Bowhead Logistics Management, LLC

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

Decision

Matter of: Bowhead Logistics Management, LLC

File: B-424143; B-424143.2

Date: March 17, 2026

Robert K. Tompkins, Esq., Hillary J. Freund., Esq., and Richard J. Ariel, Esq., Holland & Knight, LLP, for the protester.
Adam A. Bartolanzo, Esq., C. Peter Dungan, Esq., Alfred M. Wurglitz, Esq., Kathryn J. Carlson, Esq., and Samara A. Rahman, Esq., Miles & Stockbridge P.C., for Akima Facilities Operations, the intervenor.
Jonathan A. Hardage, Esq., and Travis Drost, Esq., Department of the Army, for the agency.
Christopher Alwood, Esq., and Alexander O. Levine, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Protest challenging agency's evaluation of technical proposals is denied where the evaluation was either reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation, or the protester did not establish that it was prejudiced by the agency's actions.

2. Protester is not an interested party to challenge other aspects of the agency's evaluation and best‑value tradeoff where its proposal was reasonably evaluated as ineligible for award.

DECISION

Bowhead Logistics Management, LLC, a small business of Springfield, Virginia, protests the issuance of a task order to Akima Facilities Operations, LLC, a small business of Herndon, Virginia, under fair opportunity proposal request (FOPR) No. RFP1779540, issued by the Department of the Army, U.S. Army Materiel Command, for support services at the Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. The protester challenges the agency's evaluation of proposals and source selection decision.

We deny the protest in part and dismiss it in part.

BACKGROUND

On September 16, 2025, the Army issued the FOPR as a small business set‑aside to holders of General Services Administration (GSA) federal supply schedule (FSS) contracts through GSA's eBuy system under the procedures of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) subpart 8.4.[1] COS/MOL at 2; AR, Tab 4, FOPR Amendments 0001-0004 at 1; AR, Tab 5, FOPR at 1. The solicitation sought proposals to provide non-personal services supporting LEAD.[2] COS/MOL at 2; FOPR at 1.[3] The FOPR contemplated the issuance of an order with fixed‑price and time‑and‑materials contract line items, a 1-year base period of performance, two 1‑year option periods, and an optional 6‑month extension under FAR clause 52.217-8. FOPR at 1‑3.

The order would be issued on a best‑value tradeoff basis, considering price and two non‑price factors: (1) technical and (2) past performance. Id. at 8. The solicitation explained that the technical factor was more important than the past performance factor, which in turn was more important than price. Id. The non-price factors, when combined, were significantly more important than price. Id.

The agency was to evaluate proposals under the technical factor to assess each offeror's proposed approach and understanding of the solicitation's requirements. Id. at 9‑10. The technical factor included three subfactors: (1) management plan; (2) phase‑in/phase‑out plan; and, (3) quality control plan. Id. at 9. Under the management plan subfactor, the agency was to evaluate the offerors' “understanding and management methodologies to fulfill” the PWS requirements. Id. Under the quality control plan subfactor, the Army was to evaluate offerors' understanding and methodologies to fulfill the requirements of the quality assurance plan and quality control processes. Id.

The agency was to assign each proposal an adjectival rating of outstanding, good, acceptable, marginal, or unacceptable under each technical subfactor, and then assign the proposal an overall rating under the technical factor. Id. The solicitation specified that the management plan subfactor was more important than the quality control plan subfactor, which was more important than the phase‑in/phase‑out plan subfactor. Id.

The FOPR provided that the Army would evaluate offerors' past performance for recency, relevancy, and quality to ascertain the likelihood that the offeror would successfully perform the PWS requirements. Id. at 10‑11. The Army was to evaluate a project's relevancy by considering its similarity to the instant requirement in terms of services, complexity, dollar value, contract type, and degree of subcontracting and teaming. Id. at 11.

The Army was also to evaluate the quality of recent and relevant past performance projects to determine how well the offeror performed on those contracts. Id. The solicitation stated that the agency could consider past performance questionnaires, contract performance assessment reports, and other sources in evaluating the quality of an offeror's past performance. Id. The Army was then to assign each offeror an overall performance confidence assessment rating of substantial confidence, satisfactory confidence, neutral confidence, limited confidence, or no confidence based on the quality of the offeror's recent and relevant projects. Id. at 11‑12.

The solicitation specified that, to be eligible for award, an offeror had to be assigned a rating of acceptable or better for the technical factor and a rating of satisfactory confidence or better for the past performance factor. FOPR at 8. The FOPR informed offerors that the Army intended to issue an order based on initial proposal submissions without conducting discussions. Id.

On or before the solicitation's October 17, 2025, closing date, the Army received proposals from two offerors, Bowhead and Akima. COS/MOL at 12; AR, Tab 36, eBuy Award Notification at 2. The agency evaluated Bowhead and Akima's proposals as follows:

AR, Tab 35, Source Selection Decision (SSD) at 30.

The source selection authority (SSA) conducted an independent assessment and agreed with the evaluators' findings and ratings. See id. Based on the results of the evaluation, the SSA concluded that Akima's higher‑rated, lower‑priced proposal represented the best value to the government. Id. at 30. On November 28, the agency notified Bowhead that it was not selected for award. AR, Tab 36, eBuy Award Notification at 2. On December 2, the Army provided Bowhead with a brief explanation of award pursuant to FAR subsection 8.405-2(d). COS/MOL at 13; AR, Tab 37, Bowhead Brief Explanation for Award. On December 8, Bowhead filed this protest.

DISCUSSION

Bowhead challenges several aspects of the agency's evaluation of proposals and source selection decision. We note that the protester raises several collateral arguments. While our decision does not specifically address every argument, we have reviewed each argument and conclude that none provides a basis to sustain the protest.[4] We discuss several representative examples below.

Management Plan Subfactor

Bowhead Weaknesses

The protester contends that the agency unreasonably assessed Bowhead's proposal with three weaknesses under the management plan subfactor. Protest at 15‑23; Comments & Supp. Protest at 4‑7.

First, the protester challenges the agency's assessment of a weakness in Bowhead's proposal for not providing a refresh rate for its list of qualified laborers ready to support surge requirements. Protest at 19‑21; Comments & Supp. Protest at 6‑7. By way of background, under the management plan subfactor, the solicitation instructed each offeror to “[d]escribe your organization's capability to support surge requirements with qualified personnel.” FOPR at 5. If an offeror planned on developing a list of qualified laborers, the solicitation required the offeror to “provide a refresh rate,” i.e., the number of days that would elapse between the firm updating its candidate list. Id.

The protester argues that its proposal included a refresh rate, pointing to proposal language that describes how Bowhead continuously accepts applications and conducts interviews to maintain its list of prequalified personnel. Comments & Supp. Protest at 6‑7. The agency responds that it evaluated Bowhead's proposal reasonably and in accordance with the terms of the solicitation. COS/MOL at 24‑27. The Army explains that Bowhead's proposal did not provide a refresh rate for its candidate list, but rather a fill rate (i.e., the number of days to hire an employee). Id. at 26

Where, as here, an agency issues a solicitation to firms holding FSS contracts under FAR subpart 8.4 and conducts a competition for the issuance of an order, we will review the record to ensure that the agency's evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable procurement laws and regulations. See Lamb Informatics, Ltd., B‑418405.5, B‑418405.6, Mar. 5, 2021, at 6. It is an offeror's responsibility to submit a well-written proposal, with adequately detailed information that clearly demonstrates compliance with the solicitation requirements; the offeror runs the risk that the agency will unfavorably evaluate its proposal where it fails to do so. The Concourse Grp, LLC, B‑411962.5, Jan. 6, 2017, at 7. A protester's disagreement with the agency's judgment does not establish that an evaluation was unreasonable. Id.

Here, the record demonstrates that the Army assessed a weakness because Bowhead did not provide a refresh rate for its list of qualified laborers and instead described its ability to meet a 30-day fill rate for vacancies. AR, Tab 34, Technical Evaluation Report at 40‑41; AR, Tab 35, SSD at 14‑15. In this regard, the portion of Bowhead's proposal that discusses its refresh rate states:

We have demonstrated our ability to meet the Government's required refresh rate of having a worker in place within 30 days once the opening has been identified. Since 2016, [DELETED]. On the rare occasion we could not meet the 30-day refresh rate, we requested the necessary time extensions from the [contracting officer].

AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 9. The agency found that Bowhead's discussion of a separate aspect of its proposal--its fill rates--without providing a refresh rate demonstrated that it misunderstood the Army's requirement. AR, Tab 34, Technical Evaluation Report at 40‑41.

On this record, we find no basis to question the agency's assessment of a weakness in Bowhead's management plan. The plain language of the proposal, quoted above, is clear that the only refresh rate discussed by Bowhead relates to how quickly it will fill open vacancies and not how often it refreshes its list of qualified laborers. The FOPR, however, clearly stated that offerors that planned to maintain a list of qualified laborers to support surge requirements should provide a refresh rate for the list as part of their proposal. FOPR at 5.

We are unpersuaded by the protester's argument that Bowhead's proposal met the requirement to provide a refresh rate because its proposal stated that Bowhead continuously accepts applications and conducts interviews to maintain its list of prequalified personnel. Comments & Supp. Protest at 6‑7 (citing AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 8‑9). That Bowhead accepts applications and conducts interviews on an ongoing basis, instead of only finding candidates when there is a vacancy, establishes that the firm has a list of qualified laborers but does not specify a rate at which they will refresh the list (other than whenever they receive a new application).[5] Compare AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 8‑9, with, AR, Tab 31, Akima Technical Proposal at 3 (explaining a set number of days within which the firm confirms the availability of candidates on its qualified laborer list). We deny this ground of protest.

Bowhead also challenges the agency's assessment of a weakness in Bowhead's management plan for its lack of detail on how candidates would be evaluated to ensure they meet specific job requirements. Comments & Supp. Protest at 7‑9. The protester argues that it provided detailed information in its proposal that addressed the concerns raised by the agency. Id. We find no basis to question the reasonableness of the agency's evaluation.

As relevant here, the FOPR required offerors' management plans to describe their process “to ensure that only qualified contractor employees are utilized under this contract.” FOPR at 5. The FOPR also provided that the Army would evaluate each offeror's management plan to assess the offeror's “understanding and methodologies to fulfill the [PWS] requirements” with the evaluation emphasizing the need for a “qualified work force.” Id. at 9. Further, section 1.4.7 of the PWS requires that the contractor “ensure that any personnel performing under a contract are fully trained, licensed, certified, and qualified for the position for which they will be serving.” PWS at 5.

The record reflects that the agency relied on the above evaluation criteria to assess the weakness at issue, noting that Bowhead “provides no specific detail on how candidates will be evaluated to ensure the individual meets the specific job requirements.” AR, Tab 34, Technical Evaluation Report at 45. The agency found that while Bowhead's proposal detailed how a new hire would be onboarded, it lacked depth in its description of the methods that would be used to validate and verify an employee's qualifications prior to onboarding. Id.

We have reviewed the evaluation record and find no basis to question the agency's assessed concerns with Bowhead's process for validating that a candidate meets the relevant job qualifications. While Bowhead cites several references to reviewing candidate qualifications in its proposal, see Comments & Supp. Protest at 9 (citing AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 13-14, 19), it does not point to, nor does our review of the record reveal, any meaningful explanation of how such qualification reviews would be conducted. The FOPR, however, required the agency to evaluate each offeror's plan to meet the PWS requirements, including the requirement to only hire qualified contractor employees. As noted above, it was Bowhead's responsibility to submit adequately detailed information to clearly demonstrate compliance with the solicitation requirements. The Concourse Grp., supra. Bowhead failed to do so here and its disagreements with the agency's judgements do not provide a basis to sustain the protest.

The protester also challenges the agency's assessment of a weakness in Bowhead's management plan for its lack of clarity, and the potential for non-performance, arising from Bowhead's proposed use of both seniority and merit-based considerations in the hiring, releasing, and moving of contractor staff. Protest at 15‑19, 30-33; Comments & Supp. Protest at 4‑6, 17‑20. The protester argues that the FOPR required compliance with both the incumbent collective bargaining agreement (CBA)--which mandates that certain employment decisions be based on seniority--and the PWS--which requires employment decisions to be merit-based. Id. In this regard, the protester avers that the solicitation required the incumbent CBA to be incorporated into the resulting contract, which means that offerors would have to comply with the incumbent CBA as a condition of the contract. Comments & Supp. Protest at 4. Based on this interpretation of the FOPR, Bowhead contends that the assessed weakness is unreasonable because its proposed approach met the requirements of the solicitation. Id.

The agency responds that its evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's evaluation criteria. COS/MOL at 16‑24. In support of this position, the Army contends that the FOPR did not mandate ongoing compliance with the incumbent CBA. Id. at 19. Accordingly, the agency argues that Bowhead's proposal was inconsistent with the PWS requirements where it proposed to continue to abide by the seniority provisions of the incumbent CBA, which also rendered the proposal unclear as to the extent it would implement the FOPR's merit-based employment considerations. Id. at 16‑24.

As an initial matter, we disagree with the protester that the FOPR required the contractor to comply with the incumbent CBA's seniority requirements. Where a dispute exists as to a solicitation's actual requirements, we will first examine the plain language of the solicitation. Bauer Techs., Inc., B‑415717.2, B‑415717.3, June 22, 2018, at 4. Where a protester and an agency disagree over the meaning of solicitation language, we will resolve the matter by assessing whether each posited interpretation is reasonable. Anders Constr., Inc., B‑414261, Apr. 11, 2017, at 3. To be reasonable, an interpretation must be consistent with the solicitation when read as a whole and in a reasonable manner. Planned Sys. Int'l, Inc., B-413028.5, Feb. 21, 2018, at 6.

The FOPR's price proposal submission instructions stated in relevant part:

[p]ursuant to the Service Contract Labor Standards (SCLS) (formerly known as the Service Contract Act of 1965), the determination by the Secretary of Labor as to the applicable minimum monetary wage and fringe benefits for the applicable locations will be made part of any resulting contract.

* * * * *

The [CBA] for applicable CBA locations will also be made part of any resulting contract.

FOPR at 7‑8. The FOPR also stated that “[f]or proposal purposes only,” the incumbent CBA was included as an attachment to the FOPR and that offerors' proposed rates must meet the minimum wage and fringe benefit rates in the CBA “[f]or compliance purposes[.]”[6] Id. at 8. The CBA is not specifically discussed in any other part of the FOPR or PWS.

Of relevance here, section 5.6.2.1 of the PWS states:

The key factor in hiring, releasing, and moving contractors shall be the individual contractor's performance in relationship to the required skillset. Performance of the contractor shall be rated in accordance with the labor category description. Seniority shall be considered as a last resort (e.g. performance is considered first when keeping or releasing a contractor employee. If performance ratings of the contract employees are equal, then the contractor could consider keeping the employee with highest seniority).

PWS at 31.

We find that the plain language of the solicitation, when read as a whole, did not require ongoing compliance with the incumbent CBA's seniority provisions. In this regard, the PWS is clear that the agency requires hiring, releasing, and moving contractors to be merit‑based, and that seniority should only be considered if all merit‑based considerations are equal. Id. We see no reason that the agency would include such requirements in the PWS if it wished to mandate compliance with the seniority terms of the incumbent CBA. Further, while the protester argues that the FOPR's reference to incorporating the CBA into the contract means that proposals had to comply with the existing CBA, we read the solicitation's statement that “the” CBA will be made a part of any resulting contract as referring to whatever CBA the successful offeror negotiates with the union. FOPR at 8. The FOPR clearly distinguishes this reference to the CBA from the subsequent reference to the incumbent CBA being attached “[f]or proposal purposes only.” Id.

In addition, the FOPR's mandate that offerors propose rates meeting the incumbent CBA's minimum wage and fringe rates is consistent with the statutory and regulatory requirements of the SCLS. Successor contractors covered by the statute are required to match the wage and fringe benefits paid under an existing CBA, but such requirements do not apply to other terms of the incumbent CBA, including seniority provisions.[7] Northrop Grumman Tech. Servs., B‑286012, B‑286012.2, Nov. 1, 2000, at 7‑8 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 4.163(a)). Accordingly, we find reasonable the agency's view that the FOPR did not mandate ongoing compliance with the incumbent CBA's seniority provisions, and find unreasonable the protester's view that the incumbent CBA would become part of this procurement's resulting contract for any awardee.[8]

In light of the above, we also find that the agency reasonably assessed a weakness based on Bowhead proposing to comply with the seniority provisions of the incumbent CBA. As noted above, the FOPR required the agency to evaluate proposals under the management plan subfactor to assess each offeror's understanding and methodologies to fulfill the PWS requirements. FOPR at 9. Further, section 5.6.2.1 of the PWS requires that certain employment decisions be merit-based and not based on seniority unless as a “last resort.” PWS at 31.

Despite this requirement, Bowhead's proposal stated that “[w]e balance performance with the Union's seniority requirements in the CBA.” AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 10. The proposal also stated:

[w]e perform all moves [in accordance with] Article IV, Section 3 of the Union CBA, in-place processes, and the contract PWS

* * * * *

[t]he current CBA requires transferred positions be filled in order of seniority. However, we also understand other Cost Centers should not lose well-qualified people to other areas based solely on seniority.

Id. at 20.

Based on its evaluation of this language, the agency assessed a weakness in Bowhead's proposal, finding that it was unclear how the protester planned to comply with both the incumbent CBA's seniority requirements and the PWS's merit-based requirements. AR, Tab 34, Technical Evaluation Report at 39. The agency explained that Bowhead's statements that it planned to abide by the incumbent CBA's seniority requirements “suggests a failure to comply with clearly stated FOPR requirements” and that Bowhead's ultimate plan was not clear given its discussion of considering merit in relevant employment decisions. Id.

Based on our review of the record, we find nothing unreasonable in the agency's conclusion that the protester's proposal did not clearly describe a management plan that would meet the PWS requirements. See The Concourse Group, LLC, supra.

Disparate Treatment

The protester alternatively argues that, even if the agency reasonably assessed a weakness for Bowhead proposing to comply with the incumbent CBA requirements, the agency unequally evaluated the offerors' proposals. Comments & Supp. Protest at 18‑20. In this regard, Bowhead contends that Akima also proposed to comply with the seniority requirements of the incumbent CBA. Id.

It is a fundamental principle of federal procurement law that a contracting agency must evaluate offerors in an even-handed manner. Spatial Front, Inc., B‑416753, B‑416753.2, Dec. 10, 2018, at 13. Agencies properly may assign dissimilar proposals different evaluation ratings, however. DigiFlight Inc., B‑419590, B‑419590.2, May 24, 2021, at 5. Accordingly, to prevail on an allegation of disparate treatment, a protester must show that the agency unreasonably evaluated its proposal in a different manner than another proposal that was substantively indistinguishable or nearly identical. Battelle Mem'l Inst., B‑418047.5, B‑418047.6, Nov. 18, 2020, at 6.

In support of its argument, the protester points to statements in Akima's proposal that the firm would “coordinate with the union to ensure the rules of employee seniority are respected” and that it strives “to balance performance with the union's seniority requirements in the CBA[.]” AR, Tab 31, Akima Technical Proposal at 6. However, the record demonstrates that these statements were made only when Akima was discussing its retention of institutional knowledge as part of the transition-in. See id. Notably, Akima separately proposed to renegotiate the CBA to “move from seniority to merit based[,]” and explained that its approach to managing hiring, releasing, and transferring of contract personnel is in accordance with the merit-based PWS requirements. Id. at 20.

In short, the record here demonstrates that the differences in the assessment of this weakness stem from differences in the details found in the two proposals. We see nothing unreasonable in the agency assessing a weakness based on Bowhead's statement that it would comply with the incumbent CBA's seniority requirements while not assessing a weakness to Akima, where the latter firm stated it would renegotiate the CBA to align with the PWS requirements. Accordingly, we deny this ground of protest.

Evaluation of Akima's Management Plan

The protester also challenges the agency's evaluation of Akima's proposal under the management plan subfactor. Comments & Supp. Protest at 30‑43; Supp. Comments at 12‑34. Specifically, Bowhead identifies ten aspects of the evaluation that it alleges were either inconsistent with the evaluation criteria, constituted disparate treatment when compared to the evaluation of Bowhead's proposal, or both.[9] Id. We have considered each of the allegations raised by Bowhead and, with one exception discussed below, find that the protester has not demonstrated that any aspect of the evaluation of Akima's management plan was unreasonable or unequal.

For example, Bowhead contends that the agency disparately evaluated proposals by crediting Akima's proposal with a strength for its description of how Akima's part‑time workforce would support surge staffing requirements. Comments & Supp. Protest at 30‑31; Supp. Comments at 13‑14. The protester argues that its proposal also stated it would use part-time employees to support surge requirements but was not given a similar strength. Comments & Supp. Protest at 31.

As background, the agency assessed Akima's proposal with a strength for proposing a part‑time qualified workforce that, the agency found, could “assist LEAD in maintaining efficiency during unexpected situations . . . [including] surge, refreshing vacancies, and filling in for employees on leave.” AR, Tab 34, Technical Evaluation at 8. The evaluation narrative for the strength noted that Akima had described a plan to grow the part‑time workforce to [DELETED], with each part‑time employee “working [DELETED] to maintain qualifications.” Id. (citing AR, Tab 31, Akima Technical Proposal at 4). By contrast, the record shows that, while Bowhead proposed to use part‑time employees to support surge requirements, it only vaguely proposed to transition unspecified, part‑time employees to full‑time positions as needed. AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 7.

On this record, we see no basis to object to the agency's conclusion that Akima's proposal merited a strength and Bowhead's did not. In this regard, the language of Akima's proposal more clearly described the scope of the part‑time qualified laborers the firm intended to maintain and how often these employees would work to maintain their qualifications. On the other hand, Bowhead's proposal generally described that the firm would have part‑time employees that it can convert to full-time employees to support a surge, but does not otherwise describe the scope of this labor pool.[10] In short, the record demonstrates that the differences in the assessment of strengths here stems from differences in the details found in the two proposals. See Battelle Mem'l Inst., supra at 6. Accordingly, we deny this ground of protest.

As another example, Bowhead similarly alleges that the agency disparately evaluated proposals by assessing a strength in Akima's management plan for the proposed use of a quality task list to document the steps and skills associated with each job assignment. Comments & Supp. Protest at 36‑37; Supp. Comments at 22‑25. The protester contends that it also proposed to “use a document that would serve the same function” but did not receive a similar strength. Comments & Supp. Protest at 37.

As noted above, the FOPR provided that the Army would evaluate each offeror's management plan methodologies for fulfilling the PWS requirements, including the requirement to “ensure that any personnel performing under a contract are fully trained, licensed, certified, and qualified for the position in which they will be serving.” FOPR at 5; PWS at 5. For Akima's management plan, the agency assessed a strength for proposing to use a quality task list “for each job assignment in order to document the required steps and skills associated with the position.” AR, Tab 34, Technical Evaluation at 15. The evaluation narrative explained that the list was a “well-defined quality task process” that allowed LEAD to check and track qualifications, licensing, certifications, training, and any performance issues in “a traceable document[.]”

Akima's proposal described the quality task list as a document with “the required steps and skills associated with equipment, systems, and processes.” AR, Tab 31, Akima Technical Proposal at 11. The proposal stated that the document would be used when first verifying that an employee is qualified for a job through the beginning of their performance once assigned the role. Id. Supervisors would sign off on the quality task list after observing employee performance and then the document would be filed on [DELETED]. Id. at 4, 11.

Unlike the task list process described in Akima's proposal, Bowhead's proposal provided that, as part of its screening process it would develop “detailed job descriptions for each position, including essential functions, education, and training certifications[.]" AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 19. The proposal explained that this document would provide hiring managers with the ability to vet resumes against position requirements “while allowing candidates the opportunity to review the position in detail.” Id. Unlike Akima's proposal, Bowhead's proposal did not specify whether these detailed job descriptions are simply reference documents or individual, traceable documents created for each job assignment. Further, Bowhead's proposal did not describe whether the detailed job descriptions would continue to be utilized throughout the job assignment process through the beginning of contract performance and whether they would be saved anywhere for reference. See id.

In sum, based on our review of the record, we find no basis to question the agency's assessment of the relative merits of the use of Akima's task lists versus Bowhead's detailed job descriptions. Bowhead has not shown that the differences in the evaluation here did not stem from differences in the respective proposals. See Battelle Mem'l Inst., supra at 6. We deny this ground of protest.

The protester also contends that the agency unreasonably assessed a strength in Akima's management plan for the firm's quality control manager approach where the approach merely met, but did not exceed, the solicitation requirements. Comments & Supp. Protest at 39‑40; Supp. Comments at 28‑30. The agency responds that the strength was given not for simply meeting the PWS requirements, but also for Akima's description of other activities its quality control manager would undertake to support onboarding trained personnel. Supp. COS/MOL at 50‑54. Bowhead argues that the aspects of Akima's proposal identified by the agency were not discussed in the narrative of the strength and should be ignored as a post hoc rationalization by the agency. Supp. Comments at 29.

As noted above, we will review the record of an FSS order competition to ensure that the agency's evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable procurement laws and regulations. See Lamb Informatics, Ltd., supra. In reviewing an agency's evaluation, we accord much greater weight to contemporaneous source selection materials than to representations made in response to protest contentions. Celta Servs., Inc., B‑411835, B‑411835.2, Nov. 2, 2015, at 9. Further, we give little weight to post hoc statements that are inconsistent with the contemporaneous record. Caddell Constr. Co., Inc., B‑411005, B‑411005.2, Apr. 20, 2015, at 11. Here, we agree that the agency's evaluation is not supported by the contemporaneous record.

Section 5.5.26 of the PWS states in relevant part:

The contractor shall provide employee resume, qualifications, and completed training in advance of any contractor's start date working at the federal installation. Contractor supervision shall review employee qualifications face-to-face with local Government supervisor in advance of the employee's start date. Any discrepancies found with the qualifications or certification of an employee will be reviewed with the [Contracting Officer Representative (COR)].

PWS at 30.

The strength's narrative stated, in its entirety:

[T]he Government assessed the Offeror's management plan approach in relation to onboarding appropriately trained personnel. Within that, the Quality Control Manager [] meets face-to-face with Government supervision on a regular basis prior to contractor employees starting work to ensure baseline compliance to the Labor Categories []. Discrepancies can be immediately addressed prior to onboarding reducing time and omissions in training requirements for personnel. This results in a benefit to the Government in the form of costs to train after onboarding, quality of work as the personnel will be onboarded in a ready to execute status, and schedule as all members of the cost center will be 100 [percent] capable immediately

AR, Tab 34 Technical Evaluation at 18.

It is clear from the plain language of the assessed strength that the aspects of the proposal highlighted are minimum PWS requirements. The strength narrative and the PWS requirements both describe a face-to-face meeting between contractor and agency personnel to review a new employee's qualifications before the employee's start date. The agency maintains that its evaluation was reasonable because Akima's proposal described other actions that the quality control manager would take to support Akima personnel with meeting their training requirements, including developing a “master training plan” and coordinating with supervisors and functional leads to validate training records and schedule any outstanding training before the employee's start date. Supp. COS/MOL at 52 (citing AR, Tab 31, Akima Technical Proposal at 11). While such aspects of Akima's proposal may have provided the basis for a different properly assessed strength, they are clearly not aligned with the description of the strength provided by the agency, which only parrots the PWS requirement for face‑to‑face meetings with government supervision before onboarding a new employee. Accordingly, because the agency's post‑protest defenses are not supported by the contemporaneous record; we find such explanations to be unpersuasive and afford them little weight.

On this record, we find that the agency has failed to explain or demonstrate that Akima's proposed face-to-face meetings between the quality control manager and agency personnel, to review new employee qualifications, exceeded the minimum PWS requirements or otherwise merited a strength. We conclude that the agency's evaluation was unreasonable in this regard.

Nevertheless, we do not find that this evaluation error, on its own, provides a basis to sustain the protest. In this regard, competitive prejudice is an essential element of a viable protest; where a protester fails to demonstrate that, but for the agency's actions, it would have had a substantial chance of receiving the award, there is no basis for finding prejudice, and our Office will not sustain the protest, even if deficiencies in the procurement are found. Blue Origin Federation, LLC; Dynetics, Inc.-A Leidos Co., B‑419783 et al., July 30, 2021, at 33; Armorworks Enters., LLC, B‑400394.3, Mar. 31, 2009, at 3. Our Office will not sustain a protest unless the protester demonstrates a reasonable possibility that it was prejudiced by the agency's actions. Raytheon Co., B‑409651, B‑409651.2, July 9, 2014, at 17. In other words, the protester must show that but for the agency's actions, it would have had a substantial chance of receiving the award. Id.

Here, the agency rated Akima's proposal as good under the management plan subfactor with 11 strengths and one weakness. AR, Tab 35, SSD at 4‑6, 9‑10. In light of these ratings and other strengths, we fail to see how the loss of one management plan strength, without more, would render Akima's lower‑priced proposal ineligible for award, much less lower‑rated than Bowhead's proposal.

On the other hand, the agency evaluated Bowhead's proposal as marginal under both the technical factor and the management plan subfactor. Id. at 16‑17, 30. As noted above, the FOPR specified that, to be eligible for award, an offeror had to be assigned a rating of acceptable or better under the technical factor. FOPR at 8. The removal of this strength--unreasonably assessed since Akima's proposal merely met the applicable requirement--would not affect the agency's evaluation conclusions regarding Bowhead's marginally-rated technical proposal.[11] Accordingly, the protester cannot establish that, but for this evaluation error, the protester would have been in line for award. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Bowhead, without more, has failed to demonstrate that it was competitively prejudiced by this evaluation error.

Quality Control Plan Subfactor

The protester also challenges a weakness assessed in its proposal under the quality control plan subfactor for failing to describe how Bowhead's quality control process and staff would integrate with LEAD's quality control functions. Protest at 23‑26; Comments & Supp. Protest at 10‑14. The protester contends that the Army applied unstated evaluation criteria, arguing that neither the PWS nor the FOPR's evaluation criteria required offerors to integrate with LEAD's quality control functions. Comments & Supp. Protest at 13. Id. We disagree.

When reviewing whether an agency applied unstated evaluation criteria, our decisions explain that an agency is required to evaluate proposals based solely on the factors identified in the solicitation. See DCS Corp., B‑423482.2, Sept. 12, 2025, at 8 (citing IBM Global Business Serv.--U.S. Federal, B‑409029, B‑409029.2, Jan. 27, 2014, at 4). However, an agency may apply evaluation considerations that are not expressly outlined in the solicitation if those considerations are reasonably and logically encompassed within the stated evaluation criteria. Id.

As noted above, the FOPR provided that the agency would evaluate proposals under the quality control plan subfactor by considering the offerors' understanding and methodologies to fulfill the quality assurance plan and quality control process requirements. FOPR at 9. The PWS requires the contractor to, as part of its quality control plan, “develop and implement procedures to identify, prevent, and ensure non-recurrence of defective services.” PWS at 1. Further, the FOPR's submission instructions stated that offerors' quality control plans should address how the contractor intended to “adhere and monitor contractor personnel's execution of LEAD's [q]uality [m]anagement [s]ystem[.]” FOPR at 6. The instructions also required offerors to explain how the contractor would participate in quality management system audits and internal surveillance and address how they would “help aide LEAD” in addressing issues identified through these processes. Id. In evaluating Bowhead's proposal under this subfactor, the agency assessed a weakness because Bowhead's otherwise “well-thought-out” quality control plan did not discuss how the plan would integrate with LEAD's quality control functions. AR, Tab 34, Technical Evaluation at 53. The agency explained that its concern was that “[t]here is [a] moderate risk of failure if there is no continuous collaboration with LEAD's” quality control functions. Id.

On this record, we find no basis to conclude that the agency applied unstated evaluation criteria. While the FOPR did not explicitly inform offerors that the Army would consider how the contractor proposed to integrate its quality control function with LEAD's, the FOPR advised offerors that the agency would evaluate proposed quality control methodologies. FOPR at 9. Also, as discussed above, the FOPR's submission instructions required offerors to explain how their quality control processes would work with LEAD's quality management system and how they would work with LEAD to address identified quality control issues. Id. at 6. Accordingly, we find reasonable the agency's view that coordination and integration with the agency's quality control function is a necessary part of the PWS requirement that the quality control plan ensure non-recurrence of defective services. See PWS at 1. We therefore conclude that the agency's evaluation considerations here are reasonably and logically encompassed within the FOPR's broad evaluation criteria stating that it would review offerors' quality control processes and deny this protest ground.

Arguing in the alternative, Bowhead states that its proposal did, in fact, address how it would integrate its quality control processes with LEAD's quality control program. Comments & Supp. Protest at 10‑11. In this regard, the protester points to statements in Bowhead's proposal that it would provide agency personnel with [DELETED] and invite LEAD's quality assurance evaluators to join quarterly trend reviews and joint inspections. Id.; AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 38. However, we fail to see how these references address the bases of the weakness assessed by the agency.

Indeed, the weakness acknowledged that Bowhead proposed inspections and providing a quality control dashboard. AR, Tab 34, Technical Evaluation at 53. However, the agency found that Bowhead did not describe the type of “continuous collaboration” with LEAD quality control, including explanations of how each organization would determine who had executed quality control work, that the agency believed necessary to reduce the risk of unsuccessful performance. Id. The protester does not point to, and our review of Bowhead's proposal does not reveal, any detailed description of how contractor and agency quality control functions would integrate or divide responsibility. Rather, the proposal only references joint inspections and providing quality control data to the agency.[12] See AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 36‑45. Without more, we see no basis to find unreasonable the agency's conclusion that Bowhead's failure to sufficiently describe how its quality control processes would integrate with LEAD's quality control function presented a risk of unsuccessful performance. While Bowhead may disagree with the Army's assessment, the protester has not demonstrated that the agency's evaluation judgements were unreasonable. The Concourse Group, LLC, supra at 7.

The protester also challenges the agency's assessment of an uncertainty in Bowhead's proposal under the quality control plan subfactor for not clearly describing what metrics the firm intended to utilize to monitor and address issues. Comments & Supp. Protest at 28‑30; Supp. Comments at 9‑12. Specifically, the protester argues that the agency's evaluation unreasonably ignored the contents of Bowhead's proposal, which described examples of metrics it intends to use that align with the performance metrics that LEAD uses. Id. (citing AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 40). The agency responds that it did not ignore the cited sections of Bowhead's proposal; rather, it reasonably found that those proposal aspects did not address which quantifiable metrics Bowhead intended to use to monitor and address performance issues. Supp. COS/MOL at 21‑24.

The record here demonstrates that Bowhead did not clearly identify the metrics it intended to use as part of its quality control plan. In this regard, Bowhead's proposal stated it would use quantifiable metrics and qualitative data to monitor its LEAD contract performance. AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 39. The proposal subsequently included a table of what the protester contends are five “examples of the quantifiable metrics [Bowhead] will capture for LEAD leadership.” Id. at 40. We note, however, that the “metrics” included in Bowhead's proposal are essentially a copy of the first five performance standards set forth in a performance requirements table provided in the PWS, with minor changes noting who will surveil each method. Compare AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 40, with PWS at 44. Further, while one column of the chart identified acceptable quality levels with numbers for each performance standard, the chart does not describe with any specificity what metrics or data Bowhead intends to collect or how it intends to collect it. See AR, Tab 30, Bowhead Technical Proposal at 40. Accordingly, the agency evaluated this aspect of the protester's proposal as “not clear on what metrics will be utilized and how it would align with LEAD's metrics.” AR, Tab 34, Technical Evaluation at 54. Based on this lack of clarity, the agency classified the finding as an “uncertainty” and explained that due “to the unclear nature of the response a weakness or strength was not assigned[.]” Id.

On this record, we find no basis to question the agency's assessment of an uncertainty for the lack of clear metrics in the quality control plan section of the protester's proposal. Not only is it not clear which metrics Bowhead would gather to monitor compliance with the five performance standards in its proposal, but it is also unclear whether Bowhead's use of metrics would be limited to the performance standards in the PWS or if there were other metrics Bowhead intended to utilize in its quality control plan. Bowhead was required to provide sufficient detail so that the agency could properly evaluate this aspect of its proposal. The Concourse Group, LLC, supra at 7. Its failure to do so does not provide a basis to set aside an evaluation finding that did not even rise to the level of a weakness. We deny this ground of protest.

Remaining Challenges

Bowhead raises additional protest allegations, including challenges to the agency's past performance evaluation, the sufficiency of the agency's documentation, and the reasonableness of the agency's best‑value tradeoff and source selection decision. See, e.g., Protest at 33‑38, 40; Comments & Supp. Protest at 20‑28, 45‑47; Supp. Comments at 34‑38. We dismiss these remaining challenges because we find that Bowhead, having been reasonably assessed an overall marginal rating under the technical factor, is not an interested party to raise them.

Under our Bid Protest Regulations, a protester must be an interested party, that is, an actual or prospective offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of a contract. 4 C.F.R. § 21.0(a). A protester is not an interested party if it would not be next in line for award if its protest were sustained. BANC3, Inc., B-416486, B-416486.2, Sept. 10, 2018, at 9.

As noted above, the FOPR specified that, to be eligible for award, an offeror had to be assigned a rating of acceptable or better for the technical factor. FOPR at 8. Here, we have found no basis to question the agency's evaluation of Bowhead's marginally‑rated technical proposal. Further, the single evaluation error we identified above--that the agency unreasonably assessed a strength in Akima's proposal under the management plan subfactor--does not render Akima's otherwise good-rated technical proposal ineligible for award. Accordingly, even if we found that Bowhead's remaining allegations had merit, Akima's proposal would still be eligible for award, and Bowhead's proposal would still be ineligible for award.[13] We therefore dismiss the remaining allegations.

The protest is denied in part and dismissed in part.

Edda Emmanuelli Perez
General Counsel