fraud investigations domestically. These activities have grown since 1998 in reaction to a number of security incidents. Diplomatic Security funding and personnel have also increased considerably over the last 10 years. In 1998, Diplomatic Security's budget was about $200 million; by fiscal year 2008, it had grown to approximately $1.8 billion, of which over $300 million was for security in Iraq. In addition, the size of Diplomatic Security's direct-hire workforce has doubled since 1998 and will likely continue to expand. Recently, Diplomatic Security's reliance on contractors has grown to fill critical needs in high-threat posts. Diplomatic Security faces several challenges that could affect the bureau's ability to provide security and use its resources efficiently. First, State's policy to maintain missions in increasingly dangerous posts requires a substantial amount of resources. Second, although Diplomatic Security's workforce has grown considerably over the last 10 years, staffing shortages in domestic offices and other operational challenges--such as inadequate facilities, language deficiencies, experience gaps, and balancing security needs with State's diplomatic mission--further tax its ability to implement all of its missions. Finally, Diplomatic Security's tremendous growth has been in reaction to events and does not benefit from adequate strategic guidance. Neither State's departmental strategic plan nor Diplomatic Security's bureau strategic plan specifically addresses the bureau's resource needs or management challenges.

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Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of State 1. The Secretary of State--as part of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) or as a separate initiative--should conduct a strategic review of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure that its missions and activities address the department's priority needs. This review should also address key human capital and operational challenges faced by Diplomatic Security, such as (1) operating domestic and international activities with adequate staff; (2) providing security for facilities that do not meet all security standards; (3) staffing foreign missions with officials who have appropriate language skills; (4) operating programs with experienced staff, at the commensurate grade levels; and (5) balancing security needs with State's need to conduct its diplomatic mission.
Closed - Implemented
State agreed with the report's recommendation and initially indicated that it would include its review of DS as part of the QDDR. However, State did not conduct such a review as part of the 2010 QDDR. Rather, in 2015 DS's newly created Strategic Planning Unit conducted the first phase of a Strategic Staffing Review. The Strategic Planning Unit reviewed the current staffing levels for (1) DS security programs at headquarters and (2) overseas positions (agents and security engineers). The DS Strategic Planning Unit made several conclusions concerning potential staffing concerns based on their findings in both sections of the report, which the report notes will be examined during Phase II of the Strategic Staffing Review. According to DS, Phase II will develop a workforce planning and staffing model that addresses global responsibilities of DS. This staffing model will be able to project the staffing required for DS based on planned increases in output, assess program productivity over time, and assess the impact on program output by both increases and decreases in staff. Furthermore, State has taken steps to address the five specific components of our recommendation. (1) Regarding operating domestic and international activities with adequate staff, State created 151 new DS positions for domestic and international operations. (2) Regarding providing security for facilities that do not meet all security standards, DS reiterated their policy for processing exceptions to standards and the employment of technical, procedural, and physical mitigation measures to meet security needs. In addition, DS has worked with the Department of Defense (DOD) to activate 35 new Marine Security Guard detachments in order to increase security personnel at high-threat, high-risk posts. (3) Regarding staffing foreign missions with officials who have appropriate language skills, the Foreign Service Institute developed Arabic, Urdu, and French language course aimed at giving DS agents at posts overseas the language skills necessary for effectively communicating on security matters. (4) Regarding operating programs with experienced staff, at the commensurate grade levels, State implemented new assignments and temporary duty policies that promote sending more experienced staff to high-threat, high-risk posts. An analysis conducted by State indicated that the percentage of at-grade employees filling key positions at high-threat, high-risk posts increased slightly from 2010 to 2013. (5) Regarding balancing security needs with State's need to conduct its diplomatic mission, State developed the High Threat Post Review Board and the Vital Presence Validation Process to assess and manage risk at high-threat, high-risk posts on an annual and ad hoc basis.

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