Diversified Maintenance Systems, Inc.

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

Decision

Matter of: Diversified Maintenance Systems, Inc.

File: B-423945; B-423945.2

Date: January 29, 2026

John C. Dulske, Esq., and Alyssa Isenberg, Esq., Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC, for the protester.
David S. Demian, Esq., and Scott M. Bennett, Esq., Finch, Thornton & Baird, LLP, for Paradigm Mechanical Corporation, the intervenor.
Deana R. Jaeger, Esq., and Erin L. Hernandez, Esq., Department of the Navy, for the agency.
Michael P. Grogan, Esq., and Evan D. Wesser, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Challenge to the agency's evaluation of the protester's past performance is denied where the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation.

2. Protest alleging errors in the agency's evaluation of the protester's price is denied where the agency's evaluation was reasonable, and the agency had no duty to seek clarification regarding alleged errors in the protester's proposal.

DECISION

Diversified Maintenance Systems, Inc. (DMS), a small business of Sandy, Utah, protests the award of a contract to Paradigm Mechanical Corporation (PMS), a small business of Santee, California, under request for proposals (RFP) No. N62473-24-R-2701, issued by the Department of the Navy, for commercial and institutional building construction projects at various locations, to include Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, and Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, California.  The protester challenges the evaluation of its proposal and the agency's best-value tradeoff decision.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

The agency issued the solicitation on August 8, 2024, as a women-owned small business set‑aside, contemplating the award of an indefinite-delivery, indefinite‑quantity (IDIQ) job order contract (JOC)--where orders would be placed on a fixed-price basis‑‑with a 2-year based period of performance and two 3-year option periods, for construction services at several locations, to include Camp Pendleton and Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach.  Agency Report (AR), Exh. 1, RFP at 7.[1]  The solicitation advised that award would be made on a best-value tradeoff basis, considering five factors:  (1) ability to manage multiple simultaneous projects; (2) experience; (3) past performance; (4) safety; and (5) cost.  Id. at 19.  The RFP explained that the experience and safety factors were of equal importance, and when combined were of equal importance to past performance.  Id.  The solicitation further provided that the experience, past performance, and safety factors, combined, were approximately equal to price.[2] Id.

Under the past performance factor, the solicitation advised that offerors should submit a Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) evaluation for each project submitted under the experience factor. Id. at 25. If, however, a given project did not have a completed CPARS evaluation, offerors were to submit past performance questionnaires (PPQs) for those projects. Id. In addition, the RFP allowed offerors to “provide any information on problems encountered and the corrective actions taken” for projects offered under the experience factor and advised that offerors “may also address any adverse past performance issues.”  Id.  The agency would evaluate past performance to determine “how well the Offeror's team performed on relevant projects submitted under Factor 2 (Experience) and may also consider past performance on other relevant projects currently documented in known sources.” Id. The Navy would also “consider the recency and relevance of the information, the source of the information, context of the data, and general trends in the Contractor's performance.”  Id. 

For the price factor, offerors were required to submit several items with their proposals. Id. at 29. As relevant here, each offeror was required to submit pre-priced, and non-pre-priced, coefficients for each performance location. Id. at 13-14. As explained by the RFP, an offeror's “coefficient is a multiplier that represents costs (generally indirect costs) to be applied to the work item unit price information[.]”[3] Id. at 14. The solicitation stated that the “coefficient will be used in establishing the price for task orders and modifications” issued under the JOC. Id. at 16.

While the coefficients would be used to price future orders, for the purposes of evaluating price for the instant competition, the solicitation stated that price would be evaluated based on a proposed task order included in the RFP. Offerors were required to submit three items of note. First, offerors had to complete contract line item number (CLIN) 0004, which required a total price for the work contemplated under the proposed task order. RFP at 5, 10. Second, each offeror would complete a “coefficient breakdown form,” which provided information as to how each offeror's coefficients were derived. See id., Exh. K, Coefficient Worksheet. Third, offerors had to complete several spreadsheet cells included in the proposed task order, by inputting their coefficients in the appropriate spaces, and then computing total pre-priced and non-pre-priced costs, resulting in a total order price. See id., Exh. M, Proposed Task Order 0001. The price factor (identified as “Price--Based on Proposed Task Order 0001”) would “be evaluated to determine the reasonableness and completeness of the Offeror's proposal.” Id. at 29.

The agency ultimately received six proposals, including from the protester and Paradigm. The following represents the final evaluation ratings for DMS's proposal:
 

AR, Exh. 10, Source Selection Decision Document (SSDD), Addendum 1 at 2 (price rounded to nearest whole dollar). 

On September 4, 2025, the agency notified DMS that an award had been made to PMS. See id. (reflecting Paradigm received an overall technical rating of outstanding, proposed a total price of $65,778, and was overall ranked first). After receiving a debriefing, DMS filed its protest. 

DISCUSSION

DMS raises several grounds of protest. First, the protester challenges the agency's evaluation of its past performance, contending the Navy failed to follow the solicitation's stated evaluation criteria. Second, DMS argues the agency unreasonably evaluated its proposed price, where the firm inadvertently miscalculated its total price, but properly calculated its pricing coefficients. Finally, the protester argues the agency failed to meaningfully conduct a best-value tradeoff.[4] For the reasons that follow, we find no basis upon which to sustain the protest.[5]

Past Performance

DMS contends the Navy's past performance evaluation was flawed. Protest at 13-19; Comments at 2-3. In this regard, the protester argues the agency used an arbitrary and mechanical approach in forming its evaluation conclusions, and, contrary to the terms of the solicitation, failed to account for positive trends in DMS's performance. Had the agency conducted a reasonable evaluation, DMS avers it would have received a rating of substantial confidence, rather than satisfactory confidence. In response, the agency argues its evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the stated terms of the RFP. COS/MOL at 12-16.

Where a protester challenges a past performance evaluation, we will review the evaluation to determine whether it was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's evaluation criteria.  Starlight Corp., B-420267.3, B-420267.4, Mar. 14, 2022, 2022 CPD ¶ 65 at 4. The evaluation of an offeror's past performance is generally a matter within the discretion of the contracting agency, and we will not question an agency's evaluation of past performance where it is reasonable and sufficiently documented.  Id.

The record demonstrates that the Navy evaluated the CPARS evaluations for the projects DMS submitted for the experience factor and also examined CPARS reports for twenty other projects the agency deemed relevant. AR, Exh. 3, Technical Evaluation Team (TET) Report at 7-8; see also AR, Exh. 6, Matrix of DMS's CPARS Evaluations. Based on that review, the Navy's evaluators concluded that DMS “has a history of successful performance, as evidenced by the Satisfactory ratings on four (4) relevant projects.” AR, Exh. 3, TET Report at 7. While the evaluators noted some ratings of marginal in DMS's performance record, the agency found that the record, as a whole, “indicate[s] a trend of satisfactory performance.” Id. That is, of the evaluations considered, 13 had evaluations rated as “satisfactory”, 6 as “very good”, and one as “marginal.” AR, Exh. 6, Matrix of DMS' s CPARS Evaluations. Overall, the Navy explained it had “a reasonable expectation that the Offeror will successfully perform the required effort[,]” and assigned a rating of “satisfactory confidence.” AR, Exh. 3, TET Report at 7; see also AR, Source Selection Plan at 30 (explaining that a rating of “satisfactory confidence” under the past performance evaluation factor would be assigned where “[b]ased on the Offeror's recent/relevant performance record, the Government has a reasonable expectation that the Offeror will successfully perform the required effort.”).

We find the protester's arguments challenging the reasonableness of the evaluation unpersuasive. First, DMS attacks the agency's aggregation of CPARS ratings across specific metrics into one, overall rating for each project. That is, DMS contends the Navy acted unreasonably by averaging the individual adjectival ratings (for each project) across six performance areas--quality, schedule, cost control, management, small business contracting, and regulatory compliance--into an overall project rating. Comments at 2-3. However, aside from merely asserting that the Navy's approach was “arbitrary and mechanical” (Comments at 3), DMS fails to explain exactly how such an approach is, in fact, arbitrary or mechanical, much less unreasonable. To the contrary, we find the agency's approach both reasonable and consistent with the solicitation. That is, the Navy considered the available past performance information and rendered an overall finding on that information; such an approach is in line with the RFP's mandate that the agency consider “how well the Offeror's team performed on relevant projects.” RFP at 25. DMS's allegation provides no basis to sustain the protest. See Starlight Corp., supra (the evaluation of an offeror's past performance is generally a matter within the discretion of the contracting agency).

Second, the protester argues that the Navy failed to consider, as required by the RFP, any trends in DMS's performance record. Comments at 3 (“[T]he record is devoid of any reference to DMS's performance trends, nor was there any analysis performed of how DMS's performance actually improved over time.”). The record belies the protester's assertion. Indeed, the agency, after examining the relevant CPARS information, concluded that the references “indicate a trend of satisfactory performance.” AR, Exh. 3, TET Report at 7. To the extent the protester suggests that the Navy was required to undertake a point-by-point examination of DMS's performance history to satisfy the RFP's criteria, such an evaluation was not required under the terms of the solicitation. See RFP at 25 (explaining that the Navy would examine “general trends” in contractor performance) (emphasis added). In any event, based on our review of the record, DMS's recent performance history does not manifest a clear trend that would render the Navy's evaluation conclusions unreasonable. See AR, Exh. 6, Matrix of DMS's CPARS Evaluations (showing no clear evidence of a performance trend over time that would undercut the agency's evaluation conclusions). On this record, we find reasonable the agency's past performance evaluation.

Price Evaluation

DMS also challenges the reasonableness of the agency's price evaluation. In this regard, the protester provides that because it made an obvious error in its pricing proposal, the agency should have afforded the firm an opportunity to correct its mistake. Alternatively, DMS maintains that the Navy, under the terms of the solicitation, was obliged to evaluate DMS's price coefficients as part of its evaluation, which, if undertaken, would have reasonably led the Navy to discover the pricing error. Protest at 19-21; Comments at 4-9. In response, the agency argues its price evaluation was reasonable, and the Navy did not abuse its discretion in failing to seek clarity from DMS regarding the firm's pricing. COS/MOL at 16-21.

Here, DMS's alleged error concerns the calculation of its total price for the proposed task order. DMS offered a pre-priced coefficient of [DELETED] and a non-pre-priced coefficient of [DELETED]. AR, Exh. 12, DMS Revised Price Proposal at 35-36 (DMS's exhibit K to the RFP, demonstrating how its coefficients were developed). In responding to the proposed task order (see RFP, Exh. M, Proposal Task Order 0001), the protester states it made a mistake--instead of inserting only its pre-priced and non-pre-priced coefficients into the spreadsheet as unambiguously required by the pricing template, it multiplied the coefficients by the total line prices, and then added those amounts to the total line-item prices, resulting in an inflated total order price:

AR, Exh. 12, DMS Revised Price Proposal at 38. DMS argues that had the mistake not been made, its total task order price would have been $58,399, rather than $102,786:

Protest at 20 (showing that without the error, DMS's proposed task order price would be lower). In the protester's view, this mistake was clear and obvious, and required clarification from the agency.

Clarifications are “limited exchanges” between the government and offerors that may occur when award without discussions is contemplated. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 15.306(a)(1). As a general matter, agencies may, but are not required to, engage in clarifications that give offerors an opportunity to clarify certain aspects of proposals or to resolve minor clerical errors. See e.g., Valkyrie Enterprises, LLC, B‑414516, June 30, 2017, 2017 CPD ¶ 212 at 5. Agencies have broad discretion as to whether to seek clarifications from offerors, and offerors have no automatic right to clarifications regarding proposals. Id. at 7. As our Office has explained, clarifications cannot be used to cure proposal deficiencies or material omissions, materially alter the technical or cost elements of a proposal or otherwise revise the proposal. Alltech Eng'g Corp., B‑414002.2, Feb. 6, 2017, 2017 CPD ¶ 49 at 6. Moreover, it is an offeror's responsibility to submit a well-written proposal, with adequately detailed information which clearly demonstrates compliance with the solicitation and allows a meaningful review by the procuring agency. Microwave Monolithics, Inc., B-413088, Aug. 11, 2016, 2016 CPD ¶ 220 at 6.

On this record, we find no basis to sustain this protest allegation. Even assuming that the pricing error was clear and obvious, the Navy was under no obligation to seek clarification from DMS. Indeed, as our Office has consistently stated, an agency when conducting a procurement on the basis of competitive proposals may, at its discretion, engage in clarifications, but is not required to do so.[6] See Oready, B‑423934, Jan. 9, 2026, at 5; Resource Mgmt. Sys., Inc., B‑422779.2, Feb. 10, 2025, 2025 CPD ¶ 82 at 4‑5; Mission1st Grp. Inc., B-414738.9, Feb. 12, 2019, 2019 CPD ¶ 80 at 7; Dellew Corp. B-410251.3, May 13, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 169 at 7; see also FAR 15.306(a) (“offerors may be given the opportunity to clarify certain aspects of proposals . . . or to resolve minor or clerical errors.”). Accordingly, we find nothing unreasonable with the agency's decision to exercise its discretion by not providing DMS with an opportunity to clarify its pricing proposal.[7]

The protest is denied.

Edda Emmanuelli Perez
General Counsel