Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should establish specific timeliness objectives for completing investigations conducted by the OIG of the IC. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should establish a time frame to finalize revisions to the OIG's investigations manual. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative procedures. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division. This program should consist of routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should develop a process to facilitate external quality assurance reviews of other IC-element OIGs' investigations divisions. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should ensure that as the ICIG finalizes its draft investigations procedures and investigator training plan, these documents provide an approach that systematically links the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities and training requirements throughout an investigator's career progression. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of CIA should establish a time frame to finalize revisions to the OIG's investigations manual. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of CIA should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative manual and policies. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of CIA should implement routine internal quality assurance reviews as part of the quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations divisions consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of DIA should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative procedures. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of DIA should implement routine external quality assurance reviews in the quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division consistent with CIGIE standards. (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of DIA should take steps to ensure that notifications to complainants in reprisal cases occur and are documented in the investigative case file, as required by OIG policy. (Recommendation 12)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NGA should establish specific timeliness objectives for completing investigations conducted by the OIG of NGA. (Recommendation 13)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NGA should develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division. This program should consist of routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 14)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NGA should take steps to ensure that notifications to complainants in reprisal cases occur and are documented in the investigative case file, as required by OIG policy. (Recommendation 15)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should establish a time frame to finalize the OIG's draft investigations manual. (Recommendation 16)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative procedures. (Recommendation 17)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should continue to develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division, which should incorporate routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 18)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should consider making the use of documented investigative plans a requirement for all investigations. (Recommendation 19)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should revise its training plan to provide an approach that systematically links the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to training requirements throughout an investigator's career progression. (Recommendation 20)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should take steps to ensure that notifications to complainants in reprisal cases occur and are documented in the investigative case files, as required by OIG policy. (Recommendation 21)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NSA should develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division. This program should consist of routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 22)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Security Agency/Central Security Service: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NSA should develop an investigator training plan that provides an approach that systematically links the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to training requirements to an investigator's career progression. (Recommendation 23)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Security Agency/Central Security Service: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Office of Special Counsel should require federal employees who are filing whistleblower disclosures or retaliation complaints to identify on their complaint forms their status as a permanent or probationary employee.

Agency: Office of Personnel Management: Office of Special Counsel
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should take action to educate and communicate the agency's scientific integrity polices to staff through, for example, regular training. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: In July 2020, DOE provided an update on the status of this recommendation. In that update, DOE said the scientific integrity official will be responsible for leading and coordinating with other elements of the Department, in the development of measures to educate and communicate DOE's scientific integrity policies to staff.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should establish steps and a time frame for designating a scientific integrity official to oversee the department's scientific integrity activities. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: In July 2020, DOE provided an update on the status of this recommendation. In that update, DOE said that it was still in the process of identifying an individual to serve as a scientific integrity official.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should develop mechanisms to regularly monitor and evaluate implementation of the department's scientific integrity policy, including mechanisms to remediate identified deficiencies and make improvements where necessary. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: In July 2020, DOE provided an update on the status of this recommendation. In that update, DOE stated that the Department's scientific integrity official will have the responsibility to lead and coordinate with other elements of the Department in developing procedures to monitor and evaluate the implementation of DOE's scientific integrity policy, including mechanisms to remediate identified deficiencies and make improvements where necessary.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Transportation should develop mechanisms to regularly monitor and evaluate implementation of the department's scientific integrity policy, including mechanisms to remediate identified deficiencies and make improvements where necessary. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2020, the Department of Transportation provided an update on the status of this recommendation. In that update, officials said that DOT was still working on this action. According to officials, the department will implement several mechanisms to address the recommendation, including conducting annual reviews of the scientific integrity policy and making the policy available to all relevant employees. DOT estimated it would complete these actions by the end of March 2021.

Recommendation: The Director of NIST should develop mechanisms to regularly monitor and evaluate implementation of the agency's scientific integrity policy, including mechanisms to remediate identified deficiencies and make improvements where necessary. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Commerce: National Institute of Standards and Technology
Status: Open

Comments: In Commerce's written comments, NIST had stated that, beginning in fiscal year 2019, the agency would review implementation of its policy at least annually and make recommendations to the Director of NIST as to whether any improvements were needed. In a September 2020 update, NIST provided a memorandum reporting that in fiscal year 2019 the Scientific Integrity Officer and General Counsel had discussed an allegation related to scientific integrity, and that it was determined that programmatic factors, not a lapse in scientific integrity, had occurred. According to NIST, it monitors the effectiveness of the implementation of its documented scientific integrity policy, order, and procedure by means of informal feedback from NIST researchers and supervisors, as documented in the memorandum.

Recommendation: The NOAA Administrator should develop mechanisms to regularly monitor and evaluate implementation of the agency's scientific integrity policy, including mechanisms to remediate identified deficiencies and make improvements where necessary. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Commerce: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In Commerce's written comments, NOAA stated that it will identify additional metrics for monitoring and evaluating its policy. As of October 2020, we have requested an update from the agency but have not yet received information to evaluate implementation of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of USGS should develop mechanisms to regularly monitor and evaluate implementation of the agency's scientific integrity policy, including mechanisms to remediate identified deficiencies and make improvements where necessary. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: U.S. Geological Survey
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2020, the Department of the Interior provided an update on this recommendation. In that update, officials stated that the expected completion date is the end of November 2022.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should develop documented procedures for identifying and addressing alleged violations of its scientific integrity policy. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: In July 2020, DOE provided an update on the status of this recommendation. In that update, DOE stated that the department's scientific integrity official will be responsible for leading and coordinating with other elements of the Department in developing procedures for identifying and addressing alleged violations of DOE's scientific integrity policy.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NASA should develop documented procedures for identifying and addressing alleged violations of its scientific integrity policy. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA officials stated that the agency is undergoing additional internal and external reviews-with NASA officials working through the National Science and Technology Council's Joint Committee on Research Environments, which supports scientific security, rigor, and integrity-and that completion of the implementation of the recommendation is due October 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue should ensure that the Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement develops and documents improved controls for the validity, completeness, and accuracy of data on FBAR exams and enforcement actions. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service
Status: Open

Comments: In a letter dated October 15, 2018, IRS's Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement stated that IRS is in the process of designing a new FBAR database solution using the FISMA-compliant Entellitrak case management system. The solution will include data fields and systemic controls to ensure the accurate recording and reporting of FBAR case information essential to the whistleblower program. As of December 2019, IRS officials said they are on track to complete this action by June 2020. When we can confirm that IRS has completed this action, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Inspector General should revise its policy to include a requirement to verify whether evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the six elements required in VA Directive 0701 have been addressed. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
Status: Open

Comments: The VA Office of the Inspector General updated VA Directive 0701 to require a written or electronic signature from the person preparing the response that the specific requirements of the directive were met. The updated version of the directive was submitted to the Department, the concurrence was signed on November 16, 2018. As of January 2019, the VA OIG was working with the VA to finalize and publish the directive. On February 15, 2019, the VA OIG contacted GAO with revised language for VA Directive 0701. The language clarified the requirement to include a signature and attestation by the person preparing the response. As of June 2020, the VA OIG is in the process of working with the VA administration to finalize and publish the directive. In September 2020, GAO requested an update from the VA OIG on the status of publishing the directive.

Recommendation: The Special Counsel should review and revise as appropriate, its policy for agency extension requests. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Office of Special Counsel
Status: Open

Comments: OSC is revising its practice of granting extensions when the agency provides a plausible explanation for the delay. Instead, OSC will be informing agencies at the outset of the referral that, with few exceptions, extension requests are less likely to be granted. OSC will also be communicating that failure to produce an investigative report within the statutory timeframe will result in notification of the agency's failure to the President and congressional committees under 5 U.S. C. 1213(c) (4). According to OSC, this new practice will be reflected in standard operating procedures for the OSC Disclosure Unit that the agency is currently revising.

Recommendation: The Special Counsel should communicate expected processing timelines to whistleblowers. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Office of Special Counsel
Status: Open

Comments: OSC has incorporated explicit language in its acknowledgement letters to whistleblowers that investigations may exceed the statutory timeframe. OSC has also now implemented a standard operating procedure of adhering to the 45-day timeframe for making a substantial likelihood determination under 5 U.S.C. 1213(b). According to OSC, it will be revising its acknowledgement letters to whistleblowers to reflect that OSC expects to make a referral determination within 45 days.

Recommendation: The Special Counsel should develop, document, and implement case processing procedures for OSC's Complaints Examining Unit, including procedures for how cases are prioritized, how to take favorable actions, how to balance obtaining favorable actions with meeting staff productivity expectations, and how cases should be reviewed by supervisors. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Office of Special Counsel
Status: Open

Comments: The Special Counsel convened an Effectiveness and Efficiency Working Group tasked with evaluating every unit's case process activities. The group issued recommendations in the spring of 2018, after which the Special Counsel announced a significant reorganization of OSC in the spring of 2018. Specifically, effective October 1, 2018, OSC created a new Intake Unit and merged the headquarters CEU with the Investigations and Prosecution Division (IPD). According to OSC, it continues to develop standard case processes, including procedures for prioritizing cases, obtaining favorable actions, establishing qualitative and quantitative performance expectations, and reviewing cases.

Recommendation: The Special Counsel should identify and implement additional controls and tools needed to ensure closed case files can be tracked and located efficiently. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Office of Special Counsel
Status: Open

Comments: The Clerk of OSC has identified and is implementing the following controls and tools needed to ensure closed case files can be tracked and located efficiently: (1) creation and utilization of file plans according to the OSC disposition scheduled for each unit (including inventory of records); (2) creation of an Archives and Records Centers for Information Sharing (ARCIS) account to manage functions related to OSC's Electronic Records Management System (ERMS), including retiring temporary records to the Federal Records Center (FRC), transmitting and tracking records requests to FRC, and transferring permanent records to the National Archives and Records Administration. According to OSC, the Clerk is further establishing policies and procedures, as well as staff training, for records retention, including but not limited to routine evaluations and assessments. OSC employs FOIA Xpress to locate open and closed cases in response to records requests under the Freedom of Information Act.

Recommendation: The Director of the USMS should develop and implement a mechanism to provide specific feedback to employees on the results of the promotion process, including their readiness for promotion. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Justice: United States Marshals Service
Status: Open

Comments: USMS concurred with this recommendation and said that it is taking steps to implement it. In August 2018, USMS began providing feedback reports to employees completing the redesigned competency assessment process, which include detailed breakouts of scores by competency. However, these reports do not contain specific feedback, including the employee's readiness for promotion. As of June 2019, USMS is finalizing plans to provide training to employees on the GS-13 and GS-14 competencies. As of August 2020, USMS is building development programs and computer-based courses for each grade level, including GS-13 and GS-14. To fully address this recommendation, USMS should provide information on efforts or plans to provide specific feedback to employees, including on their readiness for promotion, and provide final training plans.

Recommendation: The DOD Inspector General should implement a process to document employee recusals and impairments to independence and incorporate such information into an aggregate-level evaluation of threats to DODIG's independence. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: The DOD Inspector General concurred with this recommendation and stated in July 2020 that the DOD Office of Inspector General was in the process of implementing it.

Recommendation: To help ensure the accuracy of MSPB's reporting on whistleblower appeals received and closed, the Chairman of MSPB should update MSPB's data entry user guide to include additional guidance and procedures to help improve the identification of appropriate whistleblower appeal closing codes to use.

Agency: Merit Systems Protection Board
Status: Open

Comments: MSPB is finalizing finalized expanded guidance and procedures on coding whistleblower data. MSPB is committed to ensuring that procedures are in place for identifying and using appropriate whistleblower codes; however, MSPB is limited by its various legacy applications with regard to the improvements related to data entry that can be implemented at this time. MSPB currently is in the process of designing new core business applications that will incorporate appropriate data quality, integrity, and accountability measures to further improve its data management practices. Until the new case management system is in production in FY 2020 or early FY 2021, MSPB remains committed to utilizing the resources necessary to ensure the accuracy of its reported data. To achieve this objective, experienced attorneys reviewed, validated, and, where necessary, corrected agency whistleblowing data prior to public release in FY 2016, FY 2017, and FY 2018. MSPB is committed to this extra layer of review for FY 2019, and will continue to evaluate how to achieve this objective given other workload and available resources. According to MSPB it expects additional progress on its efforts by July 2020.

Recommendation: To help ensure the accuracy of MSPB's reporting on whistleblower appeals received and closed, the Chairman of MSPB should add a quality check in MSPB's data analysis and reporting process to better identify discrepancies or other anomalies in data queries and the resulting datasets.

Agency: Merit Systems Protection Board
Status: Open

Comments: MSPB stated that it completed drafting the data integrity study mentioned in our previous response, looking at the current processes and integrity of case-related data as a whole throughout the agency. As explained above and highlighted in MSPB's FY 2018 Annual Report, MSPB's initiative to design and configure new core business applications currently is underway, and the findings in the study are integral to incorporating the appropriate data integrity processes, including quality checks and controls, into these new applications. According to MSPB it expects additional progress on its efforts by July 2020.

Recommendation: To improve DOE's ability to evaluate and monitor the effectiveness of policies that call for all organizations, including contractors, to embrace a strong safety culture and create a work environment that encourages a questioning attitude by all employees, the Secretary of Energy should develop and implement an independent evaluation process for routinely and accurately measuring contractor employees' willingness to raise safety and other concerns without fear of retaliation. This process should ensure that an independent third party develops, conducts, and consistently applies the evaluation methodology--which should include safeguards that protect anonymity. The process should also enable DOE to oversee and ensure that appropriate corrective actions are taken in response to evaluation results.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE concurred with the recommendation. DOE has developed a plan to analyze tools utilized by site contractors to determine the viability of using the data to monitor the influence of work environment on employees' willingness to raise safety concerns. As of March 2020, DOE had completed assessments of safety culture sustainment tools and drafted a report. According to officials, the draft report is undergoing final review and officials anticipate issuing the report by the end of fiscal year 2020.

Recommendation: To help ensure that the organizational placement and practices of DOE- and contractor- provided Employee Concerns Programs (ECP) do not inhibit contractor employees from raising safety and other concerns, the Secretary of Energy should revise DOE's ECP order and guidance to (1) require that the organizational placement and practices of contractor ECP's do not compromise or impair their independence, (2) clarify the circumstances under which DOE's ECP is permitted to transfer and refer concerns to contractors, and notify or require approval of the contractor employee raising the concern, and (3) provide criteria for overseeing and evaluating the effectiveness and independence of contractor-provided ECPs.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE concurred with the recommendation. DOE issued its revised order on the employee concerns program (ECP) in January 2019. However, that order did not address all three issues raised in our recommendation. Specifically, the order states that it is a best practice for contractor ECP managers to report to a designated executive in the contractor management chain, but does not include information on concerns of independence. Additionally, there is instruction that ECP managers must assess programs and how often, but there is not specific criteria for overseeing and evaluating effectiveness or independence. As of May 2020, we are continuing to discuss these issues with DOE officials.

Recommendation: To help ensure that Congress has the information it needs as it considers whether or not to make permanent the enhanced whistleblower pilot program and that DOE has assurance that contractor employees have an effective mechanism to seek remedy for unlawful retaliation, the Secretary of Energy should fully evaluate the extent to which the pilot program has been implemented and whether its provisions will mitigate challenges associated with DOE's 708 program. This evaluation should include, at a minimum, an assessment of (1) contractors that have adopted the pilot program and the date they did so; (2) contractors that have not adopted the pilot program and an explanation of why not; (3) cases filed under the pilot program, if any; and (4) the pilot program's potential for mitigating challenges associated with the 708 program.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE concurred in principle with the recommendation. In response, the Office of Hearings and Appeals conducted a review of the Part 708 program that addressed three of the four items identified in the recommendation. As of May 2020, we are continuing to work with DOE on whether or how it plans to assess the contractors that have adopted the pilot program and the date they did so.

Recommendation: To help improve DOE's ability to take enforcement action against unlawful retaliation when appropriate and take action against contractors that create a chilled work environment, the Secretary of Energy should revise DOE's Integrated Safety Management policy and guidance to clarify what constitutes evidence of a chilled work environment and define the appropriate steps DOE should take to hold contractors accountable for creating a chilled work environment.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOE concurred with the recommendation. In January 2018, DOE issued a revision to DOE Policy 450.4A. The revised policy states that organizations should foster a culture that allows employees to "feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation...and supporting a questioning attitude concerning safety by all employees." However, the policy does not define the appropriate steps DOE should take to hold contractors accountable for creating a chilled work environment. As of May 2020, we are continuing to work with DOE to determine whether they plan to make additional changes to the policy to address our recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve the military whistleblower reprisal investigation process and oversight of such investigations, the Secretary of Defense should work in coordination with the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) to direct the services to follow standardized investigation stages and issue guidance clarifying how the stages are defined.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD officials concurred with this recommendation and provided an update in May 2019, in which they stated that the office was preparing an issuance for coordination that will direct the services to follow standardized investigation stages and guidance clarifying how the stages are defined. DOD officials estimated that the issuance would be completed by December 31, 2019.

Recommendation: To better ensure that FBI whistleblowers have access to recourse under DOJ's regulations should the individuals experience retaliation, and to minimize the possibility of discouraging future potential whistleblowers, the Attorney General should clarify in all current relevant DOJ guidance and communications, including FBI guidance and communications, to whom FBI employees may make protected disclosures and, further, explicitly state that employees will not have access to recourse if they experience retaliation for reporting alleged wrongdoing to someone not designated in DOJ's regulations.

Agency: Department of Justice
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In response to our report, in December 2016, Congress passed and the President signed the FBI Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-302, which, among other things, provides a means for FBI employees to obtain corrective action for retaliation for disclosures of wrongdoing made to supervisors and others in the employees' chain of command. Following this, the FBI worked closely with the Department of Justice's Office of Inspector General (DOJ-OIG) to develop a training that clearly identifies to whom FBI employees may make protected disclosures. In addition, the FBI issued an aligned policy directive and two fact sheets detailing whistleblower rights. In October 2018, a DOJ official reported to us that the department was in the process of updating its regulations and, in February 2020, DOJ officials confirmed that the updated regulation was in the departmental clearance process but they could not provide an estimate for when it would be finalized. As a result, as of February 2020, DOJ's regulations have not been updated and are inconsistent with the current statute and FBI's guidance and training; as such, the problem of unclear or conflicting guidance to FBI employees still needs to be addressed. To address this recommendation, DOJ would need to update its regulations and ensure that all relevant guidance is clear and consistent across the department.