Recommendation: The Director of the Federal Insurance Office should publicly communicate information about when it is considering certifying an event as an act of terrorism under TRIA. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Office of the Under Secretary for Domestic Finance: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions: Office of Financial Institutions Policy: Federal Insurance Office
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of the Federal Insurance Office should document an agreement with DHS about DHS's role, and how the agencies share information, during the process of certifying an event as an act of terrorism under TRIA. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Office of the Under Secretary for Domestic Finance: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions: Office of Financial Institutions Policy: Federal Insurance Office
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of the Federal Insurance Office should document an agreement with DOJ about DOJ's role, and how the agencies share information, during the process of certifying an event as an act of terrorism under TRIA. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Office of the Under Secretary for Domestic Finance: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions: Office of Financial Institutions Policy: Federal Insurance Office
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of the Federal Insurance Office should communicate to insurers in writing how it would utilize policyholder retention amounts in calculating "insurance losses" and "insured losses" in determining the program certification threshold, trigger, and cap, as applicable. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Office of the Under Secretary for Domestic Finance: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions: Office of Financial Institutions Policy: Federal Insurance Office
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The TSA Administrator should update the BASE cybersecurity template to ensure it reflects cybersecurity key practices, including the Detect and Recover functions outlined in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: TSA concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it by updating the BASE Cybersecurity Security Action Item section to ensure it reflects the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Detect and Recover functions. When we confirm what actions TSA has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) should ensure that the office regularly collects detailed information from cities on expenditures made using program funds and compares that information to approved purchase plans to ensure that these funds were spent as approved, consistent with program goals, and that the expenditures are in keeping with the objectives of the program. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open

Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of CWMD should more fully assess cities' performance by collecting information from cities on achieving key performance metrics and program milestones and enforcing reporting requirements on performance during exercises. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open

Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of CWMD should analyze risks related to sustaining detection capabilities, work with cities to address these risks, and enforce sustainment planning requirements for future cities. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open

Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of CWMD should clearly communicate to cities how the existing program will operate until a new program is developed and implemented. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open

Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Deputy Secretary of Defense assesses the tradeoffs of potential options for expanding public access to military commissions' proceedings by identifying and analyzing associated risks, and, as appropriate, developing a strategy to implement any viable options.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction should develop a strategy and implementation plan to help the Department of Homeland Security, among other things, guide, support, integrate and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities; leverage resources and capabilities; and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DHS agreed with GAO's September 2018 recommendation and is taking actions to address it. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) officials stated in December 2018 that CWMD plans to develop a strategy and implementation plan to help DHS guide, support, integrate and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities; leverage resources and capabilities; and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. According to CWMD officials, the implementation plan would broadly address DHS chemical defense activities and programs to prevent, protect against, and respond to chemical incidents, including support to federal, state, tribal, and territorial operators and agencies, as well as the private sector. CWMD officials provided GAO with the completed strategy in December 2019 and plan to complete the implementation plan by December 2020. The strategy includes four overarching goals that will drive CWMD's mission in protecting American safety and security from chemical threats and incidents. We will continue to monitor the status of the implementation plan, as completion of both documents is essential to help the CWMD Office guide DHS's efforts to address fragmentation and coordination issues and would be consistent with the office's aim to establish a coherent mission.

Recommendation: The Administrator of TSA should explore and pursue methods to assess the deterrent effect of TSA's passenger aviation security countermeasures; such an effort should identify FAMS—a countermeasure with a focus on deterring threats—as a top priority to address. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and has begun taking steps intended to address it. In May 2018, officials with DHS's Requirements and Capabilities Analysis (RCA) reported conducting a literature review to identify ways DHS might be able to measure deterrence. ORCA officials reported looking to published studies and other agencies to identify data sources and methods, and were in the process of developing a model to assess the deterrent value of various aviation security countermeasures. In July 2019, TSA officials reported that they were continuing to develop this model which could better inform deployment of deterrence-related countermeasures. As of October 2020, DHS has provided no further updates on steps taken to implement this recommendation. To fully address this recommendation, TSA will need to fully develop this or another method to assess the deterrent effect of TSA's aviation security countermeasures.

Recommendation: To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General--as heads of the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts--should direct the CVE Task Force to develop a cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes for CVE activities.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: In April 2019, DHS provided the National Counterterrorism Strategy as evidence that the department is including terrorism prevention as a necessary tool to meet its missions. While the strategy discusses terrorism prevention, it does not include specific activities or efforts, identify the agencies that will lead these efforts, or describe measurable outcomes for these efforts. In June 2019, DHS indicated that CVE-style prevention work would fall under a newly formed Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention under which it will be part of a broad counterterrorism strategy that DHS plans to have ready by this fall. We will continue to monitor DHS's progress in this area as it develops its plan.

Recommendation: To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General--as heads of the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts--should direct the CVE Task Force to develop a cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes for CVE activities.

Agency: Department of Justice
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2019, DOJ has not provided a response to our recommendation. In June 2019, DHS indicated that CVE-style prevention work would fall under a newly formed Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention under which it will be part of a broad counterterrorism strategy that DHS plans to have ready by this fall. We will continue to monitor DOJ's involvement in these efforts as DHS it develops its plan.

Recommendation: To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General--as heads of the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts--should direct the CVE Task Force to establish and implement a process to assess overall progress in CVE, including its effectiveness.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: In April 2019, DHS provided a commissioned review of CVE programs and activities that was expected to help identify ways to measure their effectiveness. The report provides a broad assessment of past activities and suggestions for measures and metrics going forward, but does not establish a process for agencies to measure the success of their activities or overall progress of CVE efforts. In June 2019, DHS indicated that CVE-style prevention work would fall under a newly formed Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention under which it will be part of a broad counterterrorism strategy that DHS plans to have ready by this fall. We will continue to monitor DHS's progress in this area as it develops its plan.

Recommendation: To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General--as heads of the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts--should direct the CVE Task Force to establish and implement a process to assess overall progress in CVE, including its effectiveness.

Agency: Department of Justice
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2019, DOJ has not provided a response to our recommendation. In June 2019, DHS indicated that CVE-style prevention work would fall under a newly formed Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention under which it will be part of a broad counterterrorism strategy that DHS plans to have ready by this fall. We will continue to monitor DOJ's involvement in these efforts as DHS develops its plan.