Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should direct the W87-1 program to ensure consistent, reliable, and objective assessments of remaining feature and component design decisions in Phase 6.2 by developing study plans for remaining design studies consistent with the guidelines for such plans in NNSA's AOA procedure, including documenting and justifying deviations from best practices. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should direct the Office of Defense Programs to revise its program execution instruction to require that design studies for warhead life extension and replacement programs follow AOA best practices, such as by having a study plan, or to justify and document deviations from best practices. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should direct the Office of Defense Programs' plutonium program office to ensure that the integrated master schedule in development for pit production meets NIMS standards, consistent with best practices for schedule development. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should direct the W87-1 program to prioritize the development and documentation of a risk mitigation strategy to address the risk that pit production may be insufficient to meet W87-1 production needs. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of FDA should, as part of the agency's efforts to update OLS's strategic plan for overseeing agency-wide laboratory safety, resolve agency-wide disagreements on the roles and responsibilities for the centers and OLS in implementing laboratory safety reforms. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services: Food and Drug Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of FDA should, as part of the agency's efforts to update OLS's strategic plan for overseeing agency-wide laboratory safety, address issues of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation within the safety program. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services: Food and Drug Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of FDA should, as part of the agency's efforts to update OLS's strategic plan for overseeing agency-wide laboratory safety, identify how FDA leadership will communicate agency-wide on a sustained basis about the importance of laboratory safety and OLS's role in ensuring successful implementation of laboratory safety reforms. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services: Food and Drug Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of FDA should provide OLS—as FDA's laboratory oversight body—with the necessary oversight authority and access to laboratories to oversee FDA's laboratory safety program and ensure compliance with the agency's laboratory safety policies. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services: Food and Drug Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of FDA should take steps to assess and mitigate any risks to independence posed by funding OLS—as FDA's laboratory safety oversight body—through the working capital fund. In conducting its risk assessment, FDA should specifically focus on ensuring the decision-making processes of the working capital fund supports OLS's independence and ability to hire sufficient staff to implement its laboratory safety oversight priorities. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services: Food and Drug Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology should take steps, such as updating guidance or other written communication, to ensure that the topical-research working groups (1) define and monitor progress toward achieving long-term outcomes, and (2) regularly update and monitor their charters and other written agreements to reflect these outcomes, in line with leading practices. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology should take additional steps, such as providing more specific guidance or instructions to the modal administrations on the information that should be updated or required, to ensure that the information in the Research Hub is complete and accurate. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of BOP should conduct an analysis, using available incident and cost data, and other information as appropriate, to determine if the current decision to not issue pepper spray to minimum security prisons should remain in effect. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Justice: Bureau of Prisons
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NHTSA should document an evaluation plan for the Crash Injury Research and Engineering Network pedestrian pilot program that includes criteria for determining whether and how to scale the pilot program to ensure that the piloted data-collection and analysis procedures will address NHTSA's data needs related to pedestrian injuries and vehicle characteristics. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 2020, NHTSA reported that it plans to develop an evaluation plan for the CIREN pedestrian pilot program by April 30, 2021 to inform decisions about further investigative pedestrian crash studies. According to NHTSA this plan will address research needs categorized as either crash worthiness, crash avoidance, or behavioral in nature, and will include criteria for investigative study elements and the scope or scalability of those studies. NHTSA also reported that in developing the evaluation plan it will consider input from stakeholders, including the first-hand experience from the CIREN pilot study sites. GAO will continue to monitor NHTSA's progress in addressing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NHTSA should document the overall process for making changes to NCAP, including established criteria and milestones for decisions, and share this process with external stakeholders. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Transportation: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In July 2020, NHTSA reported that it is developing proposed updates to NCAP, which it plans to publish in a notice in the Federal Register by the end of 2020. According to NHTSA this notice will clarify the process by which NHTSA updates NCAP, and after receiving and responding to comments, NHTSA plans to update its website to provide information to stakeholders on how the agency considers and finalizes changes to NCAP. GAO will continue to monitor NHTSA's actions to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NHTSA should decide whether to include pedestrian safety tests in NCAP and NHTSA should communicate this decision and rationale to relevant stakeholders and the public. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Transportation: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In July 2020, NHTSA reported that it is developing its proposal on planned changes to NCAP, which is expected to include pedestrian safety tests, and is working to publish a notice to the Federal Register by the end of 2020. According to NHTSA, this process will include receiving public comment on the proposal, which the agency will consider in deciding and communicating NHTSA's next stages. As stated in GAO's report, in the absence of a decision on whether to include pedestrian safety testing in NCAP, and the rationale for that decision, stakeholders lack clarity on whether NHTSA is using all of the policy tools at its disposal to address emerging safety risks and to achieve its strategic objectives. GAO will continue to monitor NHTSA's efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Chairman of the Board should require the Safety Recommendation and Communication team to fully document its evaluations when assessing items to propose for Most Wanted List consideration (Recommendation 1).

Agency: National Transportation Safety Board
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Chairman of the Board should take steps to publicly and fully communicate the selection rationale, such as including why NTSB believes an issue is "ripe for action" to its documentation on its website (Recommendation 2).

Agency: National Transportation Safety Board
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Chairman of FCC should develop specific, measurable goals and performance measures for its efforts to monitor the performance of new WEA capabilities, such as enhanced geo-targeting and expanded alert message length. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Federal Communications Commission
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of the IPAWS program should document how it plans to address key actions needed to educate alerting authorities in their use of IPAWS and implement a mechanism that will allow FEMA to regularly and systematically obtain and analyze feedback on alerting authorities' educational needs. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response: Federal Emergency Management Agency
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of the IPAWS program should establish procedures to prioritize pending IPAWS applications and to follow up with applicants to address these applications. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response: Federal Emergency Management Agency
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Administrator of FAA should develop a plan for analyzing currently-collected UAS test site data to determine how they could be used to advance UAS integration, and whether the collection of any additional test site data, within the agency's authority to request, could be useful for informing integration. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration: Office of the Administrator
Status: Open

Comments: DOT partially concurred with this recommendation. In DOT's official response dated March 2020, DOT officials indicated that FAA does not intend to collect any additional type of test site data, unless FAA funds new research or demonstrations. Further, officials noted that FAA has gathered data since the UAS test site program became operational in 2014, through several vehicles including details of flight tests entered into the Mission Logging System (MLS). Officials noted that FAA has and will continue to use data collected from the test sites to, among other things, better understand the challenges facing future UAS integration. We continue to believe that FAA implementing this recommendation would enable the agency to better leverage test site research and data to inform its decisions related to UAS integration. When we confirm what actions FAA has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of FDA should establish a process to monitor whether the agency is meeting its audit goals and expectations for sampling and inspections to support its removal decisions for seafood import alerts. This could be done through regularly analyzing data that FDA collects, such as those in CMS, FACTS, and OASIS. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services: Food and Drug Administration
Status: Open

Comments: FDA agreed with our recommendation. In August 2020, FDA told us that the agency is working to review and modify appropriate sections of its Regulatory Procedures Manual to better reflect the importance of foreign suppliers' corrective actions when making decisions to remove a firm from an import alert and identify higher-risk problem areas where more robust information may be needed. In addition, a checklist for import alerts and associated Compliance Management System (database) functionality are under development. According to FDA, the agency is also working to refine internal communications to better assure that firms which have recently been removed from an import alert are also considered for an inspection. Additionally, in November 2019, FDA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on accreditation of laboratories that conduct food testing to support removal from import alert and other purposes. We will continue to monitor FDA's planned actions to determine if they satisfy our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of FDA should establish a time frame for developing performance goals and measures for its imported food safety program. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services: Food and Drug Administration
Status: Open

Comments: FDA agreed with this recommendation. In August 2020, FDA told us that the agency has published some performance metrics and plans to develop additional performance measures and outcome indicators for imported food safety, to support FDA's Strategy for the Safety of Imported Food (Strategy). In addition, after publishing these initial metrics for the Strategy, the agency will develop additional performance metrics. FDA stated that the COVID-19 situation is quite fluid and the agency is unable to project timelines for developing additional performance measures at this time. We will continue to monitor FDA's planned actions to determine if they satisfy our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of FDA should, as the agency develops goals and measures for its imported food safety program, develop performance goals and corresponding performance measures specific to seafood import alerts. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services: Food and Drug Administration
Status: Open

Comments: FDA agreed with this recommendation. In August 2020, FDA told us that the agency remains committed to developing additional performance goals and measures for its imported food safety program. FDA is still reviewing the Import Alert Effectiveness Program and will consider metrics, as appropriate, based on the outcome of that review. FDA stated that the COVID-19 situation is quite fluid and the agency is unable to project timelines for developing additional performance measures at this time. We will continue to monitor FDA's planned actions to determine if they satisfy our recommendation.

Recommendation: The NHTSA Administrator should provide direction and clarification to states to ensure compliance with requirements to assess and report progress made in achieving fatality targets. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of January 2020, NHTSA told GAO that they had emailed all State Highway Safety Offices in November 2019 to clarify the requirements for states to assess their progress made in achieving fatality targets. NHTSA also told GAO that they plan to conduct a national webinar for State Highway Safety Offices to provide direction on performance management requirements by July 2020. GAO will continue to monitor NHTSA's implementation of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The NHTSA Administrator should develop and implement a mechanism that communicates to Congress and other stakeholders whether states achieve their fatality and serious injury targets. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Transportation: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In April 2020, GAO confirmed that NHTSA published each state's required safety targets from calendar year 2020 on it website. NHTSA told GAO that it plans to provide performance data on state's achievement of their 2020 targets on its website when data becomes available in the fall of 2021, and complete implementation of this recommendation in 2022. GAO will continue to monitor NHTSA's implementation of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of the FAA should identify existing or new data and information needed to evaluate oversight activities and develop a mechanism for capturing these data as needed. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: FAA has concurred with this recommendation. As of April 2020, GAO was working to analyze and evaluate the actions the agency has taken in response.

Recommendation: The PHMSA Administrator should analyze the factors affecting states' participation in underground natural gas storage inspections and analyze its workforce needs on an ongoing basis to guide its budget requests. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of February 2020, the Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is collaborating with an organization of state government oil and gas oversight officials to assess the factors affecting their participation in its underground natural gas storage inspections, according to DOT. PHMSA plans to use this information by December 2020 to assess whether additional measures can be undertaken to increase state participation for its use starting in Fiscal Year 2022.

Recommendation: NNSA's Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager and relevant NNSA officials and contractor representatives at NNSA sites should take steps to improve the accuracy of FIMS data related to NNSA's infrastructure supporting explosives activities. These steps should include reviewing and updating information about associations of assets with primary and secondary explosives missions; ensuring that those who provide asset information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to provide; and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for explosives assets that are not buildings. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 2020, we are currently reviewing agency information and plan to reach out as needed for additional information for this recommendation.

Recommendation: NNSA's Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with members of NNSA's Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials, include discussion of identified challenges related to explosives activities, such as data quality, workforce levels, and safety as well as any actions to address them, as appropriate, or document the rationale for why identified challenges were not included. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: Based on trade press reports, NNSA appears to be taking several actions that, collectively, may serve to close this recommendation as implemented. As of July 2020, we are awaiting information from agency officials and will update the status of this recommendation when the information is received.

Recommendation: NNSA's Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with members of NNSA's Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials, include fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan, such as a clearly identified mission statement and performance goals that are quantifiable, set time frames for completion, and list responsible parties to carry out specific activities for all strategic goals. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: Based on trade press reports, NNSA appears to be making progress implementing this recommendation. As of July 2020, we have requested additional information from agency officials and will update the recommendation status when the information is received.

Recommendation: The TSA Administrator should periodically review, and as appropriate, update the 2010 Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan to ensure the plan reflects relevant changes in pipeline security threats, technology, federal law and policy, and any other factors relevant to the security of the nation's pipeline systems. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that TSA will periodically review, and as appropriate, update the 2010 Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan to ensure the plan reflects relevant changes in pipeline security threats, technology, federal law and policy, and any other factors relevant to the security of the nation's pipeline systems. In October 2019, TSA officials reported that they were in the process of reviewing the 2010 Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan and anticipated completing the review by December 2019. However, this review was delayed and we will continue to monitor TSA's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health should explore the feasibility of requiring a corporate identification number in its inspection database and enabling its website to be searched by that number. This should include exploring the following issues: (1) which corporate identification number would be most appropriate to require; (2) options for obtaining this number from employers; and (3) options for entering this number in its database that would prevent or minimize delays in closing inspection records. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Labor: Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Status: Open

Comments: OSHA did not state whether it agreed with this recommendation. The agency acknowledged the potential utility of obtaining a unique identifier from each employer and said it will continue to promote the collection of Employer Identification Numbers (EIN) or Tax Identification Numbers (TIN) whenever possible by issuing a revised memorandum to field staff to reinforce the importance of collecting this information. OSHA stated that it does not view EINs as confidential or protected from disclosure. However, it expressed concerns about protecting TINs and Social Security Numbers from disclosure, and noted that it would not be able to make a data field available for public search if it contained either of these numbers. OSHA also raised concerns about the financial cost associated with redesigning the agency's data system. We encourage OSHA to explore options for addressing these concerns as it further considers how to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should provide information to contracting officials to advise them that the OSHA website is a resource for information about contractors' workplace safety and health records. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and identified implementation timelines. We will monitor the agency's progress.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should explore the feasibility of requiring a safety performance rating for contracts in industries that have relatively high rates of occupational injuries, such as manufacturing, construction, and ship building and repairing. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and identified implementation timelines. We will monitor the agency's progress.

Recommendation: The Administrator of FHWA, working with FRA, should evaluate the Section 130 Program's requirements to determine whether they allow states sufficient flexibility to adequately address current and emerging grade-crossing safety issues. As part of this evaluation, FHWA should determine whether statutory changes to the program are necessary to improve its effectiveness. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Highway Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In June 2020, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) completed a summary report, in cooperation with the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, on stakeholder views of the Section 130 program requirements. As part of this evaluation, Volpe obtained feedback from stakeholders about their experience with the program requirements and their views on the flexibility of the requirements to address current and emerging grade-crossing safety issues. The report also contained a literature review. On August 17, 2020, FHWA reported to GAO that FHWA will continue to explore what statutory changes may be appropriate during the upcoming reauthorization cycle. The recommendation remains open because FHWA has not yet determined whether statutory changes to the program are necessary to improve its effectiveness. GAO will continue to monitor FHWA's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations should direct the Commercial Crew Program to include the results of its schedule risk analysis in its mandatory quarterly reports to Congress. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA did not concur with our recommendation that the Commercial Crew Program should include the results of its schedule analysis in its quarterly reports to Congress. In July 2019, NASA reaffirmed that it will be working to ensure that the contractors' schedules and the program's internal assessments sync up as the program gets closer to launch, which is the process it used in March 2019 leading up to SpaceX's uncrewed test flight. GAO continues to believe that the recommendation is valid because the program's schedule risk analysis would provide Congress with valuable insight into potential delays, which are likely.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should develop and maintain a contingency plan for ensuring a presence on the ISS until a Commercial Crew Program contractor is certified. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation. NASA stated that it is in discussions with Russia to obtain additional seats on its Soyuz spacecraft for NASA crew as a contingency plan. NASA is also providing Extra-Vehicular Activity and robotics training for a subset of cosmonauts to support U.S. Operating Segment operations, and looking at a possible extension of the duration of the Space X Demonstration 2 crewed test flight. In November 2019, NASA reported that it completed its actions for this recommendation. However, while NASA is working on potential solutions, there is no contingency plan in place. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA needs to provide documentation of its contingency plan.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should direct the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations, the Commercial Crew Program Manager, and the Commercial Crew Program Contracting Officer to collectively determine and document before the agency certification review how the agency will determine its risk tolerance level with respect to loss of crew. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA partially concurred with our recommendation, stating it documented the agency's risk tolerance level with respect to loss of crew for the program in its May 2011 safety memo. NASA stated that ultimately the Commercial Crew Program is accountable for ensuring that the contractors' systems meet the loss of crew value of 1 in 270. In July 2019, the Commercial Crew Program noted that it will continue to determine its risk tolerance with respect to loss of crew and formally document its decisions at program management meetings. We continue to believe that, before agency certification, the key parties must collectively determine how the agency will determine its risk tolerance with response to loss of crew, as the risk tolerance for the loss of crew requirement depends on which entity is presenting the results of its analysis. We believe this approach will reduce confusion and increase transparency. In late September 2020, GAO received additional information from NASA on actions taken to implement this recommendation. We are currently assessing this information.

Recommendation: After completing the agency certification review, NASA's Chief Engineer and Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance, with support from the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations and the Commercial Crew Program Manager, should document lessons learned related to loss of crew as a safety threshold for future crewed spaceflight missions, given the complexity of the metric. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA concurred with our recommendation to document lessons learned related to the loss of crew requirement. In June 2020, NASA told us that they expect to take action to close this recommendation by the end of May 2021.

Recommendation: The Undersecretary for Health should ensure that Central Office, Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), and medical facilities document the actions they take towards achieving OSI goals. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
Status: Open

Comments: VA concurred with the recommendation. To fully implement this recommendation, VHA needs to provide information about the new documentation requirements described in the November 2019 update.

Recommendation: The Undersecretary for Health should ensure that any OSI goals that have not been met have clearly defined, measurable outcomes, including milestones or numerical targets, as appropriate, and timeframes. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
Status: Open

Comments: VA concurred with the recommendation. To fully implement this recommendation, VHA needs to provide information about specific actions, described in the November 2019 update, taken to address the recommendation including documentation showing the actions taken to review the OSI goals and documentation of new OSI goals, metrics, and timelines.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should direct ORP to require the WTP contractor to determine the full extent to which problems exist in all WTP structures, systems, and components.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE agreed with the recommendation. As of June 15, 2020, DOE has started to take action to implement this recommendation, but actions are not sufficient to close it yet. DOE has directed the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) construction contractor to determine the full extent to which problems exist in all WTP structures, systems, and components and plans to complete full implementation of this recommendation by February 15, 2021.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should direct ORP to use its authorities to stop work in areas where quality assurance problems are recurring until ORP's Quality Assurance Division can verify that the problems are corrected and will not recur.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE agreed with the recommendation. As of July 1, 2020, DOE has taken some action to implement this recommendation, but actions are not sufficient to close it yet. To implement this recommendation, DOE strengthened and evaluated the existing Office of River Protection (ORP) Stop Work process to ensure it is sufficiently rigorous. In June 2020, ORP activated this new process. However, ORP has not yet used its authority to stop work in areas in areas where quality assurance problems are recurring.

Recommendation: The Administrator of the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) should document the agency's process for deciding which products to consider for new pathogen standards, including the basis on which such decisions should be made. (Recommendation 1).

Agency: Department of Agriculture: Food Safety and Inspection Service
Status: Open

Comments: As of September 2019, FSIS is drafting a document that will outline the agency's process for deciding which products to consider for new pathogen standards, including the basis on which such decisions should be made. FSIS estimates the document will be finalized in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020. As of October 2020, FSIS has not completed this action.

Recommendation: The Administrator of FSIS should set time frames for determining what pathogen standards or additional policies are needed to address pathogens in beef carcasses, ground beef, pork cuts, and ground pork. (Recommendation 2).

Agency: Department of Agriculture: Food Safety and Inspection Service
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2019, FSIS proposed new pathogen reduction performance standards for Salmonella in raw ground beef and beef trimmings. FSIS told us the agency is developing performance standards for some pork products and plans to issue draft standards sometime in fiscal year 2020 but as of October 2020 has not completed this action.

Recommendation: The Administrator of FSIS should include available information on the effectiveness of on-farm practices to reduce the level of pathogens as it finalizes its guidelines for controlling Salmonella in hogs. (Recommendation 3).

Agency: Department of Agriculture: Food Safety and Inspection Service
Status: Open

Comments: As of September 2019, FSIS is revising its draft guidelines for controlling Salmonella in hogs. The agency plans to include in the guidelines available scientific information on the effectiveness of on-farm practices to reduce Salmonella. FSIS estimates it will complete its revision of the guidelines in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020 but as of October 2020 has not completed this action.

Recommendation: Once reliable data are available, the Coast Guard, or another agency identified by the working group, should assess the rates of commercial fishing vessel accidents, injuries, and fatalities to determine whether certain factors--including vessel length and region of operation, among other things--affect these rates. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not concur with our recommendation that the Coast Guard assess the rates of commercial fishing vessel accidents, injuries, and fatalities to determine whether certain factors-such as vessel length and region of operation-affect these rates. DHS officials stated that the Coast Guard has limited resources and capabilities to conduct such assessments and noted that the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) studies marine incidents to identify causal factors in fishing vessel casualties, which could more effectively determine casualty rates. The Coast Guard uses this information to update and develop commercial fishing vessel safety standards and policy, as appropriate. GAO agrees that NIOSH plays an important role in identifying commercial fishing fatalities and regional risk factors, but such assessments typically focus on fatalities in specific fisheries, and generally did not consider such factors as vessel length or whether the vessel has been classed. As of July 2020, Coast Guard officials stated the Coast Guard continues to work with other Federal partners on data collection strategies through the established work group to determine the best reliable data in order to establish credible rates of casualties, injuries, and fatalities in the commercial fishing vessel industry. This recommendation will remain open pending a decision by the working group on the appropriate agency to conduct these assessments.

Recommendation: The Coast Guard should issue regulations or guidance to clarify and implement the alternative-to-class approach. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security concurred with our recommendation that the Coast Guard issue regulations or guidance to clarify and implement the alternative-to-class approach. As of November 2018, the Coast Guard made a presentation to the commercial fishing industry clarifying the alternative-to-class approach as it relates to commercial fishing vessels including discussion topics such as understanding the language of 46 USC 4503 and State Licensed Naval Architect and Marine Engineers' scope of responsibilities when incorporating standards equivalent to those prescribed by a classification society. As of June 2020, Coast Guard officials stated they have formalized work instruction guidance regarding implementation of the alternative-to-class approach. This guidance is expected to be released by the end of 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Interior should direct the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs to assign responsibility to a specific office or official to develop and implement a plan to assess employees' safety training needs and monitor employees' compliance with Indian Affairs' safety training requirements.

Agency: Department of the Interior
Status: Open

Comments: Interior agreed with this recommendation. In early August 2017, Indian Affairs reported that BIA regional leadership, in collaboration with Indian Affairs' safety office, will develop and publish a safety training plan for all Indian Affairs employees with responsibilities for safety inspections. Additionally, Indian Affairs reported that BIA and BIE will develop and implement a policy to ensure that first-line supervisors monitor and report on whether employees have completed the training requirements. Indian Affairs reported a target date of January 31, 2020 for implementing this recommendation. In May 2018, Indian Affairs reported that it had completed a draft training plan and noted that it had been submitted to management for review. We requested copies of the training plan but as of August 2018, we had not been provided any. In April 2019, Indian Affairs provided documentation that it had developed and implemented a plan to assess all employees' safety training needs. In addition, agency officials reported that Interior's new training management system allows supervisors to track employees' completion of required safety training courses. However, the agency did not provide documentation that senior managers are overseeing employees' compliance with Indian Affairs' safety training requirements. In May 2020, Indian Affairs officials told us that they had developed a process to generate reports on personnel safety training compliance and would provide documentation demonstrating that such reports are shared with management to address training noncompliance. We will continue to monitor the agency's actions in this area.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Interior should direct the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management, who oversees BSEE, to establish a mechanism for BSEE management to obtain and incorporate input from bureau personnel and any external parties, such as Argonne, that can affect the bureau's ability to achieve its objectives.

Agency: Department of the Interior
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In its June 9, 2017, response to our report, Interior indicated that BSEE is developing new strategies to improve trust and foster greater collaboration for consideration by the new Director. In September 2018, Interior provided documentation of several BSEE actions, including establishing an Employee Engagement Council, an Innovation Program, and Ombudsman position within the bureau. As of August 2020, BSEE indicated that these efforts remain ongoing. However, this recommendation remains open because BSEE has not yet demonstrated that these actions represent an enduring institutionalization of improved communication throughout the bureau.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Interior should direct the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management, who oversees BSEE, to address leadership commitment deficiencies within BSEE, including by implementing internal management initiatives and ongoing strategic initiatives (e.g., Enterprise Risk Management and performance measure initiatives) in a timely manner.

Agency: Department of the Interior
Status: Open

Comments: In its June 2017 response to our report, Interior indicated that BSEE will incorporate lessons learned from its first enterprise risk management cycle in future cycles and that BSEE will incorporate a performance management dashboard in fiscal year 2018. In August 2019, BSEE provided documentation regarding actions it has taken to implement and institutionalize its enterprise risk management and performance measure initiatives. In August 2020, BSEE indicated that implementation of these processes remains ongoing. However, this recommendation remains open because BSEE has not yet demonstrated that these actions represent an enduring institutionalization of improved internal management initiatives and ongoing strategic initiatives throughout the bureau.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Interior should direct the BSEE Director to address trust concerns that exist between headquarters and the field, BSEE should expand the scope of its employee engagement strategy to incorporate the need to communicate quality information throughout the bureau.

Agency: Department of the Interior
Status: Open

Comments: In its June 2017 response to our report, Interior indicated that BSEE's response to this recommendation would be incorporated into its corrective actions for recommendation one. In September 2018, Interior provided documentation of several BSEE actions, including establishing an Employee Engagement Council, an Innovation Program, and Ombudsman position within the bureau. As of August 2020, BSEE indicated that these efforts remain ongoing. However, this recommendation remains open because BSEE has not yet demonstrated that these actions represent an enduring institutionalization of expanded employee engagement throughout the bureau.

Recommendation: To strengthen efforts to mitigate earthquake risks to federal buildings, the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of GSA should (1) Define what constitutes an exceptionally high risk building, identify such buildings, and develop plans to mitigate those risks, including prioritizing associated funding requests as needed; and (2) To the extent practicable, prioritize and implement comprehensive seismic safety measures which could include earthquake drills, seismic safety inspections, and non-structural retrofits to decrease risks and reduce damage in federally-owned and -leased buildings in earthquake hazard areas.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. In June 2019, DOD reported that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had developed a sophisticated risk assessment tool which could potentially be used to both define and assess exceptionally high risk buildings in a cost-effective manner. DOD said that it was in the process of determining the suitability of the tool for use by its components, and potentially other federal government partners. According to DOD, further action to address this recommendation will depend on both a favorable determination of the tool's suitability and the availability of funding to conduct assessments and complete the mitigation actions identified by the assessments. We will continue to monitor DOD's efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: To enhance FAA's risk-based approach for oversight of repair stations, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to develop and implement a process in Flight Standards for incorporating into SAS the volume of critical maintenance that each U.S. airline contracts to repair stations.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: FAA did not concur with this recommendation. In July 2019, GAO confirmed that FAA does not plan to implement the recommendation because the agency continues to believe the subjective nature of volume of work makes it an ineffective risk indicator. However, the agency monitors many factors as primary risk indicators at repair stations. Many of these risk indicators are associated with important aspects of work volume such as high workforce turnover; changes in management; rapid growth or downsizing; changes in aircraft complexity/programs; financial conditions; age of fleet and increases in aircraft discrepancies. FAA considers these factors and the criticality of a specific maintenance action on an aircraft to be the most important risk indicators.

Recommendation: To enhance FAA's risk-based approach for oversight of repair stations, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to develop and implement an evaluative process with measurable performance goals and measures to determine the effectiveness of SAS as the SMS safety assurance component.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: In July 2019, GAO confirmed that FAA plans to develop overall program goals and metrics as part of the next implementation phase of its new Safety Assurance System. These metrics are expected to be fully developed based on the final design of the new system and the program requirements identified. Final system testing and deployment into production for the Safety Assurance System is expected to be completed by February 2021, with final implementation scheduled to be completed by May 2022. Additionally, prior to deploying the system, FAA plans to provide training courses to the aviation safety workforce who will be using the new system, and plans to issue new policy documentation in June 2020 that will be used to provide additional guidance to that workforce on properly using the system.

Recommendation: To promote the transition to improved crash test standards, to strengthen FHWA's oversight of the roadside safety hardware's crash-testing process, and to make more information available to states and industry on how roadside safety hardware performs in actual conditions, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator of FHWA to provide additional guidance to crash test labs and accreditation bodies to ensure that labs have a clear separation between device development and testing in cases where lab employees test devices that were developed within their parent organization.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: As of January 2020, FHWA has not determined what actions, if any, it plans to take to address this recommendation. During 2019, FHWA officials stated that the agency was planning, in consultation with state departments of transportation, to establish a mechanism for third party verification of results from crash-test labs. The initial plan was to work with an outside organization that would assume responsibility for third party verification by mid to late 2020. This outside organization was to be responsible for developing guidelines with respect to lab independence and dealing with cases where a testing lab and a hardware developer are owned by the same parent company. According to FHWA officials, while the agency engaged with two outside organizations, it has not been able to establish a mechanism for third party verification of results through an outside organization and is considering additional options. As a result, FHWA is re-evaluating actions to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: To promote the transition to improved crash test standards, to strengthen FHWA's oversight of the roadside safety hardware's crash-testing process, and to make more information available to states and industry on how roadside safety hardware performs in actual conditions, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator of FHWA to develop a process for third-party verification of results from crash-test labs.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: As of January 2020, FHWA has not determined what actions, if any, it plans to take to address this recommendation. During 2019, FHWA officials stated that the agency was planning, in consultation with state departments of transportation, to establish a mechanism for third party verification of results from crash-test labs. The initial plan was to work with an outside organization that would assume responsibility for third party verification by mid to late 2020. According to FHWA officials, while the agency engaged with two outside organizations, it has not been able to establish a mechanism for third party verification of results through an outside organization and is considering additional options. As a result, FHWA is re-evaluating actions to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: To promote the transition to improved crash test standards, to strengthen FHWA's oversight of the roadside safety hardware's crash-testing process, and to make more information available to states and industry on how roadside safety hardware performs in actual conditions, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator of FHWA to support additional research and disseminate results on roadside safety hardware's in-service performance, either as part of future phases of FHWA's current pilot study on guardrail end terminals' performance or as part of FHWA's broader research portfolio.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: As of January 2020, FHWA officials stated that the agency expects the pilot program report to be issued in December 2020, but it will not report results because the sample sizes were too small. In addition, officials told us that no further research into in-service performance evaluations are planned.

Recommendation: To ensure that all BIE schools are positioned to address safety and health problems with their facilities and provide student environments that are free from hazards, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs to develop a plan to build schools' capacity to promptly address safety and health problems with facilities. Such a plan could prioritize assistance to schools to improve the expertise of facility staff to maintain and repair school buildings.

Agency: Department of the Interior
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: Interior agreed with this recommendation. In June 2018, Indian Affairs provided us with documentation on its efforts to build schools' capacity to address safety and health problems with facilities. In particular, the agency updated its Service Level Agreement between BIA and BIE, which details their roles and responsibilities for inspecting and providing technical assistance to BIE schools, among other areas. However, Indian Affairs' documents provided little information on how it planned to support BIE school personnel in fixing safety hazards in their facilities. In our 2016 report, we found that school personnel often lack the necessary technical expertise, time, and resources to address safety hazards in school buildings. Further, the agency did not include information on whether it has staffed regional offices with specialists to assist schools with safety and facility issues. In February 2020, agency officials said that they had not taken further actions to implement the recommendation and indicated that no office or official was currently responsible for coordinating efforts to implement the recommendation.

Recommendation: To enhance its ability to effectively oversee offshore oil and gas development, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to continue to implement its restructuring effort. To enhance its investigative capabilities, BSEE should establish a capability to review investigation policy and collect and analyze incidents to identify trends in safety and environmental hazards.

Agency: Department of the Interior
Status: Open

Comments: According to BSEE documentation, the Safety and Incident Investigations Division (SIID) is working closely with the Office of Policy and Analysis and the Records, Delegations, and Directives Team to implement the requirements specified in the BSEE Directives System Manual Chapter and to convert a number of Bureau Interim Directives into Bureau Manual Chapters. In May 2018, BSEE provided the results of an internal control review it had conducted to assess compliance with the tiering process outlined in the National Investigations Handbook. In particular, the Internal Control Review recommended that BSEE (1) continue revision of its National Investigations Handbook, (2) evaluate investigation tier designation, and (3) develop additional investigative training. In July 2019, BSEE provided documentation that it had converted four Bureau Interim Directives into Bureau Manual Chapters and that, in response to the Internal Control Review, it had (1) revised its National Investigations Handbook, (2) evaluated investigative tier designation, and (3) implemented additional training. As of August 2020, BSEE leadership and SIID personnel are considering changes to improve the quality and consistency of its investigative tier designation with a planned completion date of December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: To enhance its ability to effectively oversee offshore oil and gas development, the Secretary of the Interior should direct the Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement to continue to implement its restructuring effort. To enhance its environmental compliance capabilities, BSEE should develop a plan to address documented environmental oversight staffing needs.

Agency: Department of the Interior
Status: Open

Comments: According to BSEE documentation, the BSEE Director has ordered an assessment. In the meantime, inspectors are being trained to assist with environmental oversight responsibilities as appropriate. BSEE informed us during the first quarter of fiscal year 2018 that it expected to develop a plan to address documented environmental oversight staffing needs by 2020. Officials said that the timeline was pushed out to allow time to finish policy and complete a work risk assessment. In September 2019, BSEE indicated that it had identified three corrective actions based on its evaluation of risks associated with the organizational structure of the bureau's environmental compliance program that will address this recommendation. As of August 2020, BSEE anticipates implementing these actions by the end of fiscal year 2021.

Recommendation: To improve the data on tracked safety issues and postmarket studies that are needed for required reporting and for systematic oversight of postmarket drug safety, the Secretary of HHS should direct the Commissioner of FDA to work with stakeholders within FDA to identify additional improvements that could be made to FDA's current database or future information technology investments to capture information in a form that can be easily and systematically used by staff for oversight purposes.

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
Status: Open

Comments: FDA has made changes intended to improve its process for overseeing tracked safety issues, but as of August 2020, FDA was still working on changes to its process for postmarket study data. For tracked safety issues, FDA held a one-day workshop to solicit input from staff on changes to its tracked safety issue process and collect user requirements for a new IT system to support tracking safety issues. In April 2020, FDA finalized new policies and procedures and implemented a new IT system for tracking safety issues. The new IT system allows anyone within FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research to enter new safety signals and has integrated product and adverse event dictionaries. FDA stated that integrating standardized data will support consistent regulatory decisions and improve the quality of analysis. For postmarket studies, FDA has indicated that it intends to formally assess the IT needs of users as part of the planned transfer of postmarket data to its new informatics platform. As of August 2020, FDA anticipated creating a project team to address specific concerns related to postmarket study data by the end of calendar year 2020 or the beginning of calendar year 2021. GAO is keeping this recommendation open until FDA has completed its planned improvements to its process for tracking postmarket study data.

Recommendation: To improve the internal control environment for oversight using information from CAS and develop a consistent approach to the use of information from CAS in M&O contractor oversight and performance evaluation across the nuclear security enterprise, the Administrator of NNSA should establish comprehensive NNSA policies and guidance, beyond a general framework as included in NAP-21, for using information from CAS to conduct oversight of M&O contractors, clarifying whether CAS is to cover mission-related activities, and describing how to conduct assessments of risk, CAS maturity, and the level of the contractor's past performance.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: We recommended that NNSA establish comprehensive policies and guidance, beyond a general framework, for using information from contractor assurance systems (CAS) to conduct oversight of management and operating (M&O) contractors, clarifying whether CAS is to cover mission-related activities and describing how to conduct assessments of risk, CAS maturity, and the level of the contractor's past performance. NNSA agreed with the recommendation and has taken an important step to revise its policy. However, NNSA needs to take additional action. Specifically, NNSA approved a revised corporate site governance policy in August 2016, and NNSA further revised its policy in October 2019. The revised policy improves on the agency's prior policy by clarifying one element in our recommendation that CAS is to cover mission-related activities. However the policy is still a general framework and NNSA has not established associated implementing guidance. Specifically, NNSA needs to develop guidance for NNSA headquarters' and field offices' procedures to use information from CAS and appropriately balance use of information from CAS with other more direct activities to oversee M&O contractors. As of April 2020, this recommendation remains open.

Recommendation: To improve the CSA program, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to revise the SMS methodology to better account for limitations in drawing comparisons of safety performance information across carriers; in doing so, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to conduct a formal analysis that specifically identifies: (1) limitations in the data used to calculate SMS scores including variability in the carrier population and the quality and quantity of data available for carrier safety performance assessments, and (2) limitations in the resulting SMS scores including their precision, confidence, and reliability for the purposes for which they are used.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: FMCSA did not agree with our recommendation, disputing the methodology and conclusions in our report. However, we continue to believe that addressing Safety Measurement System (SMS) methodology limitations has merit and could help the agency better target FMCSA's resources to the carriers that pose the highest risk of crashing. For example, we found FMCSA requires a minimum level of information for a carrier to receive an SMS score; however, this requirement is not strong enough to produce sufficiently reliable scores. As a result, FMCSA identified many carriers as high risk that were not later involved in a crash, potentially causing FMCSA to miss opportunities to intervene with higher risk carriers. To fully implement this recommendation, FMCSA should revise SMS methodology to account for data limitations that limit comparisons so that the FMCSA is better positioned to identify and mitigate carriers that pose the greatest safety risks. FMCSA has recently developed and tested a new methodological approach that could potentially account for the limitations we identified. While FMCSA has not yet committed to deploying the new methodology, they hope to do so some time in 2020.

Recommendation: To improve the CSA program, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FMCSA Administrator to ensure that any determination of a carrier's fitness to operate properly accounts for limitations we have identified regarding safety performance information.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) agreed with the basic principles that GAO addressed in this area, but disagreed with GAO's characterization of FMCSA's proposed Safety Fitness Determination (SFD) rule. In January 2016, FMCSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which proposed a revised methodology for issuance of a safety fitness determination for motor carriers. Specifically, the new methodology would have determined when a motor carrier is not fit to operate commercial motor vehicles in or affecting interstate commerce based on the carrier's on-road safety data; an investigation; or a combination of both. However, in July 2018, in part due to a review of SMS by the National Academies of Science congressionally mandated evaluation of SMS, FMCSA announced that the enhancements previously proposed will not be completed.

Recommendation: In order to provide states with greater flexibility to pursue a range of strategies to address the various factors contributing to motorcycle crashes and fatalities, Congress should consider allowing states to use the Motorcyclist Safety Grants for purposes beyond motorcyclist training and raising motorist awareness of motorcycles.

Agency: Congress
Status: Open

Comments: As of September 2020, Congress has taken no action to implement this matter. GAO will continue to monitor Congressional action related to this matter to determine if either an extension or reauthorization of the current surface transportation program includes changes that would allow states to use the Motorcyclist Safety Grants for purposed beyond motorcyclist training and raising motorist awareness of motorcycles.