Recommendation: The Director, MDA should coordinate with the defense intelligence community on the agency's collective priorities for threat assessments and work with the defense intelligence community to determine if additional resources are needed to support the agency's threat assessment needs. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Missile Defense Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that MDA will continue to follow established processes to identify threat assessment needs and to determine if additional resources are required. However, we have yet to see sufficient evidence that MDA is collectively prioritizing its threat assessment requests. We understand that MDA prioritizes its threat assessment requests within the distinct lanes of intelligence product types. We have yet to see evidence that shows MDA has taken steps to also prioritize amongst those lanes. For example, MDA could coordinate with the intelligence community to establish a formal process or venue through which such macro-level prioritization could be conveyed and discussed. In April 2020, MDA told us that it did not plan to transfer funds to the intelligence community in fiscal year 2021 for any unique MDA intelligence needs. By not taking actions to collectively prioritize its threat assessment needs or providing the intelligence community with resources, MDA continues to run the risk of not receiving the threat assessments it needs when it needs them.

Recommendation: The Director, MDA should fully engage the defense intelligence community on key threat-related missile defense acquisition processes and decisions, including providing insight into and obtaining input from the defense intelligence community on the threat space MDA establishes for the BMDS and the threat parameters and threat models MDA assigns to BMDS elements as design requirements and test cases. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Missile Defense Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that MDA will continue to fully engage the intelligence community on key threat-related Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) acquisition processes and decisions. We have observed improvements in MDA including the intelligence community in some of these key threat-related processes and decisions, some of which were discussed in our report. Also, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the NGI and include in the report, among several items, updated threat assessments by the intelligence community informing system threshold and objective requirements. To this end, we are aware that MDA consulted with the intelligence community on the threat space and threat-related requirements that are being considered for the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering stated in a September 2019 memo to GAO that MDA also coordinates in weekly Technical Interchange Meetings with the intelligence community on the threat space bounds for parameters that have high uncertainty. We are also aware of ongoing efforts between MDA and the intelligence community to jointly model missile threats that could directly be used in MDA ground tests. These efforts address much of our recommendation; however, we have yet to see whether MDA will coordinate with the intelligence community on the threat parameters assigned to BMDS elements in the BMD System Specification. We intend to follow up with MDA to determine the extent to which MDA has implemented our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should require the Director, MDA and the Director, DIA to coordinate on establishing a process for MDA to obtain validation of its threat models. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that the department will re-examine the most cost-effective approach to meet the intent of DIA validation to support development and fielding of effective Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements. We have observed significant progress on this recommendation, primarily through the joint coordination occurring through the Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee (DIBMAC) Joint Modeling Tiger Team, where multiple pathways are being explored. Our recommendation calls for the intelligence community and MDA to coordinate on establishing a process for MDA to obtain validation of its threat models. We are also open to other pathways, such as intelligence community and MDA jointly producing threat models or MDA making direct use of threat models built by the intelligence community. Our objective is that MDA use threat models that are validated by the intelligence community when such models are necessary to inform formal BMDS processes, products, and decisions. Any pathway that MDA and the intelligence community agree upon that yields this result meets the intent of our recommendation. We believe that through the tiger team initiative, such coordination is occurring and therefore the closure of this recommendation as implemented in imminent. We are waiting to see: (1) whether MDA and intelligence community establish a formal process and/or jointly sign a memorandum of agreement to codify the process; and (2) the production and use of an intelligence community-validated threat model by MDA in a ground test or other Models and Simulation application.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should direct the Army's Provost Marshal General to take actions to help ensure that physical security inspections at locations with Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) are conducted on time, as required by Army guidance. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Chief of Naval Operations' Supply, Ordnance, and Logistics Operations Division to take actions to help ensure that physical security inspections at locations with AA&E are conducted on time, as required by Navy guidance. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations to take actions to help ensure that physical security inspections at locations with AA&E are conducted on time, as required by Marine Corps guidance. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Air Force's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, Directorate of Security Forces, to take actions to help ensure that inspectors at locations with AA&E are consistently documenting in inspection reports that all minimum requirements for physical security were checked. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to revise DOD guidance to require that the military services establish a process to consistently document the resolution of all identified physical security deficiencies. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To strengthen MDA's acquisition efforts and strengthen oversight, and to increase traceability and insight into MDA's test program, the Secretary of Defense should require MDA to (a) include a detailed crosswalk of changes to each test, such as names, planned execution dates, test types, targets, and other modifications, in each iteration of its Integrated Master Test Plan; (b) address deficiencies in its test scheduling policy by better aligning it with best practices for scheduling, including the use of a schedule work breakdown structure (WBS) that clearly traces each activity to the cost WBS, properly assigning resources to schedules, and clarifying guidance on when and how to conduct schedule risk analysis; (c) rectify deficiencies in its element and test level cost estimates by requiring the use of the common test WBS, documenting the traceability of source data, and codifying the processes and associated information for the software application Test Resource Mission Planning-Tool used to create the test level cost estimates in policy; and (d) break out funding requests by test in the BMDS Accountability Report and other budget documentation submitted during the annual budget submission.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The department partially concurred with our recommendation, agreeing to include a detailed crosswalk of changes to each test in the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Integrated Master Test Plan. However, DOD did not concur with the remaining three parts of our recommendation that include steps related to improving scheduling, cost, and reporting on MDA's test program. In August 2020, we observed that MDA had taken actions on our recommendation, such as including more detailed information on changes to the test schedule in its 2018 and 2019 versions of the BMDS Integrated Master Test Plan. We have an ongoing review to assess MDA's program and test cost estimates and plan to review the BMDS Integrated Master Test Plan to determine if the full intent of our recommendation is being met.

Recommendation: To strengthen MDA's acquisition efforts and strengthen oversight, and to improve MDA's requirement-setting process and ensure it includes an appropriate balance between MDA and warfighter priorities, the Secretary of Defense should require MDA to develop a plan to transition operational requirements analysis currently performed within MDA's Achievable Capabilities List to the U.S. Combatant Commanders, with U.S. Strategic Command as the lead entity and, in the interim, require MDA to obtain their concurrence of the Achievable Capabilities List prior to its release.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD did not concur with our recommendation to allow the warfighter to determine operational-level requirements for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Although the department disagreed with our recommendation, the Director, MDA informed us in March 2018 that he supported the warfighter providing MDA with operational-level BMDS requirements, provided they are approved by the Combatant Commander for U.S. Strategic Command. The Director, MDA also agreed to obtain U.S. Strategic Command's concurrence on the Achievable Capabilities List prior to its release. Moreover, the January 2019 Missile Defense Review clarified that missile defense requirements are established through the Warfighter Involvement Process, which is governed by U.S. Strategic Command. The review also directed DOD components to evaluate the current missile defense requirements process to ensure that Service and Combatant Commanders' involvement occurs as early as possible in the capabilities development process. According to a U.S. Strategic Command official, in July 2019, the Missile Defense Executive Board agreed with a working group's finding that improvements to the process were needed. In August 2020, U.S. Strategic Command released an update to its instruction that articulates the BMDS Warfighter Involvement Process to address issues identified by the working group. The Director, MDA has also stated in a March 2020 congressional hearing that requirements for the Next Generation Interceptor were coordinated with combatant commanders and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, which is a significant and positive development. We intend to evaluate these efforts, as they may potentially satisfy the actions we included in our recommendation.

Recommendation: In the event that operational test results for PDB-8 and PDB-8.1 reveal performance shortfalls that require additional development of the near and mid-term upgrades tested, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to establish mechanisms for overseeing those upgrades commensurate with other major defense acquisition programs, to include an initial report--similar to a Selected Acquisition Report--as soon as practical following operational testing for both PDB-8 and PDB-8.1, on the near and mid-term upgrades evaluated during these tests, including: (1) cost, schedule, and performance estimates for any additional development that is needed; and (2) an estimate of the amount of development costs it has incurred since 2013 for near- and mid-term Patriot upgrades operationally tested along with PDB-8 and PDB-8.1.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. In 2017, operational testing for PDB-8 was completed and results show some performance shortfalls although DOD asserts that there is no additional development required. DOD plans to reassess the need for any additional action after operational testing for PDB-8.1 is completed as planned in the first quarter of fiscal year 2022.

Recommendation: In the event that operational test results for PDB-8 and PDB-8.1 reveal performance shortfalls that require additional development of the near and mid-term upgrades tested, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to establish mechanisms for overseeing those upgrades commensurate with other major defense acquisition programs, to include annual updates to Congress comparing the latest cost and schedule estimates against the initial estimates and providing explanations for any major deviations until development is complete.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. In 2017, operational testing for PDB-8 was completed and results show some performance shortfalls although DOD asserts that there is no additional development required. DOD plans to reassess the need for any additional action after operational testing for PDB-8.1 is completed as planned in the first quarter of fiscal year 2022.

Recommendation: To ensure the Army retains accountability of SRC I ammunition in an in-transit status, consistent with DOD policy, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to evaluate and identify actions to enable the Army to retain accountability for in-transit items until acknowledgment of receipt.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of January 2020, the Army is undergoing a financial audit of all munitions processes that affect the financial voucher, including the Material-In-Transit between locations, both wholesale and retail. The Army gained a consensus that until a unified record for both wholesale and retail is adopted, the shipping and receipt process will remain the same as that currently in use. An effort is underway to determine the best Army Enterprise Ammunition Supply Chain via an Other Transaction Agreement solution intended to provide a seamless supply chain from wholesale to the end user. The estimated completion date is September 2023.

Recommendation: To provide decision makers with better insight and additional context to identify any significant changes to the estimates in the joint report from the prior year and understand the reasons for such changes, and to improve the completeness and transparency of the budget estimates in the report, we recommend that, for future joint reports, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO), and the Secretary of Energy direct the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to provide more thorough documentation in the joint report on the methodologies used to develop the budget estimates, including information that may be available in related planning documents, and ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information included.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. In the Fiscal Year 2019 Joint Report issued in November 2018, DOD had taken some steps to address this recommendation. For example, DOD provided more information on the methodologies used to develop budget estimates. However, DOD did not provide complete documentation of the methodologies used to determine budget estimates in the Joint Report. Specifically, DOD provided additional methodological information not included in the Joint Report to GAO in order to fully account for the estimates presented in the FY 2019 Joint Report. Both the Navy and the Air Force stated they would provide the additional methodological information in the FY 2020 Joint Report. In addition, we again identified some instances in which the Air Force's underlying budget information did not match its estimates in the Joint Report. Air Force officials explained that these discrepancies were due to an accounting error in the internal funding system and that the errors will be rectified in the FY 2020 Joint Report. We will continue to monitor DOD's response to this recommendation as we review future Joint reports.

Recommendation: To provide decision makers with better insight and additional context to identify any significant changes to the estimates in the joint report from the prior year and understand the reasons for such changes, and to improve the completeness and transparency of the budget estimates in the report, we recommend that, for future joint reports, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO), and the Secretary of Energy direct the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to provide more thorough documentation in the joint report on the methodologies used to develop the budget estimates, including information that may be available in related planning documents, and ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information included.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Energy (DOE) concurred with our recommendation and has taken steps to address it. In both the fiscal year 2018 Joint Report and the fiscal year 2019 Joint Report, DOE included significantly more information on the methodologies used to develop its budget estimates. However, in the fiscal year 2019 Joint Report, DOE did not provide complete information on budget estimates over a 10-year period. Instead, it provided 5 years of budget estimates. We will re-evaluate DOE's implementation of this recommendation as we review future joint reports.

Recommendation: To provide decision makers with better insight and additional context to identify any significant changes to the estimates in the joint report from the prior year and understand the reasons for such changes, and to improve the completeness and transparency of the budget estimates in the report, we recommend that, for future joint reports, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy, and the DOD CIO, and the Secretary of Energy direct the Administrator of NNSA to provide comparative information on changes in the budget estimates from the prior year and explain the reasons for those changes.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE concurred with our recommendation. However, as of the issuance of the fiscal year 2019 Joint Report, DOE had not taken steps to address this recommendation. The fiscal year 2019 Joint Report did not provide comparative information on changes in NNSA program costs relative to costs in prior joint reports. We will re-evaluate DOE's implementation of this recommendation as we review future joint reports.

Recommendation: In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's new Director to include in its resource baseline cost estimates all life cycle costs, specifically the operations and support costs, from the military services in order to provide decision makers with the full costs of ballistic missile defense systems.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our 2013 recommendation that decisionmakers should have insight into the full lifecycle costs of MDA's weapon systems outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR), including the military services' operations and sustainment (O&S) costs. This is especially important, as after more than a decade MDA has yet to transfer weapon systems in production and sustainment to the military services, as originally intended. Consequently, MDA is becoming responsible for an increasing amount of the costs associated with these weapon systems. DOD and Congress have expressed concerns over this situation and are exploring a path forward; however, in the mean time, determining the O&S costs can help decisionmakers fully understand the financial responsibility for these weapon systems, be it with the military services or MDA. MDA cited beginning to report aspects of this information in the BAR and also establishing joint cost estimates (JCE) for O&S with the military services for some weapon systems, both of which could potentially serve as a means of providing decisionmakers with insight into the full lifecycle costs. We have an ongoing assessment that will evaluate both of MDA's cited efforts and the extent to which these are providing decisionmakers with a comprehensive understanding of the depth and breadth of each weapon system's full lifecycle costs.

Recommendation: In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's new Director to stabilize the acquisition baselines, so that meaningful comparisons can be made over time that support oversight of those acquisitions.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with our 2013 recommendation regarding the need for MDA to stabilize its acquisition baselines, but also noted MDA's need to adjust its baselines to remain responsive to evolving requirements and threats; both of which are beyond MDA's control. Further, DOD highlighted the MDA Director's authority to make adjustments to the agency's programmatic baselines, within departmental guidelines. Our recommendation, however, is not designed to limit the Director's authority to adjust baselines or to prevent adjusting the baselines, as appropriate. Rather, our recommendation is designed to address traceability issues we have found with MDA's baselines, which are within its control. Specifically, for MDA to be able to effectively report longer-term progress of its acquisitions and provide the necessary transparency to Congress, it is critical that the agency stabilize its baselines so that once set, any revisions can be tracked over time. We have an ongoing assessment to update MDA's progress.