Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports
GAO-05-375
Published: Mar 31, 2005. Publicly Released: May 02, 2005.
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Highlights
Since September 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists could smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country in the approximately 7 million containers that arrive annually at U.S. seaports. Nuclear materials can be smuggled across borders by being placed inside containers aboard cargo ships. In response to this concern, since 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) has deployed radiation detection equipment to key foreign seaports through its Megaports Initiative (Initiative). GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in implementing the Initiative, (2) current and expected costs of the Initiative, and (3) challenges DOE faces in installing radiation detection equipment at foreign ports.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, should develop a comprehensive long-term plan to guide the future efforts of the Initiative that includes, at a minimum, (1) performance measures that are consistent with DOE's desire to install radiation detection equipment at the highest priority foreign seaports, (2) strategies DOE will employ to determine how many and which lower priority ports it will include in the Initiative if it continues to have difficulty installing equipment at the highest priority ports as identified by its model, (3) projections of the anticipated funds required to meet the Initiative's objectives, and (4) specific time frames for effectively spending program funds. |
Closed – Implemented
DOE informed GAO in a letter dated July 7, 2005, that it concurred with this recommendation and was taking steps to develop a single comprehensive long-term plan for the Megaports Initiative. DOE completed its comprehensive program plan for the Megaports Initiative in March 2006. DOE provided GAO with a copy of this plan for our review.
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| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, should evaluate the accuracy of the current per port cost estimate of $15 million, make any necessary adjustments to the Initiative's long-term cost projection, and inform Congress of any changes to the long-term cost projection for the Initiative. |
Closed – Implemented
DOE informed GAO in a letter dated July 7, 2005, that it concurred with this recommendation and will conduct a comprehensive cost analysis to asses the accuracy of the per port estimate for the Megaports Initiative at the end of Fiscal Year 2005. In February 2007, DOE officials provided GAO with information on their implementation of this recommendation. Specifically, DOE has conducted an evaluation of the previous per-port estimate based on historical cost data from relevant operational ports and from multiple ports of various sizes and stages of system implementation. In an effort to more effectively estimate the costs associated with system implementation, DOE has categorized ports by the number of radiation portal monitors deployed. DOE provided the following information about the estimated per port cost estimate by port size: Pilot 2-4 radiation portal monitors (RPMs) $2.6M; Small 10 RPMs $7.5M; Medium 18-20 RPMs $14.3M; Large 35-40 $30.4M. According to DOE, future program lifecycle planning and budget forecasting will utilize the revised basis of estimate for each category of port. As a best practice, DOE wrote that it will continue to evaluate the implementation model used in an effort to gain efficiencies leading to future cost reductions.
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Topics
Cargo screeningCost analysisCounterterrorismForeign governmentsHarborsHomeland securityInspectionInternational agreementsInternational cooperationInternational relationsMerchant vesselsNuclear materialsNuclear radiation monitoringNuclear weaponsPerformance measuresProgram evaluationSmugglingStrategic planningTerrorismTerroristsUnitized cargo systemsProgram goals or objectives