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United States Capitol Police--Deployment of Personnel

B-317252 Jan 30, 2009
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In a letter dated September 23, 2008, the Congressional Subcommittee requested GAO's opinion on whether the United States Capitol Police (USCP) complied with the applicable statute, 2 U.S.C. 1978, when it deployed personnel to Texas following Hurricane Ike. The Subcommittee also asked that we review USCP deployments conducted since 2005 and determine whether those deployments complied with the statute. The deployment, which began on September 14, 2008, occurred without USCP providing prior notification to the Committees on Appropriations as generally required under 2 U.S.C. 1978. We conclude that because the deployment was conducted for the purpose of responding to an emergency, which is one of the exceptions to the notification provisions, USCP was not required under the statute to provide prior notification to the Committees. With regard to the second question, USCP does not keep records of deployments for which it deems notification not required, and thus we were unable to conduct a general review of these deployments for compliance with the statute.

Based on our understanding of the circumstances and the language of the statute, "responding to an imminent threat or emergency," we find USCP's conclusion that it was not required to notify the Appropriations Committees of the anticipated costs to be a reasonable one. The clear purpose of the deployment was to respond to the declared emergency by protecting critical assets and personnel that were needed to restore the operations of congressional offices. The record shows that USCP's actions were taken in response to a specific and time-sensitive request by a member of the Capitol Police Board in support of the Office of the CAO's efforts to provide electricity, telephone services, and network connectivity requested by a Member of Congress whose local office had been rendered useless by the hurricane. According to USCP, Congressman Lampson was on site, assisting his constituents, throughout the time that the agents were deployed to Texas. Moreover, staff in some areas were banned from even going to their work site to determine if the office was functional. In addition to providing security and protection, USCP agents were needed to interact with other law enforcement officials who themselves were operating in a disaster area under extremely difficult circumstances. As USCP points out, the statute does not contain a definition of the phrase "responding to an imminent threat or emergency," and USCP has not attempted to define the phrase in implementing guidance or instructions. The legislative history does not explain what Congress intended regarding what constitutes an emergency. For example, should this exception be interpreted as limited to deployments in which immediate action is necessary to prevent the loss of life or property, or are deployments to provide assistance in the aftermath of an event also covered as a response to an emergency? We generally will not object to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering. Under these circumstances, we have no basis to object to USCP's view that the deployment was conducted for the purpose of "responding to an emergency" under 2 U.S.C. 1978, and thus the requirement for prior notification did not apply to this deployment.

Based on our understanding of the circumstances and the language of the statute, "responding to an imminent threat or emergency," we find USCP's conclusion that it was not required to notify the Appropriations Committees of the anticipated costs to be a reasonable one. The clear purpose of the deployment was to respond to the declared emergency by protecting critical assets and personnel that were needed to restore the operations of congressional offices. The record shows that USCP's actions were taken in response to a specific and time-sensitive request by a member of the Capitol Police Board in support of the Office of the CAO's efforts to provide electricity, telephone services, and network connectivity requested by a Member of Congress whose local office had been rendered useless by the hurricane. According to USCP, Congressman Lampson was on site, assisting his constituents, throughout the time that the agents were deployed to Texas. Moreover, staff in some areas were banned from even going to their work site to determine if the office was functional. In addition to providing security and protection, USCP agents were needed to interact with other law enforcement officials who themselves were operating in a disaster area under extremely difficult circumstances. As USCP points out, the statute does not contain a definition of the phrase "responding to an imminent threat or emergency," and USCP has not attempted to define the phrase in implementing guidance or instructions. The legislative history does not explain what Congress intended regarding what constitutes an emergency. For example, should this exception be interpreted as limited to deployments in which immediate action is necessary to prevent the loss of life or property, or are deployments to provide assistance in the aftermath of an event also covered as a response to an emergency? We generally will not object to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering. Under these circumstances, we have no basis to object to USCP's view that the deployment was conducted for the purpose of "responding to an emergency" under 2 U.S.C. 1978, and thus the requirement for prior notification did not apply to this deployment.
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B-129520, MAR. 13, 1957

TO ALAMO MOTOR LINES:

REFERENCE IS MADE TO YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 11, 1956, REQUESTING REVIEW OF THE SETTLEMENT ACTION OF AUGUST 20, 1956, WHICH DISALLOWED YOUR CLAIM, PER BILL NO. 8725-A, FOR $25 ADDITIONAL FREIGHT CHARGES ALLEGED TO BE DUE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF A SHIPMENT OF "133 W/B DETONATING FUSES," WEIGHING 6,650 POUNDS, FROM DEFENSE, TEXAS, TO FORT BLISS, TEXAS, ON APRIL 13, 1956, UNDER GOVERNMENT BILL OF LADINGWY 6,119,304.

IT IS YOUR CONTENTION THAT THE ORIGINATING CARRIER, STRICKLAND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., IS AN INTERSTATE CARRIER INSOFAR AS TRAFFIC TO OR FROM DEFENSE, TEXAS, IS CONCERNED AND, NOT POSSESSING ANY INTRASTATE PERMIT OR CERTIFICATE AUTHORIZING IT TO SERVE THAT POINT, THE PROPER RATES FOR ASSESSING CHARGES ON THIS SHIPMENT ARE THE INTERSTATE RATES PROVIDED IN SOUTHWESTERN MOTOR FREIGHT BUREAU TARIFF NO. 25-E, MF-I.C.C. NO. 246, R.C.T. NO. 26, ITEM 1-A, PUBLISHED IN SUPPLEMENT NO. 10.

THE RECORD INDICATES THAT THIS SHIPMENT MOVED FROM DEFENSE, TEXAS, TO FORT BLISS, TEXAS, BUT DOES NOT SHOW THAT IT ACTUALLY MOVED--- EITHER FROM CHOICE OR NECESSITY--- VIA A ROUTE PARTIALLY OUTSIDE TEXAS IN ORDER TO REACH THE FINAL DESTINATION, WHICH WOULD BRING THE SHIPMENT WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF "INTERSTATE COMMERCE," AS DEFINED IN SECTION 203 OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, 49 U.S.C. 303. ITEM 1-A OF TARIFF NO. 25-E INDICATES THAT THE INCREASED RATES AND CHARGES ARE ,APPLICABLE ONLY ON INTERSTATE TRAFFIC.' SO FAR AS DISCLOSED BY THE RECORD, THE SHIPMENT IN QUESTION MOVED VIA AN INTRASTATE ROUTE AND, THEREFORE, WAS INTRASTATE COMMERCE BY VIRTUE OF ITS RELATION TO THE STATE OF TEXAS, WHICH PRECLUDES THE APPLICATION OF THE INTERSTATE RATES. SEE COBB V. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS OF STATE OF WASHINGTON, 60 F.2D 631, 638; WOOLEYHAN TRANSPORT CO. V. GEO. RUTLEDGE CO., 162 F.2D 1016.

IN YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 11, 1956, YOU URGE THAT BECAUSE THE ORIGINATING CARRIER LACKED AN INTRASTATE PERMIT OR CERTIFICATE AUTHORIZING IT TO SERVE DEFENSE, TEXAS,"THE PROPER BASIS OF RATES TO ASSESS ON THIS SHIPMENT WOULD BE THE INTERSTATE RATES.' ON THE CONTRARY, THE CHARGES SEEM PROPER FOR DETERMINATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TYPE OF COMMERCE ACTUALLY INVOLVED--- IN THIS CASE A SHIPMENT TRANSPORTED IN INTRASTATE COMMERCE--- RATHER THAN ON THE BASIS OF THE TYPE OF COMMERCE FOR WHICH THE CARRIER POSSESSED OPERATING AUTHORITY, REGARDLESS OF THE TYPE OF COMMERCE INVOLVED. IN THIS CONNECTION, SEE THE REPORT IN THE CASE OF ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. V. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY, 12 F.2D 541, 548, IN WHICH THE COURT SAID THAT A CARRIER MAY NOT CHARGE INTERSTATE RATES ON A SHIPMENT OF GOODS WHICH ONE MERCHANT MAKES TO ANOTHER WITHIN THE SAME STATE (MOVING IN INTRASTATE COMMERCE.)

IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED THAT CLAIMANTS ARE REQUIRED TO FURNISH THE NECESSARY EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THEIR CLAIMS. 23 COMP. GEN. 907; 18 ID. 980; 17 ID. 831. IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE WHICH CLEARLY INDICATES THAT AN INTERSTATE ROUTE WAS REQUIRED AND ACTUALLY EMPLOYED IN TRANSPORTING THE SUBJECT SHIPMENT FROM DEFENSE, TEXAS, TO FORT BLISS, TEXAS, THE APPLICATION OF THE INTRASTATE RATE WAS PROPER. ACCORDINGLY, THE SETTLEMENT MUST BE AND IS SUSTAINED.

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