B-31772, JANUARY 26, 1943, 22 COMP. GEN. 704

B-31772, JANUARY 26, 1943, 22 COMP. GEN. 704

LEAVES OF ABSENCE - ANNUAL - ACCUMULATION RIGHTS UNDER ACT OF DECEMBER 17, 1942 THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THE ACT OF DECEMBER 17, 1942, AMENDING THE ANNUAL LEAVE ACT OF MARCH 14, 1936, BY INCREASING FROM 60 DAYS TO 90 DAYS THE AMOUNT OF UNUSED ANNUAL LEAVE THAT AN EMPLOYEE MAY ACCUMULATE "DURING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1939," WAS TO PROVIDE RELIEF FOR EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE NOT BEEN AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE THEIR ANNUAL LEAVE DUE TO THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY, AND, THEREFORE, THE SAID ACT MAY BE REGARDED AS RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1939. UNDER THE ACT OF DECEMBER 17, 1942, AMENDING THE ANNUAL LEAVE ACT OF MARCH 14, 1936, BY INCREASING FROM 60 DAYS TO 90 DAYS THE AMOUNT OF UNUSED ANNUAL LEAVE THAT AN EMPLOYEE MAY ACCUMULATE DURING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY THE PRESIDENT ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1939, AN EMPLOYEE MAY BE RECREDITED WITH ACCUMULATED ANNUAL LEAVE IN EXCESS OF 60 DAYS WHICH HE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE LOST ON THE FIRST DAY OF JANUARY 1940, 1941, 1942, AND 1943, SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION IN THE SAID ACT OF DECEMBER 17 THAT WHEN THE UNUSED LEAVE ACCUMULATED EQUALS OR EXCEEDS 60 DAYS IN THE AGGREGATE, NOT MORE THAN 15 DAYS OF UNUSED LEAVE MAY BE FURTHER ACCUMULATED IN ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR. ( MODIFIED BY 22 COMP. GEN. 932.)

COMPTROLLER GENERAL WARREN TO THE FEDERAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR, JANUARY 26, 1943:

I HAVE YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 14, 1943, AS FOLLOWS:

YOUR OPINION IS REQUESTED IN CONNECTION WITH A QUESTION WHICH HAS ARISEN AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT PASSAGE OF PUBLIC LAW 806.

AN EMPLOYEE ENTERED MILITARY SERVICE ON JANUARY 1, 1943, AND APPLIED FOR ALL ACCUMULATED AND ACCRUED LEAVE TO HIS CREDIT AT THAT TIME. AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1940, THE EMPLOYEE HAD AN ACCUMULATION OF 61 DAYS, 4 HOURS, 17 MINUTES. HE LOST 1 DAY, 4 HOURS, 17 MINUTES, UNDER SECTION II OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 8384, AND CARRIED FORWARD INTO 1941 AN ACCUMULATION OF 60 DAYS. AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1941, HE HAD AN ACCUMULATION OF 68 DAYS, 2 HOURS, 30 MINUTES, OF WHICH HE LOST 8 DAYS, 2 HOURS, AND 30 MINUTES.

UNDER PUBLIC LAW 806, APPROVED DECEMBER 17, 1942, SHOULD WE RESTORE TO THE CREDIT OF THIS EMPLOYEE THE ANNUAL LEAVE HE FORFEITED AND THEREBY ALLOW HIM TO CARRY FORWARD ON DECEMBER 31, 1940, A TOTAL ACCUMULATION OF 61 DAYS, 4 HOURS, 17 MINUTES, AND ON DECEMBER 31, 1941, A TOTAL ACCUMULATION OF 69 DAYS, 6 HOURS, AND 47 MINUTES? IN OTHER WORDS, ARE LEAVE RECORDS TO BE ADJUSTED RETROACTIVELY TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1939 (DATE ON WHICH THE PRESIDENT DECLARED A NATIONAL EMERGENCY TO EXIST) OR DOES PUBLIC LAW 806 MEAN THAT LEAVE ACCUMULATED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1942 MAY EXCEED 60 DAYS?

THE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECTION 1 OF THE ANNUAL LEAVE ACT OF MARCH 14, 1936, 49 STAT. 1161, PROVIDES:

THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TEACHERS AND LIBRARIANS OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE PANAMA CANAL AND PANAMA RAILROAD ON THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA, AND EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 4 HEREOF, ALL CIVILIAN OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED STATES WHEREVER STATIONED AND OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REGARDLESS OF THEIR TENURE, IN ADDITION TO ANY ACCRUED LEAVE, SHALL BE ENTITLED TO TWENTY-SIX DAYS' ANNUAL LEAVE WITH PAY EACH CALENDAR YEAR, EXCLUSIVE OF SUNDAYS AND HOLIDAYS: PROVIDED, THAT THE PART UNUSED IN ANY YEAR SHALL BE ACCUMULATED FOR SUCCEEDING YEARS UNTIL IT TOTALS NOT EXCEEDING SIXTY DAYS. * *

THE ACT OF DECEMBER 17, 1942, 56 STAT. 1052, PUBLIC LAW 806, PROVIDES:

THAT THE FIRST SENTENCE IN SECTION 1 OF THE ACT OF MARCH 14, 1936 (49 STAT. 1161), IS HEREBY AMENDED BY ADDING THE FOLLOWING PROVISO: PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT DURING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1939, THE LEAVE UNUSED BY THE EMPLOYEES OF THE DEPARTMENTS, INDEPENDENT ESTABLISHMENTS, AND AGENCIES, NOT IN OTHER FORM COMMUTED OR COMPENSATED, SHALL BE ACCUMULATED FOR SUCCEEDING YEARS UNTIL IT TOTALS NOT EXCEEDING NINETY DAYS: AND PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT WHEN THE UNUSED LEAVE ACCUMULATED EQUALS OR EXCEEDS SIXTY DAYS IN THE AGGREGATE, NOT MORE THAN FIFTEEN DAYS OF UNUSED LEAVE MAY BE FURTHER ACCUMULATED IN ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR.'

IT IS A GENERAL RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT A STATUTE IS NOT TO BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT UNLESS THE INTENTION OF THE CONGRESS THAT IT SHOULD BE SO CONSTRUED IS EXPRESSED IN CLEAR, PLAIN, AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE. SECTION 642, VOLUME 2, LEWIS' SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (SECOND EDITION); 16 COMP. GEN. 1051, 1054, AND DECISIONS THEREIN CITED. THE ONLY LANGUAGE THAT POSSIBLY MAY BE REGARDED AS GIVING THE AMENDATORY ACT OF DECEMBER 17, 1942, A RETROACTIVE EFFECT APPEARS IN THE TERM,"DURING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1939.' IN CONSTRUING WORDS OF SIMILAR PURPORT THE ACCOUNTING OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT BASED THEIR CONCLUSIONS SOLELY UPON THE WORDS THEMSELVES BUT HAVE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THE ENTIRE STATUTE IN WHICH THE WORDS APPEAR AND, ALSO, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA. IN DECISION OF JANUARY 23, 1918, 24 COMP. DEC. 418, THE TERM,"EXISTING WAR EMERGENCY," APPEARING IN THE ACT OF OCTOBER 6, 1917, STAT. 361, WAS GIVEN A RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. ALSO, IN DECISION OF JULY 14, 1919, 26 COMP. DEC. 40, THE TERM,"DURING THE PERIOD OF THE PRESENT WAR," APPEARING IN THE ACT OF JULY 1, 1918, 40 STAT. 733, WAS GIVEN A RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. IN DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 19, 1919, 26 COMP. DEC. 201, THE TERM,"DURING THE CONTINUANCE OF THE PRESENT WAR," APPEARING IN THE ACT OF MAY 22, 1917, 40 STAT. 87, WAS HELD INSUFFICIENT TO GIVE THE SAID ACT A RETROACTIVE EFFECT. ALSO, IN DECISION OF DECEMBER 19, 1942, B- 24219, 22 COMP. GEN. 548, TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, THE TERM,"DURING THE PRESENT WAR," APPEARING IN THE SECOND PROVISO OF THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 10 OF THE " PAY READJUSTMENT ACT OF 1942," APPROVED JUNE 16, 1942, 56 STAT. 363, PUBLIC LAW 607, WAS HELD TO BE NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH THE TERM "FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PRESENT WAR.'

IN THE FIRST DECISION CITED, SUPRA, (24 COMP. DEC. 421) WHEREIN WAS CONSIDERED A REMEDIAL STATUTE--- THE STATUTE HERE UNDER CONSIDERATION ALSO BEING A REMEDIAL STATUTE--- IT WAS STATED:

THE "EXISTING WAR EMERGENCY" REFERS TO A CONDITION NOT TO ARISE THEREAFTER BUT AS ALREADY IN EXISTENCE, AND DATES FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. THOUGH SAID ROADS HAD NO LEGAL RIGHT TO ANY INCREASED COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES THERETOFORE RENDERED, CONGRESS HAS THE RIGHT TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC MONEY FOR THE PAYMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WHEN FOUNDED UPON MORAL AND EQUITABLE OBLIGATIONS AND IN THIS CASE HAS PROVIDED FOR PAYMENT FOR SERVICES RENDERED DURING THE EXISTING WAR EMERGENCY AND THEREFORE RELATES TO PAST AS WELL AS FUTURE SERVICES. (SEE UNITED STATES V. REALTY COMPANY, 163 U.S., 427.) SEE, ALSO, THE FOLLOWING EXCERPT FROM THE SECOND DECISION CITED (26 COMP. DEC. 41):

THE WORD "DURING" MEANS "THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF" OR "FOR THE TIME OF," AND IN THAT SENSE IS INCLUSIVE IN SCOPE, AND WHEN APPLIED TO A PERIOD OF TIME INCLUDES THE WHOLE OF THE PERIOD. AS USED IN THIS ACT, OMITTING ANY CONSIDERATION OF THE DATE OF THE ACT, IT REFERS TO A PERIOD OF TIME BEGINNING WITH THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR ON APRIL 6, 1917, AND EXTENDING TO THE CLOSE THEREOF. (24 COMP. DEC. 418.)

THE DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 19, 1919, 26 COMP. DEC. 201, WAS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE EARLIER DECISIONS BY REASON OF THE WORD "CONTINUANCE" APPEARING IN THE PHRASE "DURING CONTINUANCE OF THE PRESENT WAR" IT BEING CONCLUDED THAT SUCH PHRASE DID NOT DENOTE RETROACTIVITY.

IN THE DECISION OF DECEMBER 19, 1942, SUPRA, THE STATUTE UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS NOT GIVEN A RETROACTIVE EFFECT BECAUSE OF OTHER PROVISIONS IN THE STATUTE AND IN OTHER RELATED STATUTES.

THERE IS PECULIARLY APPOSITE HERE, TOO, THE DECISION OF MARCH 14, 1942, B -23405, WHEREIN WAS CONSIDERED THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE TERM,"THAT DURING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY THE PRESIDENT ON MAY 27, 1941," APPEARING IN THE ACT OF JANUARY 2, 1942, 55 STAT. 880, PUBLIC LAW 393--- THE QUESTION INVOLVED IN THAT CASE BEING WHETHER THE STATUTE WAS APPLICABLE TO CLAIMS ARISING ON AND AFTER MAY 27, 1941, OR ON AND AFTER JANUARY 2, 1942. IN THAT DECISION IT WAS TATED:

AS STATED IN YOUR LETTER, IT IS THE GENERAL RULE THAT STATUTES ARE CONSTRUED PROSPECTIVELY AND NOT RETROSPECTIVELY, UNLESS A RETROSPECTIVE CONSTRUCTION IS REQUIRED BY EXPRESS LANGUAGE OR BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION. SEE 16 COMP. GEN. 1051 AND CASES THERE CITED, INCLUDING UNITED STATES V. ST. LOUIS RAILWAY CO., 270 U.S. 1, TO WHICH YOU REFER. SEE, ALSO, 20 COMP. GEN. 769, 771; 7 ID. 266, AND AUTHORITIES THERE CITED. SINCE THERE IS NO LANGUAGE IN PUBLIC LAW 393, APPROVED JANUARY 2, 1942, EXPRESSLY DECLARING OR NECESSARILY IMPLYING ITS PROVISIONS OR ANY PARTS THEREOF TO BE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE, THE ACT MUST BE REGARDED AS EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE OF ITS APPROVAL, UNLESS AN INTENTION TO MAKE THE ACT EFFECTIVE MAY 27, 1941, MAY BE IMPLIED FROM THE USE OF THE WORDS ,DURING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY THE PRESIDENT ON MAY 27, 1941, TO EXIST * * *.'

THE WORD "DURING" IS DEFINED AS "IN THE TIME OF," OR "AS LONG AS THE ACTION OR EXISTENCE OF," AND HAS BEEN HELD TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE TIME WITHIN A DESIGNATED PERIOD. JENNINGS V. COMMONWEALTH, 300 S.W. 353, 354; BLOCH QUEENSWARE CO. V. SMITH, SAXTON AND CO., 80 S.W. 592, 593; RICHARDSON V. CITY OF SEATTLE, 166 PAC. 1131, 1133; RIDDELL V. HARRELL, 12 PAC. 67, 70. ALSO, THE WORD "DURING" HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED JUDICIALLY AS DENOTING ANY PORTION OF A DESIGNATED PERIOD, JAMES V. GULF PRODUCTION CO., 15 S.W. (2D) 1102, 1106; AMERICAN LINSEED CO. V. EBERSON, 104 S.W. 121, 124, AND IT IS SAID THAT THE WORD IS AMBIGUOUS. BIRD V. BECKWITH, 60 N.Y. SUPP. 1041, 1042. THUS, THE USE OF THE PHRASE "DURING THE EMERGENCY" LEAVES ROOM FOR SUBSTANTIAL DOUBT AS TO WHETHER THE ACT WAS INTENDED TO AUTHORIZE THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED THEREIN ARISING AT ANY TIME DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE EMERGENCY, OR OF ONLY SUCH OF THOSE CLAIMS AS MAY ACCRUE AT SOME PERIOD WITHIN THE EMERGENCY BUT AFTER THE DATE OF APPROVAL OF THE ACT. THIS DOUBT AS TO THE INTENDED SCOPE OF THE ACT MUST BE RESOLVED BY THE ADOPTION OF THAT CONSTRUCTION WHICH IS BEST CALCULATED TO EFFECTUATE THE EXPRESSED PURPOSE OF THE ACT, * * *

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING AND HAVING IN MIND THAT THE ACT IS PURELY REMEDIAL, IN THAT IT PROVIDES AN ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL REMEDY FOR THE ADJUSTMENT OF CLAIMS WHICH MAY BE ESTABLISHED AS SUBSTANTIVELY MERITORIOUS IT APPEARS REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE ACT OF JANUARY 2, 1942, PUBLIC LAW 393, PROPERLY MAY BE CONSTRUED AS COVERING CLAIMS WHICH ACCRUED ON OR AFTER MAY 27, 1941.

THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THE ACT OF DECEMBER 17, 1942, IS INDICATED BY WHAT IS SAID IN LETTER DATED AUGUST 10, 1942, FROM THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL SERVICE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PRINTED IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPORT NO. 2631, 77TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, AS FOLLOWS:

6. NATURALLY, UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS ARE FREQUENTLY FACED WITH THE DILEMMA OF EITHER (A) AUTHORIZING EXTENDED ABSENCES ON ANNUAL LEAVE OF EMPLOYEES WHOSE CONTINUOUS SERVICES ARE NECESSARY TO THE WAR PROGRAM, OR (B) PERSUADING SUCH EMPLOYEES TO PERMIT A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF THEIR ACCUMULATED LEAVE (IN EXCESS OF 60 DAYS) TO BE FORFEITED. CONGRESS HAS MADE THE GRANTING OF ANNUAL LEAVE MANDATORY (16 COMP. GEN. 74). MANY DEPARTMENTS HAVE ESTABLISHED LIMITS ON THE AMOUNT OF ANNUAL LEAVE THAT MAY BE TAKEN AT ANY ONE TIME; BUT WHERE FORFEITURES ARE INVOLVED OF LEAVE RIGHTS GRANTED BY CONGRESS, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS CANNOT VERY WELL DENY THE EXERCISE OF THOSE RIGHTS. THE PASSAGE OF S. 2341 WILL MAKE THIS ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM SOMEWHAT EASIER TO SOLVE, BECAUSE IT WILL THEN ARISE LESS FREQUENTLY.

7. WHEN AN EMPLOYEE IS DROPPED FROM THE SERVICE ON ACCOUNT OF REDUCTION IN FORCE, OR RESIGNATION, HE IS GRANTED HIS ACCRUED ANNUAL LEAVE BEFORE HE IS ACTUALLY SEPARATED FROM THE PAY ROLL. AFTER THE WAR, THERE WILL BE LARGE CURTAILMENTS IN GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENTS. PERMITTING LEAVE TO ACCUMULATE UP TO 90 DAYS WILL GIVE THE DISMISSED EMPLOYEES THAT MUCH TIME WITH PAY TO MAKE THE ADJUSTMENTS NECESSARY TO RETURN TO PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT.

8. S. 2341 WILL TAKE THE PLACE OF OTHER LAWS WHICH EXPIRED ON JUNE 30 LAST AND WHICH AUTHORIZED THE NAVY DEPARTMENT AND WAR DEPARTMENT (FIELD SERVICE) TO GIVE EMPLOYEES DOUBLE PAY FOR WORKING DURING PERIODS OF LEAVE WHICH THEY WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE FORFEITED. IT IS THE POLICY OF THE PRESIDENT TO PRESERVE ANNUAL LEAVE FOR FUTURE USE, WHEN THE EMPLOYEE DEFERS HIS VACATIONS INDEFINITELY, RATHER THAN TO PAY HIM EXTRA COMPENSATION (DOUBLE TIME).

9. S. 2341 WILL NOT INVOLVE THE EXPENDITURE OF ADDITIONAL FUNDS. EMPLOYEES ARE NOW PAID DURING THEIR VACATIONS AT THE SAME RATE AS WHEN THEY ACTUALLY WORK, REGARDLESS OF WHEN THEIR VACATIONS ARE TAKEN. WHEN THEY DEFER OR FOREGO THEIR VACATIONS, THE SAME AMOUNT IS EXPENDED, BUT THE EMPLOYEES, OF COURSE, ARE ACTUALLY WORKING. IF THEY ARE NOT PERMITTED TO ACCUMULATE LEAVE IN EXCESS OF 60 DAYS, THEY ARE ENTITLED TO TAKE THEIR VACATIONS CURRENTLY IN LIEU OF FORFEITING THEIR LEAVE RIGHTS, AND THEY WILL BE PAID DURING SUCH VACATIONS NOW INSTEAD OF BEING PAID FOR THE SAME PERIOD OF LEAVE TAKEN LATER ON, AS S. 2341 WOULD PROVIDE. IN OTHER WORDS, UNDER S. 2341, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SIMPLY DEFER UNTIL SOME FUTURE TIME THE SAME EXPENDITURES DURING VACATION LEAVES THAT IT IS OBLIGATED TO MAKE AT PRESENT.

WHILE THERE IS NOTHING IN THAT LETTER, OR OTHERWISE IN THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, SPECIFICALLY STATING THAT A RETROACTIVE EFFECT WAS INTENDED TO BE GIVEN TO THE STATUTE, THE PURPOSE IS CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN THE LETTER TO PROVIDE RELIEF BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT EMPLOYEES HAVE NOT BEEN AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE THEIR ANNUAL LEAVE BECAUSE OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY, WHICH CONDITION CERTAINLY EXISTED AS MUCH PRIOR TO DECEMBER 17, 1942, DURING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY, AS IT WILL EXIST AFTER THAT DATE FOR THE REMAINING PERIOD OF SAID EMERGENCY. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, AND HAVING REGARD FOR THE FACT THAT THE STATUTE IS REMEDIAL, I HAVE TO ADVISE THAT THE ACT OF DECEMBER 17, 1942, MAY BE REGARDED AS RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1939. TO HOLD OTHERWISE WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE RELIEF EVIDENTLY INTENDED TO BE GRANTED BY THE STATUTE.

UNDER THE INTERPRETATION THUS MADE HEREIN THERE IS AUTHORIZED THE RECREDITING TO AN EMPLOYEE OF ACCUMULATED ANNUAL LEAVE IN EXCESS OF 60 DAYS WHICH HE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE LOST ON JANUARY 1, 1940, JANUARY 1, 1941, JANUARY 1, 1942, AND JANUARY 1, 1943, SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION OF 15 DAYS UNUSED LEAVE IN EXCESS OF 60 DAYS FOR ANY ONE CALENDAR OR LEAVE YEAR FOR INSTANCE, IF AN EMPLOYEE HAD ACCUMULATED 75 OR MORE DAYS UNUSED LEAVE UP TO JANUARY 1, 1940 (NOT COUNTING ANY LEAVE WHICH HAD BEEN FORFEITED PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 8, 1939) HE CAN HAVE RECREDITED TO HIM AS OF JANUARY 1, 1940, NOT TO EXCEED 15 DAYS OF THE UNUSED PORTION OF HIS ANNUAL FOR THE CALENDAR OR LEAVE YEAR 1939, AND SO ON FOR THE SUCCEEDING CALENDAR OR LEAVE YEARS, SUBJECT TO THE MAXIMUM ACCUMULATED LEAVE CREDIT OF 90 DAYS.

THE EMPLOYEE WHOSE CASE IS PRESENTED IN YOUR LETTER IS ENTITLED TO HAVE RECREDITED TO HIM--- IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF HIS ACCUMULATED LEAVE AS OF JANUARY 1, 1942--- THE 1 DAY, 4 HOURS, 17 MINUTES, WHICH HE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE LOST JANUARY 1, 1941, AND, ALSO, THE 8 DAYS, 2 HOURS, 30 MINUTES, WHICH HE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE LOST JANUARY 1, 1942. BUT HE COULD NOT, IN ANY EVENT, ACCUMULATE MORE THAN 15 DAYS ADDITIONAL LEAVE DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1942.