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B-243777.3, May 19, 1992

B-243777.3 May 19, 1992
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Contention that awardee gained an unfair competitive advantage over other offerors by hiring and proposing as a key employee an individual who allegedly possessed procurement sensitive information is denied where the record shows that the employee was only briefly and remotely involved in the initial planning stages of the project contemplated by the solicitation and protester does not show that the employee had access to any procurement sensitive information unavailable to other offerors. 2. Contention that awardee may have gained an unfair competitive advantage because a key employee proposed by the awardee allegedly received telephone messages and personal mail at the contracting agency's office from which contract field activities will be administered is denied where the allegation of impropriety amounts to no more than unsupported speculation.

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B-243777.3, May 19, 1992

PROCUREMENT - Competitive Negotiation - Competitive advantage - Non prejudicial allegation DIGEST: 1. Contention that awardee gained an unfair competitive advantage over other offerors by hiring and proposing as a key employee an individual who allegedly possessed procurement sensitive information is denied where the record shows that the employee was only briefly and remotely involved in the initial planning stages of the project contemplated by the solicitation and protester does not show that the employee had access to any procurement sensitive information unavailable to other offerors. 2. Contention that awardee may have gained an unfair competitive advantage because a key employee proposed by the awardee allegedly received telephone messages and personal mail at the contracting agency's office from which contract field activities will be administered is denied where the allegation of impropriety amounts to no more than unsupported speculation. PROCUREMENT - Competitive Negotiation - Discussion - Adequacy - Criteria 3. Protest that agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions by withholding information that would have permitted protester to address perceived deficiencies in its proposal is denied where, prior to oral discussions, agency provided protester with written questions about its proposal that sufficiently alerted protester to specific areas where its proposal was considered deficient, and the protester concedes that those areas were discussed during oral discussions. PROCUREMENT - Contractor Qualification - Responsibility - Contracting officer findings - Affirmative determination - GAO review 4. The General Accounting Office will not review an affirmative determination of responsibility absent a showing of possible fraud or bad faith on the part of the procurement officials, or that definitive responsibility criteria in the solicitation were misapplied. Robert W. Campbell for the protester. Brian A. Mizoguchi, Esq., Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson and Hand, for RDA International, Inc., an interested party. Robert Sonenthal, Esq., and Jeffrey Marburg-Goodman, Esq., Agency for International Development, for the agency. Aldo A. Benejam, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

Sierra Technology and Resources, Inc.:

Sierra Technology and Resources, Inc. (STAR) protests the award of a contract to RDA International, Inc., under request for proposals (RFP) No. 879-91-004, issued by the Agency for International Development (AID) for a fisheries development and management project in the Kingdom of Tonga. STAR argues that RDA had an unfair competitive advantage which should have rendered the firm ineligible for award. The protester also contends that AID showed bias against the protester and failed to conduct meaningful discussions.

We deny the protest in part and dismiss it in part.

BACKGROUND

The RFP was issued on October 30, 1990, and contemplated the award of a cost-plus-fixed-fee level of effort contract for technical and consulting services to assist the government of Tonga improve the management of its marine resources. Contract objectives included identifying and reporting on cost-effective equipment and methods useful in small-scale tuna fishing.

Offerors were required to submit separate technical and cost proposals. Section M of the RFP stated that award would be made to the responsible offeror whose offer was most advantageous to the government, cost and other factors considered. The RFP explained that technical proposals would be evaluated according to the following factors worth a maximum of 100 points: (1) proposal (20 points); (2) plan to achieve outputs (20 points); (3) offeror qualifications (15 points); and (4) personnel qualifications (45 points).

Four firms, including STAR and RDA, submitted proposals by the January 22, 1991 closing date. During the week of February 11, a five member technical evaluation committee evaluated and numerically scored each technical proposal. Cost proposals were separately reviewed. The results of that initial evaluation were as follows:

Technical-Overall

Offeror Score-Proposed Costs

RDA 424 $2,482,000 STAR 420 2,467,000 C 343 3,094,000 D 309 4,550,000

Based on these results, the contracting officer determined that offerors C and D did not have a reasonable chance of being selected for award, and therefore included only the STAR and RDA proposals within the competitive range. In an April 12 letter, the contracting officer opened negotiations with both STAR and RDA. That letter invited representatives of each firm to meet with AID officials in Manila, Philippines, on May 1, to discuss technical and cost issues raised by their proposals, and requested that prior to that meeting, each offeror respond in writing to several questions listed regarding their proposals. Following that meeting, which a STAR representative attended, the contracting officer requested best and final offers (BAFO) from both offerors by July 30. Although the BAFOs were not numerically scored, the technical evaluation committee reviewed the BAFOs, found that RDA's proposal was more advantageous to the government, and recommended that AID award the contract to RDA. Based on the evaluation committee's recommendation, and since there was no significant difference between the total costs proposed by RDA and STAR, the contracting officer awarded the contract to RDA. This protest followed.

DISCUSSION

STAR's numerous allegations may be summarized as follows: (1) RDA had an unfair competitive advantage over other offerors by hiring and proposing a key individual who allegedly had procurement sensitive information unavailable to STAR; (2) AID showed bias against STAR; and (3) AID failed to conduct meaningful discussions with the protester.

Unfair Competitive Advantage

STAR states that several months prior to the issuance of the RFP, RDA signed an exclusive employment agreement with Mr. Paul Mead, a local
master fisherman resident of Tonga whom RDA proposed as a key individual.
According to STAR, Mr. Mead was "intimately involved in the proposed
project" and contributed to its design.
STAR maintains that since Mr.
Mead knew details about the RFP that were not publicly available until
after it was issued, "it is unreasonable to assume that Mr. Mead would not
inform RDA of every possible bit of information which could provide RDA
`an edge' in its proposal preparation." STAR further alleges that having
obtained that information, RDA was able to identify candidates for certain
required positions before AID issued the RFP.

The agency and RDA explain that, contrary to STAR's assumptions, Mr. Mead
was not "intimately involved" with the procurement and did not design the
RFP or advise AID on any specific details of the solicitation.
His only
connection with the procurement was a 3-day employment in March 1989,
during which AID generally sought Mr. Mead's assistance in preparing for
the then upcoming fisheries development project.
The agency states that
Mr. Mead's participation during that brief period was only a preliminary
planning exercise before any substantive elements of the RFP were even
considered or written.
The agency further states that other consultants,
not Mr. Mead, eventually designed the project contemplated by the RFP, and
that the statement of work and the RFP itself were prepared in-house by
AID officials with whom Mr. Mead had no contact.
AID further asserts that
no one who participated in the early stages of the project design during
1989 participated in the subsequent preparation of the RFP.

An agency may exclude an offeror from the competition because of an
apparent conflict of interest in order to protect the integrity of the
procurement system, even if no actual impropriety can be shown, so long as
the determination is based on facts and not mere innuendo or suspicion.
NKF Eng'g Co. v. United States, 805 F.2d 372 (Fed. Cir. 1986); CACI, Inc.-
Federal v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983); NKF Eng'g, Inc.,
65 Comp.Gen. 104 (1985), 85-2 CPD Para. 638]
RCA Serv. Co., B-224366,
Aug. 28, 1986, 86-2 CPD Para. 241.
Our role in resolving a bid protest
allegation of a conflict of interest or appearance of impropriety is to
determine whether the agency has a reasonable basis for allowing an
offeror to compete in the face of an allegation or indication of an
apparent conflict of interest.
Laser Power Techs., Inc., B-233369;
B-233369.2, Mar. 13, 1989, 89-1 CPD Para. 267.
STAR's arguments here,
based
primarily on its unsupported assumptions, do not amount to a showing that
RDA had a conflict of interest or that it gained an unfair competitive
advantage.

The record does not support STAR's principal allegation that Mr. Mead was
"intimately involved" in designing the RFP or the statement of work, or
that he had any privileged information regarding the procurement.
Mr.
Mead's brief 3-day planning consultancy occurred before the project design
team even arrived in Tonga, and well before the RFP was prepared or the
statement of work written.
The record further shows that Mr. Mead's 3-day
1989 "consultancy" consisted primarily of 2 days of travel from Tonga to
another region in the South Pacific, where he was briefly interviewed by
AID, generally concerning his extensive fishing experience in the region.
STAR has simply not shown, and there is no basis for us to conclude, that
Mr. Mead improperly obtained any sensitive information about this
procurement as a result of that brief engagement nearly 19 months before
the RFP was issued.

In any case, the mere employment of a former government employee who is
familiar with the type of work required, but not privy to the contents of
proposals or to other inside agency information, does not confer an unfair
competitive advantage.
Technology Concepts and Design, Inc., B-241727,
Feb. 6, 1991, 91-1 CPD Para. 132, citing Regional Envtl.
Consultants, 66
Comp.Gen. 67 (1986), 86-2 CPD Para. 476, aff'd, 66 Comp.Gen. 388 (1987),
87-1 CPD Para. 428.
With no showing that Mr. Mead may have possessed
anything other than general information about the RFP, which STAR admits
was available throughout the industry prior to the solicitation being
issued, /1/ we see no basis to conclude that RDA's hiring and proposing
Mr. Mead as a key individual conferred an unfair advantage on RDA over
other offerors.
See Textron Marine Sys., B-243693, Aug. 19, 1991, 91-2
CPD Para. 162.
/2/

STAR also objects that Mr. Mead has "literally daily contact" with the
Tongan Fisheries Division office, from which various field activities
under the contract will be administered, where Mr. Mead allegedly receives
telephone messages and personal mail. /3/
STAR argues that this
arrangement also creates a conflict of interest since, through his
contacts with that office, Mr. Mead must have gained access to procurement
sensitive information that was later disclosed to RDA.

The record contains no evidence that such improprieties occurred.
STAR
has submitted no evidence that Mr. Mead's receipt of messages at the Tonga
Fisheries Division office-- which is not improper by itself, see Little
Susitna, Inc., B-244228, July 1, 1991, 91-2 CPD Para. 6-- resulted in the
agency's improperly disclosing procurement information to Mr. Mead.
Mere
allegations of possible impropriety, unaccompanied by supporting evidence,
amount to speculation, Delta Ventures, B-238655, June 25, 1990, 90-1 CPD
Para. 588, and as such, do not provide a basis for protest.
Key Book
Serv., Inc., B-226775, Apr. 29, 1987, 87-1 CPD Para. 454.

STAR also argues that by making several trips to Tonga prior to the
issuance of the RFP, RDA gained access to information about the RFP from
AID and Tongan officials, which gave RDA an unfair advantage in hiring
personnel and preparing its proposal.
The agency explains, however, and
STAR does not deny, that general information about the fisheries project
was publicly available prior to the issuance of the RFP. /4/
The agency
thus argues that by September 1990-- before the RFP was issued-- any party
interested in the Tongan portion of the project, including STAR and RDA,
could have found a fairly detailed description of the proposed project in
the public record, and could have reasonably anticipated the issuance of a
solicitation as a result.
The agency also vigorously denies that AID
officials gave RDA any information about the RFP prior its issuance, and
states that Tongan personnel were cautioned not to release any information
about the contents of the RFP to prospective offerors.

Here, in light of AID's explanation, we find nothing improper with RDA's
activities in Tonga, and there is no evidence in the record that AID
engaged in any unfair action or conduct designed to give RDA or any other
offeror a preference.
STAR's numerous allegations regarding RDA's pre-
solicitation activities to recruit fishing experts in Tonga-- efforts
apparently based on publicly available information-- simply do not provide
a basis for our Office to object to the award.

STAR also asserts that RDA has an organizational conflict of interest in
connection with one contract task, the evaluation of three different size
fishing boats-- 28-foot, 35-foot, and 40-foot-- for longline tuna
fishing.
The RFP provided that the contractor is to charter the 28-foot
and 35-foot boats, subject to AID approval, while the government of Tonga
would provide the 40-foot boat.
STAR asserts that RDA has the conflict
because Mr. Mead owns the only 35-foot boat currently available in Tonga,
and argues that Mr. Mead provided RDA with favorable lease terms
unavailable to STAR and with details about the boat's maintenance costs
and performance capabilities that unfairly contributed to the overall
quality of RDA's proposal. /5/

Even assuming that RDA was in a position to submit an enhanced proposal
as a result of having detailed information about the 35-foot boat, as STAR
alleges, this would not result in an organizational conflict of interest.
FAR Sec. 9.501 defines an organizational conflict of interest as one
that:

"because of other activities or relationships with other persons, a
person is unable or potentially unable to render impartial assistance or
advice to the Government, or the person's objectivity in performing the
contract work is or might be otherwise impaired, or a person has an unfair
competitive advantage."

STAR, however, does not argue that RDA will be incapable of rendering an
impartial evaluation of the vessel or that RDA will improperly benefit
from any follow-on work as a result of a biased evaluation.
Rather, STAR
argues that as a result of hiring Mr. Mead, RDA gained an unfair
competitive advantage over STAR because Mr. Mead provided RDA with details
about the boat, and offered RDA better terms on the charter of the 35-foot
vessel, unavailable to STAR.

Contrary to STAR's suggestion, the situation here does not give rise to
the kind of unfair competitive advantage contemplated by the regulations.
An unfair competitive advantage arises where some action by an individual
who previously participated in the procurement on behalf of the government
results in prejudice for or on behalf of the awardee, see, e.g., Holmes
and Narver Servs., Inc./Morrison-Knudson Servs., Inc., a joint venture;
Pan Am World Servs., Inc., B-235906]
B-235906.2, Oct. 26, 1989, 89-2 CPD
Para. 379, aff'd, Brown Assocs.
Mgmt. Servs., Inc.-- Recon., B-235906.3,
Mar. 16, 1990, 90-1 CPD Para. 299 (unfair competitive advantage found
where an agency employee who had access to the acquisition and source
selection plans left government service and was hired by the successful
contractor to help write its proposal on the same procurement), or where
an offeror otherwise derived an advantage as a result of improper business
conduct.
See, e.g., Compliance Corp., B-239252, Aug. 15, 1990, 90-2 CPD
Para. 126, aff'd, B-239252.3, Nov. 28, 1990, 90-2 CPD Para. 435.

By contrast here, as already discussed, Mr. Mead was not involved in
designing the RFP or the statement of work; he had no privileged
information about the procurement; and there is no evidence in the record
that RDA otherwise gained an advantage during this procurement as a result
of any improper business conduct.
To the extent that STAR complains that
RDA obtained favorable lease terms on the 35-foot boat from Mr. Mead
unavailable to STAR, or that the terms of the charter placed RDA in a more
favorable competitive position, this simply reflects the fact that RDA
reached a favorable business arrangement with Mr. Mead; this arrangement
does not give rise to an unfair competitive advantage. /6/
Agency Bias

STAR next asserts that an AID procurement official showed bias against
the protester.
STAR alleges that during the May 1 meeting, Mr. Ralph
Singleton, an AID negotiator, apparently concerned with the 1987 dates
that appeared on several resumes STAR submitted with its proposal,
remarked that, "perhaps these are the resumes you took with you when you
left RDA."
/7/ The protester infers from that remark that Mr. Singleton
had improperly concluded that STAR was guilty of improper or illegal acts
which tainted his opinion of STAR.
The protester thus maintains that
since Mr. Singleton was on the technical evaluation committee, STAR did
not receive an impartial evaluation of its proposal.

Where a protester alleges bias on the part of procurement officials, the
protester must prove that the officials intended to harm the protester.
Advanced Sys.
Tech., Inc.; Eng'g and Prof. Servs., Inc., B-241530;
B-241530.2, Feb. 12, 1991, 91-1 CPD Para. 153.
In the absence of such
proof, contracting officials are presumed to act in good faith.
Institute
of Mod. Procs., Inc., B-236964, Jan. 23, 1990, 90-1 CPD Para. 93.

While Mr. Singleton's remark may show lack of judgment, we do not believe
that it demonstrates an intent to harm STAR.
Our in camera review of the
individual evaluators' score sheets shows that Mr. Singleton awarded STAR
a total of 43 out of 45 maximum points following his evaluation of initial
proposals under the "personnel qualifications" evaluation factor, rating
STAR 4 points higher than RDA on 2 subfactors under one of the only
categories where the resumes may have had any relevance.
Mr. Singleton
also awarded STAR a total of 88 out of 100 maximum technical points, while
awarding RDA only 79 total points.
In fact, Mr. Singleton rated STAR
higher than did any other evaluator, and was the only evaluator to award a
higher score to STAR than to RDA.
STAR's contention that Mr. Singleton
was biased in his evaluation of STAR's proposal is therefore untenable.
/8/

Further, STAR's argument that Mr. Singleton formed his biased opinion
after the May 1 meeting, when he was exposed to RDA, and that he
influenced the evaluation committee to downgrade STAR's BAFO, is similarly
unsupported.
The record shows that all five members of the technical
evaluation committee carefully considered and commented on STAR's and
RDA's BAFOs and concluded that RDA's approach was more advantageous to the
government.
Specifically, the committee unanimously found unacceptable
STAR's proposed project management, which, as discussed below, was one of
several weaknesses found in STAR's initial proposal. /9/
STAR's
contentions that Mr. Singleton was biased against STAR or that he unduly
influenced the evaluation of STAR's proposal are simply not supported by
the record. /10/

Meaningful Discussions

The protester argues that AID failed to conduct meaningful discussions
with STAR because it did not adequately alert it to serious deficiencies
in its proposal.
As support for its argument, STAR points to AID's April
12, 1991, letter opening discussions with STAR, arguing that except for
two items it regarded as requiring only minor clarifications, nothing in
that letter indicated that AID considered STAR's management structure or
corporate experience as fatal flaws.

In order for discussions in a negotiated procurement to be meaningful,
contracting officials must furnish to competitive range offerors
information about the areas in their proposals which are believed to be
deficient, and give offerors the opportunity to revise their proposals to
fully satisfy the government's requirements.
See FAR Secs. 15.610(c)(2),
(5); The Scientex Corp., B-238689, June 29, 1990, 90-1 CPD Para. 597.
Agencies are not obligated, however, to afford offerors all-encompassing
discussions, Training and Mgmt.
Resources, Inc., B-220965, Mar. 12, 1986,
86-1 CPD Para. 244, or to discuss every element of a technically
acceptable, competitive range proposal that has received less than the
maximum possible score.
See Associated Chem. and Envt'l. Servs. et al.,
67 Comp.Gen. 314 (1988), 88-1 CPD Para. 248.
Agencies are only required
to lead offerors into areas of their proposals considered deficient.
See
Johnson, Basin and Shaw, Inc., B-240265; B-240265.2, Nov. 7, 1990, 90-2
CPD Para. 371.

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that AID conducted
appropriate and meaningful discussions with STAR.
The agency's April 12
letter consisted of 16 numbered paragraphs, some of which were subdivided
into additional sections with comments and questions regarding STAR's
technical and cost proposals.
In the first paragraph, under the heading
"Weaknesses of the Proposal," AID informed the protester that it had not
adequately described STAR's experience as a firm, and suggested that STAR
should submit additional information concerning any other contracts it may
have performed.
Regarding its management structure, paragraph number 7
requested STAR to "confirm that the proposed project manager ... will be
based at STAR's home office in California for the duration of the
contract"; and paragraph number 11, entitled "Home Office Support,"
specifically requested STAR to provide information regarding the number of
individuals in its "home office staff," including their professional and
support functions.

The record further shows that during oral discussions, AID specifically
led STAR to several areas in its proposal considered deficient--
specifically, the physical location of STAR's proposed project manager.
For example, STAR concedes that during discussions, AID appeared "very
concerned" over the fact that STAR's proposed project manager was
physically located in Maryland, instead of California; that due to the
differences in time zones, AID "expressed great concern" over the
potential difficulty in communicating between Tonga and the East Coast,
where the project manager would be located]
and that AID "appeared to
want" the project manager to relocate to California during the life of the
contract.
STAR also states that AID discussed its home office support.

In our view, STAR's assertion that AID did not make these points "clear"
during discussions is inconsistent with the record and with the
protester's description of the discussions.
AID presented STAR with an
extensive written list of technical and cost issues to be covered in oral
discussions and advised STAR that it should respond to those issues, and
to other matters raised during oral discussions, in its BAFO.
Assuming
that oral discussions were as STAR describes them, and given the
specificity and breadth of AID's April 12 letter, STAR's assertions that
it was not adequately informed during discussions of any deficiencies in
its proposal concerning its corporate experience or management structure
are unsupported by the record. /11/
STAR's failure to fully respond to
the agency's concern in these areas simply cannot be attributed to any
inadequacy on the part of AID to raise these matters during discussions.

STAR's Additional Allegations

STAR also states that the award was improper because RDA's performance
was allegedly unsatisfactory on a recent contract for similar services.
To the extent that STAR challenges the agency's determination that RDA is
a responsible firm, absent a showing of possible fraud or bad faith on the
part of procurement officials, or that definitive responsibility criteria
in the solicitation may have been misapplied, our Office will not review
such a determination since it is based in large part on the subjective
business judgment of the contracting officer.
4 C.F.R. Sec. 21.3(m)(5);
Alaska Indus.
Resources, Inc. B-246472, Nov. 4, 1991, 91-2 CPD Para.
427.
Definitive responsibility criteria are specific and objective
standards, established by an agency for a particular procurement to
measure an offeror's ability to perform the contract.
Management Eng'g,
Inc.; KLD Assocs., Inc., B-233085; B-233085.2, Feb. 15, 1989, 89-1 CPD
Para. 156.
Here, STAR does not allege fraud or bad faith on the part of
agency officials.
Since the RFP's requirements for offerors to provide
evidence of "adequate" financial resources and of a "successful"
performance record do not constitute standards that can be applied
objectively, as STAR maintains, we will not review the agency's
affirmative responsibility determination.

In its comments on the agency report, STAR raises various additional
allegations of impropriety.
For example, STAR contends that the agency
failed to inform it of the award to RDA within 10 days, and that AID did
not furnish STAR with a copy of the agency's administrative report in a
timely fashion.
STAR also argues, for the first time, that AID did not
properly consider the evaluation factors in evaluating its BAFO; and that
during discussions, the contracting officer directed STAR to use its
proposed ceiling rates in preparing its BAFO, to its disadvantage.
As for
AID notifying STAR of the award or not providing the agency report in a
timely fashion, we consider AID's actions to be procedural defects that
did not prejudice STAR here, and that have no effect on the propriety of
the awarded contract.
See Technical Servs.
Corp., 64 Comp.Gen. 245
(1985), 85-1 CPD Para. 152.
Further, the protester's unwarranted
piecemeal presentation of new issues and litany of additional complaints
in its comments are untimely filed and will not be considered.
Science
Sys. and Applications, Inc., B-240311]
B-240311.2, Nov. 9, 1990, 90-2 CPD
Para. 381.

The protest is denied in part and dismissed in part.

/1/ In this connection, the protester states that it was aware of the general nature of this project well before the RFP was issued; that it was aware that the project encompassed development of a commercial longline tuna fishery in Tonga; that based on this information, it assumed that "useful specialists" might include master fishermen and other individuals knowledgeable in fisheries development; and that STAR also recruited for these individuals prior to AID issuing the RFP.

/2/ We similarly have no objection to RDA proposing as one of its analysts a full-time government employee of the National Marine Fisheries Service, who does not own or substantially control RDA. See Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Sec. 3.601; International Alliance of Sports Officials, B-211755, Jan. 25, 1984, 84-1 CPD Para. 117 (where award to an organization that employed government employees was upheld since there was no evidence that the organization was substantially owned or controlled by the government employees).

/3/ In support of this allegation, STAR submits a copy of what appears to be portion of an informal 1989 report titled "Addresses Useful to Pacific Islands Fishery Personnel," published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. For Tonga, the report lists Mr. Mead in his individual capacity, shows his address as "C/O Fisheries Division," and indicates that he may be contacted by telephone "via Hotel" or by fax "via Moorings." Except for appearing on this list of useful contacts, there is no indication that Mr. Mead maintains or shares office space in the Fisheries Division as STAR alleges.

/4/ According to the agency, the AID Congressional Presentation for Fiscal Year 1990, which contained a description of the fisheries development project, was widely distributed to the public before the RFP was issued. The agreement subsequently reached between the United States and the Government of Tonga, which was executed on August 30, 1990, and was well publicized throughout the industry, also described the fisheries development project, including its goals, purposes, and contractor's responsibilities.

/5/ To the extent that STAR challenges AID's decision to include the requirement for the evaluation of a 35-foot boat, this allegation concerns an apparent alleged impropriety in the RFP, which STAR had to have protested prior to the January 21, 1992, time for receipt of initial proposals. See 4 C.F.R. Sec. 21.2(a)(1) (1992).

/6/ STAR also maintains that RDA received an improper competitive advantage because AID had "pre-selected" Mr. Mead's 35-foot boat to be evaluated. The RFP did not require offerors to identify a particular boat, however, and proposals were not evaluated on that basis. The fact that AID may have been aware that Mr. Mead owned the only 35-foot fishing vessel in Tonga did not preclude STAR from offering another boat that met the RFP's requirements, and did not have an effect on the award decision.

/7/ STAR's president, who represented STAR at the meeting, is a former employee of RDA. STAR explains that its president left employment with RDA in 1986 and subsequently incorporated STAR in 1987. It appears that the resumes STAR submitted with its proposal were obtained during the firm's initial recruiting efforts during 1987 and have not been updated since.

/8/ STAR also contends that AID showed bias by requesting more financial information from STAR than from RDA. Even if the same request was not made of RDA, STAR has not shown that AID's request had a prejudicial effect on the competitive nature of the procurement or on STAR. See, e.g., American Mut. Protective Bureau, Inc., B-229967, Jan. 22, 1988, 88-1 CPD Para. 65.

/9/ In its final comments on a supplemental agency report requested by our Office, STAR argues that AID unreasonably downgraded its BAFO in the management area. This new allegation, raised for the first time in its final comments, is untimely and will not be considered. See 4 C.F.R. Sec. 21.2(a)(2).

/10/ To the extent that STAR objects that the committee was not technically qualified to evaluate its proposal, the composition of evaluation committees is within the discretion of the contracting agency, and we will not question the agency's exercise of that discretion unless the protester presents evidence of fraud, bad faith, conflict of interest, or actual bias. MGM Land Co.; Tony Western, B-241169; B-241169.2, Jan. 17, 1991, 91-1 CPD Para. 50. STAR's allegations alone do not meet this standard.

/11/STAR also generally contends that AID did not raise any substantive issues during oral discussions, maintaining that the questions AID raised during negotiations seemed arbitrary and not relevant to the proposed services. The extent and content of discussions are within the discretion of the contracting officer, however, since the issues required to be discussed vary among the proposals. See Holmes & Narver, Inc., B-239469.2; B-239469.3, Sept. 14, 1990, 90-2 CPD Para. 210. Consequently, AID properly individualized written and oral discussions with each offeror, limiting questions to weaknesses and clarifications raised by each proposed approach.

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