Proliferation Security Initiative: Agencies Have Adopted Policies and Procedures but Steps Needed to Meet Reporting Requirement and to Measure Results
Highlights
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies have adopted interagency guidance documents that establish PSI policies and procedures and have submitted annual reports; however, these reports do not contain expenditure data for all agencies as required by law. The agencies produced documents that contain general PSI policies and procedures. In addition, DOD and the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed policies and procedures specifically to guide their agencies’ PSI activities. The annual reports submitted in 2009, 2010, and 2011 met requirements to describe PSI-related activities planned for future years and those that took place in the preceding year. Although the reports included an account of DOD’s PSI expenditures, they did not contain all expenditures for other agencies for PSI activities as required by law.
U.S. officials participated in a range of PSI activities since 2008 to meet their objective of expanding and enhancing counterproliferation efforts, but it is unclear to what extent these activities have achieved the objective because agencies lack measures of results. The agencies either led or participated in 22 PSI activities from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011 including multilateral meetings and exercises. Officials stated that their outreach efforts contributed to increased support for PSI since GAO’s 2008 report, such as the increase from 93 to 98 countries endorsing PSI. In addition, they have extended access to PSI activities to more countries that are not part of the group of 21 PSI Operational Experts Group countries, for example by holding regional planning meetings. Despite recommendations of Congress and GAO that agencies develop PSI performance indicators, DOD, State, CBP, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have not developed indicators that can be used to systematically measure progress toward the stated PSI objective. Further, the agencies have not systematically evaluated PSI activity results. Although some officials indicated plans to develop PSI performance indicators, officials from DOD and State also cited several challenges to developing indicators to measure PSI activities’ results including difficulty quantifying how PSI activities improved capacity. However, GAO has previously reported that, despite such challenges, developing measures that help link activities to results is possible. PSI agencies could develop a framework that links performance measures to outcomes. For example, such a framework could link the number of participants trained to changes in national policies that strengthen participant countries’ authority to interdict the shipment of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.
Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, the Bush Administration announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to enhance U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PSI is not a program housed in only one agency, but instead is a set of activities with participation by multiple U.S. agencies and other countries. Congress recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (State) establish policies, procedures, and indicators to measure results and required that they submit annual reports. It also mandated that GAO report on PSI effectiveness. In 2008, GAO likewise recommended that law enforcement agencies also establish policies, procedures, and performance indicators.
This report assesses (1) the progress relevant agencies have made since 2008 in establishing recommended PSI policies and procedures and issuing required annual reports; and (2) the extent to which PSI activities have enhanced and expanded U.S. counterproliferation efforts.
GAO reviewed and analyzed agency documents and interviewed officials from State, DOD, and other agencies with PSI responsibilities.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that State and DOD provide all required expenditure information in PSI annual reports and develop a framework for measuring PSIs results. DOD partially concurred with both recommendations and State partially concurred with the reporting recommendation. State disagreed with the framework recommendation, but noted its support for analysis consistent with it.
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Defense | To ensure that Congress has information to assess U.S. participation in PSI, the Secretaries of Defense and State should include in the annual PSI report to Congress the required expenditure information for all U.S. agencies participating in PSI activities. |
Closed – Implemented
In response to the GAO recommendation, Defense officials continued to provide detailed expenditure information for their own agency and began providing more detailed information about State expenditures, while noting that expenditure information for all other relevant agencies were for travel only. However, Defense and State officials provided documentation of Congress mandating an end to the annual reporting requirement in 2015. Because Congress has ended the reporting requirement that includes agencies' PSI expenditure information, this recommendation has been overtaken by events and, as such, should be closed.
|
| Department of State | To ensure that Congress has information to assess U.S. participation in PSI, the Secretaries of Defense and State should include in the annual PSI report to Congress the required expenditure information for all U.S. agencies participating in PSI activities. |
Closed – Implemented
In response to the GAO recommendation, Defense officials continued to provide detailed expenditure information for their own agency and began providing more detailed information about State expenditures, while noting that expenditure information for all other relevant agencies were for travel only. However, Defense and State officials provided documentation of Congress mandating an end to the annual reporting requirement in 2015. Because Congress has ended the reporting requirement that includes agencies' PSI expenditure information, this recommendation has been overtaken by events and, as such, should be closed.
|
| Department of Defense | To ensure that Congress has information to assess U.S. participation in PSI, the Secretaries of Defense and State should develop a framework for measuring PSI activities' results, including performance measures where possible that help link the results to PSI's objective. |
Closed – Implemented
In written comments on the draft report, DoD partially concurred with the recommendation. Defense officials provided a memo sent in September 2015 to the DoDIG that outlined Defense's "initiative to develop a framework for DoD strategic PSI objectives and to align those objectives with performance measurement indicators." The officials also provided a memo sent to the IG in June 2016 which updated the status of the initiative. According to the memo, DOD is working on a DoD-specific PSI guidance plan that it expects to complete by the end of calendar year 2016. The memo clarified that Defense has an interim framework in place until the full framework is completed. According to the memo, "While we work on this plan, we believe there are existing PSI tools -- specifically, the Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP) effort -- that may be utilized as a framework." Defense provided additional documentation that showed how CCP acts as a framework to ensure that PSI exercises [address] the ability to interdict WMD-related materials, formalize cooperation and the exchange of ideas, and build capacity in all PSI-endorsing states for future interdiction operations.
|
| Department of State | To ensure that Congress has information to assess U.S. participation in PSI, the Secretaries of Defense and State should develop a framework for measuring PSI activities' results, including performance measures where possible that help link the results to PSI's objective. |
Closed – Implemented
The Department reported in September 2015 that it was "reviewing how the Critical Capabilities and Practices (CCP) concept, in coordination with other Executive Branch agencies, [is] one means for contributing to an effective analysis of the outcomes of PSI events." In June 2016, State officials clarified how CCP serves as a framework as recommended by GAO. State explained, for example, that the CCP concept has been used as a framework to guide discussions and interdiction scenario-based exercises to create awareness of capabilities (and gaps) among the PSI community, and has been successful in supporting PSI endorsing States' counterproliferation capabilities. State further explained that the CCP contains tools ranging in complexity from fundamental to intermediate and advanced; leverages experience gained; and is a means for sharing expertise to support counterproliferation related activities. As for including performance measures, State officials said they did not believe that was possible, noting in a September 2015 communication that the department continues to believe that PSI, by its nature, does not effectively lend itself to traditional methods for collecting quantifiable measures of success. Our recommendation was for State to include performance measures where possible, and although their framework does not include performance measures, State's responses show that they considered them.
|