B-154190, JUN. 25, 1964
Highlights
PAROCZAY WAS SEPARATED FROM THE SERVICE BY RESIGNATION EFFECTIVE APRIL 13. THE RESIGNATION WAS CANCELLED TO CONFORM WITH A DECISION IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN THE CASE OF PAROCZAY V. THAT THE RESIGNATION WAS INVOLUNTARY. THE PLAINTIFF WAS RESTORED TO AN ACTIVE DUTY STATUS ON OCTOBER 21. HE WAS ADMINISTRATIVELY ALLOWED BACK PAY FOR PERIOD OF SEPARATION COMPUTED AT THE RATE HE WAS RECEIVING ON THE DATE OF HIS TENDERED RESIGNATION. THIS PAYMENT WAS IN ACCORD WITH THE ACT OF JUNE 10. THE PLAINTIFF NOW CLAIMS THAT FOR THE PERIOD OF SEPARATION HIS COMPENSATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPUTED AT THE RATES HE WOULD HAVE RECEIVED HAD HE CONTINUED IN THE SERVICE.
B-154190, JUN. 25, 1964
TO MR. J. W. MCCOOK, AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER, WEATHER BUREAU:
YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 30, 1964, REFERENCE A-2.3, ENCLOSING A VOUCHER FOR $3,626.29 IN FAVOR OF ERNEST PAROCZAY, WITH ATTACHMENTS, ASKS OUR DECISION WHETHER THE VOUCHER WHICH COVERS COMPENSATION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL BACK PAY, PROPERLY MAY BE CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT.
THE RECORD SHOWS THAT MR. PAROCZAY WAS SEPARATED FROM THE SERVICE BY RESIGNATION EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 1960. THE RESIGNATION WAS CANCELLED TO CONFORM WITH A DECISION IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN THE CASE OF PAROCZAY V. UNITED STATES, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3085-60, 219 F.SUPP. 89, THAT THE RESIGNATION WAS INVOLUNTARY. THE COURT SPECIFICALLY POINTS OUT THAT ITS DECISION DOES NOT COVER ANY ITEMS OF BACK PAY. THE PLAINTIFF WAS RESTORED TO AN ACTIVE DUTY STATUS ON OCTOBER 21, 1963. HE WAS ADMINISTRATIVELY ALLOWED BACK PAY FOR PERIOD OF SEPARATION COMPUTED AT THE RATE HE WAS RECEIVING ON THE DATE OF HIS TENDERED RESIGNATION. THIS PAYMENT WAS IN ACCORD WITH THE ACT OF JUNE 10, 1948, 62 STAT. 354, 5 U.S.C. 652 (B) AND OUR DECISION IN 41 COMP. GEN. 418.
THE PLAINTIFF NOW CLAIMS THAT FOR THE PERIOD OF SEPARATION HIS COMPENSATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPUTED AT THE RATES HE WOULD HAVE RECEIVED HAD HE CONTINUED IN THE SERVICE, INCLUDING WITHIN-GRADE STEPS AND STATUTORY SALARY INCREASES. ALSO, HE ASKS TO BE CREDITED WITH THE ANNUAL LEAVE WHICH WOULD HAVE ACCRUED HAD HE NOT BEEN SEPARATED.
THE PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIM IS SAID TO BE BASED UPON THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS IN THE CASES OF CROCKER V. UNITED STATES, 130 CT.CL. 567 AND HYNNING V. UNITED STATES, 141 CT.CL. 486. IN THE HYNNING CASE THE COURT DISTINGUISHED THE CROCKER CASE POINTING OUT THAT IT DID NOT FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF EITHER THE ACT OF AUGUST 26, 1950, 64 STAT. 476, 5 U.S.C. 22-1 OR THE ACT OF JUNE 10, 1948, 62 STAT. 354, 5 U.S.C. 652, SINCE THE EMPLOYEE WAS NOT REINSTATED OR RESTORED, AND, THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT SUBJECT TO RATE OF COMPENSATION LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED BY THOSE STATUTES. CONSEQUENTLY, IN THE CROCKER CASE LEGISLATIVE INCREASES AND IN-GRADE INCREASES WERE ALLOWED BY THE COURT IN COMPUTING THE BACK PAY DUE. SIMILAR INCREASES IN RATES WERE DENIED IN THE HYNNING CASE UNDER THE ACT OF AUGUST 26, 1950, 64 STAT. 476, 5 U.S.C. 22- 1. ALSO, THE DECISION OF THE COURT IN THE HYNNING CASE, GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF THE VALUE OF ANNUAL LEAVE WHICH WOULD HAVE ACCRUED HAD HE NOT BEEN SEPARATED, EXPRESSLY WAS OVERRULED IN ZEIGER V. UNITED STATES, 155 CT.CL. 353, SO FAR AS ANY LEAVE WHICH EXCEEDED THE STATUTORY LEAVE CEILING. THE ACT OF JUNE 10, 1948, FOR APPLICATION HERE, EXPRESSLY PRECLUDES THE ACCUMULATION OF LEAVE DURING THE PERIOD OF SUSPENSION OR REMOVAL.
THEREFORE, PAYMENT HAVING BEEN MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 652 (B) AS CONSTRUED IN 41 COMP. GEN. 418, THE CLAIMANT HAS RECEIVED ALL TO WHICH HE IS ENTITLED. IT FOLLOWS THAT THE VOUCHER, WHICH IS RETURNED, MAY NOT BE CERTIFIED FOR PAYMENT. FURTHER, THE CLAIMED LEAVE CREDITS MAY NOT LEGALLY BE GRANTED.