Space Vector Corporation B-253295.2 November 8, 1993

Space Vector Corporation B-253295.2 November 8, 1993

Procurement Noncompetitive Negotiation Contract awards Sole sources Justification Urgent needs A procuring agency's sole-source award for missile launches was reasonably justified where, after evaluating the protester's qualification package submitted in response to the agency's Commerce Business Daily announcement, the agency determined that only the awardee could meet its actual program needs within the time required, and the agency's noncompetitive procurement did not arise from a lack of advance procurement planning. Procurement Competitive Negotiation Contract awards Multiple/aggregate awards Propriety An agency's total-package procurement of several missile launches in a demonstration program, rather than separately competing the launches, was reasonable where the demonstration program requires that each missile launch exhibit identical performance parameters, and the record shows that different contractors' missiles would exhibit different performance parameters. Procurement Specifications Minimum needs standards Total package procurement Propriety An agency's total-package procurement of several missile launches in a demonstration program, rather than separately competing the launches, was reasonable where the demonstration program requires that each missile launch exhibit identical performance parameters, and the record shows that different contractors' missiles would exhibit different performance parameters.

Attorneys

DIGEST

DECISION

We deny the protest in part and dismiss it in part.[8]

One of the purposes of the LEAP program is to develop an effective theater missile defense system, by developing and testing the integrated technologies necessary to acquire, track and destroy incoming ballistic missiles. In 1991 BMDO and the Department of the Navy initiated a technology demonstration program to demonstrate that LEAP program technologies could be integrated with existing Navy missile systems into a ship-based theater ballistic missile defense system. Essentially, the Navy LEAP program involves testing whether a ship launched and controlled interceptor missile, when integrated with satellite reconnaissance, can intercept a target missile.

BMDO and the Navy began defining the program requirements in June 1991, and this process culminated in the "top-level mission requirements" contained in BMDO's Technical Requirements Document (TRD) dated November 24, 1992.[9] This document provided that the Navy would be responsible for the ship-based "interceptor" missiles while BMDO would be responsible for the integration and launching of the ground-based "target vehicles"--Aries missiles with support avionics and controls. The Aries target vehicle is to be launched from the Goddard Space Flight Center, Wallops Flight Facility, Virginia, and to fly easterly over the Atlantic Ocean to be acquired and tracked by a Navy missile cruiser offshore.

The Navy LEAP technical demonstration program contemplates a series of missile launches, each incorporating information learned from the previous launch. Before the TRD was finalized, an interceptor missile was launched in Flight Test Vehicle (FTV)-1, in September 1992, to validate the interceptor's capabilities. The FTV-2 launch, in September 1993, also involved the launch of only the interceptor missile to test the LEAP ejection capability. These launches did not involve the Aries target vehicle.

The TRD provided for the required launches of the target vehicle in the FTV-Technical Demonstration (TD), FTV-4 and FTV-5. The FTV-TD was the first launch of the Aries target vehicle to demonstrate its delivery capability, as well as the tracking capability of the Navy missile cruiser weapon systems and of the satellite tracking systems. This launch was scheduled to take place in October 1993. FTV-3 contemplated a May 1994 launch of only the interceptor missile (no target vehicle was involved), incorporating all the data learned from FTV-1 through FTV-TD. FTV-4 contemplated a July 1994 launch of both the target vehicle and the interceptor. FTV-5 contemplated an October 1994 attempt to intercept the target vehicle with the interceptor missile. The TRD required a back-up target vehicle to support the FTV-4 and FTV-5 launches as a contingency should the primary launch vehicle not be ready to launch.[10]

The TRD stated various size, weight, and performance requirements for the target vehicle and specified ground support equipment requirements. In addition, the TRD provided that the target vehicle should be:

"designed to optionally include a GPS [global positioning system] receiver to provide accurate position and attitude data during the mission. The GPS receiver will be used to verify range radar tracking accuracy and target vehicle performance in the target demonstration flight. A GPS receiver will be optional on FTV-4 and FTV-5 for further verification of radar and vehicle performance and as a potential back-up for the LEAP fire control solution."

Initially, BMDO program officials presumed that the four required Aries target vehicles would be procured from Orbital under Contract No. SDIO84-90-C-0004 between BMDO and Orbital.[11] Under this contract, Orbital provided target vehicles and launch services in support of BMDO's Flight Test Services Program.[12] See Space Servs. Inc. of Am.; Space Vector Corp., B-237986; B-237986.2, Apr. 16, 1990, 90-1 CPD Para. 392. On October 2, 1992, due to a lack of funding for fiscal year 1993, BMDO stopped work on 5 of the 15 LEAP programs under the contract. At that time, Orbital was building four Aries target vehicles for one of the canceled LEAP programs; the Aries vehicles were estimated to be approximately 80 percent complete.[13] On December 21, 1992, Orbital's contract was partially terminated for the convenience of the government; this included the program for which Orbital was building the four Aries vehicles.

In late November 1992, BMDO's contracting officer decided that Orbital's prior contract should not be modified to provide the necessary launch services for the Navy LEAP target demonstration program. The contracting officer was concerned that the probable increased contract costs entailed in the Navy LEAP launches could be considered a "cardinal change" beyond the scope of the original contract. Accordingly, BMDO's launch services director was informed that the Navy LEAP launches should be either acquired competitively or, if appropriate, through a sole source procurement. The launch services director was also informed that a competitive acquisition would ordinarily take about 6 months.

Given the time estimated to conduct a competitive procurement and the time required for design, development, fabrication and testing by a contractor to meet the launch requirements, the launch services director concluded that only Orbital, by virtue of its prior contract work and available assets, could provide the launches within the time required. On January 19, 1993, the launch services director requested that Orbital be "`turned-on' contractually by the end of next week." The launch director was advised that a CBD announcement of the sole source action must be published before any such action could be commenced. On January 26, 1993, BMDO prepared a purchase request to acquire the Navy LEAP launches from Orbital on a sole source basis.

On February 9, BMDO published a synopsis in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) for the proposed sole source procurement of the Navy LEAP launches from Orbital. In pertinent part, potential offerors were informed that:

"[BMDO] intends to award a cost-plus-fixed-fee letter contract to [Orbital] for launch and integration services for four . . . LEAP technology, demonstration, suborbital targets which consist of an Aries I booster (M56A1) with a support avionics and control section. The target vehicle must have the ability to achieve approximately 350 kilometers (km) apogee and a range of approximately 500 km. The integration services include all necessary services and mission peculiar items required to develop acceptable targets for the Navy LEAP Seekers. The launch dates for the Navy LEAP targets are October 1993, July 1994, and September 1994. Two (2) target vehicles, a primary and back-up, will be required for the July and September 1994 launches with the back-up being launched at a [to be determined] date. [Orbital] is the only known source with launch vehicle assets capable of meeting the October 1993 launch date. Interested contractors who are capable of meeting the October 1993 launch date are invited to submit a qualification package to include photographs of hardware, status of all relevant assets, detailed milestone schedules and performance capability which demonstrates the ability to provide a qualified launch vehicle and available assets to support the October 1993 and subsequent launch dates."

The qualification packages were required to be submitted within 15 days of the date of the CBD synopsis. The TRD was not provided to potential offerors, although Orbital received a copy of the TRD from BMDO's SETA contractor on December 1, 1992.

On February 11, BMDO issued Task Order No. 93-1 under Orbital's prior contract for services in support of the Navy LEAP program, whereunder Orbital was required to provide "engineering efforts to establish Navy LEAP target mission requirements, mission planning concepts, system engineering, vehicle configuration, and detailed engineering design flowdowns." Orbital was informed that the TRD should be used as the "baseline" to develop mission requirements and hardware design. On that same date, Orbital submitted its task plan in response to the task order.[14] In response to the task order, Orbital prepared several documents: the Mission Requirements Document (that defined the top-level mission requirements); the System Requirements Document (that traced the mission requirements to design requirements); and the System Design Document (that documented the actual design of the system).

On February 23 and 24, BMDO received qualification packages from Space Vector and Lockheed Missile and Space Co. Both were determined to be not qualified for similar reasons. Regarding Space Vector's package, BMDO determined that Space Vector's proposed 8-month schedule to perform the October 1993 target demonstration launch was 5 months beyond the required October launch date, assuming a date of July 15 for contract authority to proceed.[15] This proposed 8-month effort was believed by BMDO to be overly optimistic in any case, even assuming the necessary limited competition could be completed earlier. Of greatest concern to BMDO was that Space Vector did not propose a GPS receiver or propose any time in its schedule for integrating the receiver onto their missile.[16] Finally, BMDO evaluated Space Vector's package as providing for only three target vehicles, and not the required back-up vehicle.

During the week of March 15, BMDO conducted various oral discussions with Space Vector concerning Space Vector's proposed schedule and its apparent failure to provide for a back-up vehicle. On March 23, Space Vector provided additional information to BMDO supporting its proposed schedule and showing that it provided for a back-up vehicle. Space Vector also stated that it had learned "that technical and programmatic criteria other than that called for in the CBD may be used in the procurement of the Navy LEAP targets" and requested this further information. Space Vector was never provided with the TRD during the qualification process, even though the record shows that this document was the basis on which its qualification package was evaluated.[17]

On March 25, BMDO submitted several written questions to Space Vector that in part stated that the "Mission Requirements Document states a requirement to have a GPS receiver on the target vehicle to provide location information to validate range radar data. This requires that the GPS data be transmitted real-time to the receiving station."[18] BMDO asked Space Vector whether it could easily integrate the GPS receiver onto its existing target vehicle configuration and how long the effort would take. Space Vector replied that it could perform the necessary GPS integration within its original 8-month schedule and, specifically, that "[i]ntegration and check-out of [the GPS] units, along with the other required components can be accomplished in two to four months, depending on mission requirements."

After evaluating Space Vector's responses to the agency's discussions, BMDO determined that Space Vector could not provide the contract services within the time required.[19] Specifically, the agency estimated that Space Vector would require approximately 12 to 18 months to fully integrate and test a GPS system, and that this would delay the October 1993 launch, which was considered to be a firm date, by more than 7 months.[20] The agency also questioned whether Space Vector could perform the necessary range support services within the time required.

On April 23, BMDO's acting director, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2304(c)(1) (1988) as implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Sec. 6.302-1(a), signed a justification and approval (J&A) document for a sole-source award to Orbital "as the only known source with available and acceptable launch vehicle assets which is capable of meeting the required launch date." The J&A stated several reasons in support of the sole-source decision: (1) there was unacceptable technical and schedule risk that Space Vector and Lockheed would be unable to meet the October 1993 demonstration launch date; specifically, the two firms "could not perform the required end to end integration of the GPS receiver[21] without an estimated 7 [to] 11 month [delay in] the production schedule"; (2) the October 1993 launch date could not reasonably be delayed because it was coordinated and integrated with several other events; for example, the launch was coordinated with the availability of Navy LEAHY class TERRIER missile cruisers[22] that are scheduled for decommissioning by October 1994, and was integrated with a number of BMDO, Air Force, Army and Navy assets and programs, such as the Miniature Sensor Technology Integration (MSTI-2) satellite that will track the Aries target vehicle to provide data necessary to evaluate space-based passive sensor tracking capability;[23] and (3) only Orbital had access to the required hardware necessary to satisfy the October 1993 launch--specifically, work-in-progress Aries target vehicles and miscellaneous hardware (including GPS receivers and ground stations) were available as termination inventory from Orbital's prior contract. The J&A cited the consumption of these assets as further justification for the use of non-competitive procedures as follows:

"Providing these assets to another contractor would require the assets to be provided as [g]overnment [f]urnished [p]roperty (GFP) without firm knowledge by either the [g]overnment or the receiving contractor of the condition or stage of completion of the assets, which may not be compatible with the receiving vehicle, potentially leading to performance problems and claims."

After being notified of the rejection of its qualification package, Space Vector protested to our Office on May 3. Award of a cost reimbursement contract was made to Orbital on May 19, based upon the agency's written determination that urgent and compelling circumstances would not permit the agency to await our decision in this matter.

Space Vector disputes the agency's determination that Space Vector could not provide the required target vehicles, with integrated GPS receivers and ground stations, by the October 1993 launch date; in this regard, Space Vector contends that it was treated unfairly by BMDO because the Aries target vehicles and GPS receivers will be provided to Orbital as GFP (from Orbital's partially terminated contract) while BMDO required Space Vector to provide its own assets. Space Vector also argues that the integration of GPS receivers on the target vehicle and the requirement for an October 1993 target demonstration launch are not essential agency requirements that would justify a determination that Space Vector was not a qualified source; that BMDO failed to conduct advance procurement planning that would have allowed a competitive procurement even if the agency did require an October 1993 launch; and that BMDO does not have a reasonable basis to bundle the remaining target vehicle launches with the October 1993 target demonstration launch.

While the overriding mandate of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) is for "full and open competition" in government procurements through the use of competitive procedures, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2304(a)(1)(A), CICA does permit noncompetitive acquisitions in specified circumstances, such as when only one responsible source is available and no other type of property or services will satisfy the agency's needs. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2304(c)(1); Kollsman, a Div. of Sequa Corp.; Applied Data Tech., Inc., B-243113; B-243113.2, July 3, 1991, 91-2 CPD Para. 18; Petro Star, Inc., B-248019, July 27, 1992, 92-2 CPD Para. 34. When an agency uses noncompetitive procedures under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2304(c)(1), it is required to execute a written J&A with sufficient facts and rationale to support the use of the specific authority, see 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2304(f)(1)(A) and (B); FAR Secs. 6.302-1(c); 6.303; 6.304, and to publish notice of the sole source action in the CBD. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2304(f)(1)(C); 41 U.S.C. Sec. 416(b)(5). Where the agency has substantially complied with CICA's procedural requirements, we will not object to a reasonably justified sole-source award. Environmental Tectonics Corp., B-248611, Sept. 8, 1992, 92-2 CPD Para. 160. A sole-source award is justified where the agency reasonably concludes that only one known source can meet its needs within the required time, except where the noncompetitive situation arises from a lack of advance procurement planning. Servo Corp. of Am., B-246734, Mar. 31, 1992, 92-1 CPD Para. 322, recon. denied, B-246734.2, Aug. 6, 1992, 92-2 CPD Para. 75.

As described in detail below, we conclude that BMDO reasonably determined that only Orbital could satisfy the agency's Navy LEAP program requirements within the time required. We also conclude that the October 1993 launch and the requirement for the integration of a GPS receiver reasonably reflected the agency's actual needs at the time of Space Vector's disqualification and the sole source award, and that BMDO's conclusion that Space Vector could not perform the program work within the time required was not based upon a lack of advance procurement planning.

The core basis of the agency's determination that Space Vector could not provide the required target vehicle by October 1993 is the agency's conclusion that Space Vector could not perform the required GPS receiver integration by that date.

The record demonstrates that integrating a GPS receiver onto a ballistic missile, such that accurate, real-time position and velocity data can be received, is a complex task, requiring significant hardware modification and software development. The GPS receiver calculates position and velocity data by simultaneously receiving position information from four GPS satellites; this information is "downloaded" to ground-based computers for later analysis.[24] Essentially, all current commercial GPS receivers are designed for use on relatively slow-moving vehicles, such as airplanes or ships. The Aries target vehicle, a supersonic ballistic missile, requires the GPS receiver to acquire data from GPS satellites under significant acceleration, at extreme speeds, and under severe vibration. These conditions can result in the GPS receiver losing track of GPS satellites and not calculating accurate position and velocity data. The record shows that to achieve satisfactory performance from current commercial GPS receivers on a ballistic missile, the GPS receiver must be modified, software developed, and the system integrated with the rocket's flight computer and guidance and navigation units; in addition, ground support equipment must be developed that will support and monitor the on-board GPS receiver.

BMDO reports that it took Orbital 18 months to integrate a GPS receiver with an Aries vehicle under the prior contract and that under other similar programs the time required to successfully perform a GPS receiver/launch vehicle integration has ranged from 12 to 18 months.[25] Space Vector admits that it could take "a year or more" to perform end-to-end integration of a GPS receiver into its target vehicle, if Space Vector were required to procure the necessary hardware itself.

Space Vector argues, however, that the necessary GPS hardware and software is available as GFP from Orbital's partially terminated contract, and that, if this GFP were provided, Space Vector could perform the necessary integration within 3 to 4 months. In support of its arguments, Space Vector has submitted statements from an expert, who had significant experience in the space program and with GPS systems, and which are based upon his complete review of the record.[26] This expert's opinion is that Space Vector could perform the required GPS receiver integration within the 8 months Space Vector originally claimed was required to have an Aries target vehicle ready for the October 1993 launch. However, this opinion is based upon the expert's assumptions that:

"the Navy LEAP program had progressed to the point of completing all major airborne and ground support equipment design efforts prior to January 1993 and that the only work remaining was to complete the vehicle final assembly and test phase, software verification, final mission and range planning activities, and final launch operations"

and that the GFP would be provided with "a maximum of documentation, software, specifications and general design data."

BMDO and Orbital both dispute Space Vector's expert's assumptions that there is a complete GPS hardware and software system available as GFP and useable by other companies, and that detailed manuals, blueprints, or technical data exists for the GPS system. BMDO states that GFP from the prior contract was not made available to other potential offerors because this material was not considered useable by other companies. Specifically, BMDO and Orbital state that Orbital's GPS system from the prior contract consists of hardware and software that has been heavily modified and designed to integrate with Orbital's flight computer and proprietary guidance/navigation operating system. In this regard, since the prior contract did not require that Orbital provide the government with detailed technical or software data for the GPS system, the government does not have detailed technical design or software code/program information to explain Orbital's unique design. Other contractor's vehicles would necessarily have their own proprietary guidance/navigation operating systems, with which Orbital's GPS system would not interface without significant hardware modification and software development. Both BMDO and Orbital state that while Space Vector, or any other aerospace contractor, could "reverse engineer" Orbital's hardware, such an effort would take considerable time and would necessarily involve hardware modification and software development to integrate the GPS system with Space Vector's own flight computer and operating system.

Space Vector, and its expert, while disputing the agency's and Orbital's conclusions regarding the usefulness to Space Vector of the government-owned, Orbital-designed GPS system, do not show that BMDO's conclusions are unreasonable. Specifically, Space Vector does not rebut BMDO's and Orbital's arguments that Orbital's GPS system was not useable by Space Vector without significant hardware modification and software design to enable the GPS system to work with Space Vector's vehicle design. Rather, Space Vector essentially argues that if the GPS system is complete,[27] it must be useable.[28]

Based on this record, we conclude that the furnishing of Orbital's GPS system from the prior contract would not have significantly shortened the time required to integrate a GPS receiver with Space Vector's vehicle, as the protester argues.[29] Rather, significant hardware modification, software development and system testing would need to be performed. Accordingly, we find reasonable the agency's conclusion that there was significant risk that Space Vector would be unable to perform the necessary GPS receiver integration within 8 months as Space Vector claimed. This is especially true since Space Vector during the qualification discussions regarding its ability to perform GPS integration indicated that it had only "done a preliminary evaluation on how to integrate similar hardware into our vehicles" but that integration could be accomplished within 2 to 4 months. Given Space Vector's lack of specific experience and the government's experience with integrating GPS receivers with rockets under similar programs, BMDO reasonably concluded that it was highly unlikely that Space Vector could perform the required integration in less than 12 months and that it was likely that this integration would take even longer.

Space Vector argues that the requirement for integrating a GPS receiver with the Aries target vehicle and for an October 1993 launch are not actual agency requirements that would justify a determination that Space Vector was not a qualified source. Regarding the GPS receiver integration, Space Vector asserts that the agency's requirements documentation shows that the GPS receiver was never an essential or firm requirement. As Space Vector notes, the TRD only provides that the target vehicle be "designed to optionally include a [GPS] receiver," and there is no mention of a requirement for integrating a GPS receiver in the CBD synopsis. In this regard, Space Vector argues that the GPS receiver would only provide redundant position information which the agency would already be receiving from sea, land and satellite based radars. In Space Vector's view, BMDO only decided to require a GPS system on the target vehicle when the agency learned that such a system would be available from Orbital's prior contract as GFP.

The record shows that the requirement for a GPS receiver on the target vehicle evolved during the agency's definition of its program requirements. Specifically, the record shows that prior to the creation of the TRD, BMDO's SETA contractor recommended the use of a GPS receiver as a means of verifying radar tracking performance and Aries target vehicle performance in the target demonstration flight. The TRD recognized this requirement, although unartfully, by providing that while a GPS receiver might be used during the flight to provide current position and attitude data, the GPS receiver would be required for later verification of radar tracking accuracy and target vehicle performance in the target demonstration flight.[30] A November 30 Navy LEAP program briefing also identified a "C-band radar beacon and GPS receiver" as requirements on the target vehicle. Furthermore, the record shows that the GPS system will be used to verify the tracking capability and accuracy of the ship and land based radar, as well as the satellite surveillance system. In sum, we find that the GPS receiver requirement is a "real" requirement and did not represent an unnecessary redundancy, as Space Vector suggests.

Even though the CBD synopsis failed to mention the GPS receiver requirement, this does not demonstrate that it was not an actual requirement. While it is true that an agency contemplating a sole source action has a duty to make its essential requirements clear to potential vendors so as to assure that potential alternatives are brought to the agency's attention, see Masstor Sys. Corp., 64 Comp.Gen. 118 (1984), 84-2 CPD Para. 598, this does not mean that the CBD announcement, which is being used to test the market, must identify all requirements against which a potential source will be evaluated.[31] Rather, the agency may identify further requirements to vendors that respond to the CBD announcement. See, e.g., Racal-Milgo, 66 Comp.Gen. 430 (1987), 87-1 CPD Para. 472. Here, while we think that GPS receiver integration was such a critical factor in the agency's sole-source determination that it should have been disclosed in the CBD synopsis, Space Vector was informed of the GPS integration requirement during qualification discussions, was given the opportunity to demonstrate its capability in this regard, and still has not demonstrated that it had the capability to timely satisfy this requirement. See AUL Instruments, Inc., 64 Comp.Gen. 871 (1985), 85-2 CPD Para. 324.

Space Vector also argues that there is no reasonable justification for the October 1993 launch. Space Vector contends this launch date simply reflects Orbital's capabilities rather than BMDO's actual needs. Space Vector points out that BMDO's SETA contractor recommended in October 29, 1992, prior to approval of the TRD, that "[t]o ensure the maximum benefit from [the target demonstration] test, it should occur at least three months prior to FTV-4 (which was scheduled for July 1994)." Thus, Space Vector argues that the target demonstration launch could occur as late as April or May of 1994.

As indicated in the J&A supporting this sole source award, BMDO contends that there were several interlocking factors that formed the basis for the agency's selection of an October 1993 launch date. First, the Navy's decommissioning of the LEAHY class cruisers in October 1994 results in an overall compression of the entire Navy LEAP demonstration program, since the last launch (FTV-5) must occur prior to October 1994. Next, each of the scheduled launches uses information learned from prior launches. Thus, the radar tracking information learned from the FTV-TD launch will be used by the Navy to perform shipboard fire control system modifications prior to their interceptor missile launch in FTV-3.[32] Finally, the October 1993 launch was scheduled to coincide with the planned September 1993 launch of the MSTI-2 satellite, which will be used to track this launch.[33]

While Space Vector challenges each of these interconnected factors, we find that they form a valid basis for the required October 1993 launch date. First, the record supports the agency's statements as to its need for a LEAHY class TERRIER missile cruiser, and that these cruisers will be decommissioned after October 1994. Space Vector's various arguments that there may be other missile cruisers in the Navy's fleet that would satisfy BMDO needs or that BMDO can somehow delay the Navy's planned decommissioning of the LEAHY class cruisers, which BMDO disputes, do not demonstrate that there are in fact any other ships that currently meet BMDO's needs or that BMDO can effectively delay the decommissioning of these cruisers.[34]

Secondly, we find no merit to Space Vector's argument that the intended September 1993 launch of the MSTI-2 satellite was not a "driver" for the October 1993 target demonstration launch because a later target demonstration launch can be covered by the launch of the MSTI-3 satellite (scheduled for April 1994). This argument ignores the fact that information learned from the MSTI-2 satellite's tracking of the target demonstration flight will be incorporated in the tracking algorithms for the MSTI-3 satellite, and that early use of the satellite was necessary to fit the launches within the compressed window caused by the decommission of the LEAHY class cruisers.

During our consideration of the protest, the anticipated September 1993 launch of the MSTI-2 satellite was delayed until November 1993 because of technical problems with a state-of-the-art infrared camera planned for the MSTI-2 satellite.[35] This camera, which is being developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, failed to meet vibration tests after its receipt from Lawrence Livermore in July 1993, causing the delay of the MSTI-2 launch.

As a result of this delay, BMDO decided to change its Navy LEAP program launch schedule. Specifically, the FTV-TD launch will be delayed from October 1993 to December 1993.[36] The FTV-3 launch mission will be changed from an interceptor-only launch to a combined interceptor and target vehicle launch; thus, the second target vehicle launch will now occur in May 1994, rather than in July 1994, on FTV-4. The FTV-4 launch will continue to be in July 1994, and FTV-5 is now scheduled for September 1994.[37] This new schedule results in the back-up vehicle being used during the regular launching schedule and being unavailable as a contingency asset. The agency states that this compression of the target vehicle schedule launches makes the program higher risk, but is required by the October 1994 LEAHY class cruiser decommissioning[38] and the need to coordinate its launch schedule with the MSTI-2 satellite launch.

Space Vector argues that the agency's delay in the October 1993 target demonstration launch demonstrates that this launch date does not reflect the agency's actual needs. We do not agree. The delay in the October 1993 launch was caused by the delay in the MSTI program and is not attributable to any actions by the Navy LEAP program office. Rather, the target demonstration launch has been delayed so that BMDO can receive the technical information that will be supplied by the MSTI-2 satellite, as well as the later MSTI-3 and MSTI-4 satellites that will build upon information learned from the earlier MSTI satellite. The record shows that, at the time of BMDO's determination that Space Vector could not satisfy the agency's requirements within the time required, the agency did not know that the MSTI-2 satellite launch would be delayed.

We also do not agree with Space Vector that the delay in the October 1993 launch and acceleration of the next target vehicle launch demonstrates that the agency had no need for the originally scheduled relatively long delay between the FTV-TD and FTV-4 launches. As noted by the agency, this compression in the Navy LEAP launches, which is necessary because of the planned decommissioning of the LEAHY class cruisers, unavoidably makes this program much riskier than the agency originally had desired.[39] While the agency must now accept this risk, due to the planned decommissioning of the LEAHY class cruisers, we do not think that the agency had to voluntarily assume what the agency reasonably believed to be unacceptable risk by delaying the target demonstration launch to allow Space Vector to attempt to integrate a GPS system on its vehicle.

Space Vector also argues that BMDO created this sole source situation by a lack of advance procurement planning. In Space Vector's view, the agency's requirement for Aries target vehicles arose as early as August 1992 when the Navy provided BMDO with the Navy's LEAP program plan for the interceptor missile, and BMDO should have issued its CBD announcement in August/September 1992 to notify and identify potential offerors. Space Vector then contends that a solicitation could have been issued contemporaneously with the November 1992 TRD, with offers due 30 days later. Under the protester's procurement scheme, award would be made 30 days after offers were received, or approximately January 1993. Thus, in Space Vector's view, assuming a January 1993 award date, Space Vector could provide the required October 1993 target demonstration launch within the 8 months Space Vector originally proposed.

The record does not support Space Vector's projected procurement cycle. Rather, the record supports the agency's position that it was not until the November 1992 TRD that the agency's target vehicle requirements were sufficiently established to determine how it would acquire its program needs.[40] In November 1992, BMDO's program office assumed that the required target vehicles and launches would be obtained from Orbital under its existing contract. At the end of November 1992, the Navy LEAP program contracting officer informed the program office that the target vehicles and launches could not be obtained from Orbital under the prior contract, and that the requirements must either be procured competitively or a sole source justification prepared.[41] In mid-December Orbital's contract was partially terminated. During December 1992/January 1993, the program office, after assessing the time required to conduct a competitive procurement and for potential sources to perform the necessary target vehicle integration services, determined that only Orbital could meet the program needs within the time required. In January 1993, the contracting officer was requested to begin planning a sole source acquisition from Orbital. A sole source action announcement was published in the CBD in February 1993.

We find that BMDO performed adequate advance procurement planning where in a matter of little more than 2 months it assessed its program needs and published a CBD announcement of an intended sole source award to the only source that the agency believed could meet its minimum needs in the time required. While it is true that a procuring agency can publish special notices of future procurement actions in the CBD in order to assess possible competition, see FAR Sec. 5.205(c), we are unaware of any requirement that an agency publish a CBD announcement of a contemplated requirement before it determines its requirements or how it will procure them.

In any event, even if a competitive award could have been made in January 1993 to support an intended October 1993 launch, 9 months later, the agency, as noted above, reasonably determined that Space Vector could not perform the required GPS receiver integration in less than 12 months. Thus, even under Space Vector's argued for procurement cycle, the protester would not have been found qualified to perform the Navy LEAP program launches.

Space Vector also protests BMDO's "bundling" of the FTV-4 and FTV-5 target vehicle launches with the October 1993 target demonstration launch. Space Vector argues that even if it was unable to provide the target vehicle with an integrated GPS receiver by the October 1993 launch date, the protester could provide the remaining target vehicle launches. Space Vector contends that the only reason BMDO has provided for a total-package procurement of the target vehicle launches was to "consume" the government-owned Aries vehicles from Orbital's partially terminated contract.

BMDO responds that the primary purpose of the Navy LEAP program is to evaluate the interceptor missile and its fire control systems, not the target vehicles. In order to perform this evaluation, it is essential that the target vehicle performance parameters remain constant throughout the launches. In this regard, the target demonstration launch will provide performance and tracking data that will be used as a baseline for the following launches. The agency states that no two contractors' vehicles will perform identically; that is, the differences in the vehicles and their associated avionics, control system and configuration, will affect the target vehicles performance. BMDO concludes that using different contractors to launch the target vehicle would introduce new performance variables that would invalidate the target demonstration baseline performance parameters.

Because bundled or total-package procurements, combining separate, multiple requirements into one contract, can restrict competition by excluding firms that can only furnish a portion of the requirements, we review such procurements to determine whether the approach is reasonably required to satisfy the agency's legitimate minimum needs. See Electro-Methods, Inc., 70 Comp.Gen. 53 (1990), 90-2 CPD Para. 363; Airport Markings of Am., Inc. et al., 69 Comp. Gen. 511 (1990), 90-1 CPD Para. 543. We have found reasonable a total package procurement where a single contractor was required to ensure the effective coordination and integration of interrelated tasks, or where procurement by means of separate acquisitions would involve undue technical risk or would defeat a requirement for interchangeability and compatibility. Electro-Methods, Inc., supra; LeBarge Prods. Inc., B-232201, Nov. 23, 1988, 88-2 CPD Para. 510.

Here, we think the agency expressed a legitimate technical need for its target vehicle to maintain constant performance parameters throughout the Navy LEAP program launches. Since Space Vector does not assert that its vehicle would have identical performance parameters to those of Orbital's vehicle (and the record evidences that it would not), there is no basis to question the agency's decision to procure these launches on a total-package basis.

Space Vector finally protests that Orbital received source selection information, which was not made available to Space Vector, and participated in the drafting of the agency's minimum requirements in violation of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, 41 U.S.C. Sec. 423 (Supp. III 1991) and FAR Part 9.5 (organizational conflict of interest). Space Vector argues that Orbital must be disqualified from providing Navy LEAP program launch services and these requirements competed.

While BMDO and Orbital dispute all of Space Vector's allegations in this regard, we need not address these issues because we find that Space Vector is not an interested party to raise them, given our conclusion that BMDO's sole source award to Orbital was reasonably justified. Our Bid Protest Regulations provide that only an actual or prospective bidder or offeror, whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of a contract or the failure to award a contract, may have its protest considered by our Office. 4 C.F.R. Secs. 21.0(a), 21.1(a) (1993). Where, as here, we find reasonable an agency's sole source determination that only the awardee can satisfy its minimum needs, the protester would not be eligible to receive award and thus does not have the requisite economic interest to protest that the awardee has an organizational conflict of interest or that the awardee has received source selection sensitive information not available to the protester. See Eagle Research Group, Inc., B-213725, May 8, 1984, 84-1 CPD Para. 514. In any event, even if we assume the validity of the protester's allegations, we fail to see how Space Vector was prejudiced, since the agency reasonably determined that it could not conduct a competitive procurement and that only Orbital could meet its requirements. See, e.g., Comptek Research, Inc., 68 Comp.Gen. 117 (1988), 88-2 CPD Para. 518.

The protest is denied in part and dismissed in part.

7. BMDO was formerly known as the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

8. A protective order was issued in this case. Space Vector's and Orbital's counsel, and an expert/consultant employed by Space Vector's counsel, were admitted under the protective order and received access to protected material. Our decision is based upon protected, confidential information and is necessarily general.

9. The TRD was compiled by BMDO's systems engineering and technical assistance (SETA) contractor in November 1992, based upon input from BMDO and the Navy.

10. If the back-up vehicle was not required for either FTV-4 or FTV-5, BMDO intended to launch it on a subsequent test project not later than November 1994.

11. The November 24, 1992, TRD originally identified Orbital as the source for the target vehicle. The TRD was later amended to remove any reference to Orbital.

12. Orbital was required to provide and launch up to 20 target vehicles.

13. At least as early as October 21, 1992, BMDO program officials had determined that four Aries target vehicles would be required to satisfy the Navy LEAP program requirements, which BMDO believed could be provided under Orbital's existing contract.

14. Orbital received an advance copy of the task order on January 15 and began work on the task plan at its own risk.

15. The contract authority to proceed date was calculated assuming a 5-month limited competition procurement cycle.

16. Space Vector had not been informed that a target vehicle GPS system was required, so it is hardly surprising that it did not address this requirement.

17. Space Vector claims that BMDO's evaluation of its submission was also based upon the documents Orbital had prepared under Task Order No. 93-1. While BMDO denies these assertions, there is evidence in the record that supports Space Vector's claims. However, inasmuch as Space Vector cannot meet BMDO's actual requirements concerning the GPS system that were otherwise identified in the TRD and to Space Vector, Space Vector was not prejudiced by any reference to Orbital's designs.

18. The record indicates that this is the first time that Space Vector was informed of the GPS receiver requirements in the Navy LEAP project.

19. Lockheed also received discussions and was determined to be not qualified for similar reasons.

20. A schedule of 12 months was considered optimistic by BMDO, while 15 to 18 months was considered a more probable schedule.

21. BMDO states that:

"end to end integration of GPS receiver into an existing launch vehicle requires significant up front design and analysis not only in choosing and procuring flight hardware but also in the development of ground support equipment, software, and operational requirements. Complete testing must be conducted to determine the interactions between GPS and all other flight systems."

22. The "TERRIER" missile is a type of missile and associated weapon system. The Navy for its part of the LEAP testing program will use a TERRIER missile variant known as the STANDARD Missile 2, Block-II/III (Extended Range). This is the only missile in the Navy's inventory with the performance capability to launch the LEAP. Only the LEAHY and BELKNAP class cruisers can launch this TERRIER missile, and only the LEAHY class cruisers have the requisite number of missile launchers and radars.

23. The MSTI-2 satellite was scheduled for launch in September 1993, and has an estimated life of 6 months. The agency states that historically the MSTI satellite's useful life has been shorter than that originally estimated. This satellite will perform many more functions than just monitoring the Navy LEAP tests.

24. Basically, the GPS receiver coordinates signals from the GPS satellites to locate the position of the receiver at any given time; as the receiver moves with the rocket, the velocity of the rocket can be calculated by measuring the receiver's position at known time intervals.

25. For example, Hughes Missile Systems is developing a GPS system to fly on the Navy LEAP interceptor; this effort, which is separate from the target vehicle, is currently estimated as taking 17 months.

26. This individual was admitted to the protective order to assist counsel for Space Vector.

27. Space Vector references certain documentation in the record that suggests that Orbital had, or had more nearly, completed the GPS system under the prior contract. Even assuming this was the case, Space Vector has not shown that significant hardware and software work would not nevertheless be required to make it useable. In this regard, the record shows that the majority of the time required to integrate a GPS receiver with the target vehicle involved software development and testing.

28. Space Vector's expert admits, however, that to accomplish the integration of the GPS receiver with the rocket guidance system would require the development of an algorithm that would provide position versus time data in a form that can be later used to compare the ground station position versus time data generated during the flight.

29. Orbital estimates that it would take a contractor between 1 1/2 and 2 years to "cannibalize [Orbital's] GPS design . . . to develop their own unique hardware and software, to test the system, to integrate it into their launch vehicle and to develop a set of GPS ground support equipment."

30. The TRD also provides that "[a] GPS receiver will be optional on FTV-4 and FTV-5 for further verification of radar and vehicle performance and as a potential back-up for the LEAP fire control solution." The agency states it will decide after the FTV-TD launch whether to use the GPS receiver on later launches, but that in order for the GPS system to be available on later flights, its operation must be validated on the target demonstration flight.

31. We do not understand why the agency refused to provide the TRD to Space Vector after it responded to the CBD announcement, especially since the statement of the government's requirements had already been provided to Orbital. If an agency does not treat potential sources fairly in determining its actual requirements and determining whether the sources can satisfy them, this adversely reflects on the reasonableness of the agency's determinations. See Maremont Corp., 55 Comp.Gen. 1362, 1379 (1976), 76-2 CPD Para. 181. Here, however, Space Vector was not prejudiced since it was informed of the GPS requirements, which, as discussed above, it cannot timely meet.

32. These modifications were identified as including extending the range of shipboard radars, improving accuracy, and upgrading detection, weapons and fire control systems to include ballistic state vector prediction and extrapolation.

33. The agency also references the need to coincide with a planned joint BMDO, Army, Navy, and Air Force Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) program to coordinate sensor observation and engagement decisions between ships, aircraft and land-based systems. However, Space Vector has referenced documentation in the record that suggests that a delay in the launch may allow for greater satisfaction of the CEC program objectives.

34. Space Vector asserts that documentation in the record suggests that BMDO and the Navy will actually use an AEGIS class missile cruiser to support the Navy LEAP program launches. We disagree. The record shows that BMDO and the Navy early in its requirements planning discovered that an AEGIS missile cruiser could not launch the required TERRIER interceptor missile or provide the required number of radar tracking systems. While the protester argues it should be possible to use several different missile cruisers, such as the AEGIS cruisers, to provide the required radar tracking and fire control systems, and that this is the purpose of the planned CEC program, the record shows otherwise. The Navy does not currently have the capability to share radar tracking and fire control information between ships, and one of the purposes of the CEC program is to develop this capability.

35. The timing of the MSTI launch is not controlled by the Navy LEAP program office but by a separate BMDO MSTI program office, although the two offices are attempting to coordinate their programs.

36. The protester argues that this date may be further slipped to January 1994. Orbital's contract, as amended, provides for a December 1993 target demonstration launch, with January 1994 as a back-up launch date. There is no reason to believe that the December 1993 launch date is not a bona fide date, given the fact that further slippage of the target demonstration launch will exacerbate the risk involved in the remaining launches, as explained below.

37. Orbital's contract was modified to reflect this new launch schedule.

38. While Space Vector questions whether the LEAHY class cruisers will actually be decommissioned on that date if that Navy LEAP program is not completed, BMDO has verified this date.

39. The delay between the FTV-TD and FTV-4 launches was necessary to allow BMDO and the Navy to analyze and incorporate information learned from the FTV-TD target vehicle launch into both the originally scheduled FTV-3 interceptor and the FTV-4 target vehicle launches.

40. The Navy's October 1992 program plan for the interceptor missiles does not even mention the target vehicles or what the target vehicles' performance requirements would be.

41. The record is unclear as to whether modifying Orbital's prior contract to add the Navy LEAP program launches would be a "cardinal change."