Reports & Testimonies
Recommendations Database
GAO’s recommendations database contains report recommendations that still need to be addressed. GAO’s priority recommendations are those that we believe warrant priority attention. We sent letters to the heads of key departments and agencies, urging them to continue focusing on these issues. Below you can search only priority recommendations, or search all recommendations.
Our recommendations help congressional and agency leaders prepare for appropriations and oversight activities, as well as help improve government operations. Moreover, when implemented, some of our priority recommendations can save large amounts of money, help Congress make decisions on major issues, and substantially improve or transform major government programs or agencies, among other benefits.
As of October 25, 2020, there are 4812 open recommendations, of which 473 are priority recommendations. Recommendations remain open until they are designated as Closed-implemented or Closed-not implemented.
Browse or Search Open Recommendations
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Results:
Subject Term: Terrorists
GAO-20-348, Apr 20, 2020
Phone: (202) 512-8678
Agency: Department of the Treasury: Office of the Under Secretary for Domestic Finance: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions: Office of Financial Institutions Policy: Federal Insurance Office
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
GAO-20-404, Apr 3, 2020
Phone: (202) 512-8777
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open
Comments: TSA concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it by updating the BASE Cybersecurity Security Action Item section to ensure it reflects the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Detect and Recover functions. When we confirm what actions TSA has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
GAO-20-333, Apr 2, 2020
Phone: (202) 512-8612
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Office of the Secretary
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Office of the Secretary
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
GAO-20-125, Feb 12, 2020
Phone: (202) 512-8777
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration: Office of Law Enforcement - Federal Air Marshal Service
Status: Open
Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and in January 2020, DHS officials stated that FAMS is evaluating case management software to track this information and plans to pursue funding for this effort in fiscal year 2021.This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. When we confirm what actions DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration: Office of Law Enforcement - Federal Air Marshal Service
Status: Open
Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and in January 2020, DHS officials stated that FAMS had established a team to develop a plan for assessing workforce health and wellness issues. Adopting and implementing a plan that assesses the health and fitness of the FAMS workforce as a whole, should address the intent of the recommendation. When we confirm what actions DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration: Office of Law Enforcement - Federal Air Marshal Service
Status: Open
Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and in January 2020, DHS officials stated that FAMS will begin tracking air marshals' actual hours and examine the extent to which air marshals' actual and scheduled hours vary. This information could be helpful, for example, in assessing air marshals' schedule predictability. However, to address the intent of this recommendation, FAMS would need to monitor the extent that air marshals' actual work and rest hours are consistent with FAMS's scheduling guidelines. When we confirm what actions DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration: Office of Law Enforcement - Federal Air Marshal Service
Status: Open
Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and in January 2020, DHS officials stated that FAMS plans to review the goals of its 2012 action plan and develop steps to strengthen efforts to prevent discrimination. These actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. When we confirm what actions DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
GAO-20-176, Dec 18, 2019
Phone: (202) 512-2775
Agency: Department of State: Office of the Secretary
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Agency: Department of State: Office of the Secretary
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
GAO-20-72, Nov 20, 2019
Phone: (202) 512-3000
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open
Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and agreed to document which rule review process TSA I&A uses (exigent or standard) for each new rule or rule change. In March 2020, TSA updated its SOP to require that the selected rule review process be documented for each new rule and rule change. TSA's policy change is a positive first step, but to fully address this recommendation, TSA will need to demonstrate that the selected rule review process is now being documented.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open
Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and, in May 2020, DHS officials stated that they are reviewing data sources and assessing potential ways to assess the effectiveness of Quiet Skies and Silent Partner screening rules. DHS officials stated that they plan to fully address this recommendation by December 2020.
GAO-19-327, May 13, 2019
Phone: (202) 512-3841
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open
Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open
Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open
Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open
Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.
GAO-17-794, Sep 11, 2017
Phone: (202) 512-7141
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open
Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and has begun taking steps intended to address it. In May 2018, officials with DHS's Requirements and Capabilities Analysis (RCA) reported conducting a literature review to identify ways DHS might be able to measure deterrence. ORCA officials reported looking to published studies and other agencies to identify data sources and methods, and were in the process of developing a model to assess the deterrent value of various aviation security countermeasures. In July 2019, TSA officials reported that they were continuing to develop this model which could better inform deployment of deterrence-related countermeasures. As of October 2020, DHS has provided no further updates on steps taken to implement this recommendation. To fully address this recommendation, TSA will need to fully develop this or another method to assess the deterrent effect of TSA's aviation security countermeasures.
GAO-16-582, May 31, 2016
Phone: (202) 512-7141
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration: Office of Law Enforcement - Federal Air Marshal Service
Status: Open
Comments: In May 2016, we found that FAMS officials considered risk when selecting specific domestic and international flights to cover, but they did not consider risk when deciding how to initially divide their annual resources between domestic and international flights. Rather, each year FAMS considered two variables--travel budget and number of air marshals--to identify the most efficient way to divide the agency's resources between domestic and international flights. As a result, we recommended that FAMS incorporate risk into FAMS's method for initially setting its annual target numbers of average daily international and domestic flights to cover. In March 2018, FAMS revised its deployment methodology to no longer set an annual target number of average daily international and domestic flights to cover. Rather, FAMS now prioritizes deploying air marshals on as many flights as possible with passengers who have been identified as potentially higher risk because they match TSA's intelligence-based screening rules, among other risk-based priorities. In August 2020, FAMS officials explained that they were evaluating their concept of operations and planned to more fully develop a risk basis for dividing its resources between international and domestic flights. By doing so, FAMS could better ensure it is targeting its limited resources to the highest risk flights and better aligning with FAMS's stated goal of using risk-based decisions to guide mission operations. As a result, this recommendation remains open.
GAO-16-105, Dec 17, 2015
Phone: (202) 512-5431
including 1 priority recommendation
Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. DOD has taken steps to clarify what types of contractor personnel should be accounted for in its guidance on personnel status reports, but, as of July 2019, revision of that guidance is ongoing. According to Joint Staff officials in May 2018, CJCSM 3150.13C provides policy and guidance on what types of contractor personnel to account for in personnel status reports, and the updated guidance will incorporate lessons learned from USAFRICOM's implementation of that policy. The updated CJCSM 3150.13C is projected to be completed by Summer 2018. Once issued, USAFRICOM officials stated they will incorporate their local policies and standards into the CJCSM 3150.13C, and expect that a coordinated directive on local policies, procedures and standards will mitigate many of the previous interpretation issues. However, additional training and amplifying local procedures issued by the USAFRICOM J-1 may be necessary to fully implement its provisions and ensure consistent interpretation. Additionally, in February 2016, a class deviation became effective for the USAFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR). This deviation superseded Class Deviations 2014-O0005, and 2015-O0003. The deviation stated that contracting officers shall incorporate clause 252.225-7980, Contractor Personnel Performing in the United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility, in lieu of the clause at DFARS 252.225-7040, Contractor Personnel Supporting U.S. Armed Forces Deployed Outside the United States, in all solicitations and contracts, including solicitations and contracts using FAR part 12 procedures for the acquisition of commercial items that will require contractor personnel to perform in the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) area of responsibility. In addition, to the extent practicable, contracting officers shall modify current, active contracts with performance in the USAFRICOM AOR to include the clause 252.225-7980. The USAFRICOM Commander has identified a need to utilize the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker for all contracts performed in the AOR during all operational phases (including Phase 0), not limited to declared contingency operations. However, until CJCSM 3150.13C clarifying the types of contractor personnel and incorporating lessons learned from AFRICOM's implementation is finalized, this recommendation will remain open. As of July 2020, this CJSM had not been updated. Moreover, in July 2020, DOD stated that reissuance of DOD Instruction 3020.41, Operational Contract Support, is required in order to implement this recommendation. When DOD takes further action, we will update this recommendation.
Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation
Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of July 2019, DOD has taken steps to develop foreign vendor vetting guidance, but is still working to determine key components of that guidance. Office of the Deputy of the Secretary of Defense issued a directive type memorandum in April 2018 that establishes policy and assigns responsibility for developing vendor vetting guidance to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, DOD established a foreign vendor vetting working group in January 2017 to, among other things, develop guidance that will define foreign vendor vetting as a distinct function and provide combatant commanders with guidance on addressing the risks associated with relying on commercial vendors. As of November 2019, OSD officials stated the working group is making progress to develop a formal charter, identify tools and strategies to enhance vendor vetting across the combatant commands, and establish a department-wide vendor vetting policy. Until DOD develops vendor vetting guidance, this recommendation will remain open. As of July 2020, DOD had extended its directive type memorandum, but had not developed vendor vetting guidance. When we confirm what additional actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.