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Interpretation of A Law Forbidding Domestic Propaganda and Determination of Possible Violation

B-177704 L/M Feb 07, 1973
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Highlights

A Senator requested GAO's interpretation of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Programs Appropriations Act, 1972, which forbids domestic propaganda. Further, the Senator requested that GAO determine the extent to which the Agency for International Development (AID) may be violating this provision.

GAO has previously made similar determinations that the statutory restrictions are too vague. Until Congress takes legislative action to more clearly define the intent of the statutory propaganda restrictions, we generally are not in a position to conclude that an agency's informational activities are in violation of such restrictions.

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B-177704 L/M, FEB 7, 1973

PRECIS-UNAVAILABLE

J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, UNITED STATES SENATE:

ON NOVEMBER 20, 1972, WE WERE REQUESTED BY THE COMMITTEE'S STAFF TO REVIEW THE MEANING AND THE INTENT OF SECTION 501 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATION ACT, 1972, (86 STAT. 48), (AND EARLIER APPROPRIATION ACTS SINCE 1958) WHICH FORBIDS DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA, AND TO MAKE A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID) MAY BE VIOLATING THIS PROVISION.

SECTION 501 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATION ACT, 1972, (FIRST ENACTED AS SECTION 102 OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY APPROPRIATION ACT, 1958), STATES:

"NO PART OF ANY APPROPRIATION CONTAINED IN THIS

ACT SHALL BE USED FOR PUBLICITY OR PROPAGANDA

PURPOSES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES NOT HERETOFORE

AUTHORIZED BY THE CONGRESS."

THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE HAS BEEN ASKED TO MAKE SIMILAR DETERMINATIONS AT VARIOUS TIMES OVER THE LAST 12 YEARS. IN ITS RESPONSES, THIS OFFICE HAS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS (EXPRESSED IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE CONTAINED IN SECTION 501 OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATION ACT) ARE TOO VAGUE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN ONE SUCH RESPONSE, THE GAO SAID:

"'*** THE STATUTORY INJUNCTION IS TOO VAGUE

TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE OF DEFINITIVELY DRAWN GUIDELINES

WHICH WOULD CLEARLY DELINEATE UNAUTHORIZED TYPES

OF EXPENDITURES. *** AND DO NOT CONSIDER IT

APPROPRIATE TO OVERRIDE ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS

AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF PROPRIETY *** EXCEPT

WHERE THE ULTIMATE AIM IS SO PALPABLY OF A PROPAGANDA

NATURE AS TO REQUIRE THE CONCLUSION THAT

SUCH ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS ARE UNREASONABLE

IN THE FACE OF THE STATUTORY PROHIBITION.'" IN ANOTHER RESPONSE, THE GAO SAID:

"*** THERE ARE NOT ANY STATUTORY GUIDELINES FOR

DISTINGUISHING AUTHORIZED INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES

FROM THE UNAUTHORIZED ***."

ALSO, WE HAVE IN THE PAST CONCLUDED THAT THE TYPE OF PUBLICITY AND PROPAGANDA INTENDED TO BE PROHIBITED BY THE PROVISION IN QUESTION RELATED TO PUBLICITY OR PROPAGANDA DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC OF THE NEED TO SUPPORT AN AGENCY'S PROGRAM BUT THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO INTERFERE WITH THE SUPPLYING OF FULL INFORMATION TO THE CONGRESS AND TO THE PUBLIC CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE AGENCY OR ITS PROGRAMS.

UNTIL THE CONGRESS TAKES LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO MORE CLEARLY DEFINE THE INTENT OF THE STATUTORY PROPAGANDA RESTRICTIONS, WE GENERALLY ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO CONCLUDE THAT AN AGENCY'S INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES ARE IN VIOLATION OF SUCH RESTRICTIONS.

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