https://www.gao.gov Mon, 26 Oct 2020 16:27:50 -0400 GAO /images/gao_logo_rss.gif https://www.gao.gov/ Feed provided by GAO. Click to visit. https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-503 What GAO Found From 2016 through 2018, 5.6 million people applied for disaster assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and 4.4 million were referred to the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) for assistance. For eligible survivors, FEMA's IHP can offer financial assistance—including money for personal property losses and repair of certain home damages. The IHP may also provide rental assistance or direct housing assistance, such as trailers, when justified by the lack of available housing resources. Individuals and Households Program (IHP) Assistance Awarded to Almost 2 Million Survivors from 2016 through 2018 Type of Assistance Amount of Assistance Total Financial Assistance $5.98 billion Total Temporary Housing Assistance 12,805 housing units Source: GAO analysis of IHP applicant data, as of February 24, 2020. | GAO-20-503 Of the 4.4 million referred to IHP, FEMA found almost 2 million eligible. On average, FEMA awarded about $4,200 to homeowners and $1,700 to renters during 2016 through 2018. FEMA determined roughly 1.7 million ineligible for IHP assistance, and the most common reasons for ineligibility were insufficient damage, failure to submit evidence to support disaster loses, and failure to make contact with the FEMA inspector. The remaining applicants either withdrew from IHP or received no determination due to missing insurance information. Program outcomes also varied across demographic groups, such as age and income. GAO found that survivors faced numerous challenges obtaining aid and understanding the IHP, including the following: FEMA requires that certain survivors first be denied a Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loan before receiving certain types of IHP assistance. FEMA, state, territory, and local officials said that survivors did not understand and were frustrated by this requirement. GAO found that FEMA did not fully explain the requirement to survivors and its process for the requirement may have prevented many survivors from being considered for certain types of assistance, including low-income applicants who are less likely to qualify for an SBA loan. By fully communicating the requirement and working with SBA to identify options to simplify and streamline this step of the IHP process, FEMA could help ensure that survivors receive all assistance for which they are eligible. Opportunities also exist to improve survivors' understanding of FEMA's eligibility and award determinations for the IHP, for example, that an ineligible determination is not always final, but may mean FEMA needs more information to decide the award. By enhancing the clarity of its determinations and providing more information to survivors about their award, the agency could improve survivors' understanding of the IHP, better manage their expectations, build trust, and improve transparency. Disaster Survivors Sought Assistance from the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) to Recover from Hurricane Michael in Panama City, Florida Further, GAO found that since 2016, FEMA faced challenges implementing the IHP through its call center and field workforce, as well as coordinating with state and local officials, as noted below: Regarding workforce management, GAO found that FEMA has faced challenges managing its call center and field staff. Specific to their call center workforce—who help survivors apply for IHP and process assistance—challenges using program guidance, low morale, and inadequate training following the catastrophic 2017 hurricane season affected their work supporting disaster survivors. For example, while FEMA issues standard operating procedure updates for processing IHP applications, staff we spoke to at all four call centers noted that they could not maintain awareness of IHP guidance because of its large volume and frequent changes, which made it difficult for staff to appropriately address survivor needs. Identifying ways to improve the accessibility and usability of program guidance would help staff better assist survivors. Further, FEMA staff at disaster recovery centers (DRC) lacked some skills and capabilities needed to support survivors, such as knowledge to provide accurate guidance about required documents. By identifying and implementing strategies, such as on-the-job training, to ensure staff at its DRCs have the needed capabilities, FEMA could improve support and streamline the survivor experience. Regarding coordination, GAO found that state and local officials generally had trouble understanding the IHP. For example, these officials said that FEMA did not provide sufficient training, support, and guidance that was needed in order for them to be able to effectively work with FEMA to facilitate IHP assistance. Further, local officials expressed challenges coordinating with FEMA regarding temporary housing units, such as recreational vehicles. By providing more information on the IHP to local officials, and implementing best practices for information-sharing with recovery partners, FEMA could help ensure that state and local recovery partners are better able to help survivors navigate the IHP and effectively deliver temporary housing units to survivors. Lastly, FEMA has planned or implemented multiple efforts to improve assistance to survivors since 2017, including a redesign of the Individual Assistance Program, which includes the IHP. However, GAO found that FEMA did not complete activities that are critical to the success of a process improvement effort, according to GAO's Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide . Specifically, the agency did not fully assess customer and stakeholder needs and performance gaps in the program, or set improvement goals and priorities for the redesign. By completing these process improvement activities, FEMA will be able to further refine the redesigned Individual Assistance Program, and more effectively direct and focus its implementation efforts. Why GAO Did This Study During the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons, several sequential, large-scale disasters created an unprecedented demand for federal disaster assistance. GAO was asked to review issues related to the federal response and recovery to the 2017 disaster season and, specifically, the effectiveness of the IHP. This report addresses (1) IHP outcomes and challenges faced by survivors from 2016 through 2018; (2) challenges FEMA faced implementing the IHP during the same period; and (3) FEMA efforts to assess and improve the IHP, among other things. To answer these objectives, GAO analyzed data from all IHP applicants from 2016 through 2018 and reviewed relevant documentation and policies. GAO also interviewed FEMA, state, territory, local, and nonprofit officials; met with survivors; and visited locations affected by hurricanes in 2017 and 2018 selected to include multiple FEMA regions and other characteristics. What GAO Recommends GAO is making 14 recommendations, and DHS concurred. To address challenges faced by survivors, GAO recommends improving the communication of the SBA loan requirement, identifying ways to simplify the application process, improve the IHP award determination letters, and provide more information to survivors about their award. To address challenges FEMA faced implementing the IHP, GAO recommends improving the communication of guidance changes, ensure employee engagement to raise morale, and improve training among call center staff. GAO also recommends strategies to ensure DRC staff have the skills to support survivors. GAO also recommends improving IHP information provided to state, local, tribal, and territorial recovery partners; and identifying and implementing best practices for information sharing and coordination on the delivery of temporary transportable housing. To further FEMA efforts to assess and improve the IHP, GAO recommends corrections to the methodology used to survey survivors; following key process improvement activities—including engaging stakeholders, assessing performance gaps, and prioritization of process improvement—during program redesign activities; and establishing time frames for strategic planning and implementation of program improvement efforts. For more information, contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov. Wed, 30 Sep 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-701 What GAO Found In the government’s ongoing response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Congress and the administration have taken action on multiple fronts to address challenges that have contributed to catastrophic loss of life and profound economic disruption. These actions have helped direct much-needed federal assistance to support many aspects of public life, including local public health systems and private-sector businesses. However, the nation faces continued public health risks and economic difficulties for the foreseeable future. Among other challenges, the public health system, already strained from months of responding to COVID-19 cases, will face the additional task of managing the upcoming flu season. At the same time, many of the federal, state, and local agencies responsible for responding to the ongoing public health emergency are called on to prepare for and respond to the current hurricane season. Timely and concerted federal leadership will be required in responding to these and other challenges. GAO has identified lessons learned and issues in need of continued attention by the Congress and the administration, including the need to collect reliable data that can drive decision-making; to establish mechanisms for accountability and transparency; and to protect against ongoing cyber threats to patient information, intellectual property, public health data, and intelligence. Attention to these issues can help to make federal efforts as effective as possible. GAO has also identified a number of opportunities to help the federal government prepare for the months ahead while improving the ongoing federal response: Medical Supply Chain The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with support from the Department of Defense (DOD), have taken numerous, significant efforts to mitigate supply shortages and expand the medical supply chain. For example, the agencies have coordinated to deliver supplies directly to nursing homes and used Defense Production Act authorities to increase the domestic production of supplies. However, shortages of certain types of personal protective equipment and testing supplies remain due to a supply chain with limited domestic production and high global demand. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and FEMA have both identified shortages, and officials from seven of the eight states GAO interviewed in July and August 2020 identified previous or ongoing shortages of testing supplies, including swabs, reagents, tubes, pipettes, and transport media. Testing supply shortages have contributed to delays in turnaround times for testing results. Delays in processing test results have multiple serious consequences, including delays in isolating those who test positive and tracing their contacts in a timely manner, which can in turn exacerbate outbreaks by allowing the virus to spread undetected. In addition, states and other nonfederal entities have experienced challenges tracking supply requests made through the federal government and planning for future needs. GAO is making the following recommendations: HHS, in coordination with FEMA, should immediately document roles and responsibilities for supply chain management functions transitioning to HHS, including continued support from other federal partners, to ensure sufficient resources exist to sustain and make the necessary progress in stabilizing the supply chain. HHS, in coordination with FEMA, should further develop and communicate to stakeholders plans outlining specific actions the federal government will take to help mitigate supply chain shortages for the remainder of the pandemic. HHS and FEMA—working with relevant stakeholders—should devise interim solutions, such as systems and guidance and dissemination of best practices, to help states enhance their ability to track the status of supply requests and plan for supply needs for the remainder of the COVID-19 pandemic response. HHS and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) objected to GAO’s initial draft recommendations. GAO made revisions based on their comments. GAO maintains that implementation of its modified recommendations is both warranted and prudent. These actions could contribute to ensuring a more effective response by helping to mitigate challenges with the stability of the medical supply chain and the ability of nonfederal partners to track, plan, and budget for ongoing medical supply needs. Vaccines and Therapeutics Multiple federal agencies continue to support the development and manufacturing of vaccines and therapeutics to prevent and treat COVID-19. These efforts are aimed at accelerating the traditional timeline to create a vaccine (see figure). Traditional Timeline for Development and Creation of a Vaccine Note: See figure 5 in the report. As these efforts proceed, clarity on the federal government’s plans for distributing and administering vaccine, as well as timely, clear, and consistent communication to stakeholders and the public about those plans, is essential. DOD is supporting HHS in developing plans for nationwide distribution and administration of a vaccine. In September 2020, HHS indicated that it will soon send a report to Congress outlining a distribution plan, but did not provide a specific date for doing so. GAO recommends that HHS, with support from DOD, establish a time frame for documenting and sharing a national plan for distributing and administering COVID-19 vaccine, and in developing such a plan ensure that it is consistent with best practices for project planning and scheduling and outlines an approach for how efforts will be coordinated across federal agencies and nonfederal entities. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation, clarifying that it is supporting HHS in developing plans for nationwide distribution and administration of vaccine. HHS neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation, but noted factors that complicate the publication of a plan. GAO maintains that a time frame is necessary so all relevant stakeholders will be best positioned to begin their planning.On September 16, 2020, HHS and DOD released two documents outlining a strategy for any COVID-19 vaccine. GAO will evaluate these documents and report on them in future work.GAO will also continue to conduct related work, including examining federal efforts to accelerate the development and manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics. COVID-19 Data Data collected by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) suggest a disproportionate burden of COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths exists among racial and ethnic minority groups, but GAO identified gaps in these data. To help address these gaps, on July 22, 2020, CDC released a COVID-19 Response Health Equity Strategy. However, the strategy does not assess whether having the authority to require states and jurisdictions to report race and ethnicity information is necessary to ensure CDC can collect such data. CDC’s strategy also does not specify how it will involve key stakeholders, such as health care providers, laboratories, and state and jurisdictional health departments. GAO recommends that CDC (1) determine whether having the authority to require the reporting of race and ethnicity information for cases, hospitalizations, and deaths is necessary for ensuring more complete data, and if so, seek such authority from Congress; (2) involve key stakeholders to help ensure the complete and consistent collection of demographic data; and (3) take steps to help ensure its ability to comprehensively assess the long-term health outcomes of persons with COVID-19, including by race and ethnicity. HHS agreed with the recommendations. In addition, HHS’s data on COVID-19 in nursing homes do not capture the early months of the pandemic. HHS’s Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) began requiring nursing homes to report COVID-19 data to CDC by May 17, 2020, starting with information as of May 8, 2020, but made reporting prior to May 8, 2020 optional. By not requiring nursing homes to submit data from the first 4 months of 2020, HHS is limiting the usefulness of the data in helping to understand the effects of COVID-19 in nursing homes. GAO recommends that HHS, in consultation with CMS and CDC, develop a strategy to capture more complete data on COVID-19 cases and deaths in nursing homes retroactively back to January 1, 2020. HHS partially agreed with this recommendation by noting the value of having complete data, but expressed concern about the burden of collecting it. GAO maintains the importance of collecting these data to inform the government’s continued response and recovery, and HHS could ease the burden by incorporating data previously reported to CDC or to state or local public health offices. Economic Impact Payments The Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued economic impact payments (EIP) to all eligible individuals for whom IRS has the necessary information to do so; however, not everyone eligible was able to be initially identified. To help ensure all eligible recipients received their payments in a more timely manner, IRS took several actions to address challenges GAO reported on in June, including a policy change—reopening the Non-Filers tool registration period for federal benefit recipients and extending it through September 30—that should allow some eligible recipients to receive supplemental payments for qualifying children sooner than expected. However, Treasury and IRS lack updated information on how many eligible recipients have yet to receive these funds. The lack of such information could hinder outreach efforts and place potentially millions of individuals at risk of missing their payment. GAO recommends that Treasury, in coordination with IRS, (1) update and refine the estimate of eligible recipients who have yet to file for an EIP to help target outreach and communications efforts and (2) make estimates of eligible recipients who have yet to file for an EIP, and other relevant information, available to outreach partners to raise awareness about how and when to file for EIP. Treasury and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations and described actions they are taking in concert with the recommendations to notify around 9 million individuals who may be eligible for an EIP. Coronavirus Relief Fund The Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) is the largest program established in the four COVID-19 relief laws that provides aid to states, the District of Columbia, localities, tribal governments, and U.S. territories. Audits of entities that receive federal funds, including CRF payments, are critical to the federal government’s ability to help safeguard those funds. Auditors that conduct single audits follow guidance in the Single Audit Act’s Compliance Supplement, which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) updates and issues annually in coordination with federal agencies. OMB issued the 2020 Compliance Supplement in August 2020, but the Compliance Supplement specified that OMB is still working with federal agencies to identify the needs for additional guidance for auditing new COVID-19-related programs, including the CRF payments, as well as existing programs with compliance requirement changes. According to OMB, an addendum on COVID-19-related programs, including the CRF payments, will be issued in the fall of 2020. Further delays in issuing this guidance could adversely affect auditors’ ability to issue consistent and timely reports. GAO recommends that OMB, in consultation with Treasury, issue the addendum to the 2020 Compliance Supplement as soon as possible to provide the necessary audit guidance, as many single audit efforts are underway. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation. Guidance for K-12 Schools State and local school district officials tasked with reassessing their operating status and ensuring their school buildings are safe are generally relying on guidance and recommendations from federal, state, and local public health and education officials. However, portions of CDC’s guidance on reopening K-12 schools are inconsistent, and some federal guidance appears misaligned with CDC’s risk-based approach on school operating status. Based on GAO’s review, Education has updated the information and CDC has begun to do so. GAO recommends that CDC ensure that, as it makes updates to its guidance related to schools’ operating status, the guidance is cogent, clear, and internally consistent. HHS agreed with the recommendation. Tracking Contract Obligations Federal agencies are tracking contract actions and associated obligations in response to COVID-19 using a National Interest Action (NIA) code in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation. The COVID-19 NIA code was established in March 2020 and was recently extended until March 31, 2021, while a draft of this report recommending that DHS and DOD extend the code beyond September 30, 2020, was with the agencies for comment. GAO has identified inconsistencies in establishing and closing these codes following previous emergencies, and has continued concerns with the criteria that DHS and DOD rely on to determine whether to extend or close a code and whether the code meets long-term needs. GAO recommends that DHS and DOD make updates to the 2019 NIA Code Memorandum of Agreement so as to enhance visibility for federal agencies, the public, and Congress on contract actions and associated obligations related to disaster events, and to ensure the criteria for extending or closing the NIA code reflect government-wide needs for tracking contract actions in longer-term emergencies, such as a pandemic. DHS and DOD did not agree, but GAO maintains implementation of its recommendation is essential. Address Cybersecurity Weaknesses Since March 2020, malicious cyber actors have exploited COVID-19 to target organizations that make up the health care and public health critical infrastructure sector, including government entities, such as HHS. GAO has identified numerous cybersecurity weaknesses at multiple HHS component agencies, including CMS, CDC, and FDA, over the last 6 years, such as weaknesses in key safeguards to limit, prevent, and detect inappropriate access to computer resources. Additionally, GAO’s March 2019 high-risk update identified cybersecurity and safeguarding the systems supporting the nation’s critical infrastructure, such as health care, as high-risk areas. As of July 2020, CMS, FDA, and CDC had made significant progress by implementing 350 (about 81 percent) of the 434 recommendations GAO issued in previous reports to address these weaknesses. Based on the imminent cybersecurity threats, GAO recommends that HHS expedite implementation of GAO’s prior recommendations regarding cybersecurity weaknesses at its component agencies. HHS agreed with the recommendation. Why GAO Did This Study As of September 10, 2020, the U.S. had over 6.3 million cumulative reported cases of COVID-19 and over 177,000 reported deaths, according to federal agencies. The country also continues to experience serious economic repercussions and turmoil. Four relief laws, including the CARES Act, were enacted as of September 2020 to provide appropriations to address the public health and economic threats posed by COVID-19. As of July 31, 2020, the federal government had obligated a total of $1.6 trillion and expended $1.5 trillion of the COVID-19 relief funds as reported by federal agencies on USAspending.gov. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to report bimonthly on its ongoing monitoring and oversight efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This third report examines key actions the federal government has taken to address the COVID-19 pandemic and evolving lessons learned relevant to the nation’s response to pandemics. GAO reviewed data, documents, and guidance from federal agencies about their activities and interviewed federal and state officials, as well as industry representatives. What GAO Recommends GAO is making 16 new recommendations for agencies that are detailed in this Highlights and in the report. For more information, contact A. Nicole Clowers at (202) 512-7114 or clowersa@gao.gov. Mon, 21 Sep 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-633R Why GAO Did This Study Between January 1980 and July 2020, the United States experienced 273 climate and weather disasters causing more than $1 billion in damages each, according to NOAA. The total cost of damages from these disasters exceeded $1.79 trillion, with hurricanes and tropical storms accounting for over 50 percent of these damages, according to NOAA. Across the regions affected by these hurricanes over the period from 2005 to 2015, CBO estimated that federal disaster assistance covered, on average, 62 percent of the damage costs. GAO has reported that the rising number of natural disasters and reliance on federal disaster assistance is a key source of federal fiscal exposure. GAO was asked to review the costs of natural disasters and their effects on communities. This report examines (1) estimates of the costs of damages caused by hurricanes and hurricanes' effects on overall economic activity and employment in the areas they affected, and (2) actions subsequently taken in those areas to improve resilience to future natural disasters. GAO conducted case studies of Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Harvey, and Irma, selected for two reasons. First, they were declared a major disaster by the President under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, which establishes key programs through which the federal government provides disaster assistance, primarily through FEMA. Second, they had sizable effects on the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia during the period from 2004 through 2018. GAO analyzed federal agency and other data on costs, economic activity, employment, and recovery and mitigation projects in selected areas affected by these hurricanes. GAO also visited selected recovery and mitigation project sites; interviewed experts and federal, state, and local government officials; and reviewed federal, state, and local government reports and academic studies. What GAO Found Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, Harvey, and Irma (selected hurricanes) caused costly damages and challenges for some populations in affected communities. In these communities, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimated the cost of damages to be approximately $170 billion for Katrina, $74 billion for Sandy, $131 billion for Harvey, and $52 billion for Irma. These estimates include the value of damages to residential, commercial, and government or municipal buildings; material assets within the buildings; business interruption; vehicles and boats; offshore energy platforms; public infrastructure; and agricultural assets. These hurricanes were also costly to the federal government. For example, in 2016, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that federal spending exceeded $110 billion in response to Katrina and $53 billion in response to Sandy. GAO analysis suggests that the selected hurricanes were associated with widely varying effects on overall economic activity and total employment in affected metropolitan areas and counties. Economic activity was lower than expected in the month of the hurricane or some of the three subsequent months in three of the affected metropolitan areas GAO analyzed. Within one year, average economic activity in these three metropolitan areas was similar to or greater than what it had been the year before the hurricane. Total employment was lower than expected in the month of the hurricane or some of the three subsequent months in 80 of the affected counties GAO analyzed. Total employment was higher than pre-hurricane employment on average in 47 of those counties within one year but remained below pre-hurricane employment on average in the other 33 counties for at least one year. Finally, state and local government officials said that the selected hurricanes had significant impacts on communities, local governments, households, and businesses with fewer resources and less expertise, and that challenges faced by households may have impacted local businesses. Communities affected by selected hurricanes have been taking actions to improve resilience, but multiple factors can affect their decisions. Actions taken after selected hurricanes include elevating, acquiring, and rehabilitating homes; flood-proofing public buildings; repairing and upgrading critical infrastructure; constructing flood barriers; and updating building codes. A community’s decision to take resilience actions can depend on the costs and benefits of those actions to the community. Multiple factors affect these costs and benefits, including the likelihood, severity, and location of future disasters, as well as the amount of federal assistance available after a disaster. Finally, vulnerabilities remain in areas affected by selected hurricanes. For example, state and local government officials indicated that many older homes in these areas do not meet current building codes. In reports to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), states indicate they anticipate that the scope of damages via exposure to weather hazards, such as hurricanes, will likely remain high and could expand across regions affected by the selected hurricanes. In addition, some local governments have projected that population will grow in the regions affected by selected hurricanes. For more information, contact Oliver Richard at 202-512-8424 or richardo@gao.gov. Thu, 10 Sep 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-518 What GAO Found As of 2017, persistent-poverty counties were predominantly rural and more frequently located in the South than in other regions. GAO identified 409 persistent-poverty counties (13 percent of all counties), roughly 50 percent of which were rural. In contrast, high-poverty census tracts—which represented 28 percent of all census tracts—were frequently urban (74 percent). Publically reported federal spending data do not include census tracts. GAO determined that ZIP codes were the best available substitute, and 77 percent of high-poverty ZIP codes overlapped with a high-poverty census tract. Persistent- and High-Poverty Geographic Areas Of the 247 programs potentially subject to H.R. 2055, 114 (accounting for $87 billion in spending) had sufficiently complete county-level data in USAspending.gov. In fiscal years 2017–2019, agencies used 8 percent of funds in persistent-poverty counties under these programs (see fig. below). Individual agencies’ funding levels varied, but agencies used less than 10 percent of funding in persistent-poverty counties under 68 programs (60 percent of programs with sufficient data). This included 27 programs that did not have any funds used in these areas. Fewer programs had sufficiently complete ZIP code-level data (46 programs, accounting for $4.9 billion in spending), but agencies used higher percentages of funds in high-poverty ZIP codes (37 percent) under these programs. Persistent-Poverty County and High-Poverty ZIP Code Funding for Programs Subject to H.R. 2055, 2017-2019 Why GAO Did This Study The “10-20-30 formula” has been applied to appropriations for some federal programs since 2009. It requires that agencies use at least 10 percent of designated program funds in counties that have had poverty rates of at least 20 percent over the last 30 years (also known as “persistent-poverty counties”). Legislation proposed in 2019 (H.R. 2055) would apply the formula to more programs for funds appropriated over the next 10 years. It also would require these programs to increase funding in “high-poverty areas”— census tracts with a poverty rate of at least 20 percent over the last 5 years. GAO identified 247 programs across 14 agencies that may fall within the scope of this bill. GAO was asked to review federal funding allocated to persistent-poverty counties and high-poverty areas. This report examines (1) characteristics of areas with persistent or high poverty, and (2) the percentage of funds that programs included in H.R. 2055 used in persistent-poverty counties and high-poverty areas in fiscal years 2017-2019. GAO analyzed Census data and publicly reported federal spending data in USAspending.gov. For more information, contact William Shear at (202) 512-8678 or shearw@gao.gov. Thu, 16 Jul 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-685T What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator, together with key officials from the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for managing the whole-of-nation COVID-19 pandemic response. As a primary agency responsible for managing the response, FEMA has worked in coordination with other federal agencies to increase the availability of supplies for COVID-19—including distributing supplies to states and others through Project Air Bridge in an effort to expedite distribution. FEMA's contract obligations in response to COVID-19 totaled about $1.6 billion as of May 31, 2020, with obligations for goods such as surgical gowns and N95 masks accounting for $1.4 billion, or 86 percent of that total. GAO's recent report on the COVID-19 pandemic response and past work on other disasters has identified potential challenges FEMA faces in responding to the pandemic and any future nationally significant biological incidents. These challenges may be further complicated by the recent rise in COVID-19 cases and additional expected case increases in the fall. Contracting. In December 2018, GAO found inconsistencies in how FEMA coordinated and communicated with states and localities on advance contracts—those that are established prior to disasters and are typically needed to quickly provide goods and services. GAO made recommendations to improve FEMA's efforts and it is taking actions to address this issue. Medical supply acquisition and distribution. In June 2020, GAO reported on concerns about the distribution, acquisition, and adequacy of supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile and other sources. GAO will continue to monitor these issues through ongoing and future work. Deploying disaster workforce. In May 2020, GAO reported on staffing shortages and other workforce challenges FEMA faced in recent disasters. The large number of declared COVID-19 disasters coupled with hurricane and wildfire seasons adds other potential challenges. GAO made recommendations designed to enhance the information FEMA officials have to manage the workforce, which FEMA agreed to implement. After-action reporting. Analyzing lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic response may help FEMA and other agencies take corrective action for the remainder of this response and for potential future biological incidents. In May 2020, however, GAO reported that FEMA had not consistently completed prior after-action reports. FEMA agreed to implement recommendations designed to improve after-action reporting. Interagency planning for biological incidents. In June 2020, GAO reported that the National Biodefense Strategy sets goals and objectives to help the nation prepare for and rapidly respond to biological incidents to minimize their effect and could drive interagency preparedness efforts. However, implementation was in early stages at the start of the pandemic, and in February 2020 GAO made recommendations designed to address key implementation challenges, including clarifying roles and responsibilities. As shown in the COVID-19 response, FEMA's role in these efforts will be critical. GAO will continue to monitor preparedness and strategy implementation. Why GAO Did This Study The COVID-19 pandemic shows how biological threats have the potential to cause loss of life and sustained damage to the economy, societal stability, and global security. During the pandemic, 57 major disaster declarations were simultaneously issued for all U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories—the first time in history this has occurred. FEMA had obligated about $5.8 billion for the response as of May 31, 2020. This statement addresses (1) FEMA's role in managing the COVID-19 pandemic, including efforts to acquire and distribute critical medical supplies, as well as (2) potential challenges for this and other biological incident responses. This statement is based on products GAO issued from August 2003 to June 2020, as well as ongoing efforts to monitor contract obligations. For these products, GAO reviewed relevant presidential directives, statutes, regulations, policies, strategic plans, other reports, as well as federal procurement data; and interviewed federal and state officials, among others. GAO provided a copy of new contract obligation information in this statement to the Department of Homeland Security for review. What GAO Recommends GAO made many recommendations in prior reports designed to address facets of many of the challenges discussed in this statement. Federal agencies have not fully implemented all of these but, in many cases, have taken steps. GAO will continue to monitor these efforts. For more information, contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-614T What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) obligated about $788 million in disaster assistance, as of May 2020, to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, and Hawaii for response and recovery efforts following the 2018 disasters—most of which went to the CNMI. About $541 million (69 percent) of these obligations went to recovery projects in the CNMI, Guam, and Hawaii, such as debris removal and bridge and utility repair. FEMA estimates it will obligate an additional $94 million in grants to be provided directly to the CNMI and Hawaii through September 2020. Local officials GAO spoke with considered FEMA's response to the 2018 Pacific disasters to be generally effective, but it is not clear if FEMA's response procedures are well-suited for slow-moving disasters, such as volcanic eruptions. Specifically, FEMA reported taking steps prior to 2018 to improve its response capabilities in the region, such as completing catastrophic disaster plans with the CNMI and Guam and increasing the capacity of its two Pacific area distribution supply centers. Officials also told GAO that FEMA was an effective partner that led a unified, coordinated response effort. However, FEMA procedures may not be well-suited for slow-moving disasters, such as a volcanic eruption in Hawaii, which, according to Hawaii officials, resulted in FEMA starting recovery efforts before response activities were completed. Damage from Typhoon Yutu in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (left) and the Kilauea Volcano Eruption in Hawaii (right) GAO's preliminary analysis identified several challenges affecting FEMA's recovery efforts in the CNMI, Guam, and Hawaii. Specifically, CNMI and Hawaii officials noted that disagreements with FEMA over the accuracy of estimates for certain fixed-cost recovery projects have delayed these projects. According to CNMI and Hawaii officials, these disagreements were caused, in part, by FEMA not accounting for higher procurement and shipping costs to the Pacific region. In addition, similar to disaster recoveries in other U.S. island territories, limited disaster workforce capacity and shortages of construction workers hindered the implementation of FEMA-funded projects in the Pacific. Lastly, contracting and construction challenges contributed to delays in the CNMI's implementation of FEMA's Permanent Housing Construction program. Why GAO Did This Study The CNMI, Guam, and Hawaii experienced an unprecedented number of natural disasters in 2018—including typhoons, earthquakes, mudslides, and volcanic eruptions. FEMA is the lead federal agency responsible for helping states and territories prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural disasters. Due to the remoteness of Hawaii and the Pacific territories, disaster response and recovery in the region can be challenging. Title IX of the Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act of 2019 included a provision for GAO to review FEMA's response and recovery efforts for 2018 natural disasters, including those in the Pacific region. This statement is based on ongoing work and provides preliminary GAO observations on (1) the status of FEMA disaster assistance for the CNMI, Guam, and Hawaii as of May 2020; (2) the extent to which officials in the CNMI, Guam, and Hawaii found FEMA's response to the 2018 disasters effective; and (3) the challenges, if any, FEMA experienced implementing recovery assistance programs in these locations. For this work, GAO analyzed program documents, catastrophic disaster plans, and data on FEMA obligations and expenditures as of May 2020; interviewed federal, state, territorial, and local officials; and visited disaster-damaged areas in Hawaii in February 2020. GAO incorporated technical comments from FEMA on this statement, as appropriate. GAO will continue its ongoing work and make recommendations as appropriate in the final report. For more information, contact Christopher Currie at (404) 679-1875 or ccurrie@gao.gov. Wed, 08 Jul 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-508 What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers three grant programs that can fund efforts to mitigate the flood risk of properties insured by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Together, these three programs funded $2.3 billion in mitigation projects from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. The largest program's funding is tied to federal recovery dollars following presidential disaster declarations, while the other two programs are funded each year through congressional appropriations. States and localities generally must contribute 25 percent of the cost of a mitigation project, but some other federal program funds can be used for that purpose. One example of such a project is property acquisition—purchasing a high-risk property from a willing property owner, demolishing the structure, and converting the property to green space. From 1989 to 2018, FEMA has helped states and localities mitigate more than 50,000 properties; however, the number of nonmitigated repetitive loss properties (generally meaning those that flooded at least twice in 10 years) has grown. Mitigation efforts varied by state. Property acquisition accounted for about 80 percent of mitigated properties nationwide, but, in some states, elevation (raising a structure) was more commonly used. In addition, some states (e.g., Missouri and North Carolina) mitigated a high number of properties relative to their numbers of repetitive loss properties, while others (Florida, New York, Louisiana, and Texas) mitigated a low number. While these efforts can reduce flood risk and claim payments, the federal government's fiscal exposure from NFIP remains high because premium rates do not fully reflect the flood risk of its insured properties. NFIP has experienced several catastrophic flood events in recent years, and the frequency and severity of floods is expected to increase. However, NFIP's premium rates have not provided sufficient revenue to pay claims. As a result, FEMA still owed Treasury $20.5 billion as of March 2020, despite Congress cancelling $16 billion of debt in 2017. As GAO has reported in the past (GAO-17-425), Congress will need to consider comprehensive reform, including mitigation and structural changes to premium rates, to ensure NFIP's solvency. National Flood Insurance Program Annual Year-end Debt to Treasury, Fiscal Years 1995-2019 Why GAO Did This Study NFIP has faced significant financial challenges over the years, highlighted by a rise in catastrophic flood events and its $20.5 billion debt to Treasury. Contributing to these challenges are repetitive loss properties—those that have flooded and received a claim payment multiple times. Acquiring and demolishing these properties is one alternative to paying for repeated claims, but questions exist about the cost, efficiency, and effectiveness of this approach. GAO was asked to review FEMA's property acquisition efforts as a means of addressing NFIP's financial challenges. This report examines (1) funding programs available for acquisitions, (2) FEMA's flood mitigation efforts, and (3) factors contributing to NFIP's fiscal exposure. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed FEMA guidance and other documentation; analyzed FEMA data sets related to NFIP policies and claims, repetitive loss properties, and mitigation projects; and interviewed FEMA officials. What GAO Recommends GAO suggested in GAO-17-425 that Congress make comprehensive reforms to NFIP to improve the program's solvency. Given NFIP's continued debt growth, GAO maintains that comprehensive reform warrants consideration. For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov. Thu, 25 Jun 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-509 What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers three grant programs that can fund efforts to mitigate the flood risk of properties insured by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Together, these three programs funded $2.3 billion in mitigation projects from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. The largest program's funding is tied to federal recovery dollars following presidential disaster declarations, while the other two programs are funded each year through congressional appropriations. States and localities generally must contribute 25 percent of the cost of a mitigation project, but some other federal program funds can be used for that purpose. One example of such a project is property acquisition—purchasing a high-risk property from a willing property owner, demolishing the structure, and converting the property to green space. From 1989 to 2018, FEMA has helped states and localities mitigate more than 50,000 properties; however, the number of nonmitigated repetitive loss properties (generally meaning those that flooded at least twice in 10 years) has grown. Mitigation efforts varied by state. Property acquisition accounted for about 80 percent of mitigated properties nationwide, but, in some states, elevation (raising a structure) was more commonly used. In addition, some states (e.g., Missouri and North Carolina) mitigated a high number of properties relative to their numbers of repetitive loss properties, while others (Florida, New York, Louisiana, and Texas) mitigated a low number. While these efforts can reduce flood risk and claim payments, the federal government's fiscal exposure from NFIP remains high because premium rates do not fully reflect the flood risk of its insured properties. NFIP has experienced several catastrophic flood events in recent years, and the frequency and severity of floods is expected to increase. However, NFIP's premium rates have not provided sufficient revenue to pay claims. As a result, FEMA still owed Treasury $20.5 billion as of March 2020, despite Congress cancelling $16 billion of debt in 2017. As GAO has reported in the past (GAO-17-425), Congress will need to consider comprehensive reform, including mitigation and structural changes to premium rates, to ensure NFIP's solvency. National Flood Insurance Program Annual Year-end Debt to Treasury, Fiscal Years 1995-2019 Why GAO Did This Study NFIP has faced significant financial challenges over the years, highlighted by a rise in catastrophic flood events and its $20.5 billion debt to Treasury. Contributing to these challenges are repetitive loss properties—those that have flooded and received a claim payment multiple times. Acquiring and demolishing these properties is one alternative to paying for repeated claims, but questions exist about the cost, efficiency, and effectiveness of this approach. GAO was asked to review FEMA's property acquisition efforts as a means of addressing NFIP's financial challenges. This report examines (1) funding programs available for acquisitions, (2) FEMA's flood mitigation efforts, and (3) factors contributing to NFIP's fiscal exposure. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed FEMA guidance and other documentation; analyzed FEMA data sets related to NFIP policies and claims, repetitive loss properties, and mitigation projects; and interviewed FEMA officials. What GAO Recommends GAO suggested in GAO-17-425 that Congress make comprehensive reforms to NFIP to improve the program's solvency. Given NFIP's continued debt growth, GAO maintains that comprehensive reform warrants consideration. For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov. Thu, 25 Jun 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-467 What GAO Found American Samoa's economy largely contracted during the past decade. Adjusted for inflation, gross domestic product declined by 18.2 percent from 2007 to 2017, and increased by 2.2 percent in 2018 (see fig.). While American Samoa employment varied by year from 2007 to 2018, workers' inflation-adjusted earnings generally declined. American Samoa's economy continues to depend on the territorial government and tuna canning industry as key sectors. Changes in government spending and the tuna canning industry, including cannery closures, have impacted American Samoa's economy. To reduce the territory's dependence on the government and the tuna canning industry, the American Samoa government continues its efforts to diversify the economy. American Samoa Real Gross Domestic Product, 2007-2018, Percentage Change Note: Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates percentage changes using unrounded data. American Samoa's tuna canning industry faces multiple challenges, including increased competition and minimum wage increases, which led to cannery closures from 2007 to 2018. The companies that experienced the closures explained that minimum wage increases were a factor in the closures, but not a main factor. With the closures, employment of cannery workers decreased but inflation-adjusted earnings of cannery workers who maintained their jobs increased. StarKist Co. now operates the single remaining cannery in American Samoa, StarKist Samoa, but faces financial challenges. In addition to increased competition and labor market challenges, the industry faces other challenges, such as lower wages relative to those in American Samoa for cannery workers in other countries. However, American Samoa offers the tuna canning industry advantages relative to the U.S. mainland and other countries, including lower wages compared to those in the U.S. mainland as well as duty-free access to the U.S. canned tuna market, according to StarKist Samoa officials. The American Samoa government and the American Samoa Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber) view the minimum wage increases as conflicting with sustainable economic development, but employers and workers GAO interviewed noted benefits and challenges presented by minimum wage increases. The government supports setting a minimum wage that the economy can support, while the Chamber supports delaying minimum wage increases for the cannery. Employers and workers GAO interviewed noted a potential positive impact on the livelihood of workers but a potential negative impact on the remaining cannery, among other things. Why GAO Did This Study In 2007, Congress passed legislation that established a schedule of periodic increases that would have raised all minimum wages in American Samoa to the current federal level ($7.25 per hour) by 2016. However, subsequent legislation has postponed or reduced scheduled minimum wage increases. The most recent minimum wage increase in American Samoa occurred on September 30, 2018, but all minimum wages in American Samoa are not scheduled to converge with the current federal level until 2036. Pub. L. No. 111-5, enacted in February 2009, included a provision for GAO to report periodically on the economic impact of minimum wage increases in American Samoa. This report examines (1) economic trends including changes in employment and earnings since the minimum wage increases in American Samoa began in 2007, (2) the status of the tuna canning industry, and (3) stakeholder views on the minimum wage increases. GAO analyzed federal and American Samoa data for 2016 through 2018, and interviewed employers and workers in American Samoa selected on the basis of employment levels, among other criteria. Commenting on a draft of this report, the American Samoa government suggested creating a committee to set minimum wages in the territory and a moratorium on minimum wage increases until the committee is formed. The Department of the Interior suggested GAO conduct further study, including on the use of a committee to set minimum wages. The suggested further study was beyond the scope of this report. For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Thu, 11 Jun 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-464 What GAO Found GAO found selected agencies did not consistently follow all required procedures for oversight of small business subcontracting plans, both before and after contracts were awarded. GAO reviewed 26 contracts with a subcontracting plan at four agencies—Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), General Services Administration (GSA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Department of the Navy (Navy). For about half of the 26 contracts, agencies could not demonstrate that procedures for Procurement Center Representative (PCR) reviews were followed. These representatives may review small business subcontracting plans and provide recommendations for improving small business participation. When an agency is awarding a contract that includes a subcontracting plan, contracting officers are required to notify these representatives of the opportunity to review the proposed contract. Without taking steps to ensure these opportunities are provided, agencies may not receive and benefit from suggestions for increasing small business participation. For 14 of the 26 contracts, contracting officers did not ensure contractors submitted required subcontracting reports. After a contract is awarded, contracting officers must review reports contractors submit that describe their progress towards meeting approved small business subcontracting goals. In some cases, contracting officers accepted reports with subcontracting goals different from those in the approved subcontracting plans, with no documentation explaining the difference. Without complete and accurate information about a contractor's subcontracting goals, an agency cannot adequately assess a contractor's performance in meeting its subcontracting plan responsibilities. The Small Business Administration (SBA) encourages agency compliance with small business subcontracting plan requirements by providing training to contracting officers and contractors, and by conducting reviews. For instance, SBA Commercial Market Representatives conduct compliance reviews to evaluate a large prime contractor's compliance with subcontracting program procedures and goal achievement. However, SBA could not provide documentation or information on almost all compliance reviews conducted in fiscal years 2016–2018. SBA has developed new procedures for conducting compliance reviews, but as of mid-March 2020, had yet to fully implement them. SBA has conducted fiscal year 2019 compliance reviews that reflect a first phase of their new procedures. SBA has draft guidance on the new compliance review process, including some specific information regarding what Commercial Market Representatives are to record as part of the compliance review. SBA has begun to conduct compliance reviews in accordance with the guidance, but does not have clearly documented and maintained records for the first phase of these reviews. Without consistent, clear documentation and records that will be maintained going forward, SBA's ability to track contractor compliance and agency oversight efforts will be limited. Why GAO Did This Study Certain federal contracts must have a small business subcontracting plan if subcontracting opportunities exist. But recent Department of Defense Inspector General reports raised concerns about agency oversight of subcontracting requirements. GAO was asked to review oversight of subcontracting plans. Among its objectives, this report discusses (1) the extent to which selected agencies (DLA, GSA, NASA, and Navy) oversee small business subcontracting plans, and (2) how SBA encourages agency compliance with subcontracting plan requirements. GAO reviewed data and documentation for a non-generalizable sample of 32 federal contracts (including 26 contracts with a subcontracting plan) at four agencies, selected to include contracts over $1.5 million at both civilian and military agencies awarded in fiscal years 2016–2018. GAO also reviewed the Federal Acquisition Regulation, SBA and selected agency documentation, and interviewed agency officials. What GAO Recommends GAO is making 10 recommendations for ensuring procedures for PCR reviews are followed, contractor subcontracting reports are monitored and reviewed for accuracy, and SBA compliance reviews are clearly documented and maintained. DLA, GSA, NASA, and Navy concurred with our recommendations. SBA partially concurred with our recommendation. GAO maintains that its recommendation is warranted. For more information, contact William B. Shear at (202) 512-8678 or shearw@gao.gov. Thu, 28 May 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-457 What GAO Found The Small Business Administration (SBA) annually issues a funding opportunity announcement with an estimate of total funding for the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) Program. Individual SBDCs are required to use this estimate to apply for their portion of the funding. In fiscal year 2016, SBA began using the lowest funding estimate—the amount in the President's budget—rather than an estimate reflecting historical funding levels. In fiscal year 2019, the amount in the President's budget was 15 percent lower than the prior-year appropriation and in 2020, 23 percent. If SBA continues its practice for fiscal year 2021, the funding estimate will be 35 percent lower than the 2020 appropriation. When appropriations are enacted for the program, the funding amount is revised and SBDCs submit a final budget. SBA officials said they changed how they set the funding estimate to conform to federal standards and appropriations law. In a 2019 letter to the House and Senate Small Business Committees, SBA said it adopted the change to help the program operate more effectively and be consistent with federal financial management standards. SBA officials could not point to specific regulations or guidance to support this statement. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance for grants states that estimates based on the previous year's funding are acceptable if current appropriations are not yet available, as was the case when recent SBDC funding opportunity announcements were issued. SBA officials also cited the Antideficiency Act, which prohibits federal agencies from obligating or expending federal funds in advance or in excess of an appropriation. But staff from OMB and SBA's Office of General Counsel told GAO that the Antideficiency Act does not apply to a funding opportunity announcement because the announcement does not obligate federal funds. A majority of SBDCs that GAO surveyed said using the President's budget request for the initial funding estimate created budgeting, operational, and performance burdens and challenges—mostly stemming from the large gap between the initial estimate and appropriated amounts. For example, SBDCs surveyed said that they now spend more time on budgeting (determining what to cut from initial budgets to meet the lower estimate and then recalculating for final budgets); have a harder time obtaining matching funds (from state, local, or private-sector sources) or increasing the amounts from initial to final funding levels; have difficulty hiring or retaining staff; face challenges providing services to small businesses (particularly if SBDCs have staffing gaps); and thus also face challenges meeting performance goals (which include number of clients served). Under SBA's current practice for funding estimates, SBDCs will continue to experience (or may experience increasing) challenges given the growing divergence between the initial estimate and appropriated amounts. Why GAO Did This Study SBA's SBDC Program provides training and counseling to small businesses through a nationwide network of 62 lead centers and more than 900 service centers. Each year, SBDC lead centers submit grant applications based on an estimated amount in SBA's funding opportunity announcement. GAO was asked to review SBA's procedure for the SBDC funding estimate. This report discusses SBA's change to the way it estimates funding in the funding opportunity announcement, its rationale for the change, and views of SBDC grantees on the effect of the change on their budgeting and operations. GAO reviewed SBDC funding opportunity announcements, Presidents' budget requests, and appropriations for fiscal years 2012–2020; examined relevant laws and guidance; and interviewed SBA officials and OMB staff. GAO also reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from a nongeneralizable sample of eight SBDCs (selected to achieve diversity in funding amount, budget cycle, and host institution) and surveyed all 62 lead SBDCs. What GAO Recommends GAO is making one recommendation that SBA reevaluate its funding application requirements, including the initial funding estimate SBDCs are to use. SBA partially agreed and outlined steps it plans to take that could address the intent of the recommendation. For more information, contact William B. Shear at (202) 512-8678 or shearw@gao.gov. Fri, 22 May 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-396 What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requires communities participating in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to adopt FEMA floodplain maps; limit flooding caused by new development; and require that substantially damaged structures meet elevation requirements (see figure). Community floodplain officials cited challenges, including difficulty inspecting buildings after a flood, staff turnover, and adopting new NFIP flood maps. Examples of How Buildings Can Meet Higher Elevation Requirements FEMA primarily uses community assistance visits to monitor compliance with NFIP requirements. The visits include evaluations of recent construction. Until 2019, FEMA's goal was to visit all communities considered to be high-risk every 5 years. However, FEMA did not meet this goal in Texas or Florida in 2008–2019 because of a lack of resources. Many high-risk communities received only one visit in this period, and some were not visited at all. Without regular monitoring, FEMA's ability to ensure communities comply with requirements is limited. FEMA and state specialists also are to close out records of these visits in FEMA's tracking system if they find no deficiencies or violations, or when the community has resolved any issues. However, in Florida and Texas GAO found that records for many visits remained open for several years, and FEMA staff were unsure whether this indicated unresolved deficiencies or incomplete recordkeeping. Unreliable recordkeeping hinders FEMA's ability to assess community compliance with NFIP requirements. After a flood, one key community responsibility is to assess whether flood damage on a property was substantial (50 percent or more of the property's value). In such cases, the community must ensure the properties are rebuilt to current NFIP standards. However, FEMA generally does not collect or analyze the results of these assessments, limiting its ability to ensure the process operates as intended. Furthermore, FEMA has not clarified how communities can access NFIP claims data. Such data would help communities target substantial damage assessments after a flood. Why GAO Did This Study NFIP's effectiveness depends in part on communities implementing FEMA requirements on floodplain management and post-disaster rebuilding efforts. GAO was asked to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of federal disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. This report examines (1) requirements NFIP communities must meet and challenges they face, (2) FEMA's use of community visits to ensure compliance, and (3) how FEMA oversees community implementation of NFIP requirements for conducting substantial damage assessments. GAO analyzed FEMA data on oversight visits and substantial damage assessments from January 2008 through July 2019. GAO also interviewed floodplain managers in 19 communities in Texas, Florida, and Louisiana, and officials from FEMA and floodplain management organizations. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations to FEMA: The agency should (1) assess different approaches for ensuring compliance with NFIP requirements, (2) ensure data on community visits are up-to-date and complete, (3) ensure communities collect data on substantial damage assessments, and (4) clarify policies on data sharing between FEMA and NFIP communities. FEMA concurred with the recommendations. For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or CackleyA@gao.gov. Tue, 05 May 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-501PR What GAO Found In April 2019, GAO identified 5 priority recommendations for the Small Business Administration (SBA). Since then, SBA has implemented 2 of those recommendations by, among other things, entering into an agreement with the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to share loan data, enabling them to analyze borrower characteristics for loan programs. In April 2020, GAO identified 5 additional priority recommendations for SBA, bringing the total number to 8. These recommendations involve the following areas: improving the agency's ability to respond to disasters. requiring lenders to assess borrower's ability to obtain credit elsewhere. improving the agency's ability to address cybersecurity threats. addressing staffing requirements and controls related to export promotion. SBA's continued attention to these issues could lead to significant improvements in government operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015 GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact William B. Shear at (202) 512-8678 or shearw@gao.gov. Tue, 21 Apr 2020 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-369 Resumen de GAO-20-168 (en inglés), un informe para los comités del Congreso Conclusiones de la GAO La Oficina de Asistencia para Desastres de la Agencia Federal para el Dessarrollo de la Pequeña Empresa (SBA, por sus siglas en ingles), la cual administra el programa de Préstamos para Desastres, regularmente establace planes de respuesta a desastres pero no discute riesgos ni mitigación de estos riesgos en detalle en sus documentos de planificación. Específicamente, el actual Plan de Preparación y Recuperación de Desastres de la SBA carece de una discusión profunda de posibles riesgos (incluyendo cortes prolongados de energía y comunicaciones) que podrían afectar su respuesta a desastres. Tal respuesta incluye el despliegue de personal y el establecimiento de centros en áreas de desastres para aceptar solicitudes de préstamos. Las secuelas de los huracanes del 2017 (Harvey, Irma, y María) demuestran cómo estos riesgos afectaron las operaciones de préstamos. Por ejemplo, debido a los extensos cortes de energía (particularmente en Puerto Rico), a menudo lossolicitantes de préstamos no podían presentar solicitudes electrónicamente y la SBA no podía llamar o enviar correos electrónicos a los solicitantes. Como resultado, es posible que la SBA no esté adecuadamente preparada para responder a los problemas que surgen al responder a los desastres. Los cambios que la SBA realizó en el proceso de solicitud de préstamos desde el 2005 (como la implementación de solicitudes electrónicas) mejoraron la puntualidad del proceso de préstamos. Para los huracanes del 2017, la SBA procesó más del 90 por ciento de todas las solicitudes de préstamo (incluidas las que fueron denegadas o retiradas rápidamente) dentro de su meta de 45 días, promediando menos de 18 días por cada huracán. En general, alrededor del 49 por ciento de las solicitudes presentadas después de los huracanes del 2017 fueron aprobadas (ver figura). Los solicitantes y otras personas con las que habló la GAO señalaron algunos problemas con el proceso de solicitud, como cambios frecuentes en el personal de contacto de la SBA y tener que reenviar documentos. Según los funcionarios de la SBA, los cambios de personal se debieron a rotación de empleados, entre otras razones. Muchos solicitantes en Puerto Rico también encontraron problemas con traducciones durante las interacciones con la SBA. Tasas de Aprobación de Préstamos para Desastres de en Respuesta a los Tres Huracanes del 2017 La SBA no tiene planes de evaluar su programa piloto de préstamos llamado “Express Bridge Loan Pilot Program,” un programa de garantía de préstamos que comenzó en octubre de 2017 y expira el 30 de septiembre de 2020. Este programa está diseñado para ofrecer financiamiento rápido a pequeñas empresas después de desastres. Para septiembre de 2019, la SBA había recibido 93 solicitudes, pero la mayoría de ellas estaban incompletas, y la SBA había sólo garantizado dos préstamos. La Oficina de Acceso al Capital, la cual gestiona el proyecto piloto, no había solicitado comentarios a los prestamistas sobre el por qué se habían aprobado tan pocos préstamos. Sin evaluar el diseño y la implementación del programa, la capacidad de la SBA para tomar una decisión informada sobre el futuro del programa, incluyendo la evaluación de la futura demanda de este tipo de préstamos, es limitada. Propósito de este Estudio La SBA ayuda a muchos tipos de empresas (independientemente del tamaño de la empresa) y a otros afectados por desastres naturales y otros tipos de desastres declarados a través de su Programa de Préstamos para Desastres. Tales préstamos se pueden utilizar para ayudar a reconstruir o reemplazar propiedades dañadas o continuar las operaciones comerciales. Se pidió a la GAO que revisara la respuesta de la SBA a tres huracanes del 2017 (Harvey, Irma y María). Este informe examina la (1) planificación y respuesta de la SBA a los huracanes del 2017; (2) el proceso de solicitud y revisión de préstamos para desastres; y (3) la implementación del programa “Express Bridge.” La GAO analizó documentos de planificación de la SBA; datos del Sistema de Gestión de Créditos de Desastres para solicitudes presentadas entre el 31 de agosto de 2017 y el 24 de septiembre de 2018 (el periodo en el que la SBA procesó casi todas las solicitudes de préstamo para cada huracán); y documentos directrices del programa “Express Bridge.” La GAO entrevistó a propietarios de pequeñas empresas y funcionarios de gobiernos locales, organizaciones representando los intereses de las empresas, y los Centros de Desarrollo de Pequeñas Empresas en Florida, Texas, Puerto Rico, y las Islas Vírgenes Estadounidenses. Recomendaciones de la GAO La GAO está haciendo cinco recomendaciones a la SBA, entre ellas, que la agencia documente riesgos y planes para mitigarlos de manera más exhaustiva, y evalué la implementación del programa “Express Bridge.” En general, la SBA acepto nuestras recomendaciones, pero describió medidas que parcialmente cumplen con nuestra recomendación para evaluar el programa piloto. La GAO mantiene que esta recomendación debe ser implementada en su totalidad, como se describe en el informe. Véase GAO-20-168. Para obtener más información, sírvase contactar a William B. Shear al (202) 512-8678 o shearw@gao.gov. Fri, 07 Feb 2020 00:00:00 -0500 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-168 Para la versión de esta página en español, ver a GAO-20-369. What GAO Found The Small Business Administration's (SBA) Office of Disaster Assistance, which administers the Disaster Loan Program, regularly develops disaster plans but does not discuss risks and risk mitigation in detail in its planning documents. Specifically, SBA's current Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Plan lacks an in-depth discussion of risks (including extended power and communications outages) that could affect its disaster response. SBA's disaster response includes deploying staff to and establishing centers in disaster areas to accept loan applications. The aftermath of the 2017 hurricanes (Harvey, Irma, and Maria) illustrates how the risks affected SBA's disaster loan operations. For example, because of widespread power outages (particularly in Puerto Rico), loan applicants often could not submit applications electronically and SBA often could not call or e-mail applicants. As a result, SBA may not be adequately prepared to respond to challenges that arise during its disaster response efforts. Changes SBA made to the loan application process since 2005 (such as implementing electronic applications) improved timeliness. For the 2017 hurricanes, SBA processed more than 90 percent of all loan applications (including those quickly declined or withdrawn) within its 45-day goal, averaging less than 18 days for each hurricane. Overall, about 49 percent of applications submitted after the 2017 hurricanes were approved (see figure). Applicants and others with whom GAO spoke noted some application challenges, including frequent changes to SBA contact staff and having to resend documents. According to SBA officials, staff changes resulted from turnover, among other reasons. Many applicants in Puerto Rico also encountered translation challenges during interactions with SBA. Approval Rates for Disaster Loans for Three 2017 Hurricanes SBA has no plans to evaluate its Express Bridge Loan Pilot Program, a loan guarantee program that began in October 2017 and is set to expire on September 30, 2020, and is intended to offer small businesses quicker funding after disasters. As of September 2019, SBA had received 93 applications, but most of them were incomplete and SBA had guaranteed only two loans. The Office of Capital Access, which manages the pilot, had not sought feedback from lenders on why so few loans had been made. Without evaluating program design and implementation, SBA's ability to make an informed decision on the program's future, including assessing potential demand for bridge loans, is limited. Why GAO Did This Study SBA assists most types of businesses regardless of size and others affected by natural and other declared disasters through its Disaster Loan Program. Disaster loans can be used to help rebuild or replace damaged property or continue business operations. GAO was asked to review SBA's response to three 2017 hurricanes (Harvey, Irma, and Maria). This report examines SBA's (1) planning for and response to the 2017 hurricanes; (2) disaster loan application and review process; and (3) implementation of the Express Bridge Loan Pilot Program. GAO analyzed SBA planning documents; summary data from SBA's Disaster Credit Management System for applications submitted between August 31, 2017, and September 24, 2018 (the period in which SBA processed nearly all loan applications for each hurricane); and SBA guidance on the bridge loan program. GAO interviewed small business owners and officials from local governments, business advocacy organizations, and Small Business Development Centers in Florida, Texas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. What GAO Recommends GAO is making five recommendations to SBA, including that it more comprehensively document risks and plans to mitigate these risks and evaluate the implementation of the Express Bridge Loan Pilot Program. Overall, SBA agreed with the recommendations, but described actions that partially address the recommendation for evaluating the pilot. GAO maintains it should be fully implemented, as discussed in the report. For more information, contact William B. Shear at (202) 512-8678 or shearw@gao.gov. Fri, 07 Feb 2020 00:00:00 -0500 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-381 To see the version of this page in English, see GAO-20-221. Conclusiones de la GAO A partir del 30 de septiembre de 2019, la Agencia Federal para el Manejo de Emergencias (FEMA, por sus siglas en inglés) había obligado casi $6 mil millones en subvenciones de Asistencia Pública a Puerto Rico para 1.558 proyectos desde los huracanes de septiembre de 2017. De estos $6 mil millones, $5,1 mil millones se obligaron a obras de emergencia como la remoción de escombros y la restauración temporal de la electricidad. Sin embargo, FEMA y Puerto Rico enfrentaron desafíos en el desarrollo de proyectos a largo plazo de obras permanentes bajo el programa de Asistencia Pública. La gran cantidad de sitios dañados y los retrasos en el establecimiento de directrices de cálculo de costos específicas para Puerto Rico también han presentado desafíos para el desarrollo de proyectos, según los funcionarios de FEMA y Puerto Rico. Ambas partes deben aceptar los cálculos de costos fijos para estos proyectos antes de que el trabajo pueda comenzar. FEMA y Puerto Rico habían aprobado cálculos de costos fijos para 19 proyectos a partir de septiembre de 2019, entre 9.344 sitios dañados en Puerto Rico, como escuelas, hospitales y carreteras. FEMA y Puerto Rico han tomado medidas recientemente, incluso la ampliación del plazo para los cálculos de costos fijos, para abordar estos desafíos. Sin embargo, es demasiado pronto para evaluar el impacto de estas acciones. FEMA ha adaptado sus directrices de cálculo de costos de Asistencia Pública para reflejar con precisión los costos en Puerto Rico, pero podría mejorar las directrices para mejorar aún más su fiabilidad. La GAO descubrió que la directriz de FEMA cumplía sustancialmente o totalmente con las mejores prácticas en nueve de los 12 pasos incluidos en la Directriz de Calculación y Evaluación de Costos de la GAO, como documentar y definir el propósito de la calculación. Sin embargo, FEMA podría mejorar la directriz en tres áreas, incluyendo el análisis de riesgos e incertidumbres futuras que podrían afectar estos cálculos. FEMA ha desarrollado políticas y directrices de Asistencia Pública para responder a las complejas condiciones de recuperación en Puerto Rico. Sin embargo, los funcionarios del gobierno de Puerto Rico con los que habló la GAO declararon que no siempre estaban seguros de cómo proceder de acuerdo con la política de FEMA porque no entendían constantemente qué directriz estaba vigente. Además, FEMA no mantiene un repositorio de directrices de Asistencia Pública disponible para todos los socios de recuperación que incluya la directriz vigente. Por esta razón, los socios de recuperación se arriesgan a usar la directriz que ha sido revisada o reemplazada. Propósito de Este Estudio En septiembre de 2017, dos huracanes intensos, Irma y María, azotaron Puerto Rico, destruyendo carreteras y edificios, entre otras cosas. Puerto Rico calcula que se necesitarán $132 mil millones para reparar y reconstruir infraestructura y servicios hasta 2028. FEMA es la principal agencia federal responsable para ayudar a Puerto Rico a recuperarse de estos desastres. FEMA administra el programa de Asistencia Pública en colaboración con Puerto Rico para otorgar fondos para reconstruir infraestructura dañada y servicios. Se le solicitó a la GAO que analizara los esfuerzos federales de recuperación en Puerto Rico. En este informe, la GAO examina, entre otras cosas, (1) el estado del financiamiento del programa de Asistencia Pública por parte de FEMA y cualquier desafío en la implementación del programa, (2) la medida en que la directriz de cálculo de costos de Asistencia Pública aborda las condiciones en Puerto Rico y se alinea con mejores prácticas, y (3) la medida en que FEMA ha desarrollado políticas y directrices para el programa y cualquier desafío con estas políticas y directrices. La GAO analizó las directrices de cálculo de costos de FEMA, así como la documentación y los datos sobre el programa de Asistencia Pública hasta septiembre de 2019. La GAO realizó visitas a Puerto Rico y entrevistó a funcionarios de FEMA y Puerto Rico sobre el estado de los esfuerzos de recuperación. Recomendaciones de la GAO La GAO recomienda que FEMA (1) revise su directriz de cálculo de costos para que la Asistencia Pública se adhiera más plenamente a las mejores prácticas y (2) desarrolle un repositorio de las directrices de Asistencia Pública aplicables y actuales de que disponen todos los socios de recuperación relevantes en Puerto Rico. El Departamento de Seguridad Nacional estuvo de acuerdo con nuestras recomendaciones. Para más información, contactar a Chris Currie, (404) 679-1875 o curriec@gao.gov. Wed, 05 Feb 2020 00:00:00 -0500 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-221 What GAO Found As of September 30, 2019, the Federal Emeregency Management Agency (FEMA) had obligated nearly $6 billion in Public Assistance grants to Puerto Rico for 1,558 projects since the September 2017 hurricanes. Of this $6 billion, $5.1 billion was obligated for emergency work projects such as debris removal and temporary power restoration. However, FEMA and Puerto Rico faced challenges in developing long-term, permanent work projects under the Public Assistance program. The large number of damaged sites and delays in establishing cost estimation guidance specific to Puerto Rico have also presented challenges to developing projects, according to FEMA and Puerto Rico officials. Both parties must agree to fixed cost estimates for these projects before work can begin. FEMA and Puerto Rico had approved fixed cost estimates for 19 projects as of September 2019, out of 9,344 damaged sites in Puerto Rico, such as schools, hospitals, and roads. FEMA and Puerto Rico have recently taken actions, including extending the deadline for fixed cost estimates, to address these challenges. However, it is too soon to assess the impact of these actions. FEMA has adapted its Public Assistance cost estimating guidance to accurately reflect costs in Puerto Rico but could improve the guidance to further enhance its reliability. GAO found that FEMA's guidance substantially or fully met best practices for nine of 12 steps included in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide , such as documenting and defining the purpose of the estimate. However, FEMA could improve the guidance in three areas, including analyzing risks and future uncertainties that could affect these estimates. Hurricane Damage to a School in Puerto Rico, March 2019 FEMA has developed Public Assistance policies and guidance to respond to complex recovery conditions in Puerto Rico. However, Puerto Rico government officials GAO spoke with stated that they were not always certain about how to proceed in accordance with FEMA policy because they did not consistently understand what guidance was in effect. Further, FEMA does not maintain a repository of Public Assistance guidance available to all recovery partners that includes current applicable guidance. Without real time access to current applicable guidance, recovery partners risk using guidance that has been revised or replaced. Why GAO Did This Study In September 2017, two major hurricanes—Irma and Maria—struck Puerto Rico, destroying roads and buildings among other things. Puerto Rico estimates that $132 billion will be needed to repair and reconstruct infrastructure and services through 2028. FEMA is the lead federal agency responsible for assisting Puerto Rico to recover from these disasters. FEMA administers the Public Assistance program in partnership with Puerto Rico to provide funds to rebuild damaged infrastructure and restore services. GAO was asked to review federal recovery efforts in Puerto Rico. In this report, GAO examines, among other things, (1) the status of FEMA Public Assistance program funding and any challenges in implementing the program, (2) the extent to which Public Assistance cost estimating guidance addresses conditions in Puerto Rico and aligns with best practices, and (3) the extent to which FEMA has developed policies and guidance for the program and any challenges with these policies and guidance. GAO reviewed FEMA's cost estimation guidance as well as documentation and data on the Public Assistance program through September 2019. GAO conducted site visits to Puerto Rico and interviewed FEMA and Puerto Rico government officials regarding the status of recovery efforts. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that FEMA (1) revise its cost estimating guidance for Public Assistance to more fully adhere to best practices and, (2) develop a repository of current applicable Public Assistance guidance available to all relevant recovery partners in Puerto Rico. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with these recommendations. For more information, contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Wed, 05 Feb 2020 00:00:00 -0500 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-326R What GAO Found The Department of Commerce's (Commerce) Economic Development Administration (EDA) has not taken additional steps to implement the Federal Loan Guarantees for Innovative Technologies in Manufacturing (ITM) program since February 2018, when GAO last reported on the program. Appropriated funds intended to implement the ITM program were rescinded. Specifically, Congress rescinded about $18.5 million of the $19 million appropriated to EDA since 2012. EDA officials told us that the agency applied rescissions to funds available for the ITM program to meet congressional requirements. As a result of these rescissions, there are no funds available to implement the ITM program. EDA officials provided the following reasons for applying rescissions to the ITM program. First, they said that demand by small- and medium-sized manufacturers for loans under the ITM program would be limited. Such manufacturers would largely be able to access loans through the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 7(a) loan program, which has less restrictive eligibility requirements. In addition, restrictions on the use of ITM program loan proceeds could have reduced demand for the envisioned ITM program on the part of businesses. Second, EDA officials said that lender participation with the ITM program was uncertain because—based in part on discussions with other agencies—they perceived that prospective lenders faced greater risks with ITM loans in comparison to SBA program loans. Because of these and other reasons, Commerce in October 2017 withdrew a rule it proposed in September 2016 necessary to implement the ITM program, according to agency officials. EDA officials said that by mid-2017, they were reluctant to move forward with a rule due to the pending rescissions, uncertainties around the demand for the program, and requirements of Executive Order 13771. The Executive Order provides that, unless prohibited by law, whenever an agency proposes or otherwise promulgates a regulation, it must identify at least two existing regulations to be repealed. EDA and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) officials noted a number of alternatives to the ITM program. For example, new models such as peer-to-peer lending and investing can provide funding for small- and medium-sized businesses, which typically cannot qualify for a loan with a traditional lender. EDA officials also said that EDA can provide technical assistance grants to manufacturing entities related to innovative technology or manufacturing processes, which may be needed before a business can develop and expand, and thus before a business would seek financial support through a loan program. EDA officials provided a brief timeline and summary of the ITM program appropriations, spending, and rescissions from fiscal year 2012 to 2019. Specifically, From fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2015, Congress appropriated $19 million for the ITM program. For fiscal years 2016 through 2019, Congress did not appropriate new funds for the ITM program. During fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016, approximately $500,000 was spent on a contract for activities associated with ITM program implementation, according to EDA officials. Appropriations to EDA for fiscal years 2017, 2018, and 2019 each required a $10 million rescission of unobligated balances from prior-year appropriations. EDA chose to apply the 2017 rescission to the unobligated balances for the ITM program, and about $8.5 million of the 2018 rescission came from the unobligated balances for the ITM program. Under the terms of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, EDA applied a $50,000 rescission to the remaining unobligated balances for the ITM program. Why GAO Did This Study Manufacturing plays a key role in the U.S. economy as a source of economic growth, high-paying jobs, and innovation. To invest in innovation, improve U.S. competitiveness, and help address the capital needs of small- and medium-sized manufacturers, the America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Reauthorization Act of 2010 (America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010) directed the Secretary of Commerce to establish the ITM program. The ITM program is to support loan guarantees for small- and medium-sized manufacturers for the use or production of innovative technologies. Commerce's EDA is responsible for implementing the program. The America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 also included a provision for GAO to conduct a biennial review of the Secretary of Commerce's execution of the program. GAO's February 2018 report found that EDA had taken steps to implement the ITM program, but future steps were uncertain because of a perceived lack of demand for the program among small- and medium-sized businesses, competing regulatory priorities within Commerce, and reductions in available funding for the program. This report examines any steps EDA has taken to implement the ITM program since GAO's 2018 report, and how much annual funding has been provided for the ITM program from fiscal years 2012 to 2019. GAO analyzed applicable laws and program documents, interviewed EDA officials, and collected information from NIST. Tue, 28 Jan 2020 00:00:00 -0500 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-100SP What GAO Found GAO created the Disaster Resilience Framework to serve as a guide for analysis of federal actions to facilitate and promote resilience to natural disasters. It is organized around three broad overlapping principles and a series of questions that those who provide oversight or management of federal efforts can consider when analyzing opportunities to enhance their contribution to national disaster resilience. The principles are (1) information, which is about giving federal and nonfederal decision makers authoritative and understandable information to help identify current and future risks, as well as the impact of risk-reduction strategies; (2) integration, which is about enabling decision makers to take coherent and coordinated actions; and incentives, which is about making long-term, forward-looking, risk-reduction investments more viable and attractive among competing priorities. Why GAO Did This Study GAO has identified the rising number of natural disasters and increasing reliance on federal assistance as a significant source of federal fiscal exposure In the last 3 years alone, there have been about $183 billion in select supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance to multiple federal agencies and annual appropriations to the Disaster Relief Fund. Since 1980, the U.S. has experienced 254 climate and weather disasters causing more than $1 billion in damage each and totaling over $1.7 trillion. The U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) projects increases in the severity and frequency of certain extreme weather and climate-related events, which will have negative economic impacts. Disaster resilience helps to reduce the impact of climate-related events on people and property. Recognizing the gravity of the effect of these disasters on the American people and the fiscal exposure it creates, GAO created the framework to help those who have responsibility for oversight and management of federal efforts to consider what they might do that will result in federal and nonfederal decision makers taking action to increase disaster resilience throughout the nation. For more information, contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Wed, 23 Oct 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-5 What GAO Found For wildfire-related major disaster declarations from 2015 through 2018, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—consistent with its authorities and responsibilities—helped state and local officials obtain and coordinate federal resources to provide for the needs of wildfire survivors and execute recovery efforts. This support totalled over $2.4 billion and included providing staff to assist at Emergency Operations Centers and establishing Disaster Recovery Centers to coordinate disaster assistance services for survivors. In addition, FEMA provided Public Assistance grant funds to local jurisdictions to help address community infrastructure needs, such as debris removal. FEMA also assigned federal agencies to perform various missions to help with response and recovery—for example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was assigned with contracting for debris removal services in some instances. Officials from jurisdictions that GAO spoke with described practices that aided in wildfire response and recovery, but also reported experiencing challenges. Specifically, officials in affected areas noted that collaboration between FEMA and California's Office of Emergency Services allowed for timely information sharing, and FEMA's assistance at Disaster Recovery Centers greatly assisted survivors in obtaining necessary services. Among the challenges cited were onerous documentation requirements for FEMA's Public Assistance grant program and locating temporary housing for survivors whose homes were completely destroyed. In addition, the unique challenge of removing wildfire debris led to confusion over soil excavation standards and led to overexcavation on some homeowners' lots, lengthening the rebuilding process. FEMA has developed an after-action report identifying lessons learned from the October and December 2017 wildfires, but could benefit from a more comprehensive assessment of its operations to determine if additional actions are needed to ensure that policies and procedures are best suited to prepare for future wildfires. The combination of recent devastating wildfires and projections for increased wildfire activity suggest a potential change in FEMA's operating environment. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , such changes should be analyzed and addressed to help ensure that agencies maintain their effectiveness. Aerial Photo of Wildfire Damage, Santa Rosa, California, October 11, 2017 Why GAO Did This Study In 2017 and 2018, deadly wildfires struck the state of California, tragically resulting in 159 deaths and over 32,000 structures destroyed. FEMA, as the lead federal agency for responding to and recovering from disasters, has obligated about $2 billion in housing, debris removal, and other assistance following these disasters. According to recent environmental assessments, fire seasons are increasing in length, putting more people and infrastructure at risk. GAO was asked to assess a range of response and recovery issues related to the 2017 disasters. Specifically, this report addresses (1) the assistance FEMA provided to jurisdictions in response to major disaster declarations stemming from wildfires from 2015 through 2018, (2) selected jurisdictions' perspectives on FEMA wildfire response and recovery efforts, and (3) the extent to which FEMA has identified and addressed key lessons learned. GAO obtained data on FEMA wildfire disaster assistance and statistics on fire damages and fatalities; reviewed key documentation, such as incident action plans and after action reports; and interviewed officials from FEMA headquarters and regional offices, states, and a nonprobability sample of affected local jurisdictions (e.g., counties). What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that FEMA comprehensively assess operations to identify additional updates to policies and procedures that could enhance future wildfire response and recovery efforts. The Department of Homeland Security agreed with our recommendation. For more information, contact Christopher Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Wed, 09 Oct 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-143 This is the Spanish language highlights associated with GAO-20-141. Conclusiones de la GAO Las agencias federales pueden apoyar los esfuerzos de recuperación de la red eléctrica a largo plazo en Puerto Rico a través de tres funciones principales—proporcionando fondos y asistencia técnica y coordinando entre agencias locales y federales. La Agencia Federal para el Manejo de Emergencias (FEMA, por sus siglas en inglés) y el Departamento de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano (HUD) son las fuentes principales de fondos federales para la recuperación de la red. El Departamento de Energía (DOE) puede proveer asistencia técnica a las entidades locales y federales para apoyar la recuperación de la red. Además, FEMA debe coordinar las capacidades federales para apoyar y acelerar la recuperación. Líneas Eléctricas Dañadas en Puerto Rico en Noviembre de 2017 Después del Huracán María. Hasta julio de 2019, ni FEMA ni HUD proporcionaron fondos para proyectos de recuperación de la red en Puerto Rico, aunque DOE proporcionó asistencia técnica. El progreso de la recuperación de la red ha sido dificultado, en parte, porque FEMA no ha proporcionado información clara y por escrito sobre lo que será elegible para recibir fondos federales. Por ejemplo, FEMA tiene nuevas autorizaciones para financiar proyectos que mejoren la resiliencia y restauren la infraestructura de la red en Puerto Rico siguiendo los últimos estándares de la industria, pero FEMA no ha definido la resiliencia ni ha especificado cuáles estándares aceptará. Por lo tanto, no está claro cuáles tecnologías y propuestas serán elegibles para recibir fondos. Según FEMA, desarrollar políticas para implementar las nuevas autorizaciones creó desafíos para establecer directrices claras pero los funcionarios de FEMA creyeron haber llegado a un acuerdo con entidades locales a través de discusiones y capacitaciones. Sin embargo, sin aclaraciones de FEMA, las entidades locales no tienen suficiente información para implementar planes y corren el riesgo de gastar recursos en el desarrollo de proyectos que posiblemente no sean elegibles para los fondos federales. Además, la necesidad de coordinación entre las numerosas entidades involucradas en la recuperación de la red en Puerto Rico plantea desafíos, según funcionarios locales y federales. FEMA debe liderar la coordinación del apoyo federal a las agencias locales para que estas logren los objetivos de recuperación pero no ha establecido un mecanismo que esté funcionando para facilitar dicha coordinación. Según FEMA, la coordinación entre el liderazgo federal está ocurriendo y las agencias federales se comunican directamente con las entidades locales. Sin embargo, estos esfuerzos no involucran a todas las entidades federales y locales. Dada la situación única, sin un mecanismo para mejorar la coordinación entre estas entidades, los desafíos de coordinación pueden continuar dificultando el progreso. Propósito de Este Estudio En 2017 los huracanes Irma y María dañaron el sistema eléctrico de Puerto Rico, causando el apagón más largo en la historia de los Estados Unidos. Se tomó aproximadamente 11 meses después de los huracanes para restaurar el servicio eléctrico a todos los clientes con estructuras consideradas seguras para la restauración del servicio eléctrico. Las agencias federales, incluyendo a FEMA, proporcionaron alrededor de $3.9 mil millones para ayudar a restaurar el servicio eléctrico, lo cual incluyó reparaciones temporales o parciales. Ahora que se ha restaurado el servicio eléctrico, las entidades locales enfrentan una tarea más costosa a largo plazo: la recuperación de la red eléctrica para repararla y reconstruirla más completamente. Los programas federales ofrecen oportunidades para incorporar la resiliencia en la recuperación ante desastres y el gobierno federal ha asignado miles de millones en fondos para apoyar la recuperación de la red eléctrica en Puerto Rico. Se le solicitó a la GAO que analizara los esfuerzos de recuperación del gobierno federal relacionados con los huracanes de 2017. Este informe (1) describe el papel de las agencias federales en apoyar a los esfuerzos de recuperación de la red eléctrica en Puerto Rico y (2) examina el estado del apoyo federal para la recuperación de la red en Puerto Rico y los desafíos que afectan el progreso de la recuperación de la red. La GAO revisó documentación de las agencias, leyes, regulaciones y políticas federales que son relevantes a la recuperación de desastres. La GAO también entrevistó a funcionarios federales y locales, y a grupos de la industria y otras entidades interesadas. Recomendaciones de la GAO La GAO hace cuatro recomendaciones, incluyendo que FEMA (1) proporcione información clara y por escrito en forma de políticas, directrices o reglamentos que aclare cómo implementará las nuevas autorizaciones y (2) tome medidas para mejorar la coordinación entre las entidades locales y federales. En general, FEMA estuvo de acuerdo con nuestras recomendaciones. Para más información, contacte a Frank Rusco a (202) 512-3841 o ruscof@gao.gov. Tue, 08 Oct 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-141 For the Spanish translation of the highlights page for this document, see GAO-20-143. What GAO Found Federal agencies can support long-term electricity grid recovery efforts in Puerto Rico through three primary roles—providing funding and technical assistance and coordinating among local and federal agencies. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) are the primary federal funding sources for grid recovery. The Department of Energy (DOE) can provide technical assistance to local and federal entities to support grid recovery efforts. In addition, FEMA is to coordinate federal capabilities to support and expedite recovery. Damaged Power Lines in Puerto Rico in November 2017 after Hurricane Maria As of July 2019, neither FEMA nor HUD had funded long-term grid recovery projects in Puerto Rico, but DOE had provided technical assistance. Progress on grid recovery efforts has been hindered in part because FEMA has not provided clear written information on what will be eligible for funding. For example, FEMA has new authorities to fund projects that enhance resilience and restore grid infrastructure to the latest industry standards, but FEMA has not defined resilience or specified what standards it will accept. Consequently, it is unclear which technologies and approaches are eligible for funding. According to FEMA, developing a policy to implement its new authorities created challenges for establishing clear guidance but FEMA officials believed they had reached an understanding with local entities through discussions and trainings. However, without clarification from FEMA, local entities do not have sufficient information to implement plans and risk spending resources developing projects that may not be eligible for funding. Also, the need for coordination among the numerous entities involved in grid recovery in Puerto Rico poses challenges, according to local and federal officials. FEMA is to lead the coordination of federal support for local agencies to achieve recovery goals, but has not established a mechanism that is working to facilitate coordination among the numerous entities involved in grid recovery. According to FEMA, coordination across federal leadership is occurring and agencies communicate directly with local entities. However, these efforts do not involve all federal and local entities and, given the unique situation, without a mechanism to enhance coordination among these entities, coordination challenges may continue to hinder progress. Why GAO Did This Study In 2017, Hurricanes Irma and Maria damaged Puerto Rico's electricity grid, causing the longest blackout in U.S. history. It took roughly 11 months after the hurricanes for power to be restored to all of the customers with structures deemed safe for power restoration. Federal agencies, including FEMA, provided about $3.9 billion to help restore electricity service, which included temporary or partial repairs. Now that electricity service has been restored, local entities face the longer-term and more expensive task of grid recovery to more fully repair and rebuild the grid. Federal programs provide opportunities to incorporate resilience into disaster recovery efforts and the federal government has appropriated billions in funding to support electricity grid recovery in Puerto Rico. GAO was asked to review the federal response to the 2017 hurricanes. This report (1) describes the role of federal agencies in supporting electricity grid recovery efforts in Puerto Rico; and (2) examines the status of federal support for grid recovery in Puerto Rico and challenges affecting progress on grid recovery efforts. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and federal policies for disaster recovery; and agency documents. GAO also interviewed federal and local officials and industry and stakeholder groups. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations, including that FEMA (1) provide clear written information in the form of policy, guidance, or regulations that clarifies how it will implement new authorities and (2) take steps to enhance coordination among local and federal entities. FEMA generally agreed with our recommendations. For more information, contact Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Tue, 08 Oct 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-709 This is the Spanish language highlights associated with GAO-19-590. Lo que pudo constatar la Contraloría del Gobierno de los EE. UU. (GAO) Para apoyar sus objetivos de prosperidad, gobernanza y seguridad, los Departamentos de Estado (DOS), Defensa (DOD), Agricultura (USDA) y la Agencia de los Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID) asignaron aproximadamente US$ 2.400 millones desde el ejercicio fiscal 2013 hasta el ejercicio fiscal 2018 para 370 proyectos en el Triángulo Norte (El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras). La USAID y el DOS implementaron la mayor parte de estos proyectos, algunos de los cuales apoyaban a más de un sector y objetivo. Por ejemplo, la USAID implementó proyectos para combatir la pobreza, mientras que el DOS capacitó a fiscales y policías para abordar las deficiencias en materia de gobernanza y seguridad. Número de proyectos que apoyan los objetivos de prosperidad, gobernanza y seguridad en el Triángulo Norte, por país, ejercicios fiscales 2013 a 2018 El DOS, la USAID y otros organismos informaron que los 190 proyectos en los seis sectores que la GAO revisó obtuvieron resultados mixtos. Por ejemplo, en el ejercicio fiscal 2018, la USAID proporcionó asistencia a 1.376 personas que participaban en programas de desarrollo de la fuerza laboral en Guatemala, suma que excedió la meta de 1.000 personas. A su vez, proporcionó asistencia a 651 personas en Honduras pero no alcanzó la meta de 5.000 personas. El DOS y la USAID capacitaron a 12.557 empleados de los sistemas judiciales en el Triángulo Norte, lo que excedió la meta de 2.275. La USDA reformó cocinas escolares en Honduras como parte de su programa de alimentación escolar. El DOD ayudó a Guatemala a establecer un sistema presupuestario para aumentar la rendición de cuentas de fondos militares, pero el DOD notificó que persistía la desconfianza del público en las fuerzas armadas de Triángulo Norte. Hay poca información disponible sobre cómo la asistencia de los EE. UU. mejoró la prosperidad, la gobernanza y la seguridad en el Triángulo Norte. Por lo general, nuestros organismos proporcionaron más información sobre el progreso en el ámbito de la prosperidad que en los de la gobernanza y la seguridad. Esto se debe, en parte, a que las evaluaciones de los proyectos no se realizaron de manera uniforme entre organismos y sectores. Asimismo, quienes implementaron los proyectos no recopilaron sistemáticamente información clave necesaria para evaluar los avances, aunque los funcionarios notaron mejoras. No obstante, funcionarios de los organismos describieron ejemplos de progreso gracias a la asistencia técnica y mencionaron ciertos desafíos, como las sequías. La GAO ha informado que el desarrollo de un plan de vigilancia y evaluación es clave para evaluar las metas y los objetivos comunes de la agencias y para reforzar los resultados. Si bien el DOS tiene un plan de vigilancia y evaluación para la Estrategia, el plan no incluye actividades del DOD y el USDA que respalden los objetivos de la Estrategia y, por lo tanto, no establece un enfoque integral para evaluar el progreso. Fundamentos de este estudio de la GAO Los Estados Unidos han proporcionado asistencia al Triángulo Norte de América Central por muchos años con el objetivo de combatir la pobreza, la gobernanza débil y la inseguridad. La Estrategia de los EE. UU. para la colaboración en América Central (la Estrategia), que se introdujo en 2014 y actualizó en 2017, respalda los objetivos de mejorar la prosperidad, la gobernanza y la seguridad. El DOS coordina la implementación de los objetivos de la Estrategia entre las agencias. Este informe examina: (1) los proyectos implementados por Gobierno de los EE. UU. desde el ejercicio fiscal 2013 hasta 2018 para apoyar los objetivos de la Estrategia en el Triángulo Norte, (2) lo que se conoce sobre los resultados de los proyectos y (3) lo que se conoce sobre el progreso con relación a los objetivos. La GAO revisó los resultados de un subconjunto de 190 proyectos en una muestra no generalizable de seis sectores escogidos en función de los fondos, el país y el objetivo; analizó documentos de la Estrategia y elementos clave de estrategias eficaces; entrevistó a funcionarios; y llevó a cabo trabajo sobre el terreno en el Triángulo Norte. Recomendaciones de la GAO La GAO recomienda que el DOS colabore con el DOD y el USDA para desarrollar un enfoque integral para la vigilancia y la evaluación de proyectos que respalden los objetivos de la Estrategia. El DOS no estuvo de acuerdo, citando la falta de autoridad para dirigir las acciones de otras agencias. La GAO modificó la recomendación para aclarar que un esfuerzo de colaboración permitiría al DOS incluir información sobre todos los proyectos relevantes a medida que evalúa el progreso de la Estrategia, como se discute en este informe. Solicite más información a Jennifer Grover al (202) 512-7141 o GroverJ@gao.gov. Thu, 26 Sep 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-590 For the Spanish translation of the highlights page for this document, see GAO-19-709. What GAO Found To support their prosperity, governance, and security objectives, the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Agriculture (USDA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated about $2.4 billion from fiscal years 2013 through 2018 for 370 projects in the Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. USAID and State implemented most of these projects, with some supporting more than one sector and objective. For example, USAID implemented projects to address poverty, while State trained prosecutors and police to address governance and security needs. Number of Projects Supporting Prosperity, Governance, and Security Objectives in the Northern Triangle by Country, Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018 State, USAID, and other agencies reported mixed results for the 190 projects in the six sectors GAO reviewed. For example, in fiscal year 2018, USAID assisted 1,376 individuals in workforce development programs in Guatemala, exceeding the target of 1,000, while it assisted 651 individuals in Honduras, falling short of the target of 5,000. State and USAID trained 12,557 justice system personnel in the Northern Triangle, exceeding the target of 2,275. USDA rehabilitated school kitchens in Honduras as part of its school feeding program. DOD helped Guatemala establish a budget system to increase accountability for military funds, but DOD reported persistently low public trust in Northern Triangle militaries. Limited information is available about how U.S. assistance improved prosperity, governance, and security in the Northern Triangle. Agencies generally reported more information about progress toward prosperity than toward governance and security, in part because evaluations were conducted unevenly across agencies and sectors. In addition, project implementers did not consistently collect key information needed to evaluate progress, but officials noted improvements. Nevertheless, agency officials described examples of progress through technical assistance, and noted challenges, such as drought. GAO has reported that development of a monitoring and evaluation plan is key to assessing agencies' common goals and objectives, and mutually reinforcing results. While State has a monitoring and evaluation plan for the Strategy, the plan does not include activities by DOD and USDA that support the Strategy's objectives and thus does not establish a comprehensive approach to assessing progress. Why GAO Did This Study The United States has provided assistance to the Northern Triangle of Central America for many years to address poverty, weak governance, and insecurity. Introduced in 2014, and updated in 2017, the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America (Strategy) supports the objectives of improving prosperity, governance, and security. State coordinates implementation of the Strategy's objectives among agencies. This report examines: (1) the projects the U.S. government has implemented from fiscal years 2013 through 2018 to support the Strategy's objectives in the Northern Triangle, (2) what is known about project results, and (3) what is known about progress toward the objectives. GAO reviewed results for a subset of 190 projects in a nongeneralizable sample of six sectors selected based on funding, country, and objective; analyzed Strategy documents and key elements of effective strategies; interviewed officials; and conducted fieldwork in the Northern Triangle. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that State collaborate with DOD and USDA to develop a comprehensive approach to monitoring and evaluation of projects that support Strategy objectives. State did not concur, citing lack of authority to direct other agencies' actions. GAO modified the recommendation to clarify that a collaborative effort would allow State to include information about all relevant projects as it evaluates progress under the Strategy as discussed in this report. For more information, contact Jennifer Grover at (202) 512-7141 or GroverJ@gao.gov. Thu, 26 Sep 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-592 What GAO Found The catastrophic destruction encountered as a result of Hurricanes Irma and Maria proved overwhelming to the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rican governments and resulted in a large federal disaster response, complicated by losses of power, communication, and health care infrastructure. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) led the federal public health and medical services response and undertook numerous actions to address the needs in the territories—including evacuating critical care and dialysis patients from the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico and providing medical personnel and facilities. However, GAO identified several shortcomings in HHS's leadership. While the scale, location, and timing of these storms complicated response efforts, the deficiencies GAO identified were in many cases a function of preparedness policies, or lack thereof. As a result, they could adversely affect future large-scale responses unless addressed. For example, as the lead agency, HHS is responsible for ensuring that appropriate planning activities are undertaken, including monitoring the federal ability to provide core public health and medical services response capabilities. However, GAO found that HHS did not have a full understanding of the capabilities and limitations of its support agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs. Consequently, HHS's needs were not always aligned with the resources that its support agencies could provide, resulting in some deployed resources not being properly and efficiently utilized. For example, HHS requested Department of Defense medical teams, but these teams specialized in trauma and surgical care, not the chronic and primary care needed. HHS lacked plans for the territories that accounted for the chronic and primary care needs in isolated communities. This care was greatly needed, given that many, especially the elderly, could not easily access hospitals. Example of Downed Power Lines in Puerto Rico, November 2017 Why GAO Did This Study Hurricanes Irma and Maria hit the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico within two weeks of each other in September 2017, causing catastrophic damage. HHS is responsible for leading the federal public health and medical services response during a disaster, such as these hurricanes. As part of its lead federal role during these hurricanes, HHS called upon support agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs, to assist with the public health and medical services response. GAO was asked to review the federal public health and medical services response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. This report examines HHS's actions and leadership of this response, among other things. GAO reviewed documentation on the preparedness for, and response to, the hurricanes. It also interviewed federal and territory officials and interviewed or received written responses from eight nonfederal stakeholders involved in the response, such as nongovernmental organizations. GAO identified these stakeholders through research and referrals. What GAO Recommends GAO is making seven recommendations, including that HHS develop agreements with support agencies that include response capability and limitation information, and develop response plans for providing care in isolated communities. HHS disagreed with two of the seven citing, among other things, territory responsibility for plans. GAO clarified the intent of the two recommendations and believes that all seven are warranted. For more information, contact Mary Denigan-Macauley at (202) 512-7114 or DeniganMacauleyM@gao.gov. Fri, 20 Sep 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-708 This is the Spanish language highlights associated with GAO-19-526. Conclusiones de la GAO Después de los tres huracanes intensos de 2017, los esfuerzos de la Agencia Federal para el Manejo de Emergencias (FEMA, por sus siglas en inglés) y la Cruz Roja Americana (Cruz Roja) se beneficiaron de localizar socios claves en el mismo lugar. La coordinación en persona fue fundamental para mantener la comunicación en Puerto Rico y las Islas Vírgenes de E.E.U.U., debido a los apagones prolongados y el daño a las estructuras públicas. Sin embargo, algunas necesidades relacionadas con el cuidado en masa – tales como refugio, alimentación, y distribución de suministros– no fueron cumplidas. Por ejemplo, funcionarios locales en Texas dijeron que las carreteras inundadas impidieron que los camiones entregaran suministros de emergencia. Proveedores del cuidado en masa tuvieron desafíos, en parte, porque los acuerdos entre gobiernos estatales y locales con las organizaciones voluntarias no siempre detallaron cuáles servicios se podían proporcionar. Además, las directrices y los materiales de entrenamiento de FEMA no motivan explícitamente a los estados y las localidades a incluir información específica en sus acuerdos por escrito sobre la asistencia que una agencia u organización puede proporcionar. Esto limita los beneficios de la coordinación del cuidado en masa y puede poner en riesgo a las víctimas de desastres. Escuela Pública en Puerto Rico que Sufrió Daño Físico por el Huracán María La manera en que FEMA apoya y usa las evaluaciones que recibe de los estados y areas urbanes sobre sus capacidades del cuidado en masa no alcanza a asegurar el planeamiento efectivo. Los beneficiarios de las subvenciones federales para la preparación para desastres a nivel estatal, territorial, y local ddeben enviar regularmente información sobre sus capacidades a FEMA; y FEMA ha dado orientacion y asistencia técnica sobre la evaluacion de capacidades. Sin embargo, la información que algunos beneficiarios le enviaron a FEMA no fue suficientemente específica para ayudar en la respuesta a los huracanes de 2017. FEMA no exige que los beneficiarios especifiquen en sus evaluaciones de capacidades cuales son las organizaciones que proveen servicios del cuidado en masa. Adicionalmente, FEMA no tiene protocolos sistemáticos para proveer sus comentarios a los beneficiarios de modo que éstos puedan mejorar sus evaluaciones. Estas limitaciones impiden los esfuerzos de FEMA para fortalecer la preparación para emergencias. Propósito de Este Estudio This is the Spanish language highlights associated with GAO-19-526. Tres huracanes intensos afectaron a más de 28 millones de personas viviendo en Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, y las Islas Vírgenes en 2017. Los huracanes Harvey, Irma, y María – los cuales tocaron tierra a lo largo de cuatro semanas – causaron un daño combinado de $265 mil millones, y condujeron a la necesidad sin precedente para la alimentación y el refugio, según FEMA. FEMA y la Cruz Roja son las agencias responsables por coordinar el cuidado en masa bajo el sistema para la respuesta federal ante los desastres. Se le solicitó a la GAO que analizara sus esfuerzos. Este informe analiza (1) la coordinación del cuidado en masa por FEMA y la Cruz Roja en respuesta a los huracanes de 2017, y (2) el apoyo y uso de las evaluaciones de capacidades de cuidado en masa por FEMA para los huracanes de 2017. La GAO revisó leyes federales relevantes, sistemas federales, y acuerdos por escrito entre gobiernos federales, estatales, o locales y varias organizaciones voluntarias que proveen servicios del cuidado en masa. La GAO entrevistó a funcionarios de los gobiernos estatales, territoriales, y locales, y representantes de varias organizaciones voluntarias en Florida, Puerto Rico, Texas, y las Islas Vírgenes; y a funcionarios de la Cruz Roja, FEMA, y otras agencias federales que son relevantes, así como organizaciones voluntarias a nivel nacional y local. Esta es la versión en español del informe GAO-19-526, que fue publicado en Septiembre de 2019. Recomendaciones de la GAO La GAO está haciendo seis recomendaciones, entre las que se incluyen que FEMA enfatice la importancia de definir los papeles y las responsabilidades en sus directrices para los gobiernos estatales y locales, que les exija solicitar información de proveedores del cuidado en masa en sus evaluaciones de capacidades, y desarrolle protocolos para dar comentarios a los beneficiarios sobre estas evaluaciones de capacidades. FEMA estuvo de acuerdo con todas las recomendaciones de la GAO a excepción de una; la GAO mantiene que sus recomendaciones son válidas. Para más información, contacte a Kathryn A. Larin at (202) 512-7215 or larink@gao.gov. Thu, 19 Sep 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-526 For the Spanish translation of the highlights page for this document, see GAO-19-708. What GAO Found Following the three major U.S. hurricanes in 2017, disaster relief efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the American Red Cross (Red Cross) benefitted from locating key partners in the same place. In-person coordination was critical to maintaining communication in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands given the prolonged power outages and damage to public structures (see photo). However, some needs related to mass care—such as shelter, food, and supply distribution—were unmet. For example, local officials in Texas said flooded roads prevented trucks from delivering supplies. Providers encountered challenges in part because state and local agreements with voluntary organizations did not always clearly detail what mass care services could be provided. Additionally, FEMA guidance and training materials do not explicitly encourage states and localities to include in their written agreements the specific assistance each agency or organization can provide. This limits the benefits of mass care coordination and may put disaster victims at risk. Public School in Puerto Rico Damaged by Hurricane Maria State, territorial, and local grantees of federal disaster preparedness grants are required to regularly submit information on their capabilities to FEMA, and FEMA has provided related guidance and technical assistance. However, the information some grantees provided to FEMA was not specific enough to aid its response in 2017. Moreover, FEMA does not require grantees to specify the organizations providing mass care services in their capabilities assessments. Also, FEMA does not have systematic protocols for providing feedback to grantees to improve their assessments. These limitations hinder FEMA's efforts to strengthen emergency preparedness. Why GAO Did This Study Three catastrophic hurricanes affected more than 28 million people living in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2017. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria—which all made landfall within four weeks—caused a combined $265 billion in damage, and led to unprecedented demands for food and shelter, according to FEMA. FEMA and the Red Cross are the primary agencies responsible for coordinating mass care under the federal disaster response framework. GAO was asked to review their efforts. This report examines (1) FEMA's and the Red Cross' coordination of mass care in response to the 2017 hurricanes, and (2) FEMA's support and use of assessments of mass care capabilities for the 2017 hurricanes. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, federal frameworks, and written agreements between federal, state, or local governments and various voluntary organizations providing mass care services. GAO also interviewed state, territorial, local, and voluntary organization officials in Florida, Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands; as well as officials from Red Cross, FEMA, other relevant federal agencies, and voluntary organizations. What GAO Recommends GAO is making six recommendations, including that FEMA emphasize the importance of defining roles and responsibilities in its guidance to states and localities, require them to solicit information from key mass care providers in assessing capabilities, and develop protocols for providing feedback to grantees on capability assessments. FEMA agreed with all but one of GAO's recommendations; GAO maintains its recommendations are valid. For more information, contact Kathryn A. Larin at (202) 512-7215 or larink@gao.gov. Thu, 19 Sep 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-486 What GAO Found Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico reported that they followed their local processes to identify and document deaths related to hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. In Florida and Texas, medical examiners or other personnel were to complete death certificates. As of July 2019, Florida and Texas reported 84 and 94 deaths that were related to hurricanes Irma and Harvey, respectively. In Puerto Rico, physicians or medical officers were to complete death certificates, but in cases where cause of death was unknown, medical examiners at a central facility in San Juan completed the certificate. Florida and Texas officials told GAO the hurricanes did not impact their capacities to complete death certificates. However, Puerto Rico officials stated that damaged roads and power outages led to delays and impacted their ability to identify and document deaths related to Hurricane Maria. Puerto Rico officials initially reported 65 deaths in December 2017 directly related to Maria. Subsequently, because disruptions from Hurricane Maria made it difficult for Puerto Rico to identify the number of hurricane-related deaths, Puerto Rico commissioned a study by George Washington University on the number of observed deaths compared to expected deaths had the hurricane not occurred. The study estimated 2,975 excess deaths due to the hurricane as of August 2018, which is Puerto’s Rico’s current official death count. Federal agencies—the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the departments of Health and Human Services, Veteran Affairs, and Defense—supported Puerto Rico by providing cold storage equipment and other resources to help with disaster-related deaths. Florida and Texas did not need similar support as they did not face similar challenges as Puerto Rico. FEMA approved a total of 976 out of 4,802 Funeral Assistance applications in Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico, as of March 2019 (see table). Information on Funeral Assistance in Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico for Hurricanes Irma, Harvey, and Maria in 2017, as of March 2019   Applications received Applications approved Applications pending Applicationsdenieda Amount awarded ($) Florida (Irma) 454 64 5 385 252,776 Texas (Harvey) 1,941 55 0 1,886 311,575 Puerto Rico (Maria) 2,403 855 16 1,532 2,053,104 Puerto Rico (Irma) 4 2 0 2 4,350 Total 4,802 976 21 3,805 2,621,805 Source: GAO analysis of Federal Emergency Management Agency data. | GAO-19-486 Note: These data are not proxies for disaster-related death counts because, among other things, one application may represent more than one deceased person, or may be for a disinterment, or an individual who may qualify may choose not to apply. aFor Texas, the number of denied applications includes those that lacked a valid claim (e.g. no disaster-related death), whereas for Florida and Puerto Rico, such applications were categorized as “closed” rather than as denied. GAO incorporated technical comments from federal agency, state and U.S. territory officials, and academic institutions, as appropriate. Why GAO Did This Study In 2017, three major hurricanes— Harvey, Irma, and Maria—struck Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico, causing severe damage and deaths. After Hurricane Maria, questions were raised about how deaths related to the hurricane were identified and documented in Puerto Rico. States and local jurisdictions are responsible for identifying and documenting disaster-related deaths. Additionally, the federal government may play a role in helping to respond to disaster-related deaths, by, for example, providing Funeral Assistance for eligible funeral costs. GAO was asked to review Puerto Rico’s process for identifying and documenting deaths related to Hurricane Maria, as well as other states’ related processes, and federal agencies’ assistance in this process. This report discusses, among other things, (1) how Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico identified and documented deaths related to the 2017 hurricanes, and any challenges they experienced, (2) the support selected federal agencies provided to Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico involving disaster-related deaths, and (3) the number of Funeral Assistance applications FEMA received, approved, and denied for the 2017 hurricanes. GAO reviewed relevant laws and procedures from Florida, Texas, and Puerto Rico; and FEMA Funeral Assistance procedures and data for the 2017 hurricanes, as of March 2019, the most recent data available. GAO also interviewed state, territory, and federal officials about their efforts to address deaths related to the 2017 hurricanes. For more information, contact Chris P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Fri, 13 Sep 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-652T What GAO Found GAO's May 2019 report found that some individuals who are older or have disabilities may have faced challenges registering for and receiving assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its nonfederal partners (such as state, territorial, and local emergency managers). FEMA's registration did not include an initial question that directly asks individuals if they have a disability or if they would like to request an accommodation. GAO recommended that FEMA use new registration-intake questions to improve the agency's ability to identify and address individuals' disability-related needs. FEMA concurred and, in May 2019, updated the questions to directly ask individuals if they have a disability. GAO found that the substantial damage caused by the 2017 hurricanes prevented or slowed some individuals with disabilities from obtaining food, water, and other critical goods and services from states, territories, and localities. Officials from one state reported that few public transportation services, including paratransit, were functional following the 2017 hurricane affecting the state. The officials said this may have prevented people with disabilities from maintaining their health and wellness—such as by shopping for groceries or going to medical appointments—after the storm. GAO's May 2019 report also found that FEMA had taken limited steps to implement the agency's new approach to assist individuals with disabilities. GAO recommended the agency establish and disseminate objectives for implementing its new approach. FEMA concurred, and developed a draft strategic plan that includes strategic goals and objectives for the new approach, which the agency plans to finalize and disseminate in 2019. GAO recommended that FEMA, as part of its new approach, develop a plan for delivering training to all FEMA staff deployed during disasters that promotes competency in disability awareness. In concurring with this recommendation, FEMA described its plan to incorporate a disability awareness competency into the job requirements for all deployable staff, but has not yet developed a plan for training. GAO's May 2019 report also recommended that FEMA develop a timeline for completing the development of training on incorporating the needs of individuals with disabilities into emergency planning, which it planned to offer to its nonfederal partners. FEMA concurred with GAO's recommendation and, in June 2019, officials began procuring external consulting services to develop a replacement course. According to officials, the course will take about 1 year to develop and will be ready to field by August 2020. Why GAO Did This Study Three sequential hurricanes—Harvey, Irma, and Maria—affected more than 28 million people in 2017, according to FEMA. Hurricane survivors aged 65 and older and those with disabilities faced particular challenges evacuating to safe shelter, accessing medicine, and obtaining recovery assistance. In June 2018, FEMA began implementing a new approach to assist individuals with disabilities. This statement describes (1) reported challenges faced by these individuals in accessing disaster assistance from FEMA and its nonfederal partners following the 2017 hurricanes; and (2) the extent to which FEMA has implemented changes in how it supports these individuals. This statement is based on a May 2019 GAO report and selected updates. For the report, GAO analyzed FEMA documents and data from FEMA call centers and also visited 2017 hurricane locations to interview state, territorial, and local officials. GAO also interviewed FEMA officials from headquarters and deployed to each disaster location. To update FEMA's progress toward addressing its recommendations, GAO interviewed FEMA officials and analyzed agency documents. What GAO Recommends In the May 2019 report, GAO made seven recommendations to FEMA; FEMA concurred with six. FEMA has established new registration questions and a timeline to offer training to its partners. GAO continues to believe its recommendations to develop a plan to train its staff on disability awareness, among other actions, are valid. For more information, contact Elizabeth Curda, at (202) 512-7215 or curdae@gao.gov. Tue, 23 Jul 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-662T What GAO Found GAO's prior and ongoing work found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) obligated about $7.4 billion in Public Assistance grant funding to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) as of April 2019, in response to the 2017 hurricanes. FEMA obligated about $6.2 billion in Public Assistance grants for emergency work—debris removal activities, power restoration, and other emergency measures—and about $965 million in Public Assistance grants for permanent work—including the repair or replacement of public infrastructure such as roads, electrical utilities, and damaged buildings. Further, FEMA is continuing to work with Puerto Rico and the USVI to develop additional permanent work projects to repair damaged public infrastructure, such as schools and hospitals (see figure). 2017 Hurricane Damage to a School in Puerto Rico and a Hospital in the U.S. Virgin Islands In 2017, Puerto Rico established the Central Office for Recovery, Reconstruction, and Resilience and in 2019 the USVI established the Office of Disaster Recovery to coordinate and oversee federal recovery efforts. Among other things, these recovery offices are responsible for monitoring and overseeing the Public Assistance program and developing internal controls to ensure it is implemented in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and FEMA requirements. GAO's prior and ongoing work highlighted challenges with the Public Assistance program including concerns about the clarity of FEMA's guidance, and the time and resources needed to transition to a new Public Assistance delivery model in Puerto Rico. Further, Puerto Rico and USVI officials reported difficulties understanding FEMA's implementation of new flexibilities authorized by law as well as delays in jointly developing cost estimates for long-term recovery projects such as the repair or replacement of hospitals, buildings, and other public infrastructure. FEMA has taken some actions to help address these issues, including developing additional guidance and specific training. However, it is too soon to determine the effectiveness of FEMA's actions. GAO will continue to evaluate the Public Assistance program in the USVI and Puerto Rico and plans to report its findings in late 2019 and early 2020, respectively. Why GAO Did This Study In September 2017, two major hurricanes—Irma and Maria—struck Puerto Rico and the USVI, causing billions of dollars in damage to infrastructure, housing, and the economy. FEMA—a component of the Department of Homeland Security—is the lead federal agency responsible for assisting Puerto Rico and the USVI to recover from these natural disasters. Among other responsibilities, FEMA is administering the Public Assistance program in partnership with the governments of Puerto Rico and the USVI, providing them grant funding for response and recovery activities, including debris removal efforts, life-saving emergency protective measures, and the repair, replacement, or restoration of public infrastructure. This statement describes (1) the status of FEMA's Public Assistance grant funding in Puerto Rico and the USVI in response to the 2017 hurricanes as of April 2019, (2) the establishment of recovery offices in Puerto Rico and the USVI, and (3) challenges in implementing the Public Assistance program and actions FEMA has taken to address them. This statement is based on GAO reports issued in February, March, and June 2019, and includes preliminary observations from ongoing GAO reviews of FEMA operations. For ongoing work, GAO analyzed program documents and data on obligations and expenditures; interviewed agency officials; and visited disaster-damaged areas in Puerto Rico and the USVI, where GAO also interviewed FEMA and local officials. For more information, contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Thu, 11 Jul 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-479 What GAO Found Of the six agencies GAO selected for review, only the Department of Education submitted its internal control plan for disaster relief funds by the statutory deadline. The Department of Defense did not submit an internal control plan. The Departments of Agriculture, Homeland Security, and Housing and Urban Development and the Small Business Administration submitted the required internal control plans ranging from about 2 months to more than 7 months following the March 31, 2018, statutory deadline. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) did not have an effective strategy to ensure that agencies timely submitted internal control plans. OMB issued OMB Memorandum M-18-14 (M-18-14), Implementation of Internal Controls and Grant Expenditures for the Disaster-Related Appropriations, which contained guidance for agencies to use in developing their plans, on March 30, 2018, or 1 day before the statutory deadline for agencies to submit plans. Congress required OMB to issue standard guidance for agencies to use in designing internal control plans. The guidance was to include robust criteria for identifying and documenting incremental risks and mitigating controls related to disaster relief funding, and guidance for documenting the linkage between incremental risks related to disaster relief funding and efforts to address known internal control risks. Selected agencies' plans did not include sufficient information for GAO to determine if the agencies met OMB directives in M-18-14 and federal internal control standards' documentation requirements. For example, two of the five plans GAO reviewed included information that demonstrated that the plans complemented the agencies’ existing risk management practices, while three plans lacked sufficient information to make such a determination. Further, M-18-14 lacked specific instructions to agencies on what to include in their internal control plans. OMB did not have an effective outreach strategy to help ensure that agencies had proper guidance in developing and reporting their plans. OMB did not establish an external communication mechanism to ensure that internal control plans addressed key payment-integrity risks for disaster relief funds. OMB staff stated that OMB Circular No. A-123's enterprise risk management (ERM) requirements were sufficient for agencies to produce effective internal control plans, because agencies should consider disaster situations as part of their overall consideration of risk. However, while it is important that agencies develop an effective ERM process, Congress required agencies to communicate internal control plans associated with the supplemental funding provided. Federal internal control standards state that management should externally communicate necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. Without a clear OMB strategy for preparing for oversight of future disaster relief funding, there is an increased risk that agencies will not appropriately assess risks associated with disaster relief funding. As a result, Congress and others may not receive the necessary information about internal controls, which will affect Congress’s and others’ ability to provide effective oversight. Why GAO Did This Study Agencies must deliver disaster relief funding expeditiously. However, the risk of improper payments increases when agencies spend billions of dollars quickly. In 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the California wildfires created an unprecedented demand for federal disaster response and recovery resources. Congress passed three supplemental appropriations totaling over $120 billion in additional funding in response to these disasters. As part of the appropriations, Congress included an oversight framework that required federal agencies to submit internal control plans for spending these funds by March 31, 2018, in accordance with criteria to be established by OMB. This report addresses the extent to which selected federal agencies’ internal control plans provided sufficient and timely external communication to Congress and others. To address this objective, GAO selected for review six agencies that together received $115 billion of the approximately $120 billion in supplemental appropriations for activities in response to the 2017 disasters. GAO reviewed these agencies’ internal control plans and M-18-14, evaluated the internal control plans against M-18-14 and internal control standards, and interviewed agency officials and OMB staff. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that OMB develop a strategy for ensuring that agencies communicate timely and sufficient internal control plans for disaster relief funds. OMB did not agree that this recommendation is needed. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is appropriate and needed, as discussed in the report. For more information, contact Beryl H. Davis at (202)251-2262 or DavisBH@gao.gov. Fri, 28 Jun 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-617T What GAO Found GAO's issued and ongoing work identified progress and challenges in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) disaster resilience, response, recovery, and workforce management efforts, as discussed below. Disaster Resilience. GAO found that federal and local efforts to improve resilience can reduce the effects and costs of future disasters. FEMA has made progress in this area, but in July 2015, GAO found that states and localities faced challenges using federal funds to maximize resilient rebuilding following a disaster. GAO recommended that the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group—an interagency body chaired by FEMA—create a national strategy to better plan for and invest in disaster resilience. FEMA is working to address this recommendation and plans to publish the strategy by July 2019. Damage from Hurricane Michael in Florida and Wildfires in California Response and Recovery. In September 2018, GAO reported that the response to the 2017 disasters in Texas, Florida, and California showed progress since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Specifically, FEMA and state officials' pre-existing relationships and exercises aided the response and helped address various challenges. However, GAO and FEMA identified challenges that slowed and complicated FEMA's response to Hurricane Maria, particularly in Puerto Rico. GAO's issued and ongoing work also identified challenges in implementing FEMA Public Assistance grants. For example, FEMA and Puerto Rico officials identified challenges with Public Assistance policies and guidance that have complicated and slowed the recovery. GAO did not make recommendations, but continues to evaluate recovery efforts and will report its findings later this year. FEMA Workforce Management. GAO has previously reported on long-standing workforce management challenges, such as ensuring an adequately-staffed and trained workforce. For example, GAO reported in September 2018 that the 2017 disasters overwhelmed FEMA's workforce and a lack of trained personnel with program expertise led to complications in its response efforts, particularly after Hurricane Maria. While FEMA has taken actions to address several of GAO's workforce management-related recommendations since 2016, a number of recommendations remain open as the 2019 hurricane season begins. Also, GAO is currently reviewing FEMA's workforce management efforts and lessons learned from the 2017 disasters and will report its findings early next year. Why GAO Did This Study Recent hurricanes, wildfires, and flooding have highlighted the challenges the federal government faces in responding effectively to natural disasters. The 2017 and 2018 hurricanes and wildfires affected millions of individuals and caused billions of dollars in damages. In March 2019, the Midwest experienced historic flooding that affected millions of acres of agriculture and damaged significant infrastructure. Since 2005, federal funding for disaster assistance is at least $450 billion. Increasing reliance on federal help to address natural disasters is a key source of federal fiscal exposure, particularly as certain extreme weather events become more frequent and intense due to climate change. This statement discusses, among other things, FEMA's progress and challenges related to disaster resilience, response, recovery, and workforce management. This statement is based on GAO reports issued from March 2011 through May 2019, and also includes preliminary observations from ongoing GAO reviews of FEMA operations. For ongoing work, GAO reviewed federal laws; analyzed documents; interviewed agency officials; and visited disaster damaged areas in California, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, where GAO also interviewed FEMA and local officials. What GAO Recommends GAO has made numerous recommendations in its prior reports to FEMA designed to address the challenges discussed in this statement. As of May 2019, FEMA has addressed about half of these recommendations and GAO is monitoring FEMA's ongoing efforts. For more information, contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Tue, 25 Jun 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-487 What GAO Found From fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the most recent available data, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) spent approximately $81 million on 29 Section 219 projects to develop drinking water, wastewater, and stormwater infrastructure. For example, through the St. Croix Falls, Wisconsin Section 219 project, the Corps assisted with improvements to a wastewater treatment plant. Of the 29 projects, the Corps spent over half of the funding during this period on four projects: (1) Calumet Region, Indiana; (2) Desoto County, Mississippi; (3) Jackson County, Mississippi; and (4) Lakes Marion and Moultrie, South Carolina. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Section 219 Projects Receiving Over $1 Million (M) in Expenditures from Fiscal Years 2013 through 2017 The Corps generally follows its standard budget prioritization process—which involves districts, divisions, and headquarters ranking each project and headquarters making final funding decisions—to prioritize Section 219 funding. However, the Corps has not developed criteria to guide this process. GAO found the Corps varies in the factors it uses to rank Section 219 projects. For example, one district considers whether a project can be completed within the fiscal year, while another considers the level of congressional support and dollar value of the project. Headquarters officials said the agency views Section 219 projects as outside its core mission areas and therefore has not developed written criteria. Congressional direction has indicated that the Corps is to consider characteristics—such as projects with the greater economic impact—in prioritizing Section 219 project funding. While aware of this direction, Corps officials said they do not consider it when ranking projects. Federal standards for internal control states that agencies should use quality information to achieve their objectives. By establishing written criteria, the Corps would have greater assurance that its Section 219 project selections align with a clear set of priorities, such as those identified by recent congressional direction. Why GAO Did This Study Under Section 219 of the 1992 Water Resources Development Act, as amended, Congress authorized the Corps to provide assistance for the design and construction of environmental infrastructure projects, known as Section 219 projects. Such projects include the development of water transmission lines. Congress typically provides a lump sum appropriation for the Corps' construction account, out of which Section 219 and other environmental infrastructure projects are funded. GAO was asked to review projects carried out under the Section 219 program. This report examines (1) the number and type of Section 219 projects and expenditures from fiscal years 2013 through 2017, and (2) how the Corps prioritizes funding for Section 219 projects. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and agency guidance; analyzed agency data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the most recent time period for which data were available; and interviewed agency officials at headquarters, three divisions, and three districts–selected based on geographic distribution and the amount of Section 219 project expenditures. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Corps develop written criteria for ranking Section 219 projects for funding, taking into account a clear set of priorities, such as those identified by recent congressional direction. The agency concurred with the recommendation. For more information, contact Anne-Marie Fennell at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. Thu, 13 Jun 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-594T What GAO Found GAO's issued and ongoing work identified progress and challenges in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) disaster resilience, response, recovery, and workforce management efforts, as discussed below. Disaster Resilience. GAO found that federal and local efforts to improve resilience can reduce the effects and costs of future disasters. FEMA has made progress in this area, but in July 2015, GAO found that states and localities faced challenges using federal funds to maximize resilient rebuilding following a disaster. GAO recommended that the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group—an interagency body chaired by FEMA—create a national strategy to better plan for and invest in disaster resilience. FEMA is working to address this recommendation and plans to publish the strategy by July 2019. Damage from Hurricane Michael in Florida and Wildfires in California Response and Recovery. In September 2018, GAO reported that the response to the 2017 disasters in Texas, Florida, and California showed progress since Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Specifically, FEMA and state officials' pre-existing relationships and exercises aided the response and helped address various challenges. However, GAO and FEMA identified challenges that slowed and complicated FEMA's response to Hurricane Maria, particularly in Puerto Rico. GAO's issued and ongoing work also identified challenges in implementing FEMA Public Assistance grants. For example, FEMA and Puerto Rico officials identified challenges with Public Assistance policies and guidance that have complicated and slowed the recovery. GAO did not make recommendations, but continues to evaluate recovery efforts and will report its findings later this year. FEMA Workforce Management. GAO has previously reported on long-standing workforce management challenges, such as ensuring an adequately-staffed and trained workforce. For example, GAO reported in September 2018 that the 2017 disasters overwhelmed FEMA's workforce and a lack of trained personnel with program expertise led to complications in its response efforts, particularly after Hurricane Maria. While FEMA has taken actions to address several of GAO's workforce management-related recommendations since 2016, a number of recommendations remain open as the 2019 hurricane season begins. Also, GAO is currently reviewing FEMA's workforce management efforts and lessons learned from the 2017 disasters and will report its findings early next year. Why GAO Did This Study Recent hurricanes, wildfires, and flooding have highlighted the challenges the federal government faces in responding effectively to natural disasters. The 2017 and 2018 hurricanes and wildfires affected millions of individuals and caused billions of dollars in damages. In March 2019, the Midwest experienced historic flooding that affected millions of acres of agriculture and damaged significant infrastructure. Since 2005, federal funding for disaster assistance is at least $450 billion. Increasing reliance on federal help to address natural disasters is a key source of federal fiscal exposure, particularly as certain extreme weather events become more frequent and intense due to climate change. This statement discusses, among other things, FEMA's progress and challenges related to disaster resilience, response, recovery, and workforce management. This statement is based on GAO reports issued from March 2011 through May 2019, and also includes preliminary observations from ongoing GAO reviews of FEMA operations. For ongoing work, GAO reviewed federal laws; analyzed documents; interviewed agency officials; and visited disaster damaged areas in California, Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, where GAO also interviewed FEMA and local officials. What GAO Recommends GAO has made numerous recommendations in its prior reports to FEMA designed to address the challenges discussed in this statement. As of May 2019, FEMA has addressed about half of these recommendations and GAO is monitoring FEMA's ongoing efforts. For more information, contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Wed, 12 Jun 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-318 What GAO Found A range of officials from entities that partner with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—including states, territories, localities, and nonprofits)—reported challenges providing assistance to individuals who are older or have disabilities following the 2017 hurricanes. For example, officials said that many of these individuals required specialized assistance obtaining food, water, medicine, and oxygen, but aid was sometimes difficult to provide. Officials in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands cited particular difficulties providing this assistance due to damaged roads and communication systems, as well as a lack of documentation of nursing home locations. Based on GAO's analysis of FEMA data and interviews with FEMA officials and stakeholders, aspects of the process to apply for assistance from FEMA after the 2017 hurricanes were challenging for older individuals and those with disabilities. According to stakeholders and FEMA officials, disability-related questions in the registration materials are confusing and easily misinterpreted. For example, FEMA's registration process does not include an initial question that directly asks individuals if they have a disability or if they would like to request an accommodation for completing the application process (see figure below). While FEMA has made efforts to help registrants interpret the questions, it has not yet changed the language of the questions to improve clarity. As a result, individuals with disabilities may not have requested accommodations or reported having disabilities, which may have hindered FEMA's ability to identify and assist them. Sequence of Disability-Related Questions in FEMA's Registration Process FEMA did not establish objectives before implementing its new approach to disability integration, which includes adding new disability integration staff in the regions and decreasing the number of disability integration advisors deployed to disaster sites. Without documented objectives for the new approach, regional leadership across the nation may implement changes inconsistently. In addition, the new approach shifts the responsibility for directly assisting individuals with disabilities to all FEMA staff. FEMA has taken some initial steps to provide training on the changes; however, it has not established a plan for delivering comprehensive disability-related training to all staff who will be directly interacting with individuals with disabilities. Developing a plan to train all staff would better position FEMA to achieve its intended goals and better equip deployed staff to identify and assist these survivors. Why GAO Did This Study Three sequential hurricanes—Harvey, Irma, and Maria—affected more than 28 million people in 2017, according to FEMA. Hurricane survivors aged 65 and older and those with disabilities faced particular challenges evacuating to safe shelter, accessing medicine, and obtaining recovery assistance. In June 2018, FEMA began implementing a new approach to assist individuals with disabilities. GAO was asked to review disaster assistance for individuals who are older or have disabilities. This report addresses (1) challenges FEMA partners reported in providing assistance to such individuals, (2) challenges such individuals faced accessing assistance from FEMA and actions FEMA took to address these challenges, and (3) the extent to which FEMA has implemented its new approach to disability integration. GAO analyzed FEMA data and reviewed relevant federal laws, agency policy, and federal frameworks. GAO also interviewed state, territorial, local, and nonprofit officials in Florida, Puerto Rico, Texas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands; FEMA officials at headquarters, in regional offices, and deployed to disaster sites; and officials at relevant nonprofit organizations. What GAO Recommends GAO is making seven recommendations to FEMA, including that it establish new registration questions, objectives for its new disability integration approach, and a training plan for FEMA staff. The agency concurred with all but one of the recommendations. For more information, contact Elizabeth Curda at (202) 512-7215 or curdae@gao.gov. Tue, 14 May 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-464 What GAO Found Limited data are available on the needs of Indian tribes and their members for agricultural credit, such as operating or equipment loans, to develop and expand agricultural businesses on tribal lands. Federal regulations have generally prohibited lenders from inquiring about the personal characteristics, such as race, of applicants on nonresidential loans. Some tribal stakeholders and experts said that tribal members may not have applied for agricultural credit because they heard of other tribal members being denied loans. They said that tribal members likely obtain agricultural credit from Department of Agriculture programs or tribal lenders. Another potential source of agricultural credit is the Farm Credit System (FCS), a government-sponsored enterprise that includes 69 associations that lend to farmers and ranchers. Tribal stakeholders and experts reported a general lack of commercial credit on tribal lands due to the following factors: Land use restrictions. Most tribal lands only can be used as loan collateral in certain circumstances or with federal permission. Administrative process delays. Tribal members reported often encountering delays obtaining necessary federal loan documents. Legal challenges. Lenders reported concerns about their ability to recover loan collateral due to the unique legal status of tribes. Loan readiness. Tribal members may have no or poor credit histories and be unfamiliar with the paperwork required for an agricultural loan, such as a business plan. FCS is authorized to provide a range of credit services to eligible agricultural producers, which may include Indian tribes, tribal businesses, and tribal members. FCS associations must obtain land as collateral for long-term real estate loans, but are not required to do so for shorter-term loans, such as for operating costs or equipment purchases. Some FCS associations GAO contacted reported making loans to Indian tribes or their members. In a sample of 11 FCS associations with tribal lands in their territory, eight said they have loaned to tribes or their members in the past 2 years. GAO's review of these 11 associations' marketing plans and written responses to GAO follow-up questions found that seven noted outreach—such as support for agricultural education activities—targeted to tribes and their members. The other four reported broad and general outreach efforts that also included minority groups. To improve access to agricultural credit on tribal lands, stakeholders discussed several options. For example, some stakeholders discussed the potential for partnerships between commercial or government lenders and tribal lenders (such as Native Community Development Financial Institutions) and increased use of loan guarantees. Some stakeholders also discussed actions tribes could take to ease barriers to lending, such as adopting their own leasing procedures to reduce administrative processing time with federal agencies for certain loans. Why GAO Did This Study About 46 million of the 56 million acres of the land that the federal government holds in trust for the benefit of Indian tribes and their members has an agricultural purpose. However, tribal agriculture and economic development experts have noted that Indian tribes and their members may need improved access to agricultural credit. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review the ability of FCS to meet the agricultural credit needs of Indian tribes and their members on tribal lands. This report describes (1) what is known about the agricultural credit needs of Indian tribes and their members, (2) barriers stakeholders identified to agricultural credit on tribal lands, (3) FCS authority and actions to meet those agricultural credit needs, and (4) stakeholder suggestions for improving Indians' access to agricultural credit on tribal lands. GAO explored potential data sources on Indians' agricultural credit needs, conducted a literature review, and reviewed statutes and regulations governing tribal lands and FCS. GAO also reviewed the marketing plans and written responses of a nongeneralizable sample of 11 FCS associations whose territories included tribal lands with high levels of agricultural activity. GAO interviewed stakeholders from a sample of seven tribes (generally selected based on tribal region and agricultural activity), experts in tribal agriculture and economic development (selected based on relevant publications, Congressional testimonies, and others' recommendations), and representatives from FCS and its regulator, the Farm Credit Administration, and other relevant government agencies. For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov. Thu, 09 May 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-515T What GAO Found Small Business Administration (SBA) programs and activities that foster entrepreneurship have included, but do not specifically target, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU). SBA funds 63 Small Business Development Centers (SBDC) that are generally hosted by colleges or universities. Two of the 63 SBDCs are hosted by HBCUs—Howard University and the University of the Virgin Islands—and at least 16 of the more than 900 SBDC satellite locations have been at HBCUs. SBA's district offices also can initiate and oversee outreach activities to foster entrepreneurship. While these activities are not targeted to HBCUs, some district offices have worked with HBCUs. For example, district offices co-sponsored 10 counseling and training activities in 2013–2018 with six HBCUs and signed memorandums with at least 27 HBCUs to strengthen local small business development in 2008–2018. Business Workshop at the Small Business Development Center at the University of the Virgin Islands GAO's preliminary observations indicate SBA has limited data on entrepreneurship-related efforts at HBCUs. In 2018, SBA established two goals for working with HBCUs: (1) to raise awareness and provide information to help raise the capacity of HBCUs to participate in federally funded programs, and (2) to promote collaboration among HBCUs, SBA resource partners, and SBA district offices. GAO's ongoing work identified that HBCU-specific data (such as the number of outreach events involving HBCUs or the number of HBCU students or alumni who participated) are incomplete at an agency-wide level. Moreover, SBA does not systematically collect written feedback from event participants, including for events involving HBCUs. GAO's preliminary observations also indicate that SBA resource partners, such as SBDCs, have established relationships with some HBCUs. GAO will continue to examine the extent of SBA efforts to foster entrepreneurship with HBCUs. Why GAO Did This Study Historically Black Colleges and Universities play an important and unique role in the higher education system and in their local and regional economies. SBA works with many colleges and universities to provide entrepreneurial training and counseling on campuses. SBA is also part of a long-standing White House Initiative to expand the capacity of HBCUs, including their ability to participate in federal programs. However, little is known about the extent to which SBA has worked with the 101 HBCUs to foster entrepreneurship among students and others. This statement is based on (1) GAO's March 2019 report (GAO-19-328R) on SBA's plans and programs for working with HBCUs and (2) preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing review of any HBCU-specific information SBA collects and reports and collaboration of selected HBCUs and SBA. GAO reviewed recent executive orders related to enhancing HBCU capacities; agency documents, including SBA's 2018 agency plan for supporting HBCUs; and statutes and regulations for key programs and activities. GAO also interviewed SBA headquarters and selected district officials based on criteria including (1) the number of HBCUs in the state, and (2) agreements, if any, between HBCUs and SBA. GAO also interviewed six HBCUs based on their relationship with SBA. What GAO Recommends GAO is not making recommendations in this testimony, but will consider them, as appropriate, as it finalizes its work. For more information, contact Anna Maria Ortiz at (202) 512-8678 or OrtizA@gao.gov. Tue, 30 Apr 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-371SP What GAO Found In March 2018, GAO identified six priority recommendations for the Small Business Administration (SBA). Since then, SBA has implemented four of these recommendations by, among other things, taking actions to evaluate its programs' effectiveness and improve management of its software licenses. In April 2019, GAO identified three additional priority recommendations for SBA, bringing the total number to five. These recommendations involve the following areas: Improving lender compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement. Improving data collected on programs designed to support entrepreneurs. Ensuring proper staffing of SBA export finance specialists. SBA's continued attention to these issues could lead to significant improvements in government operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority recommendations are open GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact William B. Shear at (202) 512-8678 or shearw@gao.gov.   Thu, 04 Apr 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-232 What GAO Found As of September 2018, the four states and territories that received the most 2017 Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funds had signed grant agreements with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Before signing the agreements, HUD certified the grantees' financial processes and procedures. It also approved the grantees' assessments of their capacity to carry out the recovery and of unmet needs (losses not met with insurance or other forms of assistance). Before funding begins to reach disaster victims, the grantees need to take additional steps, such as finalizing plans for individual activities. As of January 2019, Texas had drawn down about $18 million (of $5 billion) for administration and planning only, and Florida had drawn down about $1 million (of $616 million) for administration, planning, and housing activities. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands had not drawn down any of the $1.5 billion and $243 million, respectively, they had been allocated. HUD lacks adequate guidance for staff reviewing the quality of grantees' financial processes and procedures and assessments of capacity and unmet needs, and has not completed monitoring or workforce plans. The checklists used to review grantees' financial processes and procedures and assessments ask the reviewer to determine if the grantee included certain information, such as its procurement processes, but not to evaluate the adequacy of that information. In addition, the checklists, which include a series of “yes” or “no” questions, do not include guidance that the HUD reviewer must consider. HUD also does not have a monitoring plan that identifies the risk factors for each grantee and outlines the scope of monitoring. Further, HUD has not developed a workforce plan that identifies the critical skills and competencies HUD needs and includes strategies to address any staffing gaps. Adequate review guidance, a monitoring plan, and strategic workforce planning would improve HUD's ability to oversee CDBG-DR grants. Without permanent statutory authority and regulations such as those that govern other disaster assistance programs, CDBG-DR appropriations require HUD to customize grant requirements for each disaster in Federal Register notices—a time-consuming process that has delayed the disbursement of funds. In a July 2018 report, the HUD Office of Inspector General found that as of September 2017, HUD used 61 notices to oversee 112 active CDBG-DR grants. Officials from one of the 2017 grantees told us that it was challenging to manage the multiple CDBG-DR grants it has received over the years because of the different rules. CDBG-DR grantees have faced additional challenges such as the need to coordinate the use of CDBG-DR funds with other disaster recovery programs that are initiated at different times and administered by other agencies. HUD officials said that permanently authorizing CDBG-DR would allow HUD to issue permanent regulations for disaster recovery. Permanent statutory authority could help address the challenges grantees face in meeting customized grant requirements for each disaster, such as funding lags, varying requirements, and coordination with multiple programs. The expected increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events underscores the need for a permanent program to address unmet disaster needs. Why GAO Did This Study The 2017 hurricanes (Harvey, Irma, and Maria) caused an estimated $265 billion in damage, primarily in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. As of February 2019, Congress had provided over $35 billion to HUD for CDBG-DR grants to help communities recover. Communities may use these funds to address unmet needs for housing, infrastructure, and economic revitalization. GAO was asked to evaluate the federal government's response to the 2017 hurricanes. In this initial review of CDBG-DR, GAO examined, among other things, (1) the status of the 2017 grants, (2) HUD's review of the initial steps grantees have taken and its plans for future monitoring, and (3) challenges HUD and grantees face in administering grants. GAO reviewed documentation from the four largest 2017 CDBG-DR grantees and HUD. GAO also reviewed prior work on CDBG-DR and interviewed officials from HUD and the four grantees. What GAO Recommends Congress should consider permanently authorizing a disaster assistance program that meets unmet needs in a timely manner. GAO also makes five recommendations to HUD, which include developing guidance for HUD staff to use in assessing grantees, developing a monitoring plan, and conducting workforce planning. HUD generally agreed with three recommendations and partially agreed with two, which GAO clarified to address HUD's comments. For more information, contact Daniel Garcia-Diaz at (202) 512-8678 or garciadiazd@gao.gov. Mon, 25 Mar 2019 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-328R What GAO Found Federal priorities for working with Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU), as expressed in Executive Order 13779 (2017), include helping young adults by strengthening HBCU participation in federal programs. In response to the Executive Order, the Small Business Administration (SBA) identified two priorities in its 2018 agency plan to help increase HBCU participation and capacity in relation to its programs: (1) provide HBCUs with information on accessing and competing for federal grants and contracts, and (2) enhance HBCUs' capabilities in helping young adults. SBA's key programs and outreach activities that foster entrepreneurship do not specifically target HBCUs, but collaboration exists with some HBCUs. For example, some HBCUs host Small Business Development Centers (SBDC), have co-sponsored activities, and signed strategic alliance memorandums. SBDCs provide technical assistance to small business and aspiring entrepreneurs and 18 HBCUs are in the SBDC network. Several HBCUs signed co-sponsorship agreements with SBA to organize activities to foster entrepreneurship. Twenty-four HBCUs have strategic alliance memorandums with SBA to facilitate working relationships. Why GAO Did This Study Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) play an important and unique role in the higher education system. For example, more than one-third of African-Americans who received a doctorate in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics in 2016 obtained their undergraduate degrees from an HBCU, and many also received their doctorates from an HBCU. The White House Initiative on HBCUs was established in 1980 as a government-wide effort to strengthen the capacity of HBCUs, including their ability to participate in federal programs. The Small Business Administration's (SBA) mission is to help Americans start, build, and grow businesses. SBA also works with public- and private-sector partners, including colleges and universities, to strengthen or expand businesses development and foster entrepreneurship. However, little is known about the extent of SBA's activities and partnership programs with the 101 HBCUs, as of December 2018. This report examines (1) federal priorities and SBA goals related to working with HBCUs, and (2) SBA's key programs and outreach activities for fostering entrepreneurship, particularly with HBCUs, and what is known about HBCU participation in these programs and activities. For more information, contact Anna Maria Ortiz at (202) 512-8678 or OrtizA@gao.gov. Thu, 07 Mar 2019 00:00:00 -0500 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-219 What GAO Found Most Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) centers reported that the January 2017 American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (AICA) cost share adjustment has helped them serve manufacturers, especially very small (i.e., less than 20 employees) and rural ones. The AICA adjusted the cost share ratio to remain at 1:1, that is, $1 of nonfederal contributions for each $1 of federal assistance. Before the adjustment, MEP centers' cost share requirement increased over the course of their cooperative agreements from 1:1 to 2:1, requiring centers to obtain a greater proportion of revenue from nonfederal sources. In GAO's survey of all 51 MEP centers, 44 centers cited positive effects of the adjustment on center operations, such as helping to improve center services or better reach underserved manufacturers. Also, 41 centers indicated the adjustment increased their financial stability, which some centers stated has allowed them to focus less on revenue generation and to serve very small and rural manufacturers. However, some MEP center officials observed that the AICA cost share adjustment impact is hard to distinguish from other factors, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) recompetition of nearly all centers' cooperative agreements between fiscal years 2014 and 2017. The recompetition increased the level of federal financial assistance for most centers and reset many centers' cost share ratio from 2:1 to 1:1 prior to the 2017 adjustment. Still, center officials said that if the cost share requirement reverted to what it was prior to the 2017 adjustment, centers would be less able to serve manufacturers, particularly very small and rural ones. Number of Manufacturing Extension Partnership Centers Operating Under Various Cost Share Ratios, Fiscal Years (FY) 2013 through 2017 NIST data show that there have been some changes in MEP centers' finances and activities since the AICA cost share adjustment; however, these changes generally began prior to the adjustment. For example, NIST data on centers' finances show an increase in federal assistance and a decrease in reported nonfederal contributions from fiscal year 2017 to 2018, but these changes generally began around fiscal year 2014, when NIST began the recompetition process. Similarly, NIST data on centers' activities show an overall increase in the numbers of very small and rural manufacturers served from fiscal year 2017 to 2018. While the change in the number of very small manufacturers served began around fiscal year 2014, the number of rural manufacturers served fluctuated from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Like MEP center officials, NIST officials said the impact of the AICA cost share adjustment is intertwined with the recompetition impacts and, going forward, the AICA adjustment may help sustain recent increases in the number of very small and rural manufacturers served. Why GAO Did This Study Small and medium-sized manufacturers are an important part of the U.S. economy. In 1988, to enhance the competitiveness, productivity, and technological performance of U.S. manufacturing, NIST established what is now called the MEP program. The program supports manufacturers through services provided by MEP centers. The centers, located in all 50 states and Puerto Rico, are operated by nonfederal organizations. The MEP centers provide assistance, either directly or through third parties, to help improve manufacturing firms' processes and productivity; expand their capacity; and help them adopt new technologies, utilize best management practices, and accelerate company growth. NIST enters into a cooperative agreement with the nonfederal organization that runs each center to provide federal financial assistance conditional upon the center contributing nonfederal matching funds—known as a cost share. The AICA included a provision for GAO to review the effect of the 2017 cost share adjustment. This report describes (1) the MEP centers' views regarding the extent to which the recent cost share adjustment has helped them serve manufacturers and (2) the extent to which NIST data show impacts of the cost share adjustment on centers' finances and activities. GAO surveyed all 51 MEP centers, analyzed NIST data on the MEP program, and interviewed NIST and MEP center officials. For more information, contact John Neumann at (202) 512-3841 or neumannj@gao.gov. Thu, 07 Mar 2019 00:00:00 -0500 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-85R What GAO Found GAO identified 15 programs and 1 tax expenditure that met its definition of economic adjustment assistance (EAA), which was developed in consultation with relevant federal agencies and regional commissions. These programs and tax expenditure are administered by one of the following six agencies or commissions: The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) and the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce (Commerce), Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), and the Treasury (Treasury). Programs differed in size. For example, according to agency officials, in fiscal year 2017 a DOL program provided about $974 million in grants to states to assist workers who had lost their jobs become reemployed; whereas a DOD program dispersed about $354,000 for grants designed to conduct research and provide technical assistance to communities affected by defense-related activities. The EAA programs and tax expenditure GAO identified are: USDA's Economic Adjustment Assistance Program, which provides funds to help certain cotton users make capital investments in land and equipment to help the U.S. textile industry remain competitive by limiting market losses, plant closures, and declines in employment.  ARC's Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and Economic Revitalization Initiative, which is intended to help communities affected by job losses in coal mining, coal power plant operations, and coal-related supply chain industries due to the changing economics of energy production.  Commerce's programs are designed to assist communities experiencing adverse economic changes and businesses affected by trade through its Assistance to Coal Communities, Economic Adjustment Assistance, and Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms programs.  DOD has five programs that work with communities facing potential economic impact due to changes within DOD or the defense industry. These changes can include base closures or realignments as well as budget cuts and layoffs that may accompany changes in defense programs, such as the cancellation of a DOD contract or weapon system program.  DOL's programs are intended to help dislocated workers, including those affected by trade or layoffs. The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) Dislocated Worker Formula Program is designed to help dislocated workers become reemployed by providing job search assistance, career services, and/or training. The National Dislocated Worker Grant Program temporarily expands service capacity at the state and local levels in response to significant dislocation events that cannot be accommodated within the operations of the formula-funded dislocated worker program. It also funds demonstration projects and provides state and local staff with training and technical assistance. The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) for Workers program is intended to help workers adversely affected by trade with opportunities to obtain the skills and support necessary to return to the workforce in an in-demand industry. The TAA Community College and Career Training program is aimed at helping community colleges increase their capacity to provide education and training programs for in-demand jobs. Finally, Health Coverage Tax Credit Infrastructure National Dislocated Worker Grants provides funding to state workforce agencies to provide health insurance coverage assistance and support related services to eligible trade-affected workers.  Treasury is responsible for administering the Tax Credit for Health Insurance Purchased by Certain Displaced and Retired Individuals (also known as the Health Coverage Tax Credit), a tax expenditure that reduces the after-tax cost of health insurance for individuals who lose their jobs due to trade. Why GAO Did This Study Individuals, businesses, and communities in the United States have had to change how they work or operate because their jobs or economies have been affected by external forces, such as trade agreements or defense or energy policies. GAO was asked to assess the federal programs specifically targeted toward helping individuals, businesses, and communities adjust to economic disruptions that reduce the demand for certain workers, commonly referred to as programs that provide EAA. The federal government provides EAA through programs and tax expenditures. Developing an inventory of EAA programs is the first step in assessing the scope of the federal government's involvement in this area, as well as determining whether these programs are effective, efficient, and able to meet current and future needs. This report describes the GAO-identified federal programs and tax expenditure that support economic adjustment, including their objectives, eligibility requirements, beneficiaries, obligations, and expenditures. For the purposes of this report, GAO (1) developed criteria, in consultation with relevant agencies and commissions, for including programs and tax expenditures by identifying the characteristics closely associated with EAA, (2) identified programs and tax expenditures that met the criteria by interviewing agency officials and searching the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance and relevant tax expenditure documents, and (3) surveyed relevant agencies asking them to confirm or provide program or tax expenditure information. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. For more information, contact Cindy S. Barnes at (202) 512-7215 or brownbarnesc@gao.gov. Tue, 05 Mar 2019 00:00:00 -0500 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-253 What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) obligated more than $1.4 billion in grant funding for Public Assistance projects in the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) as of October 1, 2018, in response to the 2017 hurricanes. FEMA obligated about $873.8 million for emergency work—debris removal activities and emergency measures to lessen the immediate threat to life, public health, and safety—and about $516.3 million for permanent work—including the repair or replacement of public infrastructure such as roads, electrical utilities, and schools. For example, FEMA obligated about $101 million for the purchase and installation of modular units to be used as temporary classrooms and other facilities while permanent school buildings are repaired or replaced. FEMA's obligations for permanent work also included funding for hazard mitigation measures to reduce the risk of damage during future storms—for example, by replacing wooden utility poles with composite fiberglass poles (see figure). Examples of Public Assistance Projects in the U.S. Virgin Islands FEMA and the USVI are transitioning from using the standard Public Assistance program in the territory to using the Public Assistance alternative procedures program. Unlike in the standard Public Assistance program where FEMA will fund the actual cost of a project, the alternative procedures allow awards to be made on the basis of fixed-cost estimates to provide financial incentives for the timely and cost-effective completion of permanent work projects. FEMA and USVI officials stated that the alternative procedures will give the USVI more flexibility in determining when and how to fund projects and provide an opportunity to repair and rebuild the USVI's critical services infrastructure—such as its education system and electrical grid—so it meets industry standards without regard to pre-disaster condition. As of November 2018, FEMA and USVI officials were discussing the process for developing projects under the Public Assistance alternative procedures. GAO will continue to monitor the USVI's plans for using the alternative procedures as part of its broader review assessing the USVI's disaster recovery efforts and will issue a follow-on report later this year. Why GAO Did This Study In September 2017, two major hurricanes—Irma and Maria—struck the USVI, causing billions of dollars in damage to its infrastructure, housing, and economy. FEMA—a component of the Department of Homeland Security—is the lead federal agency responsible for assisting the USVI as it recovers from these natural disasters. Among other responsibilities, FEMA administers the Public Assistance program in partnership with the USVI territorial government, providing the USVI grant funding for response and recovery activities, including debris removal efforts, life-saving emergency protective measures, and the repair, replacement, or restoration of public infrastructure. GAO was asked to review the federal government's response and recovery efforts related to the 2017 hurricanes. This report describes (1) the status of FEMA's Public Assistance program funding provided to the USVI in response to the 2017 hurricanes as of October 1, 2018, and (2) the USVI's transition to implementing the Public Assistance alternative procedures in the territory. GAO reviewed program documents and data on obligations and expenditures as of October 1, 2018, and interviewed officials from FEMA and the USVI regarding the Public Assistance program specifically and disaster recovery efforts more generally. GAO also conducted site visits to the USVI islands of St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report, but will continue to monitor the progress of the USVI's recovery as part of its ongoing work. For more information, contact Chris Currie at (202) 512-8777 or curriec@gao.gov. Mon, 25 Feb 2019 00:00:00 -0500 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-472 What GAO Found Federal and state preparedness and coordination efforts prior to and after the 2017 hurricane and wildfire disasters facilitated the response in Texas, Florida, and California. Specifically, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state emergency management officials implemented various preparedness actions prior to landfall of the hurricanes and during the wildfires—such as predeploying federal personnel to support response efforts; colocating federal, state, and local emergency managers; and pre-staging and delivery of commodities like food and water. Further, according to FEMA and state officials, preexisting coordination mechanisms and relationships also facilitated response efforts in each state. For example, FEMA and each state had conducted numerous emergency exercises in the years prior to these disasters and had developed relationships during response to prior disasters that led to accelerated decision-making during the 2017 disasters. Federal and state officials emphasized that there were certainly unprecedented challenges during these disasters—such as deploying a sufficient and adequately-trained FEMA disaster workforce—and lessons learned, but prior response coordination efforts helped to quickly and effectively resolve many of these challenges. The federal government provided significant support to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria, but faced numerous challenges that complicated response efforts. FEMA efforts in Puerto Rico alone were the largest and longest single response in the agency's history. As of April 2018, FEMA had obligated over $12 billion for response and recovery for Hurricane Maria (see figure below) reflecting the scale and complexity of efforts given the widespread damage. FEMA tasked federal agencies with over 1,000 response mission assignments for Hurricanes Maria and Irma in the territories at a cost of over $5 billion, compared to about 400 such assignments for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma and the California wildfires combined. For example, FEMA assigned the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers the mission to install over 1,700 emergency electricity generators in Puerto Rico, compared to the 310 for the response to Hurricane Katrina. Federal Emergency Management Agency Disaster Relief Fund Obligations and Expenditures for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, and California Wildfires through April 30, 2018 Note: An obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the government for the payment of goods and services ordered or received. An expenditure is an amount paid by federal agencies by cash or cash equivalent, during the fiscal year to liquidate government obligations. Nevertheless, GAO found that FEMA faced a number of challenges that slowed and complicated its response efforts to Hurricane Maria, particularly in Puerto Rico. Many of these challenges were also highlighted in FEMA's own 2017 hurricane after action report, including: the sequential and overlapping timing of the three hurricanes—with Maria being the last of the three—caused staffing shortages and required FEMA to shift staff to the territories that were already deployed to other disasters; logistical challenges complicated efforts to deploy federal resources and personnel quickly given the remote distance of both territories; and limited preparedness by the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico for a Category 5 hurricane and incapacitation of local response functions due to widespread devastation and loss of power and communications led FEMA to assume response functions that territories would usually perform themselves. The 2017 hurricanes and wildfires highlighted some longstanding issues and revealed other emerging response and recovery challenges. For example, the concurrent timing and scale of the disaster damages nationwide caused shortages in available debris removal contractors and delays in removing disaster debris—a key first step in recovery. In addition, FEMA's available workforce was overwhelmed by the response needs. For example, at the height of FEMA workforce deployments in October 2017, 54 percent of staff were serving in a capacity in which they did not hold the title of “Qualified”—according to FEMA's qualification system standards—a past challenge GAO has identified. FEMA officials noted that staff shortages, and lack of trained personnel with program expertise led to complications in its response efforts, particularly after Hurricane Maria. Federal Disaster Workforce Deployed at the Height of 2017 Response Acivities Further, federal, state, and local officials faced challenges finding temporary housing for disaster survivors given the extensive damage to available housing in each location. For example, given the widespread damage in Puerto Rico and lack of hotels and other temporary housing, FEMA transported survivors to the mainland United States to stay in hotels. FEMA also used new authorities and procedures to meet the need, such as providing Texas as much as $1 billion to manage its own housing program. However, this approach had not been used or tested in past disasters and state officials noted challenges in managing the program such as staffing shortfalls. State officials further noted challenges in coordinating with FEMA that led to delays in providing assistance to survivors. GAO will continue to monitor these programs. Why GAO Did This Study In 2017, four sequential disasters—hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Maria, and the California wildfires—created an unprecedented demand for federal disaster response and recovery resources. According to FEMA, 2017 included three of the top five costliest hurricanes on record. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimated that the cumulative damages from weather and climate related disasters in the United States were over $300 billion in 2017 alone. As of June 2018, Congress had appropriated over $120 billion in supplemental funding for response and recovery related to the 2017 hurricanes and wildfires. Further, in October 2017, close to 14,000 federal employees were deployed in response to the disasters. Given the scale and cost of these disasters, Congress and others have raised questions about the federal response and various recovery challenges that have arisen since the disasters. This report provides GAO's observations on: (1) federal and state preparedness and response coordination for hurricanes Harvey and Irma in Texas and Florida, and the California wildfires; (2) federal preparedness for and response to hurricanes Irma and Maria in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands; and (3) existing and emerging disaster recovery challenges highlighted by these disasters. GAO analyzed FEMA policies, procedures, guidance, and data specific to disaster response and recovery programs. GAO focused on the busiest period of disaster response activity for the federal government—August 2017 through January 2018, with select updates on recovery efforts and obtained updates through June 2018. In October and November 2017, GAO teams made site visits to hurricane damaged areas in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. At these locations, GAO visited FEMA joint field operation locations and interviewed FEMA, Department of Defense, and other federal officials about response and recovery operations, visited disaster recovery centers, and observed damage. GAO also interviewed FEMA officials responsible for wildfire response and recovery efforts in California. Additionally, GAO interviewed state and territorial emergency management officials or their designee in Texas, Florida, California, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as officials from eight cities and counties in Texas, Florida, and California (selected based on their proximity to the disaster impacted areas and their availability) to discuss their observations on the federal response in their respective jurisdictions. While the perspectives of these officials are not generalizable, they provided valuable insights into the federal response to the 2017 disasters. This report includes 10 appendices that provide further details and data on federal response and recovery efforts. These areas cover key issues and challenges that GAO believes are critical for assessing the federal response and warrant continued Congressional and agency oversight during disaster recovery. GAO is not making recommendations in this report, but has ongoing work that will address various response and recovery programs and challenges in more detail. GAO will make recommendations, as appropriate, once this work is completed. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS stated that the report highlighted the challenges of the complicated response and recovery efforts as well as provided insights into these efforts. DHS also noted that it is continuing to apply lessons learned from 2017 to improve its future program delivery and response efforts. For more information, contact Christopher Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Tue, 04 Sep 2018 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-483 View Spanish version of Highlights  (PDF, 1 page). What GAO Found Unreliable economic and limited labor data make conditions in Puerto Rico difficult to evaluate. Puerto Rico Planning Board data show that from 2005 to 2016 Puerto Rico's gross domestic product (GDP), a principal economic indicator, decreased by over 9 percent, after adjusting for inflation, and the devastation brought by Hurricane Maria in 2017 has worsened economic conditions. While the overall downward trend is reliable, GAO found that the Planning Board uses outdated methods to calculate GDP, which results in unreliable data from year to year and can make it difficult for policymakers to fully analyze specific economic needs and develop long-range plans. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), within the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce), does not calculate GDP for Puerto Rico, as it does for the other U.S. territories. For 6 years, BEA has provided technical support to the Planning Board to update its methods and Planning Board officials described plans to do so, but its methods remain outdated. A 2016 Congressional Task Force recommended that BEA calculate Puerto Rico's GDP, and BEA considers it a long-term goal; however, BEA has not taken steps to do so. Further, Puert Rico has limited labor statistics because it is not included in the Current Population Survey (CPS), which is produced by Commerce's Census Bureau (Census) and Department of Labor's (DOL) Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). CPS provides detailed information about employment, such as hours of work and earnings. The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) suggested that Census conduct a study to determine the feasibility of expanding data collection to include Puerto Rico. Census officials said that they estimated the cost of such a study but have not yet conducted it. Census officials also cited concerns with data collection burdens. However, without CPS data on Puerto Rico, policymakers are limited in estimating the full economic impact of different policy changes. For example, DOL did not have the data needed to include Puerto Rico in its assessment of the economic impact of DOL's 2016 Overtime Rule. Conducting such a study would help policymakers consider the tradeoffs of including Puerto Rico in the CPS. GAO used a different dataset—American Community Survey (ACS)—to assess the potential effects of applying the 2016 Overtime Rule, which would have increased the salary level threshold from $23,660 to $47,476 at which executive, administrative, and professional workers would not be eligible for overtime pay. GAO estimated that about 47,250 of 1.06 million workers in Puerto Rico would be affected—that is, they would become eligible for overtime pay. In response to a salary level threshold increase, employers from selected industries in Puerto Rico told GAO that they might increase certain workers' salaries, but cut overtime hours for other workers, and adjust the number of staff. An economist and a labor group official said that employers could respond by adjusting the number of staff or their hours, but the impacts to employers may be limited and the workforce could benefit. In 2017, a federal district court invalidated the 2016 Overtime Rule and the overtime salary threshold remains at $23,660, but that decision is currently on appeal. Why GAO Did This Study Puerto Rico, the largest and most populous territory of the United States, is subject to congressional authority, although it has broad authority over matters of internal governance. After it defaulted on over $1.5 billion in public debt since 2015, Congress passed PROMESA to establish federal oversight of fiscal affairs. This debt crisis coincided with DOL finalizing the 2016 Overtime Rule, which was invalidated in federal court and is being appealed. PROMESA included a provision for GAO to assess the rule's impact on Puerto Rico and examine its economic condition. This report (1) examines the economic conditions in Puerto Rico as of the end of 2016, and (2) assesses the potential effects of applying the 2016 Overtime Rule to Puerto Rico. GAO analyzed 1990-2016 economic data and replicated DOL's impact analysis of the 2016 Overtime Rule using 2015 ACS data, the same year used by DOL in its analysis. GAO also reviewed federal laws, regulations, court documents, agency guidance, and criteria related to the federal overtime rule; facilitated group discussions with employers in Puerto Rico from industries most likely to be impacted by the rule; and interviewed relevant stakeholders and labor groups. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that BEA include Puerto Rico in its reporting on GDP and that Census and BLS study the feasibility of including Puerto Rico in the CPS. Commerce agreed with our recommendations and DOL did not have any comments on the report. For more information, contact Cindy Brown Barnes at (202) 512-7215 or BrownBarnesC@gao.gov or Oliver Richard at (202) 512-8424 or RichardO@gao.gov. Fri, 29 Jun 2018 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-443 What GAO Found According to tribal officials GAO surveyed and interviewed, there are several factors they considered when deciding whether to make a direct request or to join a state's request for a major disaster declaration. Key factors that tribes reported considering were the (1) importance of tribal sovereignty, (2) financial matters such as the timeliness with which they receive funds, (3) the level of support they anticipated receiving from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and (4) their own emergency management capacity. For example, survey results showed that tribal officials' confidence in their capacity to manage the declaration was a key factor in determining whether to make a request directly. Specifically, various elements of emergency management capacity, as illustrated below, could affect tribes' ability to manage a declaration. Elements of Capacity Needed to Request and Manage a Major Disaster Declaration FEMA has developed pilot guidance for tribal declarations and solicited comments from tribes, as part of its effort to consider the needs of tribes and develop regulations. According to FEMA officials, they are currently assessing the effectiveness of policies and procedures based on data collected from tribal declarations since the passage of SRIA. These officials said they intend to begin the rulemaking process as soon as 2 years into the pilot, but may delay if they cannot collect enough data about different disaster situations during that time to conduct a complete analysis. Until the regulations are final, officials say they will exercise flexibility whenever possible. In addition, the agency offers training on the tribal declaration process and has dedicated staff who act as primary points of contact for tribal governments that require technical assistance. Why GAO Did This Study Since the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (SRIA) of 2013, federally recognized Indian tribes affected by major disasters have had the option to make disaster declaration requests directly to the President of the United States or join a state's request for federal disaster assistance. Prior to this, tribes had to receive assistance through a state. GAO was asked to assess the implementation of this new authority. This report addresses (1) the factors that influenced selected tribes' decisions about how to seek federal disaster assistance, and (2) the actions FEMA has taken to help tribes exercise the new authority. GAO analyzed FEMA's pilot guidance for tribal declarations and interviewed FEMA and tribal emergency management experts. GAO also surveyed the 36 tribes who made requests for disaster assistance in fiscal years 2013-2016 about the factors that influenced their decision making. Twenty three tribes responded. GAO visited seven tribes selected from among the survey respondents to represent different FEMA regions and disaster types. The site visits cannot be generalized but provided valuable insights into the opportunities and challenges of exercising this new authority. What GAO Recommends GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. For more information, contact Chris P. Currie at (404) 479-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Wed, 23 May 2018 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-714 What GAO Found The Department of State (State) has established processes to prepare overseas posts for crises and to conduct evacuations. In particular, posts prepare by developing and updating Emergency Action Plans (EAP) and conducting drills. EAPs are to contain information to assist posts in responding to emergencies, such as checklists of response procedures and decision points to help determine when to evacuate post staff or family members. Posts are required to conduct nine types of drills each fiscal year to prepare for crises and evacuations. State also has established processes for conducting post evacuations. Following an evacuation, post staff are required to transmit an after-action report identifying lessons learned to State headquarters. State has gaps in its crisis and evacuation preparedness for overseas posts. In fiscal years 2013–2016, almost a quarter of posts, on average, were late completing required annual EAP updates. While the completion rate improved from 46 percent to 92 percent of posts completing updates on time in fiscal years 2013 and 2016, respectively, GAO's review of a nongeneralizable sample of EAPs from 20 posts that had been approved by State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security showed that only 2 of 20 had updated all key EAP sections. GAO also found that EAPs are viewed as lengthy and cumbersome documents that are not readily usable in emergency situations, as required. In addition, GAO found that, on average for fiscal years 2013–2016, posts worldwide reported completing 52 percent of required annual drills; posts rated high or critical in political violence or terrorism reported completing 44 percent of these drills. As shown in the figure below, 78 percent of posts reported completing duck and cover drills, but only 36 percent of posts reported completing evacuation training drills. Overall, less than 4 percent of posts reported completing all required drills during fiscal years 2013-2016. In addition, although posts are required to transmit an after-action report listing lessons learned to State headquarters following evacuations, no such reports were submitted in fiscal years 2013–2016. Taken together, the gaps in State's crisis and evacuation preparedness increase the risk that post staff are not sufficiently prepared to handle crisis and emergency situations. Percentages of Overseas Posts That Reported Completing Each Type of Required Drill Why GAO Did This Study From October 2012 to September 2016, State evacuated overseas post staff and family members from 23 overseas posts in response to various threats, such as terrorism, civil unrest, and natural disasters. Overseas posts undergoing evacuations generally experience authorized departure or ordered departure of specific post staff or family members, potentially leading to suspended operations. GAO was asked to review State policies and procedures for evacuating overseas posts. This report examines (1) the processes State has established to prepare posts for crises and to conduct evacuations and (2) State's implementation of preparedness processes for crises and evacuations. GAO reviewed State guidance and documents related to crisis and evacuation preparedness, including a sample of EAPs and State databases on EAP updates and post drills. GAO also interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and in six countries selected because of posts' experiences with evacuations. This is the public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in June 2017. Information that State deemed sensitive has been omitted. What GAO Recommends In GAO's sensitive report, GAO made five recommendations to State focused on strengthening accountability for completion and review of posts' annual EAP updates and required emergency drills, enhancing the usability of EAPs, and ensuring that lessons learned reports are completed. State concurred with all five recommendations and described actions planned or under way to address them. For more information, contact Michael J. Courts at (202) 512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov. Mon, 17 Jul 2017 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-425 What GAO Found Based on discussions with stakeholders and GAO's past work, reducing federal exposure and improving resilience to flooding will require comprehensive reform of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) that will need to include potential actions in six key areas (see figure below). Comprehensive reform will be essential to help balance competing programmatic goals, such as keeping flood insurance affordable while keeping the program fiscally solvent. Taking actions in isolation may create challenges for some property owners (for example, by reducing the affordability of NFIP policies) and therefore these consequences also will need to be considered. Some of the potential reform options also could be challenging to start or complete, and could face resistance, because they could create new costs for the federal government, the private sector, or property owners. Nevertheless, GAO's work suggests that taking actions on multiple fronts represents the best opportunity to help address the spectrum of challenges confronting NFIP. Six Areas That Constitute Comprehensive Flood Insurance Reform Through its work, GAO identified the following interrelationships and potential benefits and challenges associated with potential actions that could be taken to reform NFIP in the six areas: Outstanding debt. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administers NFIP, owed $24.6 billion as of March 2017 to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) for money borrowed to pay claims and other expenses, including $1.6 billion borrowed following a series of floods in 2016. FEMA is unlikely to collect enough in premiums to repay this debt. Eliminating the debt could reduce the need to raise rates to pay interest and principal on existing debt. However, additional premiums still would be needed to reduce the likelihood of future borrowing in the long term. Raising premium rates could create affordability issues for some property owners and discourage them from purchasing flood insurance, and would require other potential actions to help mitigate these challenges. Premium rates. NFIP premiums do not reflect the full risk of loss, which increases the federal fiscal exposure created by the program, obscures that exposure from Congress and taxpayers, contributes to policyholder misperception of flood risk (they may not fully understand the risk of flooding), and discourages private insurers from selling flood insurance (they cannot compete on rates). Eliminating rate subsidies by requiring all rates to reflect the full risk of loss would address an underlying cause of NFIP's debt and minimize federal fiscal exposure. It also would improve policyholder understanding of flood risk and encourage private-sector involvement. However, raising rates makes policies less affordable and could reduce consumer participation. The decreases in affordability could be offset by other actions such as providing means-based assistance. Affordability. Addressing the affordability issues that some consumers currently face, or might face if premium rates were raised, could help ensure more consumers purchase insurance to protect themselves from flood losses. GAO previously recommended that any affordability assistance should be funded with a federal appropriation (rather than through discounted premiums) and should be means-tested. Means-testing the assistance could help control potential costs to the federal government, and funding with an appropriation would increase transparency of the federal fiscal exposure to Congress. Many industry and nonindustry stakeholders with whom GAO spoke said affordability assistance should focus on helping to pay for mitigation—such as elevating buildings—because mitigation permanently reduces flood risk (thus reducing premium rates). Mitigation efforts can have high up-front costs, and may not be feasible in all cases, but many stakeholders suggested that federal loans could be used to spread consumer costs over time. Consumer participation. According to many industry and nonindustry stakeholders with whom GAO spoke, some consumers might not purchase flood insurance because they misperceive their flood risk. For example, consumers located outside of the highest-risk areas, who are not required to purchase flood insurance, may mistakenly perceive they are not at risk of flood loss. Consumers also may choose not to purchase flood insurance because they overestimate the adequacy of federal assistance they would expect to receive after a disaster. Expanding the mandatory purchase requirement beyond properties in the highest-risk areas is one option for encouraging consumer participation in flood insurance. However, doing so could face public resistance and create affordability challenges for some, highlighting the importance of an accompanying affordability assistance program. Increasing consumer participation could help ensure more consumers would be better protected from the financial risk of flooding. Other barriers to private-sector involvement. Industry and nonindustry stakeholders with whom GAO spoke cited regulatory uncertainty and lack of data as barriers to their ability to sell flood insurance, in addition to the less than full-risk rates charged by FEMA. For example, some industry and nonindustry stakeholders told GAO that while lenders must enforce requirements that certain mortgages have flood insurance, some lenders are uncertain whether private policies meet the requirements. Clarifying the types of policies and coverage that would do so could reduce this uncertainty and encourage the use of private flood insurance. In addition, some stakeholders said that access to NFIP claims data by the insurance industry could allow private insurers to better estimate losses and price policies. FEMA officials said they would need to address privacy concerns to provide such information but have been exploring ways to facilitate more data sharing. NFIP flood resilience efforts. Some industry and nonindustry stakeholders told GAO that greater involvement by private insurers could reduce funding available for some NFIP flood resilience efforts (mitigation, mapping, and community participation). For example, some of these stakeholders said that as the number of NFIP policies decreased, the policy fees FEMA used to help fund mitigation and flood mapping activities also would decrease. Potential actions to offset such a decrease could include appropriating funds for these activities or adding a fee to private policies. This would allow NFIP flood resilience efforts to continue at their current levels as private-sector involvement increased. Why GAO Did This Study Congress created NFIP to reduce the escalating costs of federal disaster assistance for flood damage, but also prioritized keeping flood insurance affordable, which transferred the financial burden of flood risk from property owners to the federal government. In many cases, premium rates have not reflected the full risk of loss, so NFIP has not had sufficient funds to pay claims. As of March 2017, NFIP owed $24.6 billion to Treasury. NFIP's current authorization expires in September 2017. In this report, GAO focuses on potential actions that can help reduce federal fiscal exposure and improve resilience to flood risk. GAO reviewed laws, GAO reports, and other studies. GAO interviewed officials from FEMA and other agencies. GAO also solicited input from industry stakeholders (including insurers, reinsurers, and actuaries) and nonindustry stakeholders (including academics, consumer groups, and real estate and environmental associations) through interviews, a nongeneralizable questionnaire, and four roundtable discussions. What GAO Recommends To improve NFIP solvency and enhance national resilience to floods, Congress should consider comprehensive reform covering six areas: (1) outstanding debt, (2) premium rates, (3) affordability, (4) consumer participation, (5) barriers to private-sector involvement, and (6) NFIP flood resilience efforts. For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at (202) 512-8678 or cackleya@gao.gov. Thu, 27 Apr 2017 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-301 What GAO Found The Rural Utilities Service (RUS), an agency within the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), has procedures and activities that are consistent with four leading practices and partially consistent with six leading practices in managing two loan programs and one grant program aimed at funding broadband infrastructure projects in rural communities. Consistent with Leading Practices: With regard to reviewing applications, RUS has procedures for training reviewers, guarding against conflicts of interest, and conducting multiple levels of review. For external training and external communication, RUS holds workshops and seminars to inform rural communities and applicants about its programs. RUS's website contains program information, including eligibility criteria, time frames, and frequently asked questions. Applicants can also seek assistance from the RUS general field representative (GFR) assigned to their area. Program recipients whom GAO interviewed often spoke positively of the help provided by GFRs. As to coordination mechanisms, RUS has worked with other federal agencies on rural broadband-deployment efforts, including having a memorandum of understanding with the Federal Communications Commission. Partially Consistent with Leading Practices: While USDA has a high-level goal and a performance metric for measuring the benefits to rural communities of the broadband loans and grants, RUS has not developed specific program-level goals or performance measures for its individual programs. Without specific measureable goals for each loan and grant program, RUS will have difficulty determining how well the programs are performing. Regarding risk assessment, RUS conducts a variety of risk assessment activities at the loan and grant application and project level, but has not conducted a risk assessment at the program level. A higher-level, programmatic risk assessment would provide a holistic look at the programs' core processes and internal controls. For broadband programs, another leading practice is establishing mapping systems that can provide program data and reveal areas that lack service. RUS has mapping tools and systems in place, but does not have complete mapping information. RUS has efforts under way to improve its mapping data going forward. These efforts should increase RUS's understanding of broadband coverage and help RUS begin to identify possible unserved areas for outreach. For project monitoring, RUS currently oversees loan and grant recipients' projects through GFR site visits, progress reports, and audits. However, RUS does not evaluate its grant projects post-completion and is therefore missing information that could be used to improve the selection of grant recipients or the results of grant awards. RUS has established an organizational structure that supports internal communication, but does not have a centralized system to monitor loan and grant data. RUS officials said USDA is working toward such a system, but they did not have established deliverables or time frames. RUS generally has external written documentation for recipients, but internal written documentation is often outdated, affecting RUS's ability to share knowledge among its staff and retain institutional knowledge. Why GAO Did This Study RUS provides loans and grants to help finance the construction of broadband infrastructure in rural America. GAO was asked to review RUS's management of its programs to fund broadband deployment, including consistency with leading practices for federal funding, program management, and broadband deployment. This report examines the extent to which RUS's procedures and activities are consistent with leading practices and how, if at all, its management practices could be improved. GAO synthesized, from federal guidance and relevant literature, a set of 10 leading practices that would be appropriate for the management of broadband loan and grant programs. GAO validated its set of practices with states that have programs similar to the RUS programs. GAO then reviewed RUS documentation and interviewed RUS officials and six program recipients, selected for having geographically dispersed projects currently under construction. Based on this information, GAO determined whether RUS's procedures and activities were consistent, partially consistent, or not consistent with each leading practice. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that RUS develop program performance goals and measures, conduct program risk assessments, evaluate completed grant projects, establish a timeline for implementing a centralized internal data system, and update written policies and procedures for RUS staff. USDA agreed with the recommendations. For more information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Thu, 13 Apr 2017 00:00:00 -0400 https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-320 What GAO Found As of December 2016, the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and Commerce (Commerce) collectively had signed agreements to establish 11 manufacturing innovation institutes. Four of these institutes were established prior to enactment of the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014 (RAMI Act), which requires Commerce to establish a network of institutes for manufacturing innovation. Since 2014, the network—called the Manufacturing USA network—has grown as DOD, DOE, and Commerce have established seven more institutes, and Commerce, DOD, and DOE plan to sponsor up to four more institutes. Each institute is a public-private partnership between the sponsoring federal agency and a nonfederal entity in charge of operations, with the nonfederal entity matching or exceeding the federal financial assistance. GAO's analysis of institute membership from May through September 2016 shows that about 780 members had joined the seven institutes that were operating during GAO's review (i.e., supporting research projects in their technology focus areas). Members receive a variety of benefits, such as access to intellectual property and networking opportunities. Commerce, DOD, and DOE worked together to develop initial performance measures to track progress toward the Manufacturing USA program's statutory purposes. Additionally, DOD, working with Commerce and DOE, hired a consultant to review the Manufacturing USA program. The consultant's January 2017 report included recommendations on revised measures to track program progress. After considering the results of this review, Commerce plans to work with DOD and DOE to reach agreement on a revised set of measures. While Commerce may face challenges with assessing the program, such as the timeframe over which results may need to be measured, it has taken steps or has identified options to address these challenges. Commerce has used a variety of mechanisms to coordinate the Manufacturing USA program. These mechanisms incorporate several key practices GAO has identified for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration. However, GAO found that the process used to develop a governance system that outlines agencies' responsibilities for contributing to the program did not include all relevant non-sponsoring agencies (agencies that do not sponsor institutes), or ensure that their roles and responsibilities for contributing to the program are fully identified. Specifically, non-sponsoring agencies, such as the Department of Labor (DOL)—which administers discretionary grant programs that can help increase the number of skilled workers in advanced manufacturing—were not actively involved in developing the governance system. Additionally, the governance system does not specify any responsibility for non-sponsoring agencies to provide information or expertise related to their activities to the program. A Commerce official told GAO that the governance system is subject to revision, but participation in the program is up to each agency. However, including all relevant agencies in the process of revising the system and fully identifying non-sponsoring agencies' roles and responsibilities could strengthen Commerce's efforts to leverage and coordinate agencies' contributions to the program, consistent with key practices for interagency collaboration. Why GAO Did This Study Since 2012, DOD and DOE have been establishing innovation institutes to promote the research, development, and commercialization of advanced manufacturing technologies. The RAMI Act of 2014 requires the Secretary of Commerce to establish a program, with eight specified purposes, that includes a network of manufacturing innovation institutes. Commerce, through a program office, is to coordinate this program—called Manufacturing USA. The RAMI Act includes a provision for GAO to assess the program every two years, with a final assessment in 2024. This is GAO's first report in response to the statutory provision. Among other objectives, GAO examined (1) the status of the network and use of the institutes, (2) the extent to which performance measures are in place to assess progress toward achieving the statutory program purposes, and (3) the extent to which Commerce has taken steps to coordinate agencies contributing to the program. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from Commerce, DOD, DOE, DOL, the Department of Education, and Manufacturing USA institutes; and held discussion groups with a nongeneralizable sample of institute member representatives. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that Commerce work with all relevant federal agencies to fully identify roles and responsibilities for how agencies that do not sponsor institutes could contribute to the Manufacturing USA program. Commerce agreed, but suggested an alternative recommendation. GAO modified the recommendation to clarify its intent. For more information, contact John Neumann at (202) 512-3841 or neumannj@gao.gov, or Andrew Sherrill at (202) 512-7215 or sherrilla@gao.gov. Thu, 06 Apr 2017 00:00:00 -0400