Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes
GAO-03-43
Published: Oct 25, 2002. Publicly Released: Oct 25, 2002.
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Highlights
Multilateral export control regimes are consensus-based, voluntary arrangements of supplier countries that produce technologies useful in developing weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. The regimes aim to restrict trade in these technologies to keep them from proliferating states or terrorists. The United States seeks to improve the effectiveness of these regimes. GAO was asked to (1) assess weaknesses of the four regimes and (2) identify obstacles faced in trying to strengthen them.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of State | To help multilateral export control regimes achieve their stated goals and objectives, the Secretary of State should establish a strategy to work with other regime members to enhance the effectiveness of the multilateral export control regimes. This strategy should identify steps regime members should take to (1) improve information-sharing by establishing clearly defined standards for reporting export denials on a more complete and timely basis, sharing greater and more detailed information on approved exports of sensitive transfers to nonmember countries, and adopting automated information-sharing systems in the Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group to facilitate more timely information exchanges; (2) adopt and implement agreed-upon regime changes to export controls more consistently by setting guidelines for when each regime member should adopt control list changes into national laws and regulations and making this information available to all members, tracking when members adopt regime changes into national law and regulations and making information on the timing and content of these changes available to the membership, establishing minimal standards for an effective national export control system, and periodically assessing each member's national export control system against these standards and reporting the results of these assessments to the regime; and (3) identify potential changes in policies and procedures by assessing alternative processes for reaching decisions, evaluating means for encouraging greater adherence to regime commitments, and conducting an annual self-assessment of regime effectiveness. |
State provided a copy of its 31 USC 720 response. State had continued to say that the National Security Council was studying the issues in the report, a process that began in 2002. State's Office Director for Chemical, Biological, and Missile Proliferation confirmed that the NSC study was never completed. No further action on this recommendation is anticipated.
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| Department of State | To ensure that the United States is reporting all relevant information to the multilateral export control regimes, as expected, the Secretary of State should report U.S. denials of all export licenses for items controlled by a multilateral export control regime at the time the exporter is informed of the U.S. government's intent to deny an export license. |
State provided a copy of its 31 USC 720 response. State had continued to say that the National Security Council was studying the issues in the report, a process that began in 2002. State's Office Director for Chemical, Biological, and Missile Proliferation confirmed that the NSC study was never completed. No further action on this recommendation is anticipated.
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| Department of State | To enable the U.S. government to better implement its policy of strengthening the effectiveness of the multilateral export control regimes, the Secretary of State should establish criteria to assess the effectiveness of the multilateral export control regimes. |
State provided a copy of its 31 USC 720 response. State had continued to say that the National Security Council was studying the issues in the report, a process that began in 2002. State's Office Director for Chemical, Biological, and Missile Proliferation confirmed that this study was never completed. No further action is anticipated.
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Arms control agreementsExport regulationForeign trade agreementsForeign trade policiesHomeland securityNuclear proliferationNuclear weaponsRegulatory agenciesTerroristsVoluntary complianceWeapons of mass destruction