Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should change its definition for setting operational availability for ships in its Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System policy by adding information that defines the operational availability requirement by mission area in addition to the ship level and includes all equipment failures that affect the ability of a ship to perform primary missions. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation stating that it would work with the Navy and Joint Staff to revisit requirements definitions for shipbuilding programs to better ensure that they are traceable to a ship's mission and can be used across ship development and fielding. As of June 2020, DOD officials told us that there are two upcoming opportunities to make changes to DOD Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System policy and that these recommendations will receive consideration during this process.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should change its definition for setting materiel availability for ships in its Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System requirements policy to include all factors that could result in a ship being unavailable for operations, such as unplanned maintenance, unplanned losses, and training. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation stating that it will work with the Navy and the Joint Staff to revisit requirements definitions for shipbuilding programs to better ensure materiel availability requirements include all factors that could preclude a ship from operating. As of June 2020, DOD officials told us that there are two upcoming opportunities to make changes to DOD Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System policy and that these recommendations will receive consideration during this process.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the ASN (RD&A) and the CNO, once DOD requirements setting policy is revised, to update existing operational availability requirements for ongoing shipbuilding programs. When revising these requirements, the Navy should set operational availability requirements that: (1) are based on failures that affect the ability of a ship to perform primary missions and (2) are set at the mission level instead of ship level. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation stating that changes to the requirements setting policy will apply only to new shipbuilding programs. As of June 2020, DOD officials told us that there are two upcoming opportunities to make changes to DOD Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System policy and that these recommendations will receive consideration during this process. While important steps towards improving the requirements setting process, DOD officials did not state whether any policy changes would apply to current shipbuilding programs. As we discussed in our report, at least four ship classes have plans for a new flight, block, and/or major modification. DOD and the Navy may miss key opportunities to improve the Navy's sustainment requirements if it excludes existing programs that have established requirements but have yet to start design or construction.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the ASN (RD&A) and the CNO, once DOD requirements setting policy is revised, to update the materiel availability requirements for ongoing shipbuilding programs. When developing or revising these requirements, the Navy should set materiel availability requirements that fully capture all factors that could preclude a ship from being ready when needed. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation stating that changes to the requirements setting policy will apply to new shipbuilding programs. As of June 2020, DOD officials told us that there are two upcoming opportunities to make changes to DOD Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System policy and that these recommendations will receive consideration during this process.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the ASN (RD&A) and the CNO, once the Navy revises its sustainment requirements, to ensure that shipbuilding programs report operational availability and materiel availability requirements in Selected Acquisition Reports, and alternatives to the Selected Acquisition Reports, for Congress. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Navy concurred with this recommendation and will report operational and materiel availability in the Selected Acquisition Reports based on new definitions in DOD guidance. Therefore, we plan to close this recommendation once DOD updates its definitions and reports numbers in the SAR based on these new definitions.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command to ensure that cost estimators follow current guidance and GAO-identified best practices and conduct sensitivity analyses and other analyses to improve their assessment of cost risk in the O&S costs in shipbuilding programs' life-cycle cost estimates. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Navy concurred with this recommendation stating that it agrees that the use of sensitivity, uncertainty, and risk analyses is a best practice to ensure credible, defensible life cycle cost estimates. However, the Navy has yet to issue any policy updates or provide any evidence that it is conducting sensitivity analyses and other analyses to improve their assessment of cost risk in the O&S costs in shipbuilding programs' life-cycle cost estimates.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the ASN (RD&A) to ensure all shipbuilding programs develop and update LCSPs, in accordance with DOD policy, that demonstrate how a ship class can be affordably operated and maintained while meeting sustainment requirements, including associated business case analyses and identifying sustainment risk. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Navy concurred with this recommendation and stated that it will ensure that all shipbuilding program develop and maintain accurate and complete life cycle sustainment plans. However, as we state in our report, the Navy did not have any accurate and completed life cycle sustainment plans and, as July 2020, has not updated any of these plans.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Commander of Naval Sea Systems Command to evaluate and implement changes to the ILA in order to position the ILA to effectively identify key sustainment risks and make recommendations for risk mitigation, which may include existing Navy proposals to change the ILA process. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The department concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Navy will undertake a review and will approve any updated Independent Logistics Assessment (ILA) policy that emphasizes risk identification and mitigation in the ILA review. In July 2020, Navy officials stated that the Naval Sea Systems Command and the Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment co-chaired a system-level ILA Working Group in 2020 to rewrite the Navy ILA Handbook to address key deficiencies in the current ILA process and to emphasize the use of a readiness at cost model. ILA Handbook and associated Secretary of Navy Instructions is currently in comment adjudication. In addition, Naval Sea Systems Command is developing an ILA database that provides stakeholders with visibility and insight into their respective programs' ILA-identified sustainment risks to closure. Once completed, Navy officials state that these items should implement the needed improvements to ILAs.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the ASN (RD&A) and the CNO to ensure sustainment-related briefing topics prescribed by the Navy's acquisition policy are consistently discussed at Gate reviews. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Navy concurred with this recommendation and stated that it has updated its Gate 6 sustainment sufficiency process and is executing a new Gate 7 sustainment review. In July 2020, Navy officials reported to us that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition will collaborate to ensure sustainment focus areas are properly emphasized at all Gate reviews. As our report states, focusing on sustainment at Gate 7 is likely insufficient to address many of the problems we found in the report. However, as of July 2020, the Navy has yet to provide us with evidence that demonstrate an increase in focus on sustainment during gate briefings or any of the new Gate 7 briefings.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the ASN (RD&A) and the CNO to implement the sustainment program baseline initiative for shipbuilding programs and, in so doing, develop a mechanism that ensures that sustainment outcomes are a factor in shipbuilding programs' decision-making during the acquisition process. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Navy concurred with this recommendation and Navy acquisition leadership officials stated that they will review the results of the demonstration programs for the Sustainment Program Baseline initiative and implement guidance for shipbuilding and all programs in subsequent guidance and policy concerning Sustainment Program Baselines. In updating its response to our recommendations in July 2020, the Navy is planning to implement the Sustainment Program Baseline as a pilot program for ships and submarines in fiscal year 2021.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should revise SECNAVINST 5000.2 and other associated guidance to ensure PSMs are assigned to shipbuilding program offices in time to inform early acquisition decisions, including development of the program's sustainment requirements and LCSPs. (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: the Navy concurred with this recommendation and stated that they will ensure that Product Support Managers (PSM) are assigned to acquisition programs ahead of Milestone A in compliance with existing DoD PSM policies. However, as of July 2020, the Navy did not state that it is planning to revise SECNAVINST 5000.2.

Recommendation: Congress should consider developing an oversight mechanism for evaluating shipbuilding programs' sustainment cost estimate growth during the acquisition process, with requirements for the Navy to: (1) report sustainment cost estimate growth information to Congress and (2) reassess shipbuilding programs that are experiencing a high level of sustainment cost estimate growth.

Agency: Congress
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2020, there are several draft bills that would address this matter.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the shipyard optimization program office (PMS 555) include all costs—such as costs for program office activities, utilities, roads, environmental remediation, historical preservation, and alternative workspace—when developing its second, more detailed, cost estimate. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the shipyard optimization program office (PMS 555) use cost estimating best practices—as outlined in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide—in developing its second cost estimate, including a program baseline, work breakdown structure, a description of the methodology and key assumptions, inflation, fully addressing risk and uncertainty, and a sensitivity analysis. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the shipyard optimization program office (PMS 555) obtain an independent cost estimate of the Naval Shipyards program prior to the start of its project prioritization effort. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the shipyard optimization program office (PMS 555), in coordination with relevant stakeholders, establish clear roles and responsibilities for the shipyards involved in the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct NAVSEA to incorporate current cost and program data and an updated cost risk analysis in its planned update of the Columbia class lead submarine cost estimate. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, stating that the Columbia Class Program cost estimate will be updated in 2019 to support the lead ship authorization Decision Acquisition Board in 2020. As of September 2020, we have yet to receive an update on the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct NAVSEA to develop a realistic and well-documented estimate of savings from use of the authorities associated with the Fund and incorporate the savings associated with the lead submarine into the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation, stating that the updated Columbia Class Program cost estimate would incorporate estimated savings from use of the authorities associated with the fund and savings associated with the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate. In August 2020, Navy officials indicated that NAVSEA updated the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate to include updates to the estimate of savings from the use of the authorities associated with the Fund.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Columbia class program office to update the lead submarine cost estimate and cost risk analysis prior to requesting funds for lead submarine construction. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, stating that the lead submarine cost estimate and cost risk analysis will be updated to support the lead ship authorization Decision Acquisition Board in 2020. In August 2020, Navy officials indicated that NAVSEA updated the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate. However, this estimate was completed after funding was requested for lead submarine construction. While the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation plans to conduct an assessment of this estimate in the summer of 2020, the assessment will also be too late to inform the Navy's funding request.

Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Secretary of the Navy, should direct the polar icebreaker program and NAVSEA 05C to update the HPIB cost estimate in accordance with best practices for cost estimation, including (1) developing risk bounds for all phases of the program lifecycle, and on the basis of these risk bounds, conduct risk and uncertainty analysis, as well as sensitivity analysis, on all phases of the program lifecycle, and (2) reconciling the results with an updated independent cost estimate based on the same technical baseline before the option for construction of the lead ship is awarded. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments on this report, the Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2020, Coast Guard officials stated that they are updating the polar icebreaker program's life cycle cost estimate to reflect information provided by the shipbuilder and anticipate completing the update in the fall 2020. We will review the updated life cycle cost estimate at that time and determine if the actions taken meet the intent of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should direct the polar icebreaker program office to develop a program schedule in accordance with best practices for project schedules, including determining realistic durations of all shipbuilding activities and identifying and including a reasonable amount of margin in the schedule, to set realistic schedule goals for all three ships before the option for construction of the lead ship is awarded. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments on this report, the Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2020, Coast Guard officials stated that they updated the polar icebreaker program's schedule for the lead ship and are in the process of developing schedules for the follow-on ships. We will review the updated schedules once the Coast Guard provides them and determine if the actions taken meet the intent of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The DHS Under Secretary for Management should require the Coast Guard to update the HPIB acquisition program baselines prior to authorizing lead ship construction, after completion of the preliminary design review, and after it has gained the requisite knowledge on its technologies, cost, and schedule, as recommended above. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments on this report, DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will require the Coast Guard to update the HPIB program's acquisition program baselines prior to authorizing lead ship construction. As of August 2020, Coast Guard officials anticipate updating the acquisition program baselines by no later than February 2021. We will review the updated HPIB acquisition program baselines at that time and determine if the actions taken meet the intent of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy's ship delivery policy to clarify what types of deficiencies need to be corrected and what mission capability (including the levels of quality and capability) must be achieved at (1) delivery and (2) when the ship is provided to the fleet (at the obligation work limiting date (OWLD)). In doing so, the Navy should clearly define what constitutes a complete ship and when that should be achieved.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD disagreed with our recommendation to clarify the Navy's ship delivery policy and stated that other existing policies help ensure the completion and capability of ships at delivery. However, as of August 2020, Navy officials stated that they are working on a new response based on ongoing discussions with GAO and they expect to develop a new proposal for responding to this recommendation by December 2020. We maintain that the Navy's ship delivery policy is a key instruction for ensuring that complete, mission-capable ships are provided to the fleet and should be revised in line with our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to reconcile policy with practice to support INSURV's role in making a recommendation for fleet introduction. Accomplishing this may require a study of the current timing of ship trials, and the costs and benefits associated with adding an INSURV assessment prior to providing ships to the fleet.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD and the Navy did not concur with this recommendation, noting that the current timing of Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) trials provides the Navy with an opportunity to ensure contractual obligations have been met and identify construction deficiencies for correction during the post-delivery period. DOD and the Navy also stated that adding another INSURV trial at the end of the post-delivery period would not be cost-effective and could delay ship deployment schedules. However, we found that most of the significant construction deficiencies identified prior to delivery were not corrected until the post-delivery period and, therefore, INSURV generally did not have an opportunity to inspect these corrections before ships were provided to the fleet. Given this, we maintain that the Navy should re-assess the timing of its post-delivery trials in support of INSURV's responsibility to make recommendations for fleet introduction. As of August 2020, DOD officials stated that they are working on a proposal to address this recommendation based on ongoing discussions with GAO and they expect to complete this proposal by December 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to reflect additional ship milestones in Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress, including OWLD and readiness to deploy.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. DOD and the Navy agreed to report obligation work limiting dates (OWLD) in its Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress, and, as of December 2018, has implemented this portion of the recommendation. The department added the OWLDs for all ships that have yet to achieve this milestone to its Selected Acquisition Reports and plans to continue reporting this information in all subsequent Selected Acquisition Reports. However, DOD did not agree to report ready-to-deploy dates in the Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress, noting that operational factors outside of acquisition concerns can affect the timing of this milestone. While we agree that readiness to deploy is a fleet determination, we continue to believe that this date is important for Congressional oversight, as it remains the best milestone for determining when a ship has achieved a sufficient level of completeness to operate, under the Navy's current framework for ship delivery. As of August 2020, DOD and Navy officials stated that they are working on a new proposal for addressing the recommendation based on ongoing discussions with GAO and they expect to complete this proposal by December 2020.

Recommendation: To help ensure the Navy thoroughly considers the relative benefits of using FPI contracts for shipbuilding versus other contract types, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a portfolio-wide assessment of the Navy's use of additional incentives on FPI contracts across its shipbuilding programs. This assessment should include a mechanism to share proven incentive strategies for achieving intended cost, schedule, and quality outcomes among contracting and program office officials.

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments on this report, the agency concurred with this recommendation. As of July 2020, the Navy had commissioned a study of its use of additional incentives on fixed-price incentive contracts across its shipbuilding programs. The Navy plans to socialize this report with the shipbuilding program executive offices so that they can share lessons learned across the shipbuilding enterprise. The estimated completion date for this effort is the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020. Following completion of that effort, in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021, the Navy plans to provide recommendations regarding the use of additional incentives on fixed-price incentive contracts across its shipbuilding programs.