Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories
RCED-97-229
Published: Sep 25, 1997. Publicly Released: Oct 31, 1997.
Skip to Highlights
Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) controls over foreign visitors to its three nuclear weapons laboratories, focusing on DOE's: (1) procedures for reviewing the backgrounds of foreign visitors and for controlling the dissemination of sensitive information to such visitors; (2) security controls for limiting foreign visitors' access to areas and information within its laboratories; and (3) counterintelligence programs for mitigating the potential threat posed by foreign visitors.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy should direct DOE's Counterintelligence Division to perform a comprehensive assessment of the espionage threat against DOE and the weapons laboratories to serve as the basis for determining appropriate countermeasures and resource levels for laboratory counterintelligence programs. To the extent possible, this assessment should include the laboratories as well as other agencies with appropriate expertise, such as the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). |
Closed – Implemented
Two annual threat assessments have been prepared by the National Counterintelligence Center with support from the DOE. The details of these assessments are classified, but GAO can say that they will help in assessing the espionage threat to the laboratories.
|
| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy should establish appropriate program performance measures and expectations for the laboratories' counterintelligence activities and require periodic performance reviews to help determine if their activities are effectively preventing foreign espionage. |
Closed – Implemented
DOE is in the process of revising its Counterintelligence order so that it establishes appropriate program performance measures and expectations for the laboratories' counterintelligence activities. This new order will be issued in late September/early October 2000. DOE has conducted one round of periodic performance reviews to help determine if laboratories' counterintelligence activities are effectively preventing foreign espionage. A second round of reviews is now starting. The specific performance measures that are being developed will be used as part of the annual performance reviews.
|
| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy should revise DOE's foreign visitor order to: (1) clarify to all DOE and laboratory contractor personnel the specific types of unclassified, but sensitive, subjects that require protection from compromise by foreign nationals; and (2) require that the subjects of visits be independently reviewed by experts with appropriate technical backgrounds--such as laboratory individuals involved in export control issues--to verify that visits involving sensitive subjects are adequately identified for DOE's review. |
Closed – Implemented
DOE Notice 142.1 which addresses unclassified foreign visits and assignments was approved on July 14, 1999. This notice requires the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security will maintain and distribute the current list of sensitive subjects. This list was distributed on July 27, 1999. This list will be reviewed at least every 6 months. In addition, DOE facilities may append lists of their own comprising proprietary information.
|
| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy should require that DOE and the weapons laboratories comply with the current foreign visitor order by obtaining background checks on all assignees from sensitive countries. Further, the Secretary should require the laboratories to inform headquarters of the names of all other proposed foreign visitors from sensitive countries so DOE's Counterintelligence Division can obtain additional background checks at its discretion. |
Closed – Implemented
DOE has implemented this recommendation. On July 14, 1999, DOE issued a notice (DOE N 142.1) which supplements DOE policy on unclassified foreign visits and assignments to DOE and contractor organizations including the weapons laboratories. Among other things, the notice required background checks by the Office of Counterintelligence for all visits and assignments for foreign nationals that are citizens of, or are employed by a government or institution of, a sensitive country. According to counterintelligence officials at DOE, this notice has been implemented by the field and DOE.
|
| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy should require that security measures at each laboratory's controlled areas--those most accessible to foreign visitors--be assessed to ensure that the controls over persons and information in these areas are effective. This assessment should also identify the best practices at each laboratory to improve protection of sensitive information that may be exposed to foreign visitors. |
Closed – Implemented
DOE Notice 142.1 which addresses unclassified foreign visits and assignments was approved on July 14, 1999. In addition, DOE officials told us that they plan to assess security measures at the laboratory to ensure the DOE notice is being followed. They further told us that best practices will looked at to the extent feasible.
|
Full Report
Office of Public Affairs
Topics
Immigration statusAtomic energy defense activitiesClassified informationDomestic intelligenceForeign governmentsInformation leakingLaboratoriesNuclear weapons plant securitySecurity clearancesWeapons research and development