Oready, LLC

Decision

Matter of: Oready, LLC

File: B-424508; B-424509; B-424510

Date: June 8, 2026

Michael Faro, for the protester.
William B. Blake, Esq., Department of the Interior, for the agency.
Paul N. Wengert, Esq., and Todd Culliton, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Protests challenging terms of solicitations are dismissed as untimely where each protest was submitted to GAO on a business day, but after GAO had closed for filings at 5:30 p.m. Eastern Time and, as a result, each protest was filed when GAO reopened on the next business day, which was after the closing time set for receipt of quotations under the applicable solicitation.

2. Protests challenging terms of solicitations that were filed at GAO after the closing time set for receipt of quotations were not eligible for treatment as subsequent protests to GAO filed after timely agency-level protests under 4 C.F.R. 21.2(a)(3) because, even though the protester transmitted a copy of each GAO protest to the contracting officer before the applicable solicitation's closing time set for receipt of quotations, that submission did not constitute the filing of an agency-level protest.

DECISION

Oready, LLC, of Las Vegas, Nevada, a small business, protests the terms of three requests for quotations (RFQ) Nos. 140A2326Q0114; 140A2326Q0116; and 140A2326Q0117, issued by the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Education, for commercial occupational therapist and certified occupational therapist assistant services at T'iis Ts'ozi Bi'Olta'/Crownpoint Community School, in Crownpoint, New Mexico; speech/language therapy services at Tohaali Community School in Newcomb, New Mexico; and occupational therapy services, also at Tohaali Community School, respectively. The protester contends that each RFQ includes terms that unjustifiably limit competition.

We dismiss the protests.

Our Bid Protest Regulations contain strict rules for the timely submission of protests. These rules reflect the dual requirements of giving parties a fair opportunity to present their cases and resolving protests expeditiously without unduly disrupting or delaying the procurement process. Verizon Wireless, B‑406854, B‑406854.2, Sept. 17, 2012, at 4. Our timeliness rules specifically require that a protest based upon alleged improprieties in a solicitation that are apparent prior to the closing time for receipt of initial proposals be filed before that time. 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(1); see AmaTerra Envtl. Inc., B-408290.2, Oct. 23, 2013, at 3.

Interior argues that each of the protests should be dismissed as untimely because it was filed on May 18, after the May 15 closing date for submission of quotations specified in the relevant RFQ. Req. for Dismissal (B-424508) at 2; Corrected Req. for Dismissal (B-424509) at 2; Corrected Req. for Dismissal (B-424510) at 2.

Here, each RFQ, as amended, specified a closing time for submission of quotations on May 15, 2026 at 5:00 p.m. Mountain Daylight-saving Time (MDT). Protest (B-424508) exh. D, RFQ amend. 2 at 2; Protest (B-424509) exh. D, RFQ amend 2 at 2; Protest (B‑424510) exh. C, RFQ amend. 2 at 2. The protests were all submitted to our Office after our closing time of 5:30 p.m. Eastern Time (ET) on May 15,[1] and therefore, as provided in our Bid Protest Regulations, the submission after our Office had closed meant that each was filed when our Office reopened on May 18. 4 C.F.R. § 21.0(g) (“A document is filed on a particular day when it is received in [the Electronic Protest Docketing System] by 5:30 p.m., Eastern Time”); see, e.g., CWIS, LLC, B‑416544, July 12, 2018 at 3 (protest challenging sole-source justification was untimely where protest was submitted after 5:30 p.m. ET and thus was filed the next business day, which was more than 10 days after agency posted sole-source justification). Further, we have explained that as a general matter under section 21.2(a)(1), when our Office will be closed at the time established for receipt of proposals or quotations, protests must be filed by 5:30 p.m. ET on the last day on which our Office is open before the solicitation closing time. Bland & Assocs., PC, B-419924, Sep. 28, 2021, at 3; FitNet Purchasing Alliance, B‑400553, Sept. 24, 2008, at 1‑2. Accordingly, under section 21.2(a)(1), Oready had to have filed these protests with our Office by 5:30 p.m. on May 15 for them to be timely.

Oready acknowledges that its protest filings would be untimely under 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(1), but it argues that § 21.2(a)(1) does not apply. The firm contends that by sending a copy of each protest to the contracting officer at the time of submission to our Office (and thus before the 5:00 p.m. MDT closing time established in the corresponding RFQ), Oready, in effect, filed a timely agency-level protest of each RFQ on May 15 before each RFQ's closing time. Then, when our Office accepted each protest as a filing on May 18, the firm argues that the timeliness exception in 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(3) applied because each protest was therefore “a subsequent protest to GAO.” Opp. to Reqs. for Dismissal at 5. The protester's reasoning is that its protest to our Office was timely because it followed a “timely agency-level protest [that] was previously filed.” 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(3).

To determine whether the exception in 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(3) applies, we must consider whether the protester's pre-closing time emails to the contracting officers were agency‑level protests. In that regard, Oready argues that each email was sufficient to constitute an agency-level protest because it was sent to the contracting officer before the solicitation closing time, it informed the contracting officer of the alleged defective solicitation terms, and it requested relief. Opp to Reqs. for Dismissal at 4. The firm notes that we have held that an agency-level protest need not be formal or even state that it is a protest, so long as it identifies an alleged error and requests relief. Id.

The record shows that the protester's argument is contrary to the factual record and none of its protests met the requirements to be an agency-level protest. As Oready recognizes, see id. at 3, Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 33.103(d)(2) establishes formal requirements for an agency-level protest. Those requirements include that the agency-level protest make “a request for an agency ruling,” and FAR 33.103(d)(3) specifies that an agency-level protest be addressed to the contracting officer or other cognizant agency protest official. Here, even though each email was sent to the contracting officer before the RFQ closing time, it did not meet the requirements for an agency-level protest: each of the transmittals stated that it was providing a “a copy of the protest filed with GAO,” the attached protest document was expressly addressed to our Office, and it invoked our Office's Bid Protest Regulations in 4 C.F.R. part 21, and requested relief from our Office. E.g., Protest (B-424508) at 1, 10. None of the protests was addressed to any official at the Department of the Interior or the Bureau of Indian Education specifically, and none requested a ruling from that agency.

While we have recognized informal objections addressed to a contracting officer can meet the minimum requirements to constitute an agency-level protest, each of the protester's emails and its attachment forecloses any possibility that it could be construed as an agency-level protest. Each email expressly states that it is providing a copy of the protest filed with GAO and the attached document is a protest addressed to our Office that invokes our Office's regulations and requests a decision from our Office. The transmittals to the contracting officer cannot be construed as agency-level protests, so the timeliness exception in 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(3) does not apply.

Each of the protests was filed with our Office on May 18, which was after the closing time of the relevant RFQ, so each protest is untimely. 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(1).

The protests are dismissed.

Edda Emmanuelli Perez
General Counsel