Obstacles to U.S. Ability To Control and Track Weapons-Grade Uranium Supplied Abroad
ID-82-21
Published: Aug 02, 1982. Publicly Released: Aug 02, 1982.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the ability of the United States to control and account for highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium supplied abroad. This report focuses on U.S. administrative controls, physical security reviews, international safeguards and the U.S. ability to keep track of exports of highly enriched uranium. Also addressed were U.S. efforts to develop a non-weapons-grade uranium fuel to be used as a substitute for highly enriched uranium.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy should, as part of the review process relating to the extension and possible expansion of the authority to accept spent research reactor fuel, determine the principal reasons why only a small percentage of spent, highly enriched uranium has been returned in the past and adequately address the disincentives to some countries in returning such spent fuel. |
DOE and State conducted a survey of foreign facility operators to determine the disincentives. The result showed them to be: high shipping costs, high reprocessing costs caused by legislated full-cost recovery, and concerns about the U.S. position on reprocessing its own research reactor fuel. DOE has no direct control over these disincentives and plans no further action.
|
| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy should, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, streamline and consolidate the information maintained on highly enriched uranium supplied abroad into a more accurate, comprehensive, and flexible system which meets the needs of the intended users in the most economical and efficient manner. |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
| Department of Energy | The Secretary of Energy should direct that information from other readily available sources be used to verify and reconcile the data on highly enriched uranium exports within the system. |
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
|
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Topics
Energy researchExport regulationInternational cooperationMineral resourcesNuclear facilitiesNuclear facility securityNuclear proliferationStrategic materialsTerrorismUranium