Tech Systems, Inc.

Decision

Matter of: Tech Systems, Inc.

File: B-423547; B-423547.2; B-423547.3

Date: August 8, 2025

DIGEST

1. Protest challenging the agency’s evaluation of the offerors’ proposals under the non‑price factors is denied where the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation, and to the extent an error occurred, the protester has not demonstrated competitive prejudice.

2. Protest contending that the exchanges conducted with the awardee constituted improper discussions is denied where the agency’s exchanges were clarifications, rather than discussions.

3. Protest challenging the agency’s best-value tradeoff decision to select a lower-rated proposal at a lower price is denied where the record shows that the agency’s decision was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation.

Tech Systems, Inc. (TSI), of Apex, North Carolina, protests the award of a contract to TDNA Technologies, Inc. d/b/a/ Hartwood Consulting Group (Hartwood), of Stafford, Virginia, under request for proposals (RFP) No. M0026324R0002, issued by the United States Marine Corps, for uniform alteration services. TSI challenges the agency’s evaluation of TSI’s technical proposal, the evaluation of Hartwood’s proposal under the past performance factor, the agency’s exchanges with Hartwood, and the best-value tradeoff decision.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2024, the agency issued the RFP, pursuant to the procedures of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) parts 12 and 15, for uniform tailoring services for all Marine Corps recruits and drill instructor candidates in training stationed at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, South Carolina. Agency Report (AR), Exh. 5, RFP at 1; AR, Exh. 8, Performance Work Statement (PWS) at 1; AR, Exh. 7, RFP § M at 1.[1],[2] The RFP anticipated the award of a fixed-price, indefinite-delivery requirements contract with a 12-month base period, four 12-month option periods, and a 6-month option to extend services. See RFP at 3-26. TSI is providing these services as the incumbent contractor. See Protest at 3; Contracting Officer’s Statement and Memorandum of Law (COS/MOL) at 8-9.

The RFP established award would be made on the basis of a best-value tradeoff using the following three factors, listed in descending order of importance: technical capability, past performance, and price. RFP § M at 1-2. The non-price factors, when combined, were significantly more important than price, and price would become more important where proposals received similar ratings under the non-price factors. Id. at 2. The RFP stated that the agency reserved the right to award a contract based on initial offers received, without discussions. Id. at 1.

For the technical capability factor, offerors were required to submit a technical proposal, contingency plan, quality control plan, management and staffing plan, and equipment plan. AR, Exh. 6, RFP § L at 5-6. As relevant here, for the equipment plan, the RFP instructed offerors to submit a plan demonstrating the offeror’s available resources to perform the tasks within the PWS. Id. at 6. The RFP stated: “At a minimum, the equipment plan shall furnish a listing of Offeror’s proposed equipment by make, model, and year. The list shall be divided into the following categories: 1) Equipment on hand, and 2) Equipment pending acquisition.” Id. The RFP provided that the agency would evaluate how well the offeror’s equipment plan demonstrated the resources and ability to perform the requirements in accordance with the delivery schedule in the PWS. RFP § M at 3. In evaluating proposals under the technical capability factor, the RFP stated that the agency would assign proposals one of the following combined technical/risk adjectival ratings: outstanding, good, acceptable, marginal, and unacceptable. Id. at 3, 5.

For the past performance factor, the RFP provided that offerors were to submit no more than three recent past performance references. RFP § L at 6. With respect to recency, the RFP stated: “For the purposes of this solicitation, the Government will only consider work performance within the past five (5) years from the date the solicitation was released.” RFP § M at 2. The Marine Corps would evaluate the relevancy and quality of the past performance references, and the agency would assign proposals one of the following performance confidence assessment ratings: substantial confidence, satisfactory confidence, neutral confidence, limited confidence, and no confidence.[3] Id. at 4. As relevant here, the RFP defined a substantial confidence rating as: “Based on the Offeror’s recent/relevant performance record, the Government has a high expectation that the Offeror will successfully perform the required effort”; and a satisfactory confidence rating as: “Based on the Offeror’s recent/relevant performance record, the Government has a reasonable expectation that the Offeror will successfully perform the required effort.” Id. at 6.

The agency received three proposals, including the proposals submitted by TSI and Hartwood, prior to the RFP’s closing date of January 21, 2025. COS/MOL at 2; AR, Exh. 14, Award Decision at 4. Subsequently, on March 20, the agency sent Hartwood an email, stating: “The [agency] would like to make the following inquiry for clarification: Will Hartwood be fully up and running to begin work at the end of the 30-day transition period? To include but not limited to the necessary machinery.” AR, Exh. 15, Agency-Hartwood Emails at 3. In response, Hartwood wrote: “the short answer is ‘Yes’ . . . if awarded, Hartwood will be positioned to assume all [Marine Corps Recruit Depot] uniform work requirements by the end of the 30-day transitional period.” Id. at 1. Hartwood then provided a one-page discussion of its proposed approach to the transition, including strategies for obtaining the equipment needed for performance.[4] Id.

Following the agency’s evaluation of proposals, the agency assigned the proposals of TSI and Hartwood the following ratings:

AR, Exh. 14, Award Decision at 4.

In evaluating TSI’s proposal under the technical capability factor, the agency assessed two strengths and one significant weakness.[5] AR, Exh. 10, Technical Evaluation Report at 9. The Marine Corps assessed the significant weakness because TSI’s equipment plan did not provide a listing of the make, model, and year of equipment proposed for performance, as required by the RFP.[6] Id. The evaluators wrote that TSI did not provide sufficient information for the agency to determine whether TSI had the equipment on hand to perform the requirements, and the significant weakness appreciably increased the risk of unsuccessful performance. Id.

In evaluating Hartwood’s proposal under the past performance factor, the agency considered the two past performance references that Hartwood submitted.[7] AR, Exh. 13, Past Performance Evaluation Report at 3-4. The Marine Corps rated each reference as recent and relevant. Id. With respect to quality, the evaluators found that Hartwood received positive ratings on the past performance questionnaire (PPQ) and Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) report for the first past performance reference, but the Marine Corps did not assess the quality of the second reference because the agency did not receive a completed PPQ and could not find a CPARS report for the contract. Id. at 3-5. The agency assigned Hartwood’s proposal a rating of satisfactory confidence and summarized the evaluation as follows: “Based upon the Offeror’s satisfactory or better performance on relevant work, the Government has a reasonable expectation that the Offeror will successfully perform the required effort.” Id. at 5.

The source selection authority (SSA) reviewed the evaluation findings for each proposal. AR, Exh. 14, Award Decision at 8-9. With respect to the technical capability factor, the SSA considered the strengths assessed in each proposal, and the significant weakness identified in TSI’s proposal for failing to submit a complete equipment plan, and the SSA concluded neither proposal was technically superior. Id. at 9. For past performance, the SSA acknowledged that TSI’s proposal received a higher rating, it had a past performance reference that “was nearly identical in scope, magnitude, and complexity to the solicited requirement,” and it “demonstrated ‘Exceptional’ performance on this effort.” Id. The SSA stated that TSI’s proposal was superior to Hartwood’s under this factor. Id.

The SSA then observed that TSI’s proposed price was approximately six percent higher than Hartwood’s and wrote: “When considering both the non-price and price factors and the relative advantages and disadvantages between the two Offerors, Hartwood’s proposal is considered the best value to the Government.” Id. The SSA elaborated that there was a reasonable expectation that Hartwood would successfully perform the required effort, the proposals were of equal merit under the technical capability factor, and the relative advantages that TSI’s proposal offered did not merit a price premium. Id.

The Marine Corps selected Hartwood’s proposal for award on May 9, and this protest followed.

DISCUSSION

TSI protests the Marine Corps’s evaluation of TSI’s technical proposal, the evaluation of Hartwood’s proposal under the past performance factor, the agency’s exchanges with Hartwood, and the best-value tradeoff decision.[8] For the reasons explained below, we find no basis on which to sustain the protest. While our decision does not address every variation of every argument raised by the protester, our Office has considered them all and find none afford a basis on which to sustain the protest.

Evaluation of TSI’s Technical Proposal

TSI argues that the agency’s assessment of a significant weakness for TSI’s failure to list the make, model, and year of the equipment proposed for performance in its equipment plan was unreasonable because the protester’s proposal “clearly stated [that] it possessed all necessary equipment,” and TSI “was actively performing the same services under the incumbent contract using that equipment.” Protest at 3. The agency responds that TSI failed to submit an equipment plan that met the RFP requirements, and the agency’s assessment of a significant weakness was reasonable. COS/MOL at 8.

At the outset, we note that in reviewing protests challenging the evaluation of an offeror’s proposal, it is not our role to reevaluate proposals; rather, our Office examines the record to determine whether the agency’s judgment was reasonable, and in accordance with solicitation criteria and applicable procurement statutes and regulations. Patriot Def. Grp., LLC, B-418720.3, Aug. 5, 2020, 2020 CPD ¶ 265 at 7. A protester’s disagreement with the agency’s evaluation, without more, does not establish that the agency acted unreasonably. A-P-T Research, Inc., B-414825, B-414825.2, Sept. 27, 2017, 2017 CPD ¶ 337 at 4.

Here, it is undisputed that the equipment plan in the protester’s proposal did not provide the make, model, and year of the equipment proposed for performance. COS/MOL at 8; Comments & 1st Supp. Protest at 7-8; AR, Exh. 9, TSI Technical Capability Proposal at 25. Nonetheless, TSI contends the assessment of a significant weakness was unreasonable because information concerning TSI’s equipment “was too close at hand to ignore,” and the agency should have excused TSI’s failure to provide specific details concerning the equipment as “a scrivener’s error.” Comments & 1st Supp. Protest at 8-9.

We first address the protester’s argument that information concerning TSI’s equipment was too close at hand to ignore given the protester’s role as the incumbent contractor. We have stated that in certain limited circumstances, an agency has an obligation (as opposed to the discretion) to consider “outside information” bearing on an offeror’s past performance because such information is “too close at hand” to ignore or to require the offerors to shoulder the inequities that spring from an agency’s failure to obtain and consider the information. Strategi Consulting LLC; Signature Consulting Grp., LLC, B‑416867, B-416867.4, Dec. 21, 2018, 2019 CPD ¶ 10 at 13. We have stated that an agency’s obligation to consider information that is “too close at hand” is limited to information concerning past performance rather than information concerning a firm’s technical proposal. Xenith Grp., LLC, B-420706, July 14, 2022, 2022 CPD ¶ 184 at 4-5. An agency’s evaluation of an offeror’s technical proposal is dependent on the information furnished in the proposal, and an offeror that fails to submit an adequately written proposal runs the risk of having its proposal rejected as unacceptable. Id.

Here, the protester’s allegation is unavailing because, as noted above, the close at hand line of decisions is limited to past performance evaluations. The Marine Corps was under no obligation to consider TSI’s prior performance, including its equipment on hand, when evaluating TSI’s technical proposal.

Additionally, we are not persuaded by TSI’s assertion that the agency should have excused TSI’s failure to submit a compliant equipment plan as a scrivener’s error. An offeror bears the burden of submitting an adequately written proposal and runs the risk of an unfavorable evaluation when it fails to do so. Resource Mgmt. Concepts, Inc., B‑421320, Mar. 20, 2023, 2023 CPD ¶ 101 at 9. Here, offerors were required to submit an equipment plan that, at a minimum, listed the make, model, and year of equipment on hand or pending acquisition, and TSI failed to do so. RFP § L at 6; RFP § M at 3; AR, Exh. 9, TSI Technical Capability Proposal at 25. Accordingly, the agency’s assessment of a significant weakness was reasonable, and we deny this protest allegation.

Past Performance Evaluation

TSI protests the agency’s evaluation of Hartwood’s past performance, contending that the Marine Corps misevaluated the relevance of Hartwood’s first past performance reference and the recency and relevance of Hartwood’s second past performance reference. Comments & 1st Supp. Protest at 5-7. We discuss TSI’s arguments concerning each past performance reference below.

Where, as here, a solicitation requires the evaluation of past performance, we will examine an agency’s evaluation to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation’s evaluation criteria. Spinnaker JV, LLC, B-416688, Nov. 21, 2018, 2018 CPD ¶ 398 at 8. We note that an agency’s evaluation of past performance, which includes its consideration of the relevance, scope, and significance of an offeror’s performance history, is a matter of agency discretion which we will not disturb unless the agency’s assessments are unreasonable, inconsistent with the solicitation criteria, or undocumented. Cyber Prot. Techs., LLC, B-416297.2, B‑416297.3, July 30, 2018, 2018 CPD ¶ 270 at 6.

Evaluation of Hartwood’s First Past Performance Reference

As its first past performance reference, Hartwood submitted a contract under which it provides uniform alteration and fitting services for Air Force trainees (referred to here as the “Air Force contract”). AR, Exh. 12, Hartwood Past Performance Proposal at 2; AR, Exh. 13, Past Performance Evaluation at 3. The agency rated the Air Force contract as relevant after finding that the scope was essentially the same as the effort required by the RFP, the magnitude of $1.1 million per year was somewhat similar to the estimated value of the RFP, and the complexity was similar. AR, Exh. 13, Past Performance Evaluation at 3.

TSI acted as a subcontractor to Hartwood for the Air Force contract, and the protester asserts that “the Agency never acknowledged this fact and erroneously found the scope of the effort to be ‘essentially the same’ and the magnitude to be ‘somewhat similar’” when TSI performed half of the work. Comments & 1st Supp. Protest at 5 (quoting AR, Exh. 13, Past Performance Evaluation at 3). According to TSI, if the evaluators had understood that TSI had performed half of the contract, the evaluators would have evaluated the scope and magnitude of the past performance reference less favorably. Id. at 5-6. The Marine Corps responds that it evaluated Hartwood’s proposal in accordance with the RFP, which neither penalized nor rewarded offerors for managing subcontractors. Supp. MOL at 3.

The record supports the reasonableness of the agency’s evaluation of the Air Force contract. Our Office has found that an agency may properly credit the prime contractor with experience involving functions performed, even if the particular work was actually performed by a subcontractor under the prime contractor’s supervision. ASRC Fed. Data Sols., LLC, B-417655 et al., Sept. 18, 2019, 2019 CPD ¶ 325 at 10; ITT Corp., Sys. Div., B-310102.6 et al., Dec. 4, 2009, 2010 CPD ¶ 12 at 8-9. This is so because of the general rule that a prime contractor under a government contract is responsible for the performance of its subcontractors. We are aware of no requirement that an agency, in conducting its evaluation of an offeror’s past performance, determine the precise work performed by the offeror as the prime contractor and that performed by any subcontractors, and then exclude for evaluation purposes that work that had been performed by any of the subcontractors. ITT Corp., supra.

Moreover, as the agency states, nothing in the RFP indicated that the agency would consider whether a subcontractor was involved in performance when assessing the scope or magnitude of a past performance reference. Supp. MOL at 3; RFP § M at 2-4. The protester has not shown that the Marine Corps’s assessment of the Air Force contract as having essentially the same scope and a somewhat similar magnitude as the RFP was unreasonable.[9]

Evaluation of Hartwood’s Second Past Performance Reference

TSI also disagrees with the Marine Corps’s evaluation of Hartwood’s second past performance reference. The protester argues that the agency mistakenly found the past performance reference to be recent when a substantial portion of the period of performance did not satisfy the RFP’s definition of recency. Comments & 1st Supp. Protest at 6. The protester points to the RFP, which stated that “the Government will only consider work performance within the past five (5) years from the date the solicitation was released.” Id. (quoting RFP § M at 2). The RFP was issued on December 20, 2024, and TSI contends that the agency should not have considered work performed prior to December 20, 2019. Id. The period of performance for Hartwood’s second past performance reference began on April 1, 2017, and ended on September 30, 2020--therefore, in the protester’s view, the RFP permitted the agency to consider only the last 10 months, instead of the entire three-and-a-half year period of performance, for this reference.

In response, the agency asserts: “Protester has not cited to any case law or regulation in support of its interpretation of the RFP, that the entire performance of a contract would have to be completed within 5 years of the issuance of the solicitation in order to be considered recent.” Supp. MOL at 4. The agency states that it assessed recency “as a binary test--either the contract performance included a period within five years from the date of the solicitation and passes the recency test, or it did not.” Id.

Where a dispute exists as to a solicitation’s actual requirements, we begin by examining the plain language of the solicitation. Point Blank Enters., Inc., B-411839, B-411839.2, Nov. 4, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 345 at 4. We resolve questions of solicitation interpretation by reading the solicitation as a whole and in a manner that gives effect to all provisions; to be reasonable, and therefore valid, an interpretation must be consistent with such a reading. Desbuild Inc., B-413613.2, Jan. 13, 2017, 2017 CPD ¶ 23 at 5. If the solicitation language is unambiguous, our inquiry ceases. Id. An ambiguity, however, exists where two or more reasonable interpretations of the solicitation are possible.[10]

Here, we conclude that the solicitation’s definition of recency was not ambiguous. In the paragraph of the RFP defining recency, the RFP stated: “For the purposes of this solicitation, the Government will only consider work performance within the past five (5) years from the date the solicitation was released.” RFP § M at 2. The RFP was clear that to be considered, the work must have been performed within 5 years of December 20, 2024--the date the solicitation was issued. For this reason, we find the agency’s reading of the RFP as permitting it to consider performance predating the 5‑year period, as long as any work occurred within 5 years of RFP issuance, to be unreasonable.[11] Accordingly, the solicitation precluded the agency from considering the portion of Hartwood’s second past performance reference that occurred prior to December 20, 2019.

However, even accepting TSI’s interpretation of the RFP’s definition of recency, we decline to sustain the protest on this basis. Competitive prejudice is an essential element of every viable protest; we will not sustain a protest unless the protester demonstrates that, but for the agency’s improper actions, it would have had a substantial chance of receiving the award. ValidaTek-CITI, LLC, B‑418320.2 et al., Apr. 22, 2020, 2020 CPD ¶ 149 at 6. Where the record establishes no reasonable possibility of prejudice, we will not sustain a protest irrespective of whether a defect in the procurement is found. Id.; see also A-TEK, Inc., B‑404581.3, Aug. 22, 2011, 2011 CPD ¶ 188 at 10.

Here, the record shows that the agency’s assignment of a satisfactory confidence rating to Hartwood’s proposal was based on the relevance and positive ratings of Hartwood’s first past performance reference, the Air Force contract. As noted above, the agency did not receive a PPQ for Hartwood’s second past performance reference, and it was unable to locate a CPARS report for the contract. AR, Exh. 13, Past Performance Evaluation at 5. The contracting officer explains that, given the absence of quality information, the second reference “did not change the overall rating” for Hartwood’s past performance. COS/MOL at 6. Instead, the agency states: “Based on the positive

rating on the first relevant reference, the evaluation team determined it reasonably expected Hartwood to be able to successfully perform the required effort and assigned a Satisfactory Confidence rating.” Id. at 10; see also AR, Exh. 13, Past Performance Evaluation at 5.

In other words, TSI has not shown that if the agency had considered 10 months of Hartwood’s second past performance reference--instead of the three-and-half year period of performance--that Hartwood’s proposal would have received a lower rating under the past performance factor. The agency assigned Hartwood’s proposal a rating of satisfactory confidence based on the relevance and quality of performance of the first past performance reference. The second past performance reference was largely irrelevant in the evaluation. Moreover, the record establishes that the agency considered TSI’s proposal to be superior to Hartwood’s proposal under the past performance factor, and that superiority did not affect the outcome of the best-value tradeoff decision. AR, Exh. 14, Award Decision at 9. Accordingly, under these circumstances, the protester has not demonstrated competitive prejudice.

In sum, we have reviewed the record and, although the protester disagrees with the agency’s assignment of a rating of satisfactory confidence to Hartwood’s proposal, TSI has not demonstrated that the Marine Corps’s assessments were unreasonable. [12] Cyber Prot. Techs., supra. This protest ground is denied.

Exchanges with Hartwood

As noted above, prior to selecting Hartwood’s proposal for award, the Marine Corps contacted Hartwood and asked whether Hartwood would be fully functional at the end of the transition-in period. AR, Exh. 14, Award Decision at 4; AR, Exh. 15, Agency-Hartwood Emails at 3. TSI contends that the agency erroneously characterized the communication as clarifications--instead of discussions, and the protester asserts that it should have been afforded discussions to revise its equipment plan. Comments & 1st Supp. Protest at 2-3. The Marine Corps responds that the communications were clarifications because the agency did not request a proposal revision, and Hartwood’s response did not revise its proposal. Supp. MOL at 2.

The discussions provisions of FAR part 15 describe a spectrum of exchanges that may take place between an agency and an offeror during negotiated procurements.[13] Clarifications are “limited exchanges” between the government and offerors that may allow offerors to clarify certain aspects of proposals or to resolve minor clerical errors. FAR 15.306(a)(2). Discussions, on the other hand, occur when an agency indicates to an offeror significant weaknesses, deficiencies, and other aspects of its proposal that could be altered or explained to enhance materially the proposal’s potential for award. FAR 15.306(d)(3).

The agency’s characterization of a communication as clarifications or discussions is not controlling; it is the actions of the parties that determine whether discussions have been held and not merely the characterization of the communications by the agency. Trademasters Serv., Inc., B-418522.2 et al., Apr. 2, 2021, 2021 CPD ¶ 161 at 7-8. In situations where there is a dispute regarding whether communications between an agency and an offeror constituted discussions, the acid test is whether an offeror has been afforded an opportunity to revise or modify its proposal. Ranger Am. of the Virgin Islands, Inc., B-418539, B-418539.2, June 11, 2020, 2020 CPD ¶ 194 at 9.

Based on our review, we find that the exchanges between the Marine Corps and Hartwood were clarifications, not discussions. The protester’s argument is premised on the claim that Hartwood was able to revise its proposal. Comments & 1st Supp. Protest at 2-3. However, here, the communication from the agency did not permit Hartwood to revise or modify its proposal--but rather to confirm what Hartwood had already proposed to do--and is therefore properly categorized as a clarification. Windstream Communs., B-408258.2, May 21, 2014, 2014 CPD ¶ 163 at 6.

Additionally, we disagree with the protester’s assertion that because Hartwood elected to send “an expansive response” that “provided detailed information in its transition plan,” the communications constituted discussions. Supp. Comments & 2nd Supp. Protest at 2. The only information that the Marine Corps requested was a yes or no response to the question, “Will Hartwood be fully up and running to begin work at the end of the 30-day transition period?” AR, Exh. 15, Agency-Hartwood Emails at 3; see also 2nd Supp. MOL at 2; Supp. COS ¶ 2. Furthermore, the agency states that it did not consider the unsolicited information that Hartwood provided in response in the evaluation, and the protester has not identified any evidence in the record that contradicts the agency’s position. 2nd Supp. MOL at 2; Supp. COS ¶ 3. Consequently, the communications did not constitute discussions.

Because the agency did not conduct discussions with Hartwood, the agency was not required to engage in discussions with any other offeror, including TSI. STG, Inc., B‑411415, B‑411415.2, July 22, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 240 at 8 (denying protest that communication constituted discussions where there was no indication that the offerors were permitted to revise or modify their proposals). Nor, for that matter, was there anything inherently improper with the agency engaging in clarifications with only one offeror. TechOp Sols. Int’l, Inc., B-419964.2, B-419964.3, Jan 18, 2022, 2022 CPD ¶ 34 at 5-6. Accordingly, this allegation is denied.

Best-Value Tradeoff

The protester challenges the agency’s best-value tradeoff decision, asserting that the agency unreasonably concluded that there were no meaningful distinctions between the offerors’ proposals when TSI’s proposal was better-rated under the past performance factor. Protest at 2. Additionally, the protester contends that “the record is devoid of any analysis used to justify the lower-rated offeror; especially when the Solicitation noted that non-price factors held significantly more weight than price factors.” Comments & 1st Supp. Protest at 9-10. The Marine Corps responds that the tradeoff decision was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation, and it reasonably concluded that TSI’s “marginally better Past Performance did not justify its higher price.” COS/MOL at 14.

Source selection officials have broad discretion in determining the manner and extent to which they will make use of the technical and price evaluation results, and their judgments are governed only by the tests of rationality and consistency with the stated evaluation criteria. Integrity Mgmt. Consulting, Inc., B-418776.5, June 22, 2021, 2021 CPD ¶ 245 at 10. When reviewing an agency’s source selection decision, we examine the supporting record to determine if it was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation’s evaluation criteria and applicable procurement statutes and regulations. The SI Org., Inc., B-410496, B-410496.2, Jan. 7, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 29 at 14. Moreover, even when price is the least important factor, an agency may properly select a lower-priced, lower-rated proposal provided that the agency reasonably concludes that the price premium involved in selecting a higher-rated, higher-priced proposal is not justified. See, e.g., i4 Now Sols., Inc., B-412369, Jan. 27, 2016, 2016 CPD ¶ 47 at 15 (concluding, among other things, that an agency was reasonable in declining to pay a price premium for a proposal with superior past performance).

In this case, the SSA noted that the protester and awardee received the same rating under the technical capability factor, and he also acknowledged that Hartwood’s proposal was assessed one strength and no weaknesses, while the agency assessed two strengths and a significant weakness in TSI’s proposal. AR, Exh. 14, Award Decision at 8-9. The SSA reviewed the evaluators’ findings under the technical capability factor and concluded: “Based on the relative disadvantage within TSI’s proposal, in combination with the relative advantages, neither Offeror’s approach is considered superior over the other.” Id. at 9. For the past performance factor, the SSA wrote that TSI’s proposal was assigned a higher rating and was superior to Hartwood’s. Id. The SSA then considered the evaluation findings under the non-price factors, as well as the offerors’ proposed prices, and concluded that the relative advantages in TSI’s proposal, including its higher rating under the past performance factor, did not warrant a 6.2 percent price premium. Id. at 9.

Here, we have no basis to question the reasonableness of the agency’s tradeoff decision. In this regard, contrary to the protester’s assertions, the record shows that the SSA clearly described the differences between the offerors’ proposals--including TSI’s evaluated superiority under the past performance factor--and provided an analysis supporting the selection of Hartwood’s proposal. AR, Exh. 14, Award Decision at 8-9. As noted above, even where price is the least important factor, an agency may properly select a lower-priced, lower-rated proposal provided that the agency reasonably concludes that the price premium involved in selecting a higher-rated, higher-priced proposal is not justified. i4 Now Sols., supra. While TSI disagrees with the outcome, we find nothing unreasonable in the agency’s assessments and conclusions. Accordingly, we find no merit in TSI’s protest challenging the agency’s best-value tradeoff decision. This protest allegation is denied.

The protest is denied.

Edda Emmanuelli Perez
General Counsel

 

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