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Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the United States and the international community.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources posed a significant security threat to the United States and the international community.
Many foreign nuclear research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Because HEU can be used in nuclear weapons, the Department of Energy (DOE) has two programs to return HEU from foreign reactors to either the United States or Russia. The U.S.
Russia's continued operation of three plutonium production reactors poses a serious proliferation threat. The Department of Energy's (DOE) Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program seeks to facilitate the reactors' closure by building or refurbishing replacement fossil fuel plants.
Potentially dangerous sealed sources containing greater-than-Class-C radioactive material pose a threat to national security because terrorists could use them to make "dirty bombs." Public Law 99-240 requires the Department of Energy (DOE) provide a facility for disposing of unwanted sources.
The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (R&D) Program is to conduct needs-driven research, development, testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are intended to strengthen the United States' ability to...
The security systems installed by the Department of Energy (DOE) are reducing the risk of theft of nuclear material in Russia, but hundreds of metric tons of nuclear material still lack improved security systems.
In 1993, the United States agreed to buy 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from Russia. This uranium was extracted from dismantled nuclear weapons over a 20-year period. USEC, Incorporated, (the company that acts as an executive agent for the United States) paid Russia about $1.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined whether the Department of Energy's (DOE) expenses to close out its participation in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project were reasonable.